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It took a certain time for the commentators to warm up, but after a slow start, 
the seminal ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the case Gerhard 
Köbler v. Republic of Austria1 set off an unprecedented academic race for 
contributions to the legal literature on European Community law. After all, Köbler v. 
Austria was the landmark decision providing the long-awaited affirmative answer to a 
question that had, anticipated by some, proscribed by others, nurtured speculation and 
caused repeated academic controversy over the years: the existence of a principle of 
Member State liability for breaches of European Community law committed by a 
national court adjudicating at last instance. A great deal of ink has since been used to 
comment on the Court’s groundbreaking judgment of September 2003 and there is no 
end in sight to the flow of critical articles, disgruntled commentaries and heated 
discussions on the Court’s ruling. Ever since the CJEU’s legendary Francovich 
ruling,2 the topic of Member State liability for breaches of European Community Law 
has inspired and challenged numerous writers and commentators, and has in the past 
seventeen years without doubt been one of the most popular tunes on the ‘evergreen 
hit-list’ of EU law topics. Briefly put, the general question of State responsibility and 
the specific principle of Member State liability in the European Community have 
given rise to an unprecedented amount of academic legal literature, so much in fact, 
according to Carol Harlow, as “to require an apology for any more”.3 
                                                 
1
 C-224/01, Gerhard Köbler v. Republic of Austria [2003] ECR I-10239. Hereafter also referred to as 
“the Köbler case” or “Köbler”. 
2
 Joined Cases C-6 & 9/90, Andrea Francovich and Danila Bonifaci and others v. Italian Republic 
[1991] ECR I-5357. Hereafter also referred to as “the Francovich ruling”. 
3
 CAROL HARLOW, "Francovich and the Problem of the Disobedient State" (1996) European Law 
Journal 2, p. 199. In a similar vein, PETER JANN, "Neuere Entwicklungen der Staatshaftung im 
Europäischen Gemeinschaftsrecht", Haftung für staatliches Handeln - Österreichische Richterwoche, 
12.-16. Mai 2003 (Wien, Bundesministerium für Justiz, 2003), p. 17. 





The Köbler case changed that. Indeed the current Köbler-hype brings back 
memories of one of the high points of popularity of the Francovich-doctrine in 1996, 
the year the CJEU pronounced the legendary follow-up ruling in Brasserie du 
Pêcheur/Factortame, clarifying a number of questions which had been left 
unanswered in its earlier decision in the Francovich case.4 The path-breaking Köbler 
ruling gives rise to serious reconsiderations of the principle of Member State liability 
for breaches of EC law and undoubtedly calls for a more detailed analysis of what has 
already been considered an exhaustively analysed doctrinal ‘evergreen’ of European 
Community law. It is precisely this new groundbreaking development which not only 
provides – to use the words of Carol Harlow – an “apology”5 to justify the following 
study, but also raises countless points of reflection that makes further analysis 
imperative. When reviewing the extant academic contributions on the topic, it is 
impossible to overlook the unusually harsh criticism and emotionally-charged nature 
of some of those commentaries. While academic writing is certainly not supposed to 
silence constructive criticism (in fact, one would hope that the opposite is the case), it 
does not require an expert on the Köbler case or State liability to understand that some 
of those voices in the literature are highly critical and denounce what many of them 
perceive to be a frontal attack by the CJEU on the national judiciary as a whole, and, 
above all, on the indefeasible position of national supreme courts.  
 
At first glance, when looking at the Köbler ruling, these misgivings in the 
Member States appear incomprehensible. Claiming that the “application of the 
principle of State liability to judicial decisions has been accepted in one form or 
another by most of the Member States”,6 the CJEU seemed to be introducing nothing 
new or at least nothing entirely unknown to the legal systems of the (then) fifteen 
members. Moreover, as the Court seemed to imply, the Köbler ruling was the mere 
confirmation of a principle that had already existed in the CJEU’s early case-law on 
the question of State liability and certainly since the Court’s explicit reference to it in 
                                                 
4
 Joined Cases C-46 & 48/93, Brasserie Du Pêcheur SA v. Germany and R. v. Secretary of State for 
Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd. and others [1996] ECR I-01029. 
5
 HARLOW, "Francovich...," supra note 3, p. 199. 
6
 C-224/01, Köbler, supra note 1, para. 48.  





the joined cases of Brasserie du Pêcheur & Factortame. In those cases, the Court was 
clear in holding that the “principle holds good for any case in which a Member State 
breaches Community law, whatever be the organ of the State whose act or omission 
was responsible for the breach.”7 The expansion of the Francovich-doctrine in Köbler 
to include also breaches of Community law committed by the national judiciary under 
the umbrella concept of Member State liability for violations of EC law was therefore 
the mere affirmation of a principle that had long been an integral part of the 
Community legal order.8  
 
So why all the fuss? Critique of the Court’s jurisprudence is a permanent feature 
of academic commentary but it usually does not go beyond a short-lived stir among 
legal commentators. An initial uproar generally mellows down rather quickly only to 
become silent over time. However, Köbler seems to be different. For some reason 
critical voices appear to resonate ever more loudly in this case and their arguments 
seem to be more cogent. Furthermore, it is peculiar that discussions on the CJEU’s 
ruling in Köbler rather frequently evoke highly defensive discourses on national legal 
concepts and fundamental principles, on intangible values and long-standing legal 
traditions. What are the reasons for such furore about a judgment that was supposedly 
built on principles “generally acknowledged”9 in the laws of the Member States? How 









                                                 
7
 C-46 & 48/93, Brasserie, supra note 4, para. 32. See also Case C-302/97, Klaus Konle v. Republic of 
Austria [1999] ECR I-3099, para. 62. 
8
 C-224/01, Köbler, supra note 1, para. 30. See also Opinion, Advocate General Léger in C-224/01, 
Köbler, supra note 1, paras. 50 et seq. 
9
 Advocate General Léger in C-224/01, Köbler, supra note 1, para. 82. 





i) Definition of subject and thesis 
 
 
A principle generally acknowledged by the laws of the Member States?10 
 
The current study focuses on the CJEU’s assessment in Köbler of the various 
approaches to the question of Member State liability for judicial breaches under the 
national laws of the (then) fifteen EU Member States. The extension of the 
Francovich-line and the introduction of a concept of Member State liability for 
judicial breaches under European Community law were seen by the CJEU to be yet 
another addition to its long-standing case-law on Member State liability, which today 
constitutes one of the bedrock principles of the Community’s legal system. When it 
comes to the principle of extra-contractual liability, be it of the EU Member States or 
the Community itself, the CJEU has repeatedly claimed to draw inspiration for its 
reasoning from common national legal concepts shared by the Member States.11 
“[P]rinciples common to the laws of the Member States” is, however, not a phrase 
that has been invented by the Court of Justice of the EU, but is rather an expression 
already used in the Treaty of Rome12 to confirm that the foundations of non-
contractual liability of the Community itself were based on such commonalities. 
However, an equivalent reference with respect to the concept of extra-contractual 
liability of the Member States is nowhere to be found in the primary or secondary 
sources of EC law.  
 
Whatever meaning the founders of the Treaty might have attributed to those 
‘common principles’ in Article 288(2) EC,13 for the question of Member State liability 
the CJEU alone holds the monopoly on their interpretation. However, so far the CJEU 
                                                 
10
 With reference to Advocate General Léger’s assertion in Ibid, para. 85. 
11
 So also WALTER VAN GERVEN, "The Emergence of a Common European Tort Law: The EU 
Contribution - One Among Others" in S. Moreira De Sousa and W. Heusel (eds.), Enforcing 
Community Law from Francovich to Köbler: Twelve Years of the State Liability Principle (Köln, 
Bundesanzeiger, 2004), p. 232. 
12
 Article 288(2) EC (former Article 215(2) EC): “In the case of non-contractual liability, the 
Community shall, in accordance with the general principles common to the laws of the Member States, 
make good any damage caused by its institutions or by its servants in the performance of their duties.” 
(emphasis added). 
13
 Former Article 215(2) EC. 





has hardly ever included express references to the comparative analyses (which it 
undoubtedly undertakes) in its final judgments.14 In the Köbler case as well the Court 
once again left us in the dark as to precisely which commonalities it means when 
referring to the Member States’ common legal principles and the method it employs to 
extract such principles from the national legal systems in the development of a similar 
framework under EC law. Briefly put, while the outcome of the Court’s deliberations 
is clear and binding for the Member States, its comparative practice of ‘law-making’ 
remains as opaque as ever. In an attempt to verify the Court’s conclusions, namely 
that the principle of State liability for judicial breaches has been accepted in most EU 
Member States,15 we will embark on a comparative analysis of the prevailing national 
legal concepts in the area of State liability for judicial breaches. 
 
Though the Court remains silent on its methodological approach, the 
comparative component has without doubt grown to be a recurring theme in the 
Court’s reasoning.16 Furthermore, comparative references can be found rather 
frequently in the Opinions of the Advocates General.17 More than that, the Court even 
explicitly referred to the comparative approach as a method of interpretation of 
Community law,18 a fact confirmed by a former President of the Court, Judge Mertens 
                                                 
14As Judge Lenaerts pointed out, the recent case-law of the CJEU contains even fewer references to 
comparative law than in the past. See KOEN LENAERTS, "Interlocking Legal Orders in the European 
Union and Comparative Law" (2003) 52 International and Comparative Law Quarterly, p. 874. A 
noteworthy exception in this respect is, for example, the Court’s judgment in the Joined cases 7/56, 
3/57 to 7/57, Dineke Algera, Giacomo Cicconardi, Simone Couturaud, Ignazio Genuardi, Félicie 
Steichen v. Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community [1957] ECR 81, p. 118. 
15
 C-224/01, Köbler, supra note 1, para. 48. 
16
 See for example LENAERTS, "Interlocking legal...," supra note 14, p. 873. Supportive of the idea also 
ASTRID CZAJA, Die außervertragliche Haftung der EG für ihre Organe (Baden-Baden, Nomos Verl.-
Ges., 1996), pp. 23 et seq. 
17
 See, for example, Joined cases 7/56, 3/57 to 7/57, Algera, supra note 14, p. 118. As for the Opinions 
of the Advocates General see in particular the Opinion by Advocate General Léger in the Case C-
353/99 P, Council of the European Union v. Heidi Hautala [2001] ECR I-09565, in which Léger 
included an assessment of the laws of all the (then) fifteen Member States relating to the right of access 
to information by public authorities. 
18
 C-46 & 48/93, Brasserie, supra note 4, para. 27: “Since the Treaty contains no provision expressly 
and specifically governing the consequences of breaches of Community law by Member States, it is 
for the Court […] to rule on such a question in accordance with generally accepted methods of 
interpretation, in particular by reference to the fundamental principles of the Community legal 
system and, where necessary, general principles common to the legal systems of the Member 
States.” 





de Wilmars.19 In addition, one should also not underestimate the degree of legal 
comparison practised within the CJEU merely due to the fact that the judges come 
from different countries with different legal backgrounds.20 Hence, the views held by 
single judges will always be directly or indirectly influenced by their respective 
national legal traditions.21  
 
The criteria used by the CJEU in the course of its comparative analyses and the 
method applied to arrive at its final rulings are sources of constant speculation in 
academic literature. The situation is further complicated by the fact that since the 
Treaty is silent on this particular issue, there is no generally acknowledged definition 
of what the term ‘common principles’ really means, nor is there a uniform 
understanding on the methodology that needs to be employed in order to find them.22 
The only point of consensus among academics is the identification of those 
comparative methodologies which the CJEU surely does not apply in its 
jurisprudence. So far there is widespread agreement that in order to identify common 
principles the Court does not compare the legal systems of all Member States with 
each other. The procedure of filtering a common minimal standard out of all the 
equivalent national legal orders is apparently out-dated and no longer used in 
practice.23  
 
In the past numerous suggestions have been made as to how best to approach 
this issue. Parts of the literature suggested simply using the best and most advanced 
solution offered by all the different legal systems.24 However, according to Wurmnest 
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and others,25 what clearly speaks against the application of such a technique is the fact 
that the solution provided by one single national system could hardly be 
representative of a legal principle which could prove to be effective across the whole 
Community. Moreover, what disqualifies this method even further is that the selection 
criteria are rather subjective instead of being based on objective standards. Similar 
objections can be voiced against choosing a system that represents best the interests of 
the Community.26 Identifying common legal principles on the basis of such criteria is 
not an objective way of proceeding and therefore hardly a useful method in practice.  
 
Overall, studies have revealed that in the process of formulating common 
principles of EC law the CJEU does not necessarily follow one single method.27 
Bluntly put, the national systems merely serve as a pool from which the CJEU can 
pick and choose solutions if and however it wants to.28 As Judge Koen Lenaerts 
stated, “the comparative law method, when applied by the Community judge, is 
driven by a single leitmotif, and that is to find through the examination of other legal 
orders the solution which best suits the objectives of the Community.”29 In the 
literature the method termed ‘wertende Rechtsvergleichung’30 has been used to label 
the procedure followed by the CJEU in identifying such general principles of 
Community law. Over the years this terminology has also been adopted by several 
Advocates General, among them Advocate General Roemer, who gave a well-known 
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account of the CJEU’s method of comparison in his Opinion in the Schöppenstedt 
case.31 In a similar manner, the Advocate General in the Köbler case, Philippe Léger, 
also declared that it was  
 
settled case-law that, in order to acknowledge the existence of a general 
principle of law, the Court does not require that the rule be a feature of all 
the national legal systems. […] The Court merely finds that the principle is 
generally acknowledged and that, beyond the divergences, the domestic 
laws of the Member States show the existence of common criteria.32 
 
Despite the occasional interpretative reading of the Court’s practice by an Advocate 
General, the CJEU itself remains silent about the comparative methodology it 
employs in its jurisprudence to this day.   
 
Notwithstanding the CJEU’s discretion regarding its comparative law 
assessments, we are confronted with a rather peculiar situation in the Köbler case. A 
rare glimpse into the tools employed to achieve the comparative outcome was recently 
offered by Advocate General Léger in his Opinion in the case.33 The comparative 
analysis undertaken by the Advocate General and the conclusions drawn from it were 
to a large extent based on a comparison of the different systems of State liability for 
judicial breaches in the (then) fifteen EU Member States. While Léger initially also 
referred to the principles of international law and especially the concept of State unity 
as set out in Article 4(1) of the International Law Commission’s draft articles on State 
responsibility34 in order to confirm the applicability of this principle under 
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Community law too, he substantiated his arguments by an explicit reference to the 
results of his comparative analysis. In fact, in his Opinion Léger expressly mentioned 
all fifteen Member States and referred to their State liability regimes as having been a 
crucial factor in reaching his conclusions for an applicable model under Community 
law.35  
 
This is precisely the point where Köbler so clearly differs from the Court’s 
earlier judgment in Brasserie du Pêcheur & Factortame.36 In the latter case the Court 
had, despite evidence to the contrary in the Member States’ domestic structures, 
introduced the principle of State liability for legislative breaches of Community law. 
Nevertheless, whatever method of interpretation the Court might have used in the end 
to justify the introduction of such a principle under EC law, neither the Court nor 
Giuseppe Tesauro, the Advocate General in the case, proceeded by explicitly referring 
to the Member States’ respective national frameworks of State liability for legislative 
breaches.37  
 
In Köbler, however, the evidence is too solid to be denied. It is obvious from 
Advocate General Léger’s reasoning that besides his reference to international law, he 
made his assumptions by relying heavily on a comparative overview of the legal 
situation in the (then) fifteen Member States,38 all of which led him to conclude that in 
his understanding 
 
all the Member States accept the principle of State liability for judicial acts. 
All - except for the moment Ireland - accept that principle in respect of 
judgments themselves where they infringe legal rules applicable in their 
territory, in particular where there is a breach of fundamental rights.39 
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In support of his previous statement the Advocate General went on to present 
more country-specific comparative evidence by claiming that:  
 
[a]ll the other Member States (The Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of 
Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Kingdom of Spain, the 
Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Republic of Austria, 
the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden) - excluding the 
Hellenic, Portuguese and French Republics, where the situation is evolving 
and more nuanced - accept the principle of State liability irrespective of the 
nature of the legal rule infringed.40  
 
Despite the undoubted significance for the overall assessment of the case, 
Advocate General Léger’s comparative analysis on the question of State liability for 
judicial breaches in all the EU Member States was dealt with in a rather precipitous 
manner. After all, the Advocate General devoted only eight out of the 174 paragraphs 
in his Opinion to presenting his comparative results for fifteen different Member 
States and the common principles they shared, before reaching his conclusions in the 
case, which were later confirmed by the CJEU in its final ruling.41 Moreover, it is 
rather unfortunate that the Advocate General did not reveal the method and the 
material he used in the course of his comparative research. All that naturally leaves us 
puzzled and above all curious as to the well-foundedness of his claim. For the Court, 
Léger’s findings were, however, sufficient to conclude that it followed “from this 
comparative legal analysis that the principle of State liability for the acts or omissions 
of supreme courts can be acknowledged as a general principle of Community law”.42 
Notwithstanding the method used by the CJEU to extract ‘common principles’ from 
the laws of the Member States, as far as the Köbler judgment is concerned, the Court 
explicitly confirmed that in the course of its reasoning it directly relied on the 
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comparative analysis previously undertaken by Advocate General Léger in his 
Opinion in the case.43 Overall, it would therefore be rather difficult to deny that the 
CJEU was guided by the Advocate General’s results when reaching its conclusions 
that the “application of the principle of State liability to judicial decisions has been 
accepted in one form or another by most of the Member States.”44 
 
Our aim is therefore straightforward.  We seek to complete the comparative 
analysis which the CJEU and the Advocate General started, but left unfinished in the 
Köbler case. We will attempt to verify whether the EU-wide systems of State liability 
for judicial breaches are – as argued by the Court – indeed guided by principles 
common to the laws of the Member States. In doing so, we endeavour to answer the 
following questions. Based on the methodology applied by the Advocate General in 
his comparative findings, was the Court correct to talk about common principles of 
the Member States? And if so, did the Court’s conclusion in this case “take the pulse 
of the national legal systems, to find the best solution in the middle-line?”45 
 
These considerations are the starting point of a challenging and extensive 
project, which will lead us through the colourful and diverse spectrum of State 
liability for judicial breaches in an enlarged European Union of 27 Member States. 
We endeavour to examine all 27 different national legal systems and to inquire about 
the differences in their concepts of State liability for judicial errors. Thereby, we will 
also seek to find proof for the existence of principles common to the traditions of the 
Member States. 
 
In this context, it is, however, important to clarify at the outset that this thesis 
does not claim to provide a detailed analysis of 27 national liability schemes, nor does 
it purport to cover all the substantive and procedural aspects involved when it comes 
to the general question of State liability for judicial breaches. Moreover, it is 
important to underline that the objective of the present study is not to develop a 
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standard European model or a uniform solution to the intractable problem of State 
liability for judicial errors. Apart from the fact that our endeavour to provide a general 
overview of 27 different legal systems is already a substantial undertaking, it would 
be – at least in the realms of this study – an impossible aspiration to merge them into 
one perfectly efficient system. Such an ambition would in any case be redundant in 
light of the fact that the CJEU has already confronted us with a fait accompli in the 
Köbler ruling, which contains the uniform solution to this problem on the Community 
level, though whether it is also the perfectly efficient one is another question. 
 
Instead, the fundamental feature of our work is that it compares, analyses, 
defines and classifies the existing regimes of State liability for judicial breaches in the 
EU without pursuing an evaluative assessment. What is far more important for the 
purposes of our study is the question of how to combine the different national 
schemes of State liability for judicial breaches that emerge from the 27 Member 
States.46 What common criteria and characteristics can be identified that would allow 
us to group the different national systems and to draw up a valid scheme of 
classification? Which ‘type’ of State liability for judicial breaches plays a 
dominant/marginal role among all the systems represented in the European 
Community? Finding the answers to these questions is the primary task of this study.      
 
In sum, the goals of this comparative project are twofold. First, we seek to 
provide a legal cartography that sketches out a rough overview of the different 
approaches towards State liability for judicial breaches within the European 
Community and at the same time arranges and classifies the various national systems 
in some functional and explanatory way. Our second objective is somewhat more 
practical. We wish to provide a clear framework the reader can use in order to better 
understand the responses and the critical comments, which in the immediate aftermath 
of the Köbler ruling, came from every corner of the European Union. The criticisms 
and arguments made in favour of discarding the newfound Köbler principle have been 
most frequently coloured by the critic’s national legal background and the 
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understandable influences of national legal traditions, particular provisions of national 
law, leading national cases and doctrinal influences. These comments appear difficult 
to retrace without any prior knowledge of the country’s general legal framework in 
the area. In the numerable but in many cases unjustified critiques of the Köbler case, 
authors frequently invoke the most obvious contradictions and ostensible clashes 
arising between their respective national framework and Köbler’s extension of the 
longstanding Francovich-doctrine. In an attempt to lessen the incomprehension on the 
national as well as the CJEU’s side, we hope to build a conceptual bridge between the 
national systems on the one hand and the respective national responses to the Köbler 
case on the other.47 
 
ii) Overall frame and structure of the thesis 
 
As a starting point, the first chapter of this thesis will be devoted to an analysis 
of the Köbler judgment itself.48 Questions related to the implications, the framework, 
the limits and conditions of this unprecedented decision will be addressed here. 
Moreover, we will outline the circumstances which led to the CJEU’s ruling. In the 
course of the analysis, we will also provide a brief narrative of the Court of Justice’s 
most significant rulings in its development of the Community law principle of 
Member State liability. 
 
 Having set out the development of this principle, we can then begin our 
comparative analysis. As any comparative study is only ever as good as its underlying 
methodology, chapter II will first outline the basic parameters, methodological tools 
and concepts employed in the course of this thesis. Only after the tools and the 
method are clear will we proceed to an analysis of the wide spectrum of national 
models of State liability for judicial acts across the EU. The questionnaire, which has 
been designed especially for this purpose, is at the centre of the examination of the 
different national concepts. Country-specific information will predominantly be 
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extracted from the number of questionnaires which have been completed by a large 
pool of country experts consisting of judges, professors, practitioners and law students 
across Europe.  
 
 Chapter II also aims to sift the wealth of information we have obtained so as to 
provide a preliminary overview of the diverse spectrum of national legal concepts of 
State liability for judicial wrongs in force in the 27 EU Member States. The different 
manifestations of judicial responsibility in various countries are often based on 
specific nationally-driven attitudes, social factors, traditions and values such as the 
degree of judicial prestige, the openness of judicial proceedings and the status of the 
judiciary within the overall State apparatus. Briefly put, judicial responsibility is a 
value-laden concept that reflects “a certain relationship of the subject to social 
values”.49 However, as social values and traditions differ among societies, diversity is 
an inevitable feature of the topic under discussion. Despite the differences between 
systems that we will encounter in the course of this project, we will nevertheless try to 
identify common traditions and overlapping approaches among the various national 
concepts of State liability for judicial breaches. The outcome of this analysis will then 
allow for the categorisation of the different systems into specific, pre-defined groups 
and for the creation of a general taxonomy of the various national approaches to the 
question. In this way we hope to achieve comparable results, from which the CJEU 
might have drawn inspiration for its jurisprudence on the matter.   
 
Chapters III, IV, V and VI of the thesis will then shed light on the scheme of 
public liability in a number of selected Member States. Based on the classificatory 
scheme developed in chapter II, each group of countries will be represented by one 
prototype, i.e. one national system. The prototypes we have chosen to represent our 
four categories are the United Kingdom, Austria, France and Belgium. Not only will 
we examine the general framework and composition of the respective State liability 
regime, but we will also contrast the Köbler judgment with the effective framework of 
State liability in the representative national prototypes and analyze in particular the 
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substantive and procedural difficulties that might arise in the course of the application 
of the Köbler-principle under each national remedial framework. The fact that under 
domestic law the notion of State liability for judicial breaches is often a heavily 
restricted concept, also has unexpected consequences for the implementation of the 
respective principle deriving from Community law, which is, according to the 
principle of national procedural autonomy, in the hands of the Member States. And, in 
fact, as the reader will see, the Köbler ruling has already caused serious institutional 
and procedural difficulties in various Member States. 
 
Against this background, the analysis of our prototypes in chapters III to VI will 
also illustrate how the influence of the common national principles on the 
Community-law framework of non-contractual liability is far from being one-sided. 
The situation has transformed into a reciprocal exchange between the concept of non-
contractual liability on the Member State and the Community level. Our prototypes 
will provide evidence for the fact that ever since the CJEU’s ruling in Francovich, the 
‘matured’ and constantly evolving principle of Member State liability under EC law is 
bouncing back into the various national liability regimes through – what has been 
termed – the ‘spill-over effect’. This might also allow us to substantiate our tentative 
predictions about the application of the Köbler principle in the various Member 
States.  
 
We begin, however, with the story of Gerhard Köbler, the German professor 
who wanted nothing more than the financial recognition of his long-time service as a 
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CHAPTER I.                                                                                                            
THE JUDGMENT GERHARD KÖBLER V. REPUBLIC OF AUSTRIA 
 
 
One future day the European Court will be asked to say, straightforwardly, 
whether Community law requires a remedy in damages to be made 
available in the national courts to those who sustain loss as a result of 
breach of the Treaty by public authorities.50 
 
That day arrived long ago. In fact, over the past seventeen years the CJEU has 
been and continues to be the motor of the development of the individual’s right to 
seek redress from the State for breaches of European Community law. Until today, 
this principle continues to be a moving target in the jurisprudence of the CJEU. A 
vivid proof for that was the Court’s recent Köbler ruling. 
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I. The case Gerhard Köbler v. Republic of Austria (C-224/01) 
 
 
1. Origin and scope of the action 
 
a) The factual and legal background of the case at the national level 
 
Gerhard Köbler, a German national, had been working under a public law 
contract as an ordinary university professor in Innsbruck (Austria) since March 1986. 
Prior to this, Mr. Köbler had been employed at several universities in Germany. In the 
course of his appointment at the University of Innsbruck, Mr. Köbler applied by letter 
dated 28 February 1996, for a special length-of-service increment to be taken into 
account in the calculation of his retirement pension. Based on Article 50a of the (now 
amended) Gehaltsgesetz, the Austrian Law on Salaries, this increment, or 
‘Dienstalterszulage’ as it has been termed in German, was granted to university 
professors who, in addition to a set of other requirements, had completed fifteen years 
of service as a professor exclusively at Austrian universities or specified institutions 
of higher education in the country.51  
 
While at the time of his application for the special length-of-service increment 
in February 1996, Mr. Köbler had only completed 10 years in the capacity of an 
ordinary university professor in Austria, he argued that the periods of service at 
universities of other Member States of the European Community also had to be taken 
into account in the calculation of his total years of service. In doing so, the total 
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calculation would eventually amount to the requisite length of service.52 
Notwithstanding Köbler’s reasoning, his application for the grant of the special 
length-of-service increment was rejected on the grounds that he did not fulfil the 
entire set of conditions, which had been laid out in Article 50a of the Austrian Law on 
Salaries. In concreto, the competent Austrian ministry, the Bundesministerium für 
Wissenschaft Verkehr und Kunst,53 referred to the fact that Article 50a Gehaltsgesetz 
made the receipt of the special length-of-service increment conditional upon fifteen 
years’ service as a professor exclusively at Austrian universities.54 Following the 
official refusal of the special increment, Köbler lodged an appeal before the 
Verwaltungsgerichtshof, the Austrian Supreme Administrative Court or VwGH.55 
Based on the argument that in the calculation of the total number of years of service 
required for the grant of the special increment the provision of Article 50a GG 
purposely excluded periods of service spent at universities outside Austria, Köbler 
claimed that this specific regulation of the Austrian Law on Salaries amounted to 
indirect discrimination and therefore violated Community law, namely the general 
principle of freedom of movement for workers as regulated in Article 39 EC56 and 
Article 7 of the Council Regulation No 1612/68.57 Confronted with Köbler’s appeal, 
the VwGH made a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the EU 
on the basis of Article 234(3) EC.58  
 
At a certain stage in the proceedings, the VwGH was notified by the Registrar of 
the CJEU of a recent ruling issued by the Court in the case Schöning-
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Kougebetopoulou.59 The Registrar subsequently sent a letter to the VwGH on 11 
March 1998, asking whether in light of the CJEU’s ruling in this specific case, the 
VwGH still considered it necessary to maintain its earlier request for a preliminary 
ruling. Consequently, by order of 25 March 1998, the VwGH asked the parties in 
writing to submit their comments on the Registrar’s request within a deadline of two 
weeks. However, in that same order the Court further added that in light of the 
CJEU’s judgment in the case Schöning-Kougebetopoulou the question, which had 
been referred to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling, had apparently been resolved in 
favour of the plaintiff.60 
 
Following the Registrar’s notification, the VwGH withdrew its reference for a 
preliminary ruling on 24 June 1998 and by judgement of the same day ultimately 
declared that the special length-of-service increment as foreseen in Article 50a GG 
qualified as a loyalty bonus (‘Treueprämie’), which would in fact justify a deviation 
from the principle of free movement for workers under Community law.61 This was 
contrary to its order for a preliminary reference to the CJEU of 22 October 1997, in 
which the VwGH had stated that the special-length-of-service increment neither 
qualified as a loyalty bonus nor as a reward,62 and also contrary to its initial stance on 
the question in its order of 25 March 1998. The VwGH therefore rejected Mr Köbler’s 
application by decision of 24 June 1998.63 Following the judgment, Mr. Köbler 
brought an action for damages against the Republic of Austria before the 
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Landesgericht für Zivilrechtssachen Wien,64 the Regional Civil Court of Vienna, 
claiming that the VwGH’s ruling in the case gravely violated his rights under 
Community law. He argued that Austria was to be held liable for the damage he had 
sustained as a result of the VwGH’s earlier judgment in the case. Faced with these 
allegations, the Regional Civil Court of Vienna subsequently decided to refer several 
questions for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU on the basis of Article 234 EC.65 
 
b) The questions at the heart of the preliminary reference proceedings before 
the CJEU 
 
The Landesgericht für Zivilrechtssachen Wien submitted five questions in total 
to the CJEU, out of which the first two concerned the general principle of Member 
State liability as established under Community law. The Landesgericht asked the 
Court in general terms whether according to the CJEU’s established Francovich-
doctrine, Member State liability could also be invoked by breaches of EC law 
committed by the national judiciary, and in particular by national courts adjudicating 
at last instance. If this was the case, the court continued, would the principle of 
national procedural autonomy still leave it up to the Member States to determine 
which national court would be competent to rule in such a case?66 At that point the 
Austrian Court did not desist from underlining that according to Austrian law67 the 
decisions of the three highest courts in the country, namely the 
Verfassungsgerichtshof,68 the Oberste Gerichtshof,69 and the 
Verwaltungsgerichtshof,70 could never give rise to the State’s liability. The first 
couple of questions therefore clearly touched on an unresolved issue regarding the 
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established principle of Member State liability, insofar as the CJEU had never 
explicitly ruled on this question before.  
 
The second set of questions submitted by the Austrian Court related to the 
substantive side of the case. More precisely, the Landesgericht asked the CJEU to rule 
on the question as to whether the VwGH’s classification of the special length-of-
service increment as a loyalty bonus was compatible with Community law.71 Last but 
not least, the Austrian Court sought confirmation from the Court of Justice on whether 
the CJEU itself would rule in the case or whether it was on the Landesgericht alone to 
determine if the Verwaltungsgerichtshof had overstepped the limits of discretion in its 
final ruling in the case, so as to fulfil the conditions to invoke the liability of the 
Austrian State in the case of Mr. Köbler.72  
 
2. The CJEU’s Köbler judgment 
 
a) The question of attribution 
 
Confronted with an explicit request for a preliminary ruling by the Vienna 
Regional Civil Court, the CJEU issued its judgment in the case on 30 September 
2003. As far as the substantive side of the case was concerned, the Court ruled, inter 
alia, on the general compatibility of a loyalty bonus with Community law. In line with 
the Opinion of the Advocate General, the CJEU stated however that the judgment in 
Schöning-Kougebetopoulou73 had not answered this question with undisputable 
finality and that “the inferences drawn by the Verwaltungsgerichtshof from that 
judgment are based on an incorrect reading of it.”74 The CJEU elaborated on this 
point by arguing that, in certain cases, a loyalty bonus might constitute a pressing 
public interest reason and thus justify a deviation from Community law. However, in 
the present case, the CJEU continued, such a justification would clearly not hold as 
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the specific length-of-service increment in Austria not only rewarded an employee’s 
loyalty to his/her employer, but also led to “a partitioning of the market for the 
employment of university professors in Austria,” which was contrary to the principle 
of freedom of movement for workers according to Article 39 EC.75 On these grounds, 
the CJEU concluded that the Supreme Administrative Court had been mistaken when 
it had precipitately qualified the particular increment under Article 50a GG as a 
loyalty bonus in its final decision and had subsequently announced that the strict 
requirements attached to the particular increment under Article 50a GG were justified 
under Community law.76  
 
In reply to the first two questions that had been referred to the CJEU by the 
Austrian Court regarding the applicability of the Francovich-line to cases when the 
breach of Community law was attributable to a court of last instance, the CJEU issued 
a landmark ruling that was unprecedented with respect to the Court’s settled case-law 
on the question of Member State liability. In fact, the Court added yet another novelty 
to its case-law, which had so decisively guided and influenced the development of this 
concept under Community law ever since its seminal Francovich ruling. In that 
case,77 the CJEU had set the foundations for what is seventeen years later one of the 
most fundamental principles of European Community law: the maxim of extra-
contractual liability of the EU Member States for breaches of Community law.  
 
In Francovich, the CJEU had created a remedy under Community law 
enforceable by individuals in their national courts against defaulting Member States.78 
Furthermore, the Court argued that this newly-created concept of State liability for 
breaches of EC law was in fact a principle “inherent in the system of the Treaty”.79 
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With reference to Article 10 EC,80 the CJEU stated that among the measures which 
Member States must take in order to ensure the fulfilment of their obligations under 
Community law, was the obligation to nullify the unlawful consequences of a breach 
of EC law. With respect to the specific question of attribution, in Francovich the 
Court had targeted the Italian legislature for the non-implementation of an EC 
Directive,81 which had caused harm to several individuals.82 The CJEU’s ground-
breaking Francovich judgment was soon followed by several decisions in cases 
concerning a Member State’s failure to implement directives, such as Wagner Miret83, 
Faccini Dori84 and El Corte Inglés.85 
 
A second milestone in the development of the principle of Member State 
liability under Community law was the Court’s well-known ruling in the joined cases 
Brasserie du Pêcheur/Factortame.86 While in Francovich the Court had exclusively 
mentioned Article 10 EC87 as the legal basis for the newfound remedy under EC law, 
it is interesting to note that only five years later in its ruling in Brasserie du 
Pêcheur/Factortame the CJEU resorted for the first time to the “principles common to 
the Member States” as a legal basis and source upon which it had created the 
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Francovich-doctrine under Community law.88 While targeting the German, as well as 
the UK legislature for national laws that were in breach of EC law,89 the Court 
clarified and refined some of the general conditions of Member State liability for 
breaches of EC law that it had established in its earlier Francovich ruling.90 Even 
though the Court had so far only expressly ruled on the liability of Member States in 
cases of legislative breaches of EC law, it was precisely in this famous judgment that 
the CJEU also clarified matters with respect to the question of attribution and 
established – in the words of Tridimas91 – “the universality of State liability”: 
 
It is for each Member State to ensure that individuals obtain reparation for 
loss and damage caused to them by non-compliance with Community law, 
whichever public authority is responsible for the breach and whichever 
public authority is in principle, under the law of the Member State 
concerned, responsible for making reparation.92  
 
Hence, the Court of Justice declared that the principle of Member State liability 
could be imposed irrespective of the national organ responsible for the breach, and 
argued that, as a matter of principle, all State authorities were bound to apply the rules 
established under Community law.93 Thereby, the Court’s rationale was based on the 
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understanding of State responsibility under general international law with respect to 
the question of attribution, whereby an unlawful act is necessarily attributed to the 
State and not to the State organ, which committed it.94 This so-called unitary concept 
of the State, which allocates acts by all State organs, including the judiciary, to the 
State as a whole, eventually also played a decisive role in the Köbler case. In fact, 
only shortly after Brasserie du Pêcheur/Factortame, and in line with its earlier ruling, 
the Court found that the Francovich-line of cases applied when the violation of 
Community law was attributable to the administrative authorities of a Member State.95  
 
While in subsequent decisions such as British Telecommunications,96 
Dillenkofer,97 Denkavit,98 and Rechberger99 the Court further clarified and refined the 
scope and content of the application of Member State liability, each violation of 
Community law in these cases had been committed either by the national legislature 
or the administrative authorities of a Member State. The Court had never expressly 
ruled on the question of whether a Member State could also be liable for breaches of 
EC law attributable to the national judiciary. Amid growing speculation and scholarly 
attention to the issue,100 the Court of Justice of the EU finally provided the long-
awaited answer to this question in Köbler.  
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In Köbler the CJEU expressly confirmed that the application of the traditional 
concept of Member State liability also included violations of EC law committed by a 
national court adjudicating at last instance.101 The CJEU declared that as a matter of 
principle there was no exception to the general concept of Member State liability for 
acts violating Community law simply because the breach was attributable to the 
national judiciary102 Furthermore, the Court stated that: 
 
[i]n the light of the essential role played by the judiciary in the protection of 
the rights derived by individuals from Community rules, the full 
effectiveness of those rules would be called in question and the protection 
of those rights would be weakened if individuals were precluded from 
being able, under certain conditions, to obtain reparation when their rights 
are affected by an infringement of Community law attributable to a decision 
of a court of a Member State adjudicating at last instance.103 
 
In her contribution to what could be called a ‘Festschrift’ entitled “Enforcing 
Community Law from Francovich to Köbler”, which was published following a 
colloquium held by the Academy of European Law in 2001 in honour of the tenth 
anniversary of the Francovich case, Pekka Aalto subscribed to the idea that the 
principle of Member State liability on the Community level was established in two 
successive phases. She argued accordingly that the first period was initiated with the 
CJEU’s landmark ruling in Francovich, whereas the second stage was heralded by the 
Court’s judgment in Brasserie du Pechêur/Facortame. Continuing Aalto’s time-line, 
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we argue that the Köbler case opened up a new era, a third stage, in the continuing 
development of the Francovich-line.104 
 
b) The conditions of liability 
 
After confirming in general terms the existence of the principle of Member 
State liability for breaches of EC law by a national supreme court in the first part of 
the Köbler judgment, the CJEU went on to present the conditions that were 
intrinsically tied to the invocation of a Member State’s liability for judicial violations 
of Community law.105 In doing so, the Court adhered, in principle, to the traditional 
threefold test, which it had established in its longstanding case-line on the question of 
Member State liability. Similar to the principle itself, the conditions of its application 
have also over time been gradually developed and refined in the Court’s 
jurisprudence.106 The different requirements set up by the CJEU in its case-law ever 
since Francovich eventually crystallized into three basic core conditions, with which 
the Court demanded absolute compliance. In order to invoke a Member State’s 
liability, first, the rule of law infringed had to be intended to confer rights on 
individuals; secondly, the breach of Community law had to be sufficiently serious; 
and last but not least, it had to be possible to establish a direct causal link between the 
breach of the obligation incumbent on the State and the loss or damage sustained by 
the injured parties.107  
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With reference to the situation in Köbler, the Court indicated in its ruling that in 
case of a violation of Community law by a court adjudicating at last instance, a 
Member State’s liability would in principle be subject to those same long-standing 
conditions.108 Prima facie, the prerequisites set up in Köbler seem to converge with 
the three core requirements to which the CJEU traditionally adhered in its case-law on 
the question of Member State liability for breaches of Community law. Yet, after a 
closer analysis it becomes clear that in Köbler, while leaving two of these 
requirements unaltered, the Court changed one of the conditions with the intention of 
narrowing the ambit of a Member State’s liability in cases of a breach of Community 
law committed by a national court adjudicating at last instance. Notwithstanding the 
general affirmation of the applicability of the principle in such cases, the Court 
nevertheless acknowledged that having regard to the specific nature of the judicial 
function, the special status attributed to the judiciary within the State apparatus and 
the importance of the fundamental principle of legal certainty, the traditional 
requirements of State liability had to be adapted to the special circumstances of the 
case.109 Taking these elements into consideration prompted the Court to refine the 
traditional conditions it had been using in its case-law until then.110  
 
i) The ‘manifestness’ of the breach 
 
It was the second of the established ‘trinity’ of requirements that the CJEU 
modified in the Köbler case. As mentioned above, the latter presupposed a 
“sufficiently serious breach”111 of Community law by the public organ responsible for 
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the breach. In Köbler, the Court increased the qualification of the breach required in 
this context by ruling that State liability for a violation of Community law by a 
national court adjudicating at last instance could only be invoked in the exceptional 
case that the court in question had “manifestly infringed the applicable law”.112 
Briefly put, the CJEU introduced a higher threshold in cases of judicial violations of 
Community law in order to render it more difficult to hold the State liable for harm 
caused to an individual by an erroneous judicial act, as opposed to those breaches of 
Community law committed by the legislative or the administrative authorities of a 
Member State. Seeking to clarify which actions were to amount to a ‘manifest breach’ 
of Community law, the Court provided a non-exhaustive list in Köbler outlining some 
of the crucial factors to be considered when evaluating a violation of EC law by a 
national supreme court. Those elements included, inter alia,  
 
the degree of clarity and precision of the rule infringed, whether the 
infringement was intentional, whether the error of law was excusable or 
inexcusable, the position taken by a Community institution and non-
compliance by the court in question with its obligation to make a reference 
for a preliminary ruling under the third paragraph of Article 234 EC.113 
 
Moreover, according to the Court, a breach of Community law qualified as being 
“sufficiently serious where the decision concerned was in manifest breach of the case- 
law of the Court.”114  
 
 After formulating the general conditions of liability to be applied in cases of 
judicial breaches of Community law, the Court proceeded to an evaluation of the 
Austrian Supreme Court’s actions, which had eventually substantiated Köbler’s claim 
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for damages. In this context, the Landesgericht für Zivilrechtssachen Wien had asked 
the CJEU to rule on the question as to whether, under consideration of all the facts in 
the case, the conditions necessary to invoke the liability of the Austrian State were 
fulfilled.115 With reference to the newly-established second requirement in this 
context, the Court commented on the degree of ‘seriousness’ or ‘manifestness’ of the 
Austrian Supreme Court’s failure to uphold its request for a preliminary ruling under 
Article 234(3) EC and the resulting infringement of Community law in the VwGH’s 
final judgment. It declared that it was due to the VwGH’s “incorrect reading” of the 
Schöning-Kougebetopoulou judgment that the VwGH had no longer considered it 
necessary to maintain its preliminary reference to the CJEU.116 However, the CJEU 
concluded that even though the withdrawal of the request for a preliminary ruling by 
the VwGH had constituted an undeniable infringement of Community law, in 
considering all the circumstances of the case, the breach was not manifest enough so 
as to justify the incurrence of State liability.117 As a result, by a cruel stroke of irony, 
Mr. Köbler was not entitled to receive any compensation. 
 
ii) The conditions for liability: Advocate General Léger’s Opinion   
 
With respect to the conditions applicable in liability cases involving erroneous 
judicial acts, the responsible Advocate General in the Köbler case, Philippe Léger, 
had suggested a slightly different approach in his Opinion, which was eventually not 
entirely followed by the CJEU and also led to a different outcome in Léger’s 
conclusions. Nevertheless, on the essential points of the case regarding the extension 
of the Francovich-doctrine to judicial breaches of EC law, the Advocate General and 
the Court both agreed that the Member States were obliged to compensate for the loss 
or damage caused to individuals as a result of a breach of Community law, even if 
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that breach stemmed from a decision of a national court adjudicating at last 
instance.118  
 
Despite the basic consensus on the principle per se, the Court’s final ruling was 
also in line with the Advocate General’s Opinion regarding the basic substantive 
conditions for Member State liability for judicial breaches.119 Both the CJEU and 
Léger expressed the view that the traditional core conditions governing Member State 
liability under Community law had to be modified and adjusted to the particular 
circumstances of the case. Similar to the CJEU’s reasoning in its final judgment, 
where the Court had resorted to the classical framework conditions of the Francovich-
line (albeit in a slightly modified form), Advocate General Léger also argued for the 
application of more stringent conditions in cases where the harm had been caused by 
an erroneous judicial act.120 Furthermore, agreement remained on the need to adjust 
the second of the traditional Francovich-criteria.121 Likewise, Léger referred to the 
special status of the judiciary and the fundamental principles of legal certainty, the 
independence of the judiciary and the respect for the maxim of res judicata, all of 
which had to be taken into account in this case.122 Accordingly, the Advocate General 
also underlined the need to adapt the Francovich-test in Köbler-type cases of Member 
State liability.123 Thus, the Advocate General and the Court fully agreed that State 
liability for breaches of Community law by a national supreme court adjudicating at 
last instance could only be invoked in the exceptional case of a manifest infringement 
of the applicable law.124   
 
Notwithstanding the agreement on these general points, Köbler belongs to the 
exceptional group of cases, in which the CJEU did not fully follow the Advocate 
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General’s Opinion.125 The point of contention between the Court and Léger arose over 
the precise definition of the required ‘manifest breach’ of Community law. Contrary 
to the Court of Justice, which listed a number of elements and criteria applicable to 
qualify an infringement as manifest, the Advocate General expressly argued that the 
decisive element in the classification of an error of the judiciary as manifest, was the 
question of whether the breach was excusable.126 Even though the CJEU had also 
explicitly referred to the element of excusableness of a breach in its list of criteria of 
possible indicators of a manifest breach in Köbler, Léger put a much stronger 
emphasis on the element of the excusableness and rendered it the decisive factor in his 
assessment of the “manifestness” of a judicial breach.127 The different approach in the 
Advocate General’s Opinion eventually also led to a different final outcome in 
Köbler. Unlike the CJEU, the Advocate General argued that the VwGH had in fact 
committed an inexcusable and therefore manifest infringement of Community law by 
withdrawing its request for a preliminary ruling and consequently, by dismissing Mr. 
Köbler’s application.128 Hence, according to the Advocate General’s Opinion, Austria 
would have needed to compensate Mr. Köbler for the damage he had sustained as a 
result of the Austrian Supreme Court’s manifest breach of Community law.129 
Compared to Léger’s conclusions, the CJEU was more lenient towards the Austrian 
Verwaltungsgerichtshof in its final ruling. 
 
c) Critical assessment and unresolved questions  
 
The key points of contention regarding the Court’s Köbler ruling are quite 
obvious in the sense that they have not only been addressed by several Member States 
already in their observations to the Court in Köbler, but have also been addressed in 
the Advocate General’s Opinion, as well as the Court’s final judgment. Moreover, 
they have been repeated numerous times in the doctrine. The three crucial objections 
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to the application of the Köbler principle were essentially first, the independence and 
the authority of the judiciary; secondly, the principle of legal certainty and thirdly, the 
absence of a court competent to determine disputes of State liability for judicial 
breaches under national law.130 It is precisely these three arguments that are used most 
frequently to criticize the Court’s approach. While we will address each of these 
contentious points in due course, there are a few reflections and comments left to be 
made beforehand on the Court’s ruling itself. 
 
i) The mystery of manifestness  
 
Overall, the CJEU was very clear in confirming that under the extended 
Francovich-doctrine judicial violations of Community law could also trigger the 
liability of a Member State. However, when it came to outlining requirements that had 
to be fulfilled in each case, the Court provided a rather vague account of the newly-
introduced prerequisite of a ‘manifest’ breach. In fact, when looking at the set of 
possible elements which the Court listed in paragraph 55 of its ruling and which 
could, according to it, potentially account for a manifest breach of Community law, a 
direct comparison with a similar list included in the Brasserie du Pêcheur/Factortame 
judgment in order to clarify the meaning of a “sufficiently serious breach”,131 
indicates that except for one additional factor added to the list in Köbler, the exact 
same criteria had been previously used by the Court as the decisive test to determine 
whether in the case of liability induced by national authorities the Member State 
“manifestly and gravely disregarded the limits on its discretion”.132 The additional 
criterion to be considered in Köbler-like cases was the “non-compliance by the court 
in question with its obligation to make reference for a preliminary ruling under Art. 
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234 EC par. 3.”133 The fact that the Court had already introduced the requirement of a 
‘manifest’ breach in the context of Community-law violations by national authorities 
enjoying wide discretion is undoubtedly rather confusing. In Brasserie du 
Pêcheur/Factortame the Court required a ‘manifest and grave’ disregard of discretion; 
Köbler, however, only calls for a ‘manifest’ breach.  
 
But not a ‘grave’ one? While it is clear that the Court surely did not want to 
introduce less stringent conditions for judicial breaches as opposed to those applicable 
to violations by public authorities acting with wide discretion, the Court’s 
terminological choice in Köbler is rather unfortunate. In addition, the fact that the 
CJEU did not follow-up with a clear and unambiguous definition of the required 
degree or qualification of the breach leaves a lot of questions unanswered. Moreover, 
in light of the fact that in the eyes of the CJEU the breach by the Austrian Supreme 
Administrative Court was not manifest enough to incur the liability of the State, 
renders it rather difficult to imagine a breach which would in fact meet this test. Even 
the CJEU’s well-known follow-up ruling in Traghetti, which could have served as an 
opportunity for the Court to clarify some of the unresolved issues, did not shed more 
light on the definition of ‘manifestness.’ Instead, in this case the Court simply directly 
referred to paragraphs 53 to 55 of the Köbler ruling, which contain the list of criteria 
to be applied in such a case.134  
 
In this context one additional aspect should, however, be considered which 
might provide if not an explanation then at least speculation on what could have 
influenced the Court’s decision in Köbler. What remained (at least in the wording of 
the judgment) entirely outside of the CJEU’s considerations was the role played by 
the Court’s Registrar in this particular case. After all, the Austrian VwGH had only 
withdrawn its preliminary reference after having received the notification from the 
Court’s Registrar asking whether in light of the CJEU’s ruling in the case Schöning-
Kougebetopoulou the VwGH still “deemed it necessary” to maintain its reference to 
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the Court.135 Considering the fact that the Registrar had quite evidently misjudged the 
situation in his notification to the Austrian Court to reconsider its earlier reference 
under Article 234(3) EC gives us reason to consider to what extent the CJEU itself 
might carry a certain degree of fault in the VwGH’s handling of the case. The CJEU is 
conspicuous in its silence on the matter in the final Köbler ruling and so it remains 
nothing more than speculation to suggest that this might explain the Court’s leniency 
towards the Austrian Verwaltungsgerichtshof when qualifying its breach of EC law as 
not manifest enough to invoke the State’s liability.136 Moreover, it would surely be 
rather difficult in practice to establish the causal link between the Registrar’s 
notification to the VwGH – despite the remaining questionable situation under 
Community law – and the VwGH’s subsequent breach of EC law in its final ruling in 
the case. 
 
In sum, after the CJEU’s general confirmation of the principle of Member State 
liability for judicial breaches of Community law, the Court’s emphasis on the required 
‘manifestness’ of the breach in this context was the other real novelty introduced by 
the Köbler judgment. Nevertheless, in its final ruling the CJEU missed out on 
defining the precise conditions for the application of the Köbler doctrine, especially 
with respect to the newly-established requirement of a manifest breach.  
 
ii) The eternal struggle with non-compliant supreme courts 
 
As noted above, the CJEU had added one additional element to its list of factors 
contributing to the qualification of a violation of EC law as manifest. This was a court 
of last instance’s violation of its duty to make a preliminary reference to the Court 
according to Article 234(3) EC.137 With respect to this last element, however, the 
Court had not made it entirely clear in the Köbler ruling whether the breach of the 
duty to refer questions for a preliminary ruling only amounted to a manifest breach in 
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combination with other factors or whether the breach of Article 234(3) EC constituted 
a self-standing violation that would in itself be sufficient to invoke a Member State’s 
liability. While the Advocate General had clearly stated in his Opinion that the 
violation of a court of last instance’s duty to make a reference to the CJEU according 
to Article 234(3) EC was an inexcusable error in itself that would impose liability,138 
the Court only mentioned the violation of Article 234(3) EC as one factors among 
others that should be taken into consideration in the assessment of whether the 
national court’s violation amounted to a manifest breach.139 In addition to the 
Advocate General also the European Commission’s observations in the case had also 
argued for the application of the Francovich-doctrine to cases of violations of Article 
234(3).140 The specific weight that should be attributed to a breach of Article 234(3) 
EC in the overall evaluation of a national court’s breach was not specified any further 
by the CJEU.141  
 
iii) Courts or merely courts of last instance? 
 
There was one last point which was not immediately clear from the Court’s 
reasoning in the case. With the explicit confirmation of an extended Francovich-
doctrine that also embraced judicial violations of Community law, in Köbler, did the 
Court extend the individual’s right to reparation to all judicial breaches of Community 
law or only to those violations committed by courts adjudicating at last instance? 
While the Köbler case obviously dealt with a breach incurred by a court of last 
instance, the Austrian Supreme Administrative Court, it was nevertheless not made 
explicit in the Court’s reasoning that the Köbler principle would not be applicable 
violations of Community law by lower national courts.  
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However, this appears to be the case. This is at least what can be deduced from 
the CJEU’s established case-law on the question of national procedural autonomy. As 
the CJEU had already ruled in Francovich, while the right to reparation for damage 
incurred through a breach of EC law was a principle “inherent in the system of the 
Treaty” and hence, an autonomous remedy,142 the Court has repeatedly underlined 
that  
[i]n the absence of Community legislation, it is for the internal legal order 
of each Member State to designate the competent courts and lay down the 
detailed procedural rules for legal proceedings intended fully to safeguard 
the rights which individuals derive from Community law.143 
 
However, the Member State’s procedural and substantive autonomy was not 
unlimited and indeed immediately relativised by the CJEU with the well-known 
principles of effectiveness and equivalence.144 Thereby, the requirements imposed on 
the Member States were that the applicable national rules guaranteeing the 
individual’s right to reparation under Community law must first, “not be less 
favourable than those relating to similar domestic claims” and secondly, “must not be 
so framed as to make it virtually impossible or excessively difficult to obtain 
reparation”.145 In this context, the Court, however, also stated early on that a 
provision under national law requiring the harmed individual to resort first to the 
legal remedies open to him/her in the national courts before invoking a liability claim 
was not necessarily contrary to Community law. In fact, with respect to the wide-
spread principle of primacy of appellate review, the Court clearly stated that  
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it is a general principle common to the legal systems of the Member States 
that the injured party must show reasonable diligence in limiting the extent 
of the loss or damage, or risk having to bear the damage himself.”146 
 
Therefore, once again relying on a ‘common principle’, the CJEU also 
subscribed to the idea that the individual has to show diligence in avoiding loss or 
at least in limiting its extent before resorting to an action in damages. In essence, 
the individual is therefore only compensated for harm that he could not prevent. 
According to the CJEU, this included a situation whereby the loss might have been 
avoided or at least limited, had the individual availed himself of adequate legal 
remedies open to him under national law. Briefly put, the Court approved of the 
principle of the primacy of appellate review, as long as it was in line with the 
principle of effectiveness, meaning that it did not render it impossible for the 
individual to obtain reparation. Hence, a principle such as the primacy of appellate 
review, which apparently exists in most EU Member States,147 will preclude a 
situation whereby an individual can resort to a State liability claim before having 
lodged an appeal to the next instance court.148 
 
Last but not least, it seems to be fully in line with the Court’s application of the 
unitary concept of the State as it exists under international law and its confirmation as 
a principle that “must apply a fortiori in the Community legal order”149 that the rule 
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of prior exhaustion of local remedies is as much a feature of EC law in this case as it 
is a ‘categorical imperative’ under customary international law.150 
 
d) Revealing commonalities or calling for the national bugbears? 
 
The Köbler case triggered critical reactions not only in the Member States’ 
observations during the proceedings in front of the CJEU,151 but also immediately 
after the Court had issued its ruling. Köbler was received with little enthusiasm in the 
academic legal literature and even less praise were few. On the contrary, the judgment 
provoked rather puzzled reactions in scholarly writing and some voices of discontent 
even came from members of national supreme courts. Peter Wattel, Advocate General 
in the Netherlands’ Supreme Court, rather ironically commented on the CJEU’s 
decision in Köbler by reminding the Court that “[t]hose who live in glass houses 
should not throw stones.”152  
 
When faced with such critical reactions and the defence of such fundamental 
issues like the authority of the principle of res judicata, legal certainty and the 
intangible maxim of judicial independence by some commentators, the question 
inevitably arises if what the Court established in Köbler is really reflected in the 
national legal orders of the Member States? In essence, to return to the question we 
raised in our introductory comments, how could something so “common” be at the 
same time so divisive? According to the CJEU the concept of State liability for 
judicial breaches established in Köbler had been built on principles “generally 
acknowledged”153 in the laws of the (then) fifteen Member States. What are these 
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general principles that inspired and guided the Court in the establishment of such a 
concept on the Community level? 
 
In search of an answer to these questions, it is through the principle of national 
procedural autonomy that we will gain access to the various systems of State liability 
in the Member States. As noted above, in its Francovich judgment the Court had 
already delegated to the Member States the power to determine the substantive and 
procedural conditions under national law in order to safeguard the rights that 
individuals derive from Community law. Thereby, the Court had declared that “it is 
on the basis of the rules of national law on liability that the State must make 
reparation for the consequences of the loss and damage caused.”154 Consequently, the 
remedy of reparation is purely a matter of national law.155 A comparison of the 
liability standards under national law of each Member State with those required by 
Community law is therefore indispensable in order to ensure that the remedial 
framework under national law corresponds with the CJEU’s requirements enshrined 
in the twin principles of effectiveness and equivalence. Accordingly, through the 
direct comparison of the Köbler principle with the corresponding regime under 
national law, the commonalities that so heavily influenced the CJEU’s reasoning in 
the case should also become obvious. The principle of national procedural autonomy 
will be the ‘lodestar’ in guiding us through the national legal systems of State liability 
for judicial breaches. According to Advocate General Léger this should be a fairly 
easy task as, with the exception of Ireland, “all the Member States accept the principle 
of State liability for judicial acts”.156 In this spirit and in search for commonalities our 
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I. Preliminary remarks on basic aims and methodology 
 
While there are many virtues to 
comparative law the main aim of 
contemporary comparative law is 
the systematization of different 
legal orders and legal systems.157
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1. Questions of terminology and the delimitation of the object of study 
 
Following the presentation of our subject of study in the introductory 
paragraphs and the formulation of those questions which we will seek to answer in the 
course of it, we are now concerned with the scope of our comparative project. This is 
even more so, given the width of our topic and need to define precisely the focus of 
our primary research question. 
 
In this context, it is first of all vital to clarify the terminology we are going to 
employ in the course of our work. With reference to remedial claims for damages 
caused in the exercise of a judicial function, there are a number of concepts which 
will be used throughout our comparative analysis into different legal and national 
contexts. Apart from problems of translation, which are unavoidable when conducting 
a comparative legal study that covers 23 different working languages,158 one of the 
most significant hurdles to overcome in the course of a comparative exercise is the 
preliminary task of defining the parameters of that study.159 Without the definition of 
clear and uniform parameters at the very outset, any comparative assertion that 
follows will be tainted. By defining the terminology and the concepts we are going to 
employ in the course of this study, we seek to provide a clear and precise definition of 
those basic parameters which will serve as the foundation for our comparative 
analysis. On the terminological side, if we ask for the definition of a judicial act and 
the concept of judicial responsibility, different people from different Member States 
will present us with different answers. Accordingly, we will need to clarify upfront 
what we understand by the notion of a ‘judicial act’ and what meaning we attribute to 
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a) Problems of terminology 
 
“Legal terms in any language take their coloration and meaning in considerable 
measure from the legal systems in which they are used.”160 The validity of this 
statement by Schlesinger has been proven right many times throughout this analysis. 
Already in the course of the current delimitation exercise, we will encounter a number 
of challenges in that respect. The key problems we faced in the current study were 
different terminological hurdles, which rendered it rather challenging at times to find 
a common denominator for our basic parameters. First of all, differences in the 
conceptualization of the State161 among certain Member States have created some 
difficulties of comparison. It is, for example, not easy to delimit a study on State 
liability in English law, where there is, in fact, no precise legal definition of the 
State.162 These differences also explain the diversity of terms which are generally 
used interchangeably to refer to the concept of State liability in England, such as 
‘governmental liability’ or ‘Crown liability’. In France, on the other hand, the concept 
of the State has been analysed and debated over centuries, in an attempt to define the 
contours of the scope of administrative liability.163  
 
The French system, however, poses different delimitational problems, which 
stem from the jurisdictional complexities of the civil and administrative court system 
in France. The principle of strict separation of courts has led to the development of 
two different liability regimes and we are therefore faced with the complex situation 
of State liability for violations by the justice judiciaire on the one hand, and harm 
committed by an act of the justice administrative on the other. Even though the 
majority of State liability claims fall within the purview of the administrative law 
courts, the ordinary courts in France have gained jurisdiction in certain cases, inter 
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alia concerning the activities of the judicial organs (justice judiciaire). Thereby, the 
civil courts apply the concept and the rules of responsabilité administrative. All that 
creates the rather complex picture of public liability in France. 
 
b) The concept of a judicial act 
 
The concept of a judicial act is certainly not easy to define either as it tends to 
have different meanings and interpretations in different Member States. Moreover, it 
is obvious that judges and court officials involved in the judicial process perform a 
number of different functions. Does the concept of a judicial act only include acts of a 
judicial nature? Or does it also embrace acts of an administrative or ministerial nature, 
i.e. any act involving no exercise of judgment and discretion, since they are 
undoubtedly also a vital part of every judicial process? To avoid a conflict between 
the various interpretations and in order to arrive at a uniform and autonomous 
definition which will be used throughout this study, we will resort to the long-
standing definition of a judicial act by Velu, which he established as early as 1985 in 
his commentary on the Council of Europe’s Recommendation No. R (84) 15 on 
Public Liability.164 The Recommendation itself had failed to come up with a single 
autonomous definition of ‘a judicial act’ and instead simply referred to the respective 
definitions used under the domestic law of each State. Critical of the 
Recommendation’s lack of precision regarding the meaning attributed to a judicial 
act, Velu established a broad, but sufficiently concise definition of the concept at the 
occasion of the XVth Colloquy on European Law in Bordeaux. In his report, which 
was later published in a collection of essays by the Council of Europe,165 Velu draws 
upon two basic elements which are, in his understanding, crucial to the definition of a 
‘judicial act’. First, he stipulates that the concept of an “act” includes any form of 
conduct, be it an action or omission, producing direct effects on a person’s rights, 
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freedoms or interests.166 Secondly, a “judicial act” is to be interpreted as embracing 
“any act carried out in the administration of justice which was performed in the 
exercise of a judicial function.”167  
 
With respect to the second element and the terminology employed in this 
context, Velu subsequently distinguishes between two different categories of judicial 
acts. In line with the Council of Europe’s explanatory memorandum to the 
Recommendation on Public Liability, Velu further clarifies that a judicial act not only 
refers to the act of “giving a judgment in contentious proceedings”, but also embraces 
“any function exercised either by members of the legal service or on their behalf or 
under their responsibility, supervision or direction with the object of contributing to 
the establishment or execution of such judgments.”168 This also concerns matters such 
as the organization and the smooth functioning of the judicial apparatus. It is crucial 
for the delimitation of our study to take into account these two different concepts as 
melded together in the definition of a judicial act. A similar distinction is usually 
drawn under national law like, for example, in the United Kingdom where officers of 
courts of justice generally act either judicially or ministerially; or in France, where a 
distinction is usually drawn between an ‘acte administrative’ on the one hand and an 
‘acte juridictionnel’ on the other.169 However, this distinction is not always as clear-
cut. Especially when looking at the daily judicial practice, it can at times be fairly 
problematic to distinguish clearly between judicial acts pertaining to the 
administration of justice on the one hand and acts performed in the course of 
contentious court proceedings on the other.  
 
The United Kingdom is a particularly good example for a legal system, in which 
it is fairly difficult to draw a clear line of demarcation between judicial acts and so-
                                                 
166
 Ibid, p. 80. 
167
 Ibid, p. 80. See also the text and the relevant explanatory memorandum of this Recommendation 
and its Appendix in the brochure entitled “Public Liability”, published in 1985 by the Legal Affairs 
Directorate of the Council of Europe. 
168
 Ibid, p. 80. 
169
 ANNA OHLENBURG, Die Haftung für Fehlverhalten von Richtern und Staatsanwälten im deutschen, 
englischen und französischen Recht (Osnabrück, Universitätsverlag Rasch, 2000), p. 67. 





called ministerial acts. This even more so, as neither the courts nor the literature have 
come up with a uniform definition of what constitutes a judicial as opposed to a 
ministerial act.170 In a similar vein, Robson stated early on that “[t]here does not 
appear to be any conclusive test by means of which judicial activities can be infallibly 
distinguished from administrative activities, very largely because there is no dividing 
line between the two.”171 In an attempt to clarify the situation under British law, 
Clerk, amongst others, tried to draw a dividing line between the various acts 
performed by officers of courts of justice. According to his definition, a ministerial 
act was one “which the law points out as necessary to be done under the 
circumstances, without leaving any choice of alternative courses,” adding that 
“[e]very purely formal step in a legal process, and everything which is necessary to 
carry into execution what has been judicially decided, is ministerial.”172 The guiding 
element which is attached to a judicial act (as opposed to a ministerial act), according 
to Clerk, is “the exercise of a discretion, in which something has to be heard and 
decided.”173 These latter so-called ‘judicial acts stricto sensu are generally considered 
to constitute the heart of the judicial function.174  
 
According to most national systems, there is also a clear separation between a 
State’s liability for erroneous judicial acts of an administrative nature and the system 
of liability applied to judicial acts stricto sensu. Based on the results of our survey, 
when an individual suffers harm as a result of a ministerial judicial act, he or she 
usually has the possibility to lodge a State liability claim for judicial breaches under 
much less restrictive conditions than for those judicial violations related to judicial 
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acts stricto sensu. In fact, in cases where the act causing the damage is a judicial act 
performed during contentious court proceedings, a so-called judicial act stricto sensu, 
we are faced with a number of different national approaches towards public liability. 
Overall, what all the 27 Member States seem to have in common is the awareness that 
judicial acts stricto sensu constitute an exception, which cannot simply be absorbed 
by the general regime of State liability.175 It is this latter type, judicial acts stricto 
sensu, which will be at the focus of our analysis. 
 
c) The different faces of judicial responsibility 
 
The complex correlation between the two concepts of judicial independence and 
judicial responsibility was perfectly pointed out by Lord Woolf when he noted that 
“the judiciary’s independence carries with it responsibilities”.176 Judicial responsibility 
in itself is already an ambiguous term as it carries both meanings, power and 
accountability for the application of that power.177 Accordingly, judicial power entails 
the exercise of the governmental or State function of adjudication. Since adjudication 
is another concept whose meaning and definition are to our study, we will base our 
understanding thereof on the broad definition provided by Shetreet, who split the 
general notion of adjudication into three different elements, an administrative, a 
procedural and a substantive element.178 With reference to this threefold division 
Shetreet argued that  
 
[j]udges have administrative responsibility for managing the cases, fixing 
dates for their hearing, organizing the judicial workload and expediting the 
hearing and the resolution of the cases. Judges also have procedural 
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responsibilities for conducting the trial itself and for regulating the process 
according to the rules of evidence and procedure. […] Eventually […] the 
judges have to […] resolve cases. This part of the adjudication, which can 
be called ‘substantive’ decision making, involves the determination of the 
findings of fact and the application of the relevant legal norms to the facts 
of the case.179 
 
The question of accountability for the exercise of such power of adjudication in 
all its forms is a central tenet of our study.  
 
Generally speaking, judicial accountability is a complex legal construct, which 
involves an objective assessment of the judge’s or the judiciary’s behaviour on 
various levels and through an array of different mechanisms.180 In order to clarify the 
meaning of the concept itself, it is crucial to differentiate between the different forms 
or types of judicial accountability. First, according to whatever forum is responsible 
for evaluating the judges’ performance, we can broadly distinguish between political, 
societal and various forms of legal accountability of judges. Furthermore, according 
to who is held accountable, we also differentiate between personal and public liability 
for judicial acts.181 In a similar manner, the different faces of judicial responsibility 
have also been carefully outlined in a compelling study by Mauro Cappelletti, in 
which he provided a general topical overview on the question on the basis of 28 
national reports, which had previously been presented at the 11th International 
Congress of the International Academy of Comparative Law, held in Caracas, 
Venezuela in 1982.182  
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The enormous challenge in presenting a concise and yet comprehensive study 
on judicial responsibility lies in the breadth of the topic. Not only are we faced with 
different embodiments of judicial accountability, but beyond that we are also dealing 
with diverse and subjective perceptions of the concept of responsibility as they prevail 
in various national systems. In line with Cappelletti’s systematization,183 we can in 
fact broadly distinguish between four different types of judicial accountability, out of 
which most national systems usually adopt three or even four. These are political 
accountability, societal (or public) accountability, the personal legal accountability of 
judges and the vicarious legal accountability of the State for the acts of judges.  
However, prevalence of the one or the other type can certainly be observed in 
different societies and over different time periods. Therefore, the identifiable 
differences among national systems also lie in the manner in which legal systems 
combine the application of various types and sub-types of judicial responsibility. 
 
The first expression of judicial accountability emerging in this context is the 
process of political accountability.184 This form of judicial liability concerns the 
responsibility of an individual judge or the judiciary as a group for culpable behaviour 
during the exercise of judicial duties, but also for specific conduct outside the office. 
Under English law, for example, judicial misbehaviour has been defined as “the case 
of conviction upon an indictment for any infamous offence of such a nature as to 
render the person unfit to exercise the office,” as well as “improper exercise of the 
functions pertaining to the office, or non-attendance, or neglect of or refusal to 
perform the duties of the office.”185 Political responsibility entails the judge’s duty to 
give account to the legislative and/or the executive branch of government by means of 
a non-judicial process. While such a practice of holding judges politically accountable 
is hardly used in any of the EU Member States today, in the past a strong tradition in 
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this respect existed in common law countries. This again might partly explain the 
strict application of the principle of judicial immunity when it comes to civil liability 
claims in these countries.186  
 
While it is often not easy in practice to draw a clear line between the various 
concepts of judicial responsibility, at least theoretically political accountability is to 
be distinguished from the concept of societal or public accountability. This second 
type of judicial accountability, which is exercised through informal pressures and 
hence, lacks a specific pattern or procedure, refers to the responsibility of an 
individual judge or the judiciary as a whole vis-à-vis certain societal bodies or groups, 
or the general public. This type of accountability may express itself in instances as 
general as the exposure of the individual judge or the judiciary to public scrutiny and 
to criticism by the media.187 A very prominent example in this context was the famous 
Sunday Times case, which was decided by the European Court of Human Rights in 
1979.188  
 
In addition to the political and societal accountability of judges, there are also 
various forms of legal accountability, which are based on violations of the law (rather 
than on politically or socially reproving behaviour) and regulated through predefined 
legal processes. Legal (personal) accountability of an individual judge constitutes the 
third option in the classification scheme of judicial liability proposed by Mauro 
Cappelletti.189 Personal liability of a judge always refers to acts and words spoken in 
the exercise of a judge’s functions, but can also embrace behavior outside the office if 
it adversely affects the honor and dignity of the profession. Generally speaking, the 
notion of personal liability acts as an umbrella term as it can be pursued on three 
different levels. Accordingly, we distinguish between a judge’s criminal, civil or 
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disciplinary liability, each of which forms a sub-group under the general heading of 
personal liability. 
 
Notwithstanding the fact that it only happens rarely that a judge is held 
criminally liable for his or her actions, most countries have specific regulations for 
such incidents, including special rules of procedure to be applied in case a judge 
commits a crime in the exercise of his or her function. In the case of Germany, for 
example, such regulations can be as detailed as to define specific crimes that are 
typically only applicable to the judiciary, such as willful abuse of the judicial office 
and other offenses, for which - if convicted - the judge is held personally liable on a 
criminal law basis.190 Even with respect to more general crimes such as the taking of 
bribes, more severe sanctions might be applied in cases when the perpetrator is to be a 
judge. Other national systems refrain from identifying crimes, which explicitly refer 
to judicial officers. Instead, countries like Spain191 or France192 simply subsume 
offenses committed by a judge in his or her function under the general catalogue of 
criminal provisions, which generally applies to all public servants. Such provisions 
usually refer to criminal acts such as corruption or refusal to perform activities in 
office. In the United Kingdom, only judges of superior courts such as the High Court 
judges enjoy an extended form of judicial immunity which also protects them from 
criminal liability.193 
 
Disciplinary liability also belongs to the broad category of personal legal 
accountability of judges. Noteworthy is that among the different sub-groups of 
personal judicial liability, each sub-type appears to have a particular function and to 
be pursuing a different aim. Whereas the principal function of civil liability (as 
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considered below) traditionally lies in the compensation of the harmed individual, the 
basic rationale behind the concept of disciplinary liability is to police a profession for 
the public good, which in our case means to ensure through the application of 
disciplinary sanctions that judges abide by their legal duties.194 Disciplinary sanctions 
usually include warning or censure, forced transfer or compulsory retirement and go 
as far as to include removal from office. In Germany, for example, disciplinary 
control is also exercised on the basis of a formal complaint 
(‘Dienstaufsichtsbeschwerde’), which can be invoked ex officio or by an aggrieved 
party.195 The various national bodies entrusted with the disciplinary power can decide 
to apply various sanctions in order to guarantee the smooth and efficient functioning 
of the judiciary.196  
 
Finally, under the third subtype of personal accountability judges can be held 
liable for their actions on a civil law basis. The principal idea behind liability actions 
under civil law is without doubt one of compensation.197 The judge is held personally 
accountable for the harm he or she has caused to the claimant, which implies that the 
judge has to compensate the harmed individual for the resulting damage. The concept 
of personal liability of judges involves once more a balancing exercise of various and 
partly contradicting values, to which each society attributes different levels of 
importance. Such values include, amongst others, the principle of judicial 
independence and judicial impartiality on the one hand, and the pursuit of justice as 
well as the principle of accountability of all public servants on the other.198  
 
                                                 
194
 WURMNEST, Grundzüge..., supra note 23, pp. 94 et seq. 
195
 Section 26 of the German Judiciary Act 1972 (DRiG). See also MARTINA KÜNNECKE, "The 
Accountability and Independence of Judges: German Perspectives" in G. Canivet et al. (eds.), 
Independence, Accountability, and the Judiciary British Institute of International and Comparative 
Law, 2006), pp. 217 et seq. 
196
 In Greece, for example, jurisdiction for disciplinary actions against superior judges is attributed to 
the Supreme Disciplinary Council. Based on Article 91 § 3 of the Greek Constitution all disciplinary 
actions against the remaining judges are to be brought before special disciplinary councils.  
197
 WURMNEST, Grundzüge..., supra note 23, pp. 94-95. 
198
 CAPPELLETTI, "'Who Watches the Watchmen?'...," supra note 177, p. 15. 





Should a judge be held personally liable for a violation of his duties? Would it 
not be in line with the principle of judicial independence to limit the personal liability 
of a judge to violations committed intentionally or with gross negligence? Should 
judges be tried in front of normal courts or should there be a special adjudicative body 
dealing with such claims? All these questions find different answers in different 
national legal systems and thus, also explain the large substantive and procedural 
diversity that exists among the various EU Member States concerning the question of 
personal liability of judges under civil law.199 
 
In general, the restrictions on the personal legal accountability of judges in civil 
law (excluding the concept of recovery actions by the State – see below) are either of 
a substantive and/or procedural nature, whereas the latter form of limitation is rarely 
used anymore. According to Chapter 4(1) of the Swedish Tort Liability Act, for 
example, the personal liability of a judge is subject to rigorous substantive 
restrictions.200 In Luxembourg,201 a judge is only personally liable in damages in case 
of deni de justice, which includes offences such as refusal or failure to act or 
unjustified delay in the legal procedure. In other legal systems judges are only 
personally liable if the judge commits the violation intentionally and willfully, 
whereas intention certainly remains very difficult to prove in this context.202 Such 
strict substantive limitations to the personal liability of a judge, which we also 
encounter in countries like the United Kingdom, render it almost impossible for a 
harmed individual to lodge a successful liability claim. In fact, in these cases the 
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restrictions even precipitate a quasi-civil immunity of judges. Furthermore, procedural 
limitations can constitute an additional hurdle to overcome in that respect. Some 
countries choose to impose such procedural restrictions as a means of limiting liability 
claims against judges.203 Broadly speaking, cases of personal liability of judges under 
civil law are rare in practice and generally only play a marginal role in the overall 
scheme of judicial accountability.  
 
This means that in a number of countries such liability is vicariously assumed 
by the State, meaning that the State accepts direct liability in lieu of its judicial 
officers. When talking about legal accountability, we therefore generally distinguish 
between the personal liability of a judge (with all its subtypes) on the one hand, and 
‘vicarious’ liability of the State on the other. These two forms of legal accountability, 
which differ with respect to the subject which is being held accountable for the 
judicial act, can be applied either exclusively or concurrently with each other. Their 
interplay varies from one national system to the other. In some countries such as 
Austria,204 Bulgaria,205 the Czech Republic,206 France,207 Slovenia, Italy208 and 
Romania,209 vicarious liability of the State for judicial wrongs has fully absorbed the 
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personal liability of the judge. Consequently, this has led to a situation in which the 
harmed individual can only claim compensation for damages from the State.  
 
In such systems of exclusive public liability, the State usually retains the right to 
sue the judge who has caused the damage in order to recover the damages it has 
previously paid to the victim under the scheme of vicarious liability – a so-called 
“recovery action”. 210 However, even though there might in principle be a right for the 
State to recover loss from the judge, in most cases such recovery actions are limited 
by the amount the State can ask the judge qua tortfeasor to repay. This is the case in 
countries like Estonia,211 Italy212 and Lithuania.213 Alternatively, under the legal 
system of countries such as Romania214 and Portugal,215 recovery actions are 
restricted to cases when the judge has acted in bad faith or, at least, been grossly 
negligent.216 In Luxembourg, while the State can generally invoke recursory actions 
against public servants, such action is excluded if the harm was committed by a judge. 
The only system which allows for full regress by the State from the judge, who has 
caused the damage, is Slovakia.217 Overall, the benefit of such system of vicarious 
liability of the State is that it spares the judge from being confronted with direct 
liability claims by allegedly harmed individuals.  
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Contrary to the concept of exclusive State liability, other EU Member States 
such as Greece,218 Luxembourg219 and Spain220 adhere to a system of judicial 
responsibility in which the liability of the State is concurrent with, instead of 
exclusive to, the personal liability of the judge.221 Spanish law, for example, does not 
attribute exclusivity to the principle of vicarious State liability, but additionally uses a 
regime of personal liability whenever judges have acted willfully or negligently in the 
exercise of their functions.222 A similar system is entertained in Greece where the 
judge and the State are jointly liable.223 The parallel application of the two concepts of 
civil liability certainly opens up additional avenues for the claimant. However, it can 
be observed that under the Spanish as well as the Greek system, the conditions which 
need to be fulfilled in order to invoke the personal liability of a judge, tend to be more 
restrictive. While the strict conditions applied to the concept of personal liability of 
judges seem to be justified in view of the aim to protect judges from assaults upon 
their judicial independence by civil suits, the same cannot be said for the concept of 
State liability. After all, State liability shields the judge from any outside pressures in 
the decision-making process by transferring the responsibility for his or her actions 
and the resulting financial burden to the State. Moreover, as mentioned before, 
recovery actions by the State against the judge as tortfeasor are frequently limited by 
law. 
 
These considerations directly lead us to the last type in the general scheme of 
judicial responsibility, namely the legal (vicarious) accountability of the State for 
judicial breaches. This form of judicial accountability will be the primary focus of our 
analysis. Legal (vicarious) accountability of the State for damage caused by the 
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judiciary in the exercise of its judicial functions is a predominant model among all the 
instruments of judicial accountability used in the various national legal systems across 
Europe. Characteristically classified as a method of legal responsibility under civil 
law, the concept of vicarious State liability is, as mentioned before, applied either 
exclusively or concurrently with personal accountability of the judge. 
 
Vicarious liability of the State appears to be the most advanced solution among 
the vast range of options offered to ensure full accountability of the judicial branch for 
all its actions. In fact, the primary responsibility of the State for damage caused by the 
judiciary embraces simultaneously two principal objectives contained in any liability 
claim. Not only will the State’s primary liability ensure adequate compensation for 
the harmed individual, but at the same time it protects the maxim of judicial 
independence by shielding judges from having to confront directly liability claims by 
dissatisfied litigants.  
 
d) Tertium comparationis 
 
Against the backdrop of this myriad of possibilities for holding judges 
accountable for their actions, the current study is steered towards this specific form of 
judicial accountability. Leaving aside the political as well as the public dimension of 
judicial responsibility, we will focus therefore our inquiry on the various ways the EU 
Member States hold judges legally accountable in civil law. Even though the general 
concept of judicial responsibility under civil law embraces, as we have just seen, not 
only the responsibility of the State, but also the judge’s personal responsibility, our 
study will focus on State liability for judicial acts. In a nutshell, we are not concerned 
about instruments of criminal and/or disciplinary liability, which are both important 
features of the general concept of judicial responsibility, nor are we dealing with a 
judge’s personal liability, which may be incurred by officials who have performed 
judicial acts causing damage, and which may arise either from the principal action 
brought by the victim herself or from an action for indemnity brought by a public 
authority. With respect to our previous discussion on the definition of a judicial act 





per se,224 we will confine our analysis primarily to judicial acts stricto sensu, i.e. those 
acts performed by the judiciary in the course of contentious court proceedings or, as 
Shetreet labelled it, judicial tasks involved in “substantive” decision making, which 
form the third part of the principle of adjudication.225  
 
What is interesting in this context is first of all that, despite the CJEU’s claim to 
have found identical features common to all Member States,226 it appears at first 
glance that the national liability regimes in this category differ substantially from one 
Member State to the next. What is common to all the Member States, on the other 
hand, are special legislative provisions concerning compensation payments by the 
State for errors in the criminal justice system. This is however an issue, which stands 
at the sidelines of the generic debate on judicial accountability. Such errors are 
generally considered to be neither a case of personal responsibility of judges nor one 
of State liability. Instead, it is usually formulated as a case of direct and strict liability 
of the State to provide the victims of miscarriages of justice with adequate indemnity 
or reparation, which has been previously established by law, instead of the full 
reparation of the damage caused. Two classical examples of such errors that are 
regulated in an explicit manner in most EU Member States are the individual’s right 
to compensation for arbitrary detention on remand and for false conviction. The 
awarding of a lump sum by the State in such cases reflects the indemnifying, but not 
fully reparatory character (as in granting full compensation) of these regulations.227  
 
Therefore, contrary to the impressive and celebrated work on the question of 
judicial responsibility by one of the most distinguished comparativists, Mauro 
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Cappelletti, more than twenty years ago,228 we have reduced the scope of our project 
to finding the answer to this question only with respect to one type of judicial 
accountability, which is the principle of State liability for harm caused by erroneous 
judicial acts. On this issue, however, we hope to arrive at a final tabular overview 
which describes the prevailing situation in the European Union and all its Member 
States.  
 
2. The methodological approach 
 
a) Method of analysis: the questionnaire 
 
A significant element for the validity of any comparative study is its choice of 
its methodological foundations. A suitable comparative law methodology serves as 
the key to bring to the fore the richness of all the principles and data extracted from 
27 different national legal orders. In fact, since our comparative study will be an 
exercise in legal cartography, the methodological aspect of the project is crucial.  
 
Methodologically, the collection of information and data was based on the 
answers we received to our questionnaire, which was specifically designed for the 
purpose of this study and sent to selected country experts from each of the 27 EU 
Member States. The questionnaires were first distributed in the spring of 2005 and the 
process of collecting, validating and clarifying the information contained in the 
experts’ answers was completed by May 2008. While in many cases language barriers 
did not allow us to validate information provided by the various country experts 
ourselves, a strict minimum requirement of two fully-completed surveys from each 
Member State was applied in order to be able to compare and confirm the information 
we received. Thereby, the process of clarification and the task of following-up on 
those replies, which were not sufficiently clear, took up a large part of the overall time 
spent on establishing a valid comparative assessment.  
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The country-specific information on the various national legal systems in the 27 
EU Member States was completed and expanded in the course of two different 
research missions, the first one in October 2005 to the Max Planck Institute of 
Comparative Public Law and International Law in Heidelberg, Germany. A second 
mission followed in the form of an extended internship at the Court of Justice of the 
European Union in Luxembourg in the spring of 2008, during which we had access 
not only to the vast collection of comparative legal literature and primary resources at 
the Court, but most of all to a valuable and unique pool of human resources in the 
form of the European and national legal experts who work at the CJEU.  
 
Nevertheless, despite all our efforts, some questions remained unanswered and 
the categorization of a handful of Member States could not be completed with utmost 
certainty. We have, in order to alert the reader, marked these cases with an asterisk in 
the various graphs which we will be displaying in the following chapters. The analysis 
of the national reports in these countries has proven to be a complicated task because 
of, among other things, the abundance of material, the need to understand the 
specifics of particular legal orders, and different terminology.229  
 
b) Ensuring the comparability of concepts 
 
Among the array of different approaches in the field of comparative law, the 
present study specifically recognizes the importance of the functional approach, 
which holds that the aim and purpose of comparative law is to identify and compare 
functionally equivalent rules.230 In addition, whilst taking account of comparative law, 
a continuous attempt will be made to contrast the various elements with the situation 
prevailing under European Community law after Köbler.  
 
Alan Watson rightly described the comparativist’s aim of seeing a particular 
legal pattern common to many divergent systems as “one of the greatest perils of 
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comparative law”.231 The danger lies in the overly ambitious intention of 
comparativists to gain comparable results. This often leads to inaccurate results, 
which are achieved only by gross misstatements of relevant legal facts. The way to 
reach reliable results is to attain the right comparative perspective by means of a 
sound comparative methodology. Aware of the pitfalls of any comparative exercise, a 
preliminary problem we had to resolve was how to obtain comparable answers to the 
questions we wished to address about different legal systems. The answers had to 
refer to identical questions interpreted as identically as possible by all the country 
experts. Besides, the answers had to be self-sufficient in two ways. First, the 
information provided for each Member State had to be complete, so that no additional 
explanations would be required. Secondly, the answers had to be reliable in the sense 
that they could be accepted at ‘face value’. Even though we relied on at least two 
experts per Member State, our goal was that in theory even one single completed 
questionnaire should be sufficient in order to obtain a general picture of the State 
liability regime in that country. 
 
As a general guideline, we have designed the questions with a sufficient degree 
of specificity as to require each country expert address all the decisive factors in his or 
her system. After all, we did not want merely to rely on the concept of State liability 
for judicial breaches as outlined in the country’s legal sources, but also provide 
information on the application of this principle in the jurisprudence of the courts. This 
proved to be a crucial element especially in those countries where we were faced with 
an absolute silence of the legislature on the issue of State liability for erroneous 
judicial acts. As for example in the cases of the Netherlands, Slovenia, Belgium or 
Greece, it was most often a decisive judgment by a superior court which established a 
country’s approach to such a principle.232 Furthermore, in light of the fact that the 
Köbler case is a rather recent judgment by the CJEU and the Köbler-doctrine a 
frequently discussed topic in legal scholarship, we had to ensure that to design the 
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questions in a way as to allow for an objective analysis of each national system. In 
order to present the country experts with a neutral, fact-based questionnaire and in an 
attempt to flush out any subjective perceptions, comments or suggestions on the 
ruling itself or on the principles underlying the national systems, our template 
excluded any reference to Köbler. In the development of the questionnaire we have 
therefore tried to take all these aspects into consideration, but nevertheless keep the 
questions as short, clear and precise as possible. In the end, we arrived at a set of nine 
questions, which addressed the following questions. 
 
c) The central comparative questions  
 
In line with the above considerations, the template of our questionnaire, which 








State Liability Regime with Respect to Breaches  












Please answer the following questions with reference to the national law  
of your home country (or the country specifically assigned to you)! 
 
 
NOTA BENE: With the exception of question 6, all other questions contained 
in this survey refer exclusively to  
the liability of the State for violations by its organs,  
rather than the personal liability of a single public officer.  
 
 







Is there an explicit constitutional provision or a fundamental ruling 
of a Constitutional Court regulating the question of State liability 
in general? 
 
  YES       NO 
 








What is the applicable national law (or jurisprudence) containing 












What is the primary function of the national legal provisions/case 




  Repairing damages  
 




  Contributing to law enforcement 
 
If yes, please specify: 







Does the national Constitution contain a specific principle protecting 
the courts (or courts of last instance) with respect to State 
liability claims based on violations committed by the judiciary? 
 
  YES       NO 
 








Has one of the following been explicitly restricted or limited in the 
Constitution/national law on State liability? 
 
 
a) State Liability for administrative breaches? 
 
  YES       NO 
 





b) State Liability for legislative breaches? 
 
  YES       NO 
 





c) State Liability for judicial breaches? 
 
  YES       NO 
 
If yes, please specify:  







a) Despite liability of the State for judicial breaches, is there also a 
separate regime of personal liability of judges in your respective 
national legal order? 
 
   YES       NO 
 







b) To what extent is the personal liability of a judge different from 
the provisions on general liability of the State for judicial failures? 
And is there a difference in the functions (repairing damages vs. 












Does the Constitution/national law on State liability exclude State 
liability claims for judicial violations as a whole? 
 
  YES       NO 
 
















Is there any noteworthy case law/significant precedent with respect 
to the question of State liability for breaches of law incurred by the 
judiciary?  
 
  YES       NO 
 









Out of the four choices indicated below, into which category would 








Restricted system of State liability for judicial breaches under 
domestic law….. 
 
  2.)…depending on which national court committed the 
violation.  
 




  4.) Comprehensive recognition of State liability for judicial 




Thank you very much for your time and effort! 





II. Community-wide spectrum of State liability for judicial breaches       
under the domestic law of the 27 EU Member States 
 
Ubi Jus, Ibi Remedium? 
 
 
1. Preliminary screening of the various national approaches  
 
Looking at the problem of State liability for judicial breaches from a 
comparative perspective, our first task was to scan the information we had 
accumulated on each country and to undertake a first screening of the results. This 
preliminary exercise helped us to start comparing the architecture of all the systems in 
a general manner and to identify common principles and traditions, but also apparent 
differences, between the various liability regimes. In the process of analysing the 
wealth of information on the different systems of public liability, we tried to underline 
the most salient features of each national regime.  
 
One of the difficulties we faced in the course of our analysis was the fact that 
we were confronted with different approaches on how to regulate the question of State 
liability for judicial breaches. First, there are those countries, which explicitly address 
the issue of the State’s liability for judicial acts, be it in order to exclude such 
principle altogether or to restrict its application in various forms. The second group 
comprises those countries, which indeed have a general legal framework regulating 
the broad question of State liability, but which do not specifically address those 
liability proceedings in which the judiciary acts as the tortfeasor. The latter group 
certainly made it much more difficult to classify the system on a purely normative 
basis and required us to look beyond the normative foundation at the practical 
application of those rules. 
 
Despite this general observation, the variety of factors, traits and formats that 
have been addressed in our questionnaire, have allowed us to identify additional and 
more significant differences and similarities between the systems. Generally speaking, 
we tried to pursue a similar methodology to the one applied in the ‘Ius Commune 





Casebook Project’233 and to be guided by the maxim that “the emphasis is not so 
much to create uniform rules as to find similar solutions and rules in the existing laws 
(and if they cannot be found, to state the differences) and to analyse and compare the 
legal reasoning behind them.”234 
 
2. Principal approaches dominating the European landscape: proposal of a 
classification scheme: “Four Model Member States” 
 
The identification of core characteristics among all the national legal systems 
then allowed for the formation of different pre-defined groups. After establishing the 
classification and identifying the various groups, all the national regimes of State 
liability for erroneous judicial decisions were, depending on their respective 
attributes, assigned to one of the four groups. Our final typology will then display the 
spectrum of the different regimes of State liability for judicial breaches in the national 
Member States classified by groups. In order to explore the particular attributes and 
characteristics attached to each group, we have, by use of a selected national 
prototype, outlined the most pertinent features shared by all the countries belonging to 
a specific group. Moreover, we provided a tabular overview of all the countries 
classified under each particular group. Finally, drawing threads from all the four 
groups, the concluding part will position all the Member States into the established 
legal taxonomy.  
 
As has been underlined before, the aim of this study is not to evaluate the 
existing national structures, but to categorize them according to their most pertinent 
features from a substantive point of view. In fact, the principal method of screening in 
this study was based on identifying the most significant characteristics of these 
different national solutions. It seemed the most pragmatic solution for the purposes of 
our study to choose an approach whereby we would be able to present the large 
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spectrum of State liability regimes for judicial breaches as it exists in the 27 EU 
Member States, but at the same time offer a more detailed look into each one of the 
different approaches dominating the European landscape.  
 
In light of the various characteristics identified in a first screening exercise of 
the material, we have created four functional and explanatory groups. It is crucial to 
note at this point that the four groups have been set up merely on the basis of the 
specific characteristics they represent with respect to the concept of State liability for 
judicial breaches. Consequently, results obtained in the course of this categorization 
were not driven by the idea to establish a certain hierarchical order among the national 
systems or by a desire to find “the best” and/or “the worst” group of countries. The 
order in which we will consider the four groups in the course of this comparative 
exercise does not reflect any ranking or value-judgment.  
 
Moreover, our classification scheme allows for overlapping, meaning that 
countries featuring more than one of the pertinent characteristics that define each 
group will automatically qualify for more than one group and will not be placed in 
one single category. This, of course implies that those Member States which qualify 
for several groups naturally also impose several forms of restrictions on their State 
liability regime for erroneous judicial acts. Hence, notwithstanding our continuous 
intention to exclude any form of hierarchy between our four groups of classification, 
we do think it is fair to argue that the more groups a Member State qualifies for, the 
greater the restrictions this country imposes on its system of State liability for 
erroneous judicial acts.  
 
Before introducing these systems group-by-group through the use of four 
representative prototypes, we will briefly explain the distinguishing characteristics of 
each regime, which will, however, be laid out in more detail in each of the 
forthcoming chapters that have been devoted to one group each. In sum, the next four 
chapters, that is chapters III to VI, will outline groups I to IV in that order. 
 
 





a) GROUP I 
 
Total exclusion of State liability for judicial breaches under national law with 
limited exceptions provided by the ECHR and/or other international agreements 
 
 
The first group in our taxonomy contains all those countries in which the 
general concept of the State’s liability for breaches of law committed by the national 
judiciary has been rejected in an explicit manner, be it in a clear objection to such a 
possibility in a law or statute, or on the basis of an established line of jurisprudence in 
the country. The only exceptions allowed in this context are instances of State liability 
for judicial breaches as regulated under international law, such as the ECHR or other 
international agreements, to which the country is a signatory. 
  
Apart from the few exceptions arising from such international treaty obligations, 
some countries take the view that a judge is generally unable to commit any fault, 
which in turn makes any system of State liability for judicial failures superfluous. 
Those Member States of the European Union which take this approach will be 
considered in chapter III of our study. The prototype we have chosen for this group 
will be England and Wales. By exploring the historical roots of the special status of 
immunity awarded to the judicial branch in this country, we hope to also reach a 
better understanding just as to why these countries are so reluctant to allow for the 
State’s liability in cases of harm caused by a judicial act. At first glance, it appears 
that countries classifying under group I attribute a special status of immunity to the 
judiciary, which stems from the legal tradition of these Member States.  
 
As for the exceptions provided under group I, the analysis of the ECHR will 
provide the perfect opportunity to follow up on some of the arguments used by the 
Court and Advocate General Léger in Köbler regarding the recognition of a principle 
of international State responsibility for judicial breaches. Moreover, we will compare 
the Köbler ruling with the equivalent national restrictions on State liability for judicial 
breaches in order to pinpoint at the substantive and procedural difficulties the Member 
States belonging to group I will eventually face under the Köbler-doctrine.   
 





b) GROUP II  
 
Restricted scope of State liability for judicial breaches according to the 
source and/or the nature of the judicial act causing the breach 
 
 
Group II is one of the more diverse out of the four groups of our classificatory 
scheme. The distinctive feature which characterises the countries belonging to this 
group is the restriction of the respective national system of State liability for judicial 
breaches according to either the source or the nature of the judicial act. Contrary to 
group I, we are now dealing with countries that recognize the existence of a general 
concept of State liability for harm caused by judicial authorities. However, there are 
still restrictions on the application of such a principle in practice and these can be 
further classified into two different sub-groups. The first sub-group comprises all 
countries which impose limitations on their State liability regime and thus exempt 
specific courts (usually higher courts) from any form of liability, i.e. the source of the 
breach. In this way they also render the State immune against State liability claims for 
acts performed by these courts. The second form of restriction concerns acts of a 
specific nature, which fall outside the purview of State liability. A prominent case in 
this respect seems to be Italy, whose restrictive approach in this context has recently 
even been scrutinised by the CJEU. While the prototype representing the systems of 
State liability featuring restrictions related to the source of a judicial act, will be 
Austria (considered to fall into the first sub-group of group II), we will also examine 
the case of Italy when we come to consider the second sub-group of group II. 
 
 
c) GROUP III 
 
Restricted form of State liability under domestic law  
limited by the degree of fault in the judicial act 
 
A leading characteristic of group III of our taxonomy is the fact that all Member 
States qualifying for this group restrict the possibility of holding the State liable on 
the basis of a harmful judicial act by requiring illegality and fault. There must also, be 
a causal link between the fault and the damage incurred. These regimes certainly do 





not have an objection in principle to State liability, but they intrinsically tie the 
invocation of a State liability claim for judicial breaches to a requirement of qualified 
fault. A classic example of a country adhering to group III of our taxonomy is France. 
France also seems particularly interesting and challenging given that the development 
of the State liability regime in France seems to have been heavily influenced by the 
long-standing tradition of the strict separation of courts in France. Furthermore, one of 
the key questions that will be addressed in this third group is a problem which has 
already been briefly discussed in the first chapter of our study, namely the 
compatibility of requirements of qualified fault in the context of State liability claims 
under national law with the newly-established requirement of a ‘manifest breach’ in 
Köbler. Since the Court has never introduced a direct reference to the element of fault 
in its Francovich-line of cases, a number of Member States will be confronted with 
the question of how to interpret the Community law requirement of a manifest breach 
in the context of the principle of national procedural autonomy. In this context we will 
also address the question of a national supreme court’s breach of Article 234(3) EC, 
which has been declared by the CJEU to be a decisive criterion in its qualification of a 
manifest breach.  
 
 
d) GROUP IV 
 
Procedural Obstacles to a Comprehensive Recognition of  
the Principle of State Liability for Judicial Breaches  
 
 
The last group of our categorization broadly embraces all those countries 
featuring procedural obstacles to the invocation of State liability for judicial breaches 
stricto sensu. While Member States pertaining to this last category also recognize a 
general principle of State liability for judicial breaches under national law, the 
concept is nevertheless subject to heavy procedural restrictions. Some of the Member 
States belonging to group IV appear to have set up an entire procedural ‘armoury’ to 
fend off State liability claims based on judicial acts, which at times almost amount to 
a quasi-immunity of specific courts. These procedural barriers range from 
requirements such as the application of the procedural rule of res judicata to the basic 
principle of primacy of appellate review. One of the key concepts of this fourth group 





is the protection of judicial decisions which have acquired the force of res judicata. 
While this seems to be a common feature among the national systems, in Köbler the 
CJEU added its own view to the debate on the interpretation of this principle. One of 
those countries which will be heavily affected by the practical application of the 
Köbler-principle under national law is Belgium, which will serve as our prototype for 
this last group. 
 
Having considered these general characteristics rather abstractly, we turn to 
discuss each country’s approach in greater detail by looking at the pertinent 
characteristics of every group, principally through the closer examination of our 
national prototype for each group. This allows us to show comprehensively the full 
spectrum of State liability regimes in the European landscape. Generally speaking, it 
is acknowledged that one important use of comparative law is to provide a critique of 
one’s own legal system.235 In our case, the point of reference will be the regime of 
State liability for judicial breaches as set up by the EU’s Court of Justice in the Köbler 
ruling. This newfound ‘European model’ will, in due course, be compared with the 
prevailing spectrum of different national liability regimes in force in the 27 Member 
States.  
 
Despite all the diligence applied in the course of the evaluation of the various 
questionnaires and the verification of the compilation by the different country experts, 
it is difficult in a study of this scope and complexity to eliminate all chance of 
misclassification. The reader will appreciate that the categorization of 27 countries on 
the basis of documentary evidence is a somewhat hazardous enterprise, which is, as 
any quantitative analysis, certainly not free from a certain level of digression. Even 
though utmost care has been applied in classifying the different systems, the 
evaluation of law and jurisprudence always involves a degree of uncertainty on which 
reasonable minds may differ. Needless to mention, all mistakes are ours alone. 
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CHAPTER III.                                                                                                            
TOTAL EXCLUSION OF STATE LIABILITY FOR                           




Even though it is impossible to establish a hierarchical order among our four 
categories because the restrictions towards the principle of State liability for judicial 
breaches in each group turn out to be so diverse and multi-faceted, there is 
nevertheless one group of Member States that apply, without doubt, the most radical 
solution in this respect. At the far end of the EU-wide spectrum of State liability for 
judicial breaches, we encounter examples of the most restrictive national legal 
frameworks towards public liability claims for harm incurred by the judiciary. Those 
Member States which reject entirely the idea of State liability for judicial breaches 
under national law, form group I of our analysis, and comprises countries such as the 
United Kingdom, Ireland, the Netherlands and Bulgaria.236 Group I therefore contains 
all national legal systems, which share comparably strict characteristics and severely 
limited approaches in their public liability regimes for damage caused not by the 
administrative or the legislative branch, but exclusively by the national judiciary.  
 
In line with our methodological framework as outlined in the previous chapter, 
the following pages will examine a typical example of this most stringent approach by 
way of one representative example. For group I our national prototype will be the 
United Kingdom. The choice of the representative example for group I and the ambit 
of the following study on the selected national legal framework have been the subject 
of careful deliberation. After all, the national example for each of the four groups 
should be able to highlight the most distinctive characteristics common to the Member 
States in each respective category of our classification scheme. Needless to say, 
despite sharing similarities and common solutions with respect to the concept of State 
liability for judicial breaches, all these countries certainly represent independent and 
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divergent legal systems, which have distinct national characteristics and 
idiosyncrasies. It was therefore not an easy task to select one representative example 
out of such a variegated pool of countries. Eventually, however, the concept of State 
liability for judicial breaches in England and Wales appeared to be the most suitable 
of all the available candidates in group I.  
 
The Case of the UNITED KINGDOM 
 
As the representative example of group I, the United Kingdom237 legal system 
also exhibits its own conceptual particularities. It would be impossible to avoid these 
altogether in the course of our analysis and due to their significance, it is probably 
best to consider them upfront. In British law we encounter two peculiarities which 
differ from the concepts and the terminology we usually apply in the field of State 
liability in the majority of EU Member States. The concepts of ‘the Crown’ and ‘tort’ 
require a short digression on the basic terminology used in the British context. This 
should also serve the reader as an ancillary tool to understand the foreign legal 
concepts, which will thereafter be referred to frequently in the course of this chapter.  
 
 Overall, the current study of English law plainly focuses on the rules of State 
liability and does not purport to give a broad introduction to either English civil or 
administrative law. Furthermore, the analysis of the State liability regime in the 
United Kingdom will be confined to the sphere of tort, thus excluding actions based 
on contract and restitution. In fact, our study will cover a rather amorphous sphere of 
the British legal order, where the challenges of this delimitation exercise are self-
evident. Considering the large number of countries included in the current 
comparative study, the differences in the conceptualization of ‘the State’ as a political 
and legal entity already create difficulties of comparison. These differences also 
explain the diversity of expressions commonly used in reference to State liability, 
which will be applied interchangeably in the course of the forthcoming analysis. 
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Accordingly, in this study the notions of ‘public (authority) liability’ and 
‘governmental or State liability’ are to be regarded as synonyms. However, what 
renders the current task even more challenging is the fact that it proves particularly 
difficult to delimit a study on State liability under the law of England and Wales 
where we are confronted with the complete absence of an applied legal definition of 
‘the State’.238  
 
 
I. The Concept of State Liability for Judicial Breaches in the UK 
 
 
The simple heading of this chapter on State liability for judicial breaches in 
England and Wales already raises at least two substantial questions of definition. 
What precisely do we mean when referring to ‘the State’ in British law? How do we 
define the concept of the State and its organs and especially the judiciary in this 
context? And secondly, how should we apply the notion of public liability in the UK 
in light of the domestic practice regarding torts for harmful acts of public authorities? 
In order to take full account of the particularities in British law and in an attempt to 
set the stage for an in-depth analysis of our central question on remedial claims of 
damages for judicial breaches, a few preliminary definitions will clarify the 
terminology we will employ in the course of this chapter. As mentioned before, the 
notion of ‘the State’, which in itself is a concept that has proven difficult to define, is 
especially ambiguous in its interrelation with the concept of the Crown in the United 
Kingdom. 
 




It almost seems paradoxical that despite the fact that Thomas Hobbes,239 one of 
the greatest English political philosophers, was among the first to articulate a modern 
concept of the State, the UK remains an exception within the Western legal 
                                                 
238
 See HARLOW and RAWLINGS, Law..., supra note 162, p. 32. 
239
 See, inter alia, THOMAS HOBBES, Leviathan (Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1968). 




tradition.240 Dyson even went as far as to portray the UK as a “stateless society”,241 
referring to a society that not only lacked a State tradition, but where the political and 
the legal concept of the State were not even developed, and the term itself was rarely 
used. In English literature reference was traditionally made to kingdom, country, 
people, nation, and government. In the UK, the State as a heuristic concept has not 
been widely employed in constitutional law or legal theory, since the entity endowed 
with legal personality is the Crown. Notwithstanding the fact that even in the UK the 
notion of the State is now casually used in particular in conjunction with European 
Community law, under national law the State still does not qualify as a legal entity 
and still lacks legal personality.242  
 
Seen from a different angle, the mere assertion that the law of England and 
Wales does not formally recognize a concept of the State is also blurred. After all, 
there is generally a degree of ambiguity in the concept of the State and the precise 
definition of the term ‘State’ itself. However, if one uses the notion of the State to 
refer to an abstract idea of executive government, the nearest equivalent legal concept 
in the UK would be the Crown.243 Consequently, two decisive questions will have to 
be briefly addressed in the subsequent paragraphs. Is it possible to use ‘the Crown’ as 
a synonym for ‘the State’ in its function as an organized public entity? And if not, to 
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a) The nature of the British Crown 
 
 
The crown as an object is a piece of 
jewelled headgear under guard at the 
Tower of London. But it symbolizes the 
powers of government which were 
formerly wielded by the wearer of the 
Crown.245 
 
It is difficult to come up with an all-embracing definition of the British Crown. 
Over time interpretations have varied and even though it is at the heart of the British 
constitution, the nature of the Crown and its powers remain shrouded in uncertainty 
and continue to generate controversy. In fact, the numerous interpretations and 
structural comparisons used to describe the Crown have left some authors with the 
opinion that the Crown as a legal concept “has been strained to the point of 
incoherence.”246 Or, in the words of Sir William Wade, the nearer the judges come to 
the “bedrock of the Constitution”, the less certain they become.247 Even basic 
questions of definition related to the Crown tend to result in a myriad of different 
answers and yet it seems that in this context no single definition commands collective 
assent. 
 
A sharp distinction is traditionally drawn between the Monarch acting in his/her 
personal capacity and the Monarch or ‘the Crown’ as the political entity, which 
exercises governmental powers. Then again ambiguity arises as to whether the 
political (as opposed to the personal) capacity of the Crown is simply expressed  
through the Monarch exercising his or her governmental powers or whether it is in 
fact apposite to equate the Crown in its political functions with the auxiliary device248 
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of either a corporation sole or a corporation aggregate.249 A familiar periphrasis that 
has been frequently used to describe the Crown is its association with a corporation 
sole, which under English law is a legal entity, made up of one single person.250 In 
contrast to a corporation aggregate,251 which consists of two or more people, a 
corporation sole is a guarantor for legal continuity by way of direct vertical 
transmission of power from one holder of the position to the next. However, both 
auxiliary constructs, which are used to describe the British Crown, remain criticized 
in theory and flawed in their practical application.252 Even though it would be in the 
general interest to define the Crown conclusively, not least because the law grants 
exclusive privileges and immunities to the Crown, overall, contradictions and loose 
ends with respect to its definition prevail to this day. Nevertheless, it remains 
indisputable that the British Crown, whatever its precise ambit, possesses wide-
ranging powers, which are concomitant with the functioning of the constitutional and 
political system of the United Kingdom.253  
 
b) The concept of ‘the State’ in the United Kingdom 
 
Constitutional thought and doctrine in the United Kingdom have largely 
dispensed with the concept of the state. Instead of the state we have the 
Crown, which serves as a central, organising principle of government. The 
Crown is associated with the idea of executive authority rather than with 
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that of the common interest: the major public powers are vested in the 
Crown, or in ministers who are the servants of the Crown.254  
 
As indicated in the previous paragraphs and re-iterated in the above statement, 
the UK seems to have substituted an evolving State tradition with the traditional 
concept of the Crown. However, the problem is that, as opposed to the concept of the 
State, the Crown has never been systematically cultivated as a self-standing legal or 
juridical concept. Over time and especially due to the constant growth of the public 
law domain in the United Kingdom, this has increasingly caused problems.255 The 
Crown’s perennial presence within the structure of the British government therefore 
raises the question whether, and if so to what extent, the Crown is capable of 
providing an alternative to the State as a legal concept. Is it therefore feasible in the 
context of our study on State liability in the European Union to use the Crown as a 
synonym for the State?256  
 
Over time the use of the Crown as a synonym for the State has encountered an 
increasing number of obstacles and occasionally even provided a poor substitute for 
the concept of the State. The reasons for this lie partly in the historical fact that in the 
UK the monarchical structure of government had missed out on drawing a clear 
distinction between the ‘private’ and the ‘public’ sphere of the Sovereign’s 
responsibilities. As a result, it foreclosed the development of a separate body of public 
law.257 Overall, the formation of the British State is to a large extent a political 
achievement, which never seems to have been equally recognized in law. Essentially, 
the idea of the State remains invisible within the legal framework of government in 
England.258 The judiciary has partly responded to this impasse by modifying and 
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attenuating many of the traditional prerogative powers of the Crown.259 In accordance 
with these developments, the notion of the State under British law has to be discussed 
in light of the nature and the contemporary significance of the political traditions and 
the country’s legal inheritance.260 It is therefore essential today to interpret the Crown 
within its present constitutional and political context and to follow Lord Reid’s advice 
to “beware of looking at older authorities through modern spectacles.”261  
 
A decisive factor which undoubtedly had significant influence on a “State-
assimilated” interpretation of the Crown in the UK was the definition of the State as 
adopted under European Community law and especially in the case law of the CJEU, 
both of which are binding in the UK.262 Consequently, it is not the domestic definition 
of the Crown that eventually prevails for the purposes of application under 
Community law, but it is in fact through EC law that the domestic courts in the UK 
were introduced to the juridical concept of the State. The incontrovertible fact that 
English courts have had to apply a particular pre-defined notion of the State as a legal 
concept in connection with EC law is vividly reflected in the domestic case-law. 
National courts have, for example, been directed towards a certain definition of the 
State for the purposes of the Community law doctrine of vertical direct effect in cases 
such as Foster v. British Gas,263 Griffin v. South West Water Services Ltd,264 and the 
N.U.T case.265  
 
When it comes to the question of the liability of public bodies for damages, 
domestic courts will inevitably be confronted with the same task: namely to prove that 
the defendant is in fact an emanation of the State. In doing so, national courts could 
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either resort to Article 234 EC by referring a question for a preliminary ruling to the 
CJEU, or they could just decide the case on the basis of the existing case-law in light 
of the CJEU’s jurisprudence on direct effect.266 A practical example of Community 
law providing a path-breaking interpretation concerning public sector arrangements in 
general and the Crown in particular was the case Factortame Ltd. v. Secretary of State 
for Transport.267 In this ruling, the CJEU seemed to imply that the Crown was simply 
to be equated with the British government. In fact, the Court stated that any liability 
imposed upon the State would have to be met by the government and that any liability 
imposed upon the government could be seen as a liability imposed on the State.268 
Even though judicial pronouncements do not always provide unequivocal answers, it 
is clear from this case that the concept of the State was perceived to be closely 
connected to the Crown.269  
 
Notwithstanding these terminological discrepancies and in light of the fact that 
the subsequent analysis will predominantly deal with questions of public liability, 
which is to be imposed on a legal person, references to the State hereinafter should, as 
far as the United Kingdom is concerned, be understood as references to the Crown. In 
line with the CJEU’s ruling in Factortame,270 we will simply follow the logic of Carol 
Harlow in this context, who deliberately uses the term ‘State’ instead of ‘Crown’ in 
her work when discussing questions of State liability in the UK. She chooses to do so 
for the simple reason that “[t]he term ‘state’, in contrast to the familiar terminology of 
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Crown and public authorities, possesses no technical, legal resonance for tort lawyers 
and carries little intellectual baggage, at least inside the domestic legal system.”271  
 
2. Absolute immunity of the Crown: the origins of the doctrine of judicial 
immunity in England 
 
Given the complex legal situation we encounter with respect to the Crown in the 
UK, the key issue of this chapter, which is the principle of non-contractual liability for 
breaches of law committed by public authorities, also anticipates an exceptional 
starting-point for analysis. Whereas the concept of the British Crown is almost unique 
in the comparative context, the strict form of State immunity for judicial breaches of 
law, which still prevails in the UK, is a representative example of an entire category 
of national legal systems that encompass a similarly restrictive approach towards State 
liability.272  
 
a) Absolute Crown immunity and ministerial non-immunity? 
 
“The King can do no wrong” is a principle that has for centuries played a 
decisive role in many countries, among them France, Italy and the UK. Underwritten 
by the idea of sovereignty, the law excluded or seriously limited liability claims 
against the State and its officials, including the judiciary, brought by individuals who 
had suffered harm caused by a State action. At the time, the legal standing of an 
individual was marked not only by the complete absence of a right to redress against 
the Sovereign, but also by the fact that he or she had no right to redress for damage 
caused by a subject acting under the authority of the Sovereign.273 In the case of 
Britain the historical context is especially relevant as it is only by looking at the legal 
history that one can understand the unprecedented protection granted towards the 
judicial branch in the United Kingdom to this day. The maxim of the Crown’s 
absolute immunity from suit dominated British legal thought until the second half of 
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the twentieth century and fostered the belief that the concept of State responsibility for 
judicial breaches was simply irreconcilable with the concept of sovereignty.274  
 
The dictum that the King or Queen as the foundation of justice could do no 
wrong also implied that no court could exercise jurisdiction over him or her. In his 
writings, Blackstone portrayed the situation in a slightly overblown manner when he 
stated that “[t]he King […] is not only incapable of doing wrong, but even of thinking 
wrong: he can never mean to do an improper thing: in him there is no folly or 
weakness.”275 The rule of the Crown’s infallibility adheres to the group of customary 
authority, privilege and immunity vested in the monarch, which altogether form the 
Crown’s legal prerogatives. These royal prerogatives furnish the Crown with wide-
ranging legal immunities and privileges, as well as some unique powers.276 Likewise, 
they were traditionally the Crown’s pillars of governance.277 Over time, however, the 
wide scope of immunity once attached to the Crown was gradually alleviated. Albeit 
in principle not subject to parliamentary scrutiny, Parliament has occasionally 
intervened in the Crown’s prerogatives through various statutes and most notably in 
the Crown Proceedings Act 1947.278 Consequently, a fair proportion of the traditional 
prerogatives have by now been put on a statutory basis.  
 
The principle of absolute Crown immunity also embraced the executive power 
of the Crown, which consisted of representative and responsible ministers and 
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subordinate officers acting in the name of the Crown. Since all government 
departments qualified as agencies of the Crown, they, as an entity, could not be held 
legally accountable for any wrongful act which had caused harm to individuals. As 
‘Her (or His) Majesty’s Government’ was acting on the basis of a set of royal acts, the 
executive at first remained immune from legal accountability. Due to the fact that the 
law did not identify or recognize ‘the government’ of ‘the State’, there was simply no 
concept of official responsibility for government acts. However, on a separate level 
attempts were made to mitigate the privilege of immunity of the entire governmental 
body. In the end the Crown’s immunity was only tolerable because it did not shield 
the Queen’s ministers and Crown officers from bearing personal responsibility in law 
for anything unlawful they did. Therefore, it made no difference whether the officers 
were acting in an official capacity or not. In fact, ministers of the Crown enjoyed none 
of the immunities that were granted to the Crown. Furthermore, no veil of immunity, 
not even the orders of the Crown itself, could absolve them from obeying the law. 
Maitland felicitously summed up the situation by stating that “[w]e can hardly lay too 
much stress on the principle that though the King cannot be prosecuted and sued, his 
ministers can be both prosecuted and sued, even for what they do by the King’s 
express command.”279  
 
 As outlined above, within this system of liability, which prevailed until 1947, 
the rule of law was the predominant overarching maxim.280 The distinction between 
the Crown’s immunity and its servants’ non-immunity was a highly artificial but 
necessary device to reconcile the imperative immunity of the Sovereign with the rule 
of law. In order to ensure the co-existence of the Crown’s immunity with the non-
immunity of its officers, basic constitutional logic demanded that the legal 
personalities of the Crown and those of the Crown officers should be kept distinct. As 
one author described it, since English law had failed to produce a coherent theory of 
the State, the situation had been rendered acceptable only by a compromise of 
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absolute Crown immunity and the non-immunity of its servants.281 However, this 
unsatisfactory state of affairs was eventually resolved in 1947. 
 
b) The Crown Proceedings Act 1947 
 
 i) Vicarious liability of the Crown 
 
On a provisional timeline the doctrine of Crown immunity could be separated 
into three different periods demarcated by two distinct milestones. First is the period 
of absolute Crown immunity before the CPA 1947; the second is the period after the 
enactment of the CPA, but before the House of Lords’ ruling in the case M v. Home 
Office282 in 1993; and the third is the situation since M v. Home Office.283 Thus, 
during the first period prior to the enactment of the CPA 1947 the situation as far as 
civil wrongs were concerned could be summarized as follows: as long as the plaintiff 
sued the actual wrongdoer or the person who ordered the wrongdoing, he or she could 
easily bring an action against Crown officials personally, even if they had been acting 
in their official capacity at the time when they committed the alleged tort. Hence, 
Crown servants were not able to hide behind the Crown’s veil of immunity. 
 
The inception of modern State liability in Britain is to be found – rather 
surprisingly for representatives of theories adhering to the divisive elements of the 
common law versus the civil law tradition – in a statutory provision, namely the 
Crown Proceedings Act 1947. The CPA 1947 for the first time drastically reduced the 
Crown’s hitherto absolute immunity from legal process and eventually opened up the 
possibility of holding the Crown liable in tort, contract and certain other areas.284 
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Thus, the CPA largely removed the pre-existing “lacuna in the rule of law”.285 
Notwithstanding a few exceptions, according to the CPA the Crown could be held 
liable in respect of torts committed by its servants or agents.286 Thereafter, the action 
was generally to be brought against the relevant government department.287  
 
From the previous discussion on the conceptual interrelation of the Crown with 
a potentially State-assimilated structure, we can therefore deduce that any act against 
the Crown as an entity could be interpreted as an act against the State, which would 
have to be defended by the British government as the Crown’s executive power. 
Under the CPA any liability imposed upon the State would have to be met by the 
government and conversely, any liability imposed upon the government could be 
regarded as responsibility imposed upon the State. In this manner, the CPA 
assimilated the civil liability of the Crown to that of a private individual by equating 
the Crown in terms of tortious liability with a private person of full age and 
capacity.288 Even though the Crown was from then on placed in the position of an 
ordinary litigant, the continuing idiosyncrasies of Crown liability render the situation 
much more complex than that of an ordinary litigant and demonstrate that further 
explanation is required in this context.  
 
As regards the precise content of the CPA 1947, it suffices here to present the 
general structure of the Act.289 Part I of the CPA dealing with collective matters of 
‘substantive law’ confers the general right to take proceedings against the Crown as of 
right and without Her Majesty’s fiat in cases where, before the enactment of the CPA, 
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the claim could have been enforced by Petition of Right or under any of the statutory 
provisions replaced by the Act.290 Section 2 discusses permissible actions against the 
Crown under the CPA and refers to torts committed by Crown servants or agents for 
any breach of their duties giving rise to tortious liability. However, the CPA 
throughout carefully distinguishes between the Crown on the one hand and its officers 
on the other.291 Accordingly, section 2 does not remove the right of a harmed 
individual personally to sue the actual tortfeasor. The law relating to indemnity, 
contribution and contributory negligence is regulated in section 4.292 In summary, 
under the CPA, the Crown was ex tunc generally liable in tort within the limits of this 
Act.293  
 
ii) Procedural questions 
 
Generally speaking, the CPA relates to civil proceedings against the Crown and 
hence replaced the special forms of procedure previously governing such actions. Part 
II of the CPA deals in a collective manner with issues related to “jurisdiction and 
procedure” and proclaims that civil proceedings by or against the Crown are subject to 
the provisions of the Act and are to be instituted and proceeded with in accordance 
with the rules of court.294 According to section 17, the Minister responsible for the 
Civil Service – usually the Prime Minister of the day – has to publish a list of 
authorized government departments for the purposes of the Act. With reference to this 
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list, civil proceedings against the Crown are to be instituted against the appropriate 
authorized government department. If none of the authorised government departments 
is suitable for the claim, it should be brought against the Attorney General.295 
Moreover, in case the applicant is in doubt which government department he or she 
should proceed against, proceedings may be initiated against the Attorney General, 
who will subsequently apply to have the name of the correct department 
substituted.296  
 
In terms of jurisdiction, proceedings by or against the Crown are to be held in 
the High Court (section 14 of the Act), unless the court, with the consent of the 
Crown, orders otherwise. If proceedings are instituted against the Crown in a county 
court and the Attorney General certifies that those proceedings involve an important 
question of law or may be decisive in other cases, then the proceedings must be 
removed to the High Court, which may take such removal into account when 
awarding costs. Otherwise the ordinary rules concerning the transfer from or to the 
county court are binding also on the Crown.297 Finally, part III and part IV of the CPA 
1947 relate to “judgments and execution” by or against the Crown (ss. 24-27) and deal 
with miscellaneous and supplemental matters respectively (ss. 28-40).298 
 
Notwithstanding the removal of the Crown’s immunity and its exposure to 
wide-ranging tort, contract and other liabilities, the CPA 1947 also contains certain 
public acts which are entirely excluded from the ambit of vicarious liability of the 
Crown. Among others, section 2(5) marks a rather significant exception in this 
respect. In fact, this provision had important implications for the question of the 
Crown’s liability regarding acts performed by its judges, magistrates or constables as 
it explicitly shielded any action by the judiciary from proceedings by virtue of the 
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CPA 1947.299 In view of such far-reaching exceptions as in section 2(5), the question 
naturally arises as to whether the CPA truly lived up to its initial intention and 
purpose of removing the infamous “lacuna in the rule of law”,300 which had so long 
been criticised in the doctrine. In fact, various authors - among them Sir William 
Wade - lamented that to secure immunities for certain Crown officers through special 
provisions in the CPA was to re-enforce such lacunae, not to erase them.301 In an 
attempt to get a clearer picture of the prevailing situation in the UK, the following 
analysis will therefore focus especially on those immunities which were preserved 
even after the enactment of the CPA. Accordingly, special attention will be devoted to 
the issue of lasting and absolute immunity of all Crown officials pertaining to the 
judicial branch.302 
 
c) The Town Investments case and the decision in M v. Home Office  
 
Even after the enactment of the CPA of 1947, the legal nature and the position 
of the Crown, as well as the liability of ministers and Crown officers, have been the 
subject of some remarkably contradictory judicial opinions.303 Generally speaking, 
these were basic questions of constitutional law, which in principle ought to be clear 
and well-settled in any national legal system. However, as mentioned before, in the 
UK it appears at times that the closer it comes to core constitutional questions, the less 
certain judges seem to be. 
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In its function as a court of final instance the House of Lords has had a 
significant influence on the development of an advanced interpretation of the Crown 
and its responsibilities, as well as on the modification of the Crown officers’ status 
with respect to questions relating to liability for harmful acts pursued in the course of 
their official functions. Two judgments deserve special attention in this context. Even 
though more than 15 years apart, these significant judicial dicta significantly 
contributed to shaping the legal standing of the Crown before the domestic courts. 
Moreover, they also clarified the status of the Crown officers and the possibility of 
holding them personally and/or the Crown liable for harm caused to individuals 
during the exercise of their official functions. These two cases, which interestingly 
enough differ fundamentally regarding their respective outcomes, are nevertheless 
closely linked in terms of content. Moreover, both rulings are milestones with respect 
to the continued development of the legal perception of the Crown after the CPA 
1947. Furthermore, these cases also signal the repeated efforts in the jurisprudence to 
create a timelier definition of ‘the government’ in England. Barring the success of 
these various attempts, the development of the Crown’s perception after the CPA 
1947 is ostensibly mirrored in the Town Investments case304 of 1978 and the judgment 
of the House of Lords in M v. Home Office 1994.305  
 
i) Town Investments Ltd. v. Department of the Environment 
 
The Town Investments case stirred up discussion of the legal standing and the 
definition of the Crown and its officers in the context of a public lease agreement. In 
this case the Court of Appeal had ruled that a lease of premises to the Department of 
the Environment did not formally constitute a lease to the Crown, but that instead it 
was to be classified as a lease held by the Secretary of State. Furthermore, the Court 
of Appeal had declared in the same judgment that a specific phrase in the lease 
agreement stating that the Secretary of State was in fact a party to the lease “for or on 
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behalf of Her Majesty”306 merely indicated that the Secretary of State was acting in 
the “corporate capacity” of a minister.307  
 
On appeal, the House of Lords overturned the decision by introducing a 
different basis for its reasoning. At the outset, Lord Diplock clarified in his speech 
that it was in fact not private law, which applied in the given circumstances, but 
“public law that governs the relationships between Her Majesty acting in her political 
capacity, the government departments […], the ministers of the Crown […] and civil 
servants of all grades who are employed in those departments.”308 Furthermore, Lord 
Diplock underlined that in reality the concept of the Crown was a fictional construct 
and that confusion could be avoided “if instead of speaking of ‘the Crown’ we were to 
speak of ‘the government’.”309 In fact, he went on to argue that the term ‘government’ 
should be used “to embrace both collectively and individually all of the ministers of 
the Crown and parliamentary secretaries under whose direction the administrative 
work of the government is carried on by civil servants [...]”.310 Therefore, acts 
undertaken by this closely defined group, including - like in the present case - the 
Secretary of State, were to be regarded as acts of the Crown. Overall, Lord Diplock 
reiterated that the notion of the Crown, as employed in the present context, constituted 
a legal fiction under public law.311 
 
The majority of the law lords supported Lord Diplock’s legal reasoning, which 
stipulated that from a legal perspective the Crown technically had to be regarded as a 
corporation sole. At the same time, according to his speech, this concept was to be 
viewed as a term of art and had to be recognized as a legal fiction under public law. 
Thus, the Crown was to serve as a synonym for “the government” as an institution.312 
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In addition to Lord Diplock’s reasoning, Lord Simon also argued in the same case that 
the Crown included prima facie all ministers and central government officials. In his 
speech, however, the Crown constituted not a corporation sole, but a corporation 
aggregate.313 Both of the above models attempted to develop a legal phraseology in 
order to define ‘the government’ in Britain in a conclusive manner by vesting the 
Crown with the fictional construct of a corporation. The question whether starting, 
from the ruling in Town Investments, the courts indeed succeeded in developing a 
more timely legal concept of the government in the United Kingdom, cannot be fully 
answered in the affirmative. Even after the ruling in Town Investments a host of 
questions concerning the Crown still remained unanswered.  
 
However, one has to acknowledge that in many respects over time and 
particularly in this specific ruling the courts have managed to partly divest the Crown 
of its exalted status. In fact, judges have started to dismantle the Crown’s absolute 
immunity in a piecemeal fashion and this behaviour seems to be a continuing trend.314 
Generally speaking, the status of the Crown has been notably diminished as a 
consequence of the development of public law in the UK. In a 1995 judgment315 Lord 
Mustill perceived the gradual occurrence of this phenomenon as necessary. He argued 
that in order to  
 
avoid a vacuum in which the citizen would be left without protection against 
a misuse of executive powers the courts have had no option but to occupy 
the dead ground in a manner, and in areas of public life, which could not 
have been foreseen 30 years ago.316  
 
It is especially in the area of judicial review that the Crown was gradually divested of 
its absolute immunity. 
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ii) The judgment in M v. Home Office 
 
More than fifteen years after the House of Lord’s ruling in Town Investments, a 
revised framework of public liability for governmental acts was set up in 1993 in the 
landmark decision in M v. Home Office.317 However, the case by case approach taken 
up by the law lords established a scheme which retained the distinction between the 
Crown and its servants and preserved the classical view that was rooted in the 
principle that the King could do no wrong. Opinions on the true outcome of this ruling 
were manifold and not always supportive. Loughlin even went as far as to declare the 
judgment a mere attempt to “refashion public law while retaining intact an 
unreconstructed core.”318 What significance did the judgment really have for the 
overall governmental structure in Britain? Was M v. Home Office a missed 
opportunity to resolve the distortions, which existed with respect to the concept of the 
State that had originally been generated by British history? And did the law lords’ 
ruling in the case truly forestall the development of a modern conception of the State 
in Britain? 
 
In a nutshell, the substance of the case revolved around court proceedings, 
which were brought on behalf of an applicant against the Home Secretary on an 
allegation of contempt of court. The applicant, a citizen of Zaire, had claimed political 
asylum in the United Kingdom in 1990. The claim was subsequently rejected by the 
Secretary of State, who then also ordered the applicant’s removal from the UK. The 
day of M’s removal an application for leave to move for judicial review was lodged. 
Despite the judge’s subsequent order not to remove M from the UK pending further 
hearing, the Home Office nevertheless put M on a flight back to Zaire. Hereinafter, 
proceedings were brought against the Secretary of State on behalf of the applicant.319  
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According to M, the Secretary of State had allegedly failed to comply with an 
undertaking and a judge’s order while it was in force. Hence, the question was 
whether contempt of court proceedings could actually be brought against the Crown. 
The Court of Appeal had held that since the Crown itself was a legal fiction under 
public law, neither the Crown nor the Home Office had sufficient legal personality to 
be the subject of contempt proceedings. In its judgment the Court of Appeal declared 
that in principle the Home Office could never be guilty of contempt since neither the 
Crown nor the government departments were subject to the contempt jurisdiction of 
the courts, but only the ministers and civil servants personally.320 Consequently, in 
this particular case the Court concluded that the Secretary of State was guilty of 
serious contempt.321  
 
The House of Lords dismissed the Secretary of State’s appeal. In conformity 
with the Court of Appeal’s judgment,322 the House of Lords concluded that “the 
Secretary of State had properly been found to be in contempt” of court.323 
Furthermore, the Law Lords declared that in the course of judicial review proceedings 
the court did have jurisdiction to make coercive orders against ministers and when 
they acted in disregard of such orders, the court had the power to make a finding of 
contempt. Such finding would be applicable “not against the Crown directly, but 
against a government department or a minister of the Crown in his official 
capacity.”324 Recalling the decision in Town Investments, which had broadly 
subsumed public officers under the Crown’s veil of absolute immunity, the case of M 
v. Home Office changed this position drastically. In fact, the decision established the 
power of the British courts to subject Crown officers acting in their official capacity 
to public law remedies. This included the possibility to grant injunctive relief and to 
find ministers guilty of contempt if they disobeyed such orders. At the same time, 
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however, the doctrine of absolute immunity of the Crown from legal process remained 
fully intact.325 
 
In light of the complexity of all the developments after the CPA 1947 and for 
purposes of clarification, it appears necessary at this point to outline briefly the status 
quo after the House of Lord’s judgment in M v. Home Office. Where have all these 
developments since the CPA 1947 eventually left us? No attempt will be made to 
summarize the entirety of the preceding discussion. The present position can be 
conveyed quite simply: there is a clear distinction between the two meanings 
attributed to the Crown, which is the monarch on the one hand and the entire 
administrative branch on the other. This distinction also has significant implications 
with respect to the Crown’s liability since it results either in the total immunity of the 
monarch acting in his/her personal capacity or in the far-ranging liability of the Crown 
as an executive body.326 Even though much confusion has been cleared away by the 
House of Lords ruling in M v. Home Office,327 there are still contradictions and loose 
ends, which future judgments may have to sort out.  
 
Opinions are also divided over the question as to whether, in light of the 
decision in M v. Home Office, the concept of government vis-à-vis the notion of the 
Crown had been resolved conclusively. On the one hand, it appears that the decision 
succeeded at least in drawing a more concerted line of demarcation between the 
Crown’s executive and personal functions. This could be interpreted as a further step 
towards the legal recognition of the notion of government in the UK. Accordingly, as 
argued by Wade and Forsyth, the introduction of the concept of personal liability of 
public officials succeeded in reconciling the principle of strict adherence to the rule of 
law with the traditionally protected status of the Crown.328 Citizens should be able to 
obtain legal redress whenever public powers have been exercised wrongly. In the UK, 
domestic law had come ever closer to this ideal and in fact, the decision in M v. Home 
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Office almost brought this process to completion.329 After all it was an artificial 
construct which sought to set in place the framework of official liability for 
governmental acts in the UK. But did it truly resolve the pivotal questions concerning 
the defining characteristics of the Crown? 
 
In fact, part of the literature claims that the judgment in reality evaded the 
central concern of finding a clear defining line between the legal status of the Crown 
on the one hand and that of the Crown’s servants on the other. Moreover, M v. Home 
Office was seen as a lost opportunity of not only differentiating the concept of the 
Crown from the personality of the monarch, but also of articulating a concept of the 
Crown as both a corporation aggregate standing for the community and as an 
executive body known as the government. In addition to that, the judgment had failed 
to establish a framework of official liability for acts of the Crown. This is also 
mirrored in Lord Woolf’s speech in M v. Home Office where he declared that even 
though “in the theory which clouds this subject the distinction is of greatest 
importance”, there was no need to insist on this definition in the current case since it 
was “of no practical significance”.330 It is precisely this lack of legal precision in the 
Court’s reasoning, which was denounced by critics of the decision. One of those 
critical voices, Martin Loughlin, asserted that besides the appraisal of M v. Home 
Office as “the most important case in constitutional law for the past 200 years and 
more,” the judgment in fact missed out on the opportunity to carry through the 
preparatory work, which had been undertaken in Town Investments. Loughlin 
deplored the fact that the Court “failed to develop further a legal concept of the State 
and to set in place a modern framework of official liability for governmental 
action.”331 Hence, he concluded that the judgment was “indicative of an attempt to 
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refashion public law while retaining intact an unreconstructed core.”332 All that would 
have been necessary, Loughlin concluded, was that the traditional notion that ‘[t]he 
king can do no wrong’ be separated from the understanding of the Crown as an 
executive body or as the government.333   
 
To conclude, it should be underlined that until today the Crown is, as it has 
always been, immune from legal process at common law. From the feudal court 
structure until now and in line with the overarching principle that ‘[t]he King can do 
no wrong,’ there is still no court in the UK which could try the Queen. It was on these 
premises that the Crown’s immunity had been recognised in M v. Home Office by 
Lords Templeman and Woolf.334 As far as tort, contract and analogous claims were 
concerned, the Crown’s immunity had been largely abolished by the Crown 
Proceedings Act 1947, but nevertheless still remained in place in some respects.335 In 
fact, the CPA merely removed the Crown’s immunity regarding civil proceedings, but 
did not include public law litigation or the process of judicial review.336 The crucial 
question thereafter was whether the same immunity also extended to servants of the 
Crown, including ministers. This issue was finally addressed in the case M v. Home 
Office. The judgment overruled the House of Lords’ ruling in Town Investments, to 
the extent that it had implied that the concept of the Crown - in its fictional disguise as 
a “corporation aggregate”337 - also embraced all the ministers and Crown officials 
under its umbrella of immunity. 
 
Put briefly, the current situation is that all officers of the Crown, whatever the 
source of their power, are amenable to the remedies available under judicial review. 
On the basis of this assertion:  
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[t]he doctrine that the king cannot be sued in his own courts would apply 
only to the monarch in person and not the Crown as a political entity and the 
archaic and arcane distinctions formerly employed by the courts in their 
efforts to hold the executive to account could be allowed to wither away.338        
 
3. Crown liability in tort: vestiges of immunity 
 
In the UK, apart from the concept of the Crown, we are confronted with yet 
another legal particularity in the field of non-contractual liability, which is not found 
in most other EU Member States (with the exception of Ireland). This is the common 
law concept of ‘tort’. Consequently, before finally delving into the details of the 
public liability regime in the UK, the concept of tort law should briefly be outlined. 
 
a) The concept of tort in the United Kingdom 
 
With respect to questions of liability, UK law has adhered to the Roman law 
tradition by retaining specific heads of tortious liability. This implies that an action for 
damages against a public authority for wrongdoing must fall within one of the diverse 
and varied torts. Unlike in French or German law, tort law in England and Wales is 
not to be found under a civil code heading or even in a specific piece of legislation. 
Despite some rare exceptions, tort law has remained the province of the common law. 
British law simply does not have statutory principles on non-contractual liability, 
neither under civil law nor in relation to public authorities. Instead, liability is based 
on a number of specific torts, each of which has its particular scope and its own rules. 
The traditional torts range from various forms of trespass to chattels and specific 
economic torts, such as fraud or deceit, inducing breach of contract, conspiracy, 
intimidation and others.339 Each tort has separate requirements, which have to be 
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satisfied in order to give rise to liability. The attendant risk that some interests may 
remain unprotected has been greatly reduced over time, mainly through the evolution 
of the tort of negligence into an independent ground of tortious liability. Negligence 
has now become the most general and, in practice, also the most important tort.340 
 
Generally speaking, every legal system has to decide on a conceptual foundation 
for damages liability with respect to public bodies. In the UK the basic premise is that 
a public body that acts ultra vires is liable in tort if a cause of action can be 
established. However, the rationale is that an ultra vires act per se will not give rise to 
liability for damages. In addition, the claim has to correspond to one of the recognised 
private law causes of action as summarised above.341 Consequently, in the UK there is 
neither a general principle of liability for damages nor a separate body of law dealing 
with actions for damages against public bodies. It is on the claimant to show that the 
facts of his/her claim lie within one of the established heads of tort. Thereby, UK law 
subjects the conduct of public authorities to the same tort rules as those that apply to 
any natural or legal person.342 Due to the specific nature of activities generally 
performed by public authorities, this nevertheless results in a concentration of actions 
against them in a number of specific torts. The various torts create varying degrees of 
liability depending on the amount of discretion the public body possesses as well as 
the seriousness of the fault and the nature of the interest affected.343  
 
In X and Others (Minors) v. Bedfordshire, Lord Browne-Wilkinson listed three 
different causes of action that could be relied upon against a public body. Those were 
first, breach of statutory duty, second, common law negligence and last but not least, 
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misfeasance in public office.344 Out of these three causes of action the two torts of 
negligence and breach of statutory duty form the grounds on which tortious liability of 
public authorities is most commonly based in the UK.345 However, over time the list 
established in X and Others (Minors) v. Bedfordshire expanded so that by now we 
have to add two additional causes of action to it, which are the cases of breach of 
European Community law on the one hand and the violation of the specific duties 
placed on public authorities by the Human Rights Act 1998 on the other.346  
 
Some authors have argued that the large number of special rules governing the 
liability of public authorities produce, in effect, a separate body of law.347 However, in 
reality, a large part of these rules focus mainly on granting special immunity to 
particular public functions, which may or may not be performed by a public authority, 
rather than granting protection to the public authority as such. Indeed, one of the 
reasons why there is no adequately defined concept of ‘public authority’ in the UK is 
precisely this focus on the functions performed by a public body as well as the proper 
rules of liability which should govern them.348 
  
The particularities of non-contractual liability with respect to the Crown in its 
executive functions and the concurrent development towards a more concerted public 
law definition of ‘the government’ in the UK cover only a small part of the general 
concept of Crown liability for public authorities in torts. After all, the executive is just 
one of the three branches of the State, while the two others, the legislature and the 
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judiciary, have been deliberately factored out of this analysis so far. The reason for 
pursuing such a delimited approach towards the subject at the outset is that public 
liability for acts performed by the administrative branch in the UK as it had been 
established in the Crown Proceedings Act 1947 remains the exception rather than the 
rule. With respect to the two remaining branches of the State, we are faced with an 
even more constricted system of damages liability, namely a system composed of 
widespread vestiges of Crown immunity that cover the entire scope of the legislative 
as well as the judicial functions.349 Contrary to the rather complex framework we face 
with respect to vicarious liability of the Crown in its executive functions for torts 
committed by its servants or agents, Crown liability for wrongful legislative or 
judicial acts remains but an exceptional feature in the UK. To shed light on this 
lasting veil of immunity, we will take both, the legislative, but especially the judicial 
branch under close consideration. 
 
b) Legislative and judicial wrongs 
 
In practice there is already a reluctance to award compensation to an individual 
for harmful decisions taken by a public authority in the exercise of a statutory duty, 
insofar as it is acting intra vires, i.e. within the authority conferred upon it by 
Parliament. A fortiori, Acts of Parliament enacted by the sovereign power of 
Parliament can never give rise to liability.350 The same applies to acts of the judiciary, 
which, as mentioned before, enjoys immunity for all of its actions by virtue of section 
2(5) Crown Proceedings Act.351 Thus, in the UK the legislature and the judiciary 
enjoy, each on their own normative basis, absolute immunity from suit.  In principle, 
English law does not have special rules of liability affecting particular public 
authorities. However, the different range of their duties and functions, which regulate 
the responsibilities of public authorities, will inevitably create differences in the scope 
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of their liability. The defences that these powers create will mean that they are not 
liable for some activities, while their duties may create liability for certain acts, for 
which other public authorities would not be liable. Equally, the pattern of torts, under 
which they will be held responsible, differs according to the nature of their 
activities.352  
 
Nevertheless, in the UK the fundamental maxim of ‘ibi ius, ubi remedium’, 
ensuring the availability of a corresponding remedy for every right, constitutes a 
somewhat troublesome principle in relation to the judiciary’s absolute immunity from 
suit. It provokes an open conflict between the two competing requirements of “the 
public interest in an independent judiciary free from the fear of vexatious personal 
actions, and the fundamental policy of common law, which seeks to provide an 
adequate remedy to a wrongfully injured member of the Community”.353 While in 
most EU Member States a similar conflict of legal principles and values and the 
subsequent balancing exercise usually result in a compromise, in the UK a clear 
choice was made in favour of judicial independence. To put it bluntly, by preserving 
the shield of absolute immunity for judicial actions, the principle of judicial 
independence was given precedence over citizens’ rights in the UK.354 In comparison 
to other countries the outcome in Britain was certainly radical. Consequently, it is 
natural to raise the question in this context whether a clear choice between the two 
conflicting legal principles really had to be made. As we will show in the course of 
the analysis of our three remaining archetypes, different approaches to resolve this 
conflict of values certainly point towards the fact that the principles of judicial 
accountability and judicial independence are not mutually exclusive.355 Furthermore, 
on this question the International Association of Judges confirmed already in 1984 
that  
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[i]ndependence does not […] mean absence of responsibility for his own 
actions. The concept which regards the judge as unrestrained by law 
(legibus solitus) would end, sooner or later, in protecting, not so much his 
necessary freedom, as the arbitrariness of his decisions.356  
 
i) Crown liability for legislative breaches under domestic law 
 
In the joined cases Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame,357 an alleged non-
liability of the State for acts or omissions of the legislature was raised by the British 
authorities in order to deny, on an abstract level, the existence of State liability in the 
given circumstances.358 The overriding concept of parliamentary sovereignty provided 
the normative basis for this decision. The fundamental maxim of parliamentary 
sovereignty stipulates absolute sovereignty of Parliament as the supreme law-making 
body in the UK. Albert Dicey explained the concept in his book Introduction to the 
Study of the Law of the Constitution as, “the right to make or unmake any law 
whatever; and further, that no person or body is recognised by the law of England as 
having a right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament.”359 
 
Sovereign legislation owes its validity to no superior authority. The courts 
accept it in its own right.360 Under the traditional rules, in case of conflict any 
previous Act can always be expressly or impliedly repealed by a later Act. However, 
the full nature of legislative supremacy is reflected in the relation between the 
legislative authorities and the judicial branch in the UK, i.e. between the organ which 
creates and the organ which applies Acts of Parliament. Parliamentary sovereignty not 
only means that courts are bound to apply Acts of Parliament, but that at the same 
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time they also have no power to question or challenge their validity. According to 
Lord Morris,  
 
[i]t is the function of the courts to administer the laws which Parliament has 
enacted. In the process of Parliament there will be much consideration 
whether a Bill should or should not in one form or another become an 
enactment.  When an enactment is passed there is finality unless and until it 
is amended or repealed by Parliament. In the courts there may be argument 
as to the correct interpretation of the enactment: there must be none as to 
whether it should be on the Statute Book at all.361  
 
As a consequence, in the UK there is no judicial review of primary legislation 
passed by the Parliament. Courts are bound to apply the law and may not review a 
legislative act or question its validity as futile as the law may be. At the most, courts 
are granted a certain leeway of interpretation of a legislative act. Therefore, under 
domestic law, courts simply cannot uphold an individual’s claim for damages based 
on a legislative act without at the same time violating the principle of parliamentary 
sovereignty. It follows that Parliament can make or unmake any law it wishes and no 
person or body can set aside or override such legislation.362 As a corollary, Parliament 
enjoys absolute immunity with respect to damages claims by individuals.363   
 
ii) Crown liability for judicial breaches under domestic law 
 
A preliminary point to be clarified at the outset of this analysis concerns the 
peculiar status of the judiciary in the United Kingdom. In the United Kingdom 
constitution, the judiciary as a body is not simply perceived as an additional branch of 
the State. Interestingly, as we will see later on, this view on the position of the 
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judiciary within the State apparatus is precisely opposite from what the CJEU has 
voiced in the Köbler ruling.364 In the UK judges are first and foremost regarded as 
members of the independent judiciary. The view that the judge might be an ordinary 
servant of the Crown and, by extension that vicarious liability applies, has been 
rejected under UK law.365 Still, officers of courts of justice366 can be regarded as 
Crown servants in a number of ways. They hold positions granted by the Crown, 
swear oaths to uphold the law and are “persons by whom the functions of government 
of a state are carried out”.367 Seen from this angle, one could argue that the judiciary 
is undeniably part of the State apparatus.368 However, in light of their functions, 
judges should always be free to rule without influence and pressure from the 
legislative or the executive power.369 Moreover, in order to protect their 
independence, judicial officers have been excluded from the regular mechanisms of 
accountability. However, practice has shown that even judges are not free from errors.  
 
Both the UK and Ireland have adopted an exceptionally lenient approach 
towards the judiciary in this respect. Instead of holding judges or the judiciary 
accountable for their faults, the judicial branch has been shrouded in an almost 
impenetrable cloak of protection. This principle is known as absolute judicial 
immunity. In the UK, Ireland and in all the other Member States pertaining to group I 
of our classificatory scheme, the concept of State liability for judicial breaches 
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therefore reaches its utmost limits of constraint.370 Immunities postulate that judges 
have to be shielded from liability for harm suffered by an individual by virtue of them 
having acted as judges, no matter if they were malicious or careless in their actions.371 
Accordingly, officers of courts of justice not only enjoy the privilege372 of special 
immunity from actions in tort, but also of personal immunity of civil and/or criminal 
liability for acts done or words spoken in the exercise of their duties. In the United 
Kingdom all these elements fall under the joint umbrella of absolute judicial 
immunity as proclaimed in s. 2(5) of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947. 
 
According to this doctrine, such wide-ranging protection is justified by the need 
to ensure that judicial organs act in the interests of justice, without fear of possible 
liability for what they do. The objective is to strengthen their independence, so that 
judicial decisions may not be warped by fear of personal or collective liability. 
Already at this point we can observe that the UK, as our prototype representing the 
countries included in group I, applies a wide interpretation of the general principle of 
judicial independence. In fact, Rogers goes as far as to classify judicial independence 
as a right of the public rather than a privilege of the judges themselves. He claims that 
it is simply not in the public interest to inquire whether judicial “acts […] are 
malicious or not.”373 Frequently, the adherence to the denial of damages as a remedy 
for judicial breaches has also been justified by referring to alternative forms of 
redress. The argument put forward is that there are other remedies to compensate for 
judicial misconduct, but that those remedies do not lie in an action for damages and 
are frequently not to be obtained in court.374 However, it remains doubtful to what 
extent those ‘alternative’ remedies are effective as a means of redressing judicial 
wrongs.  
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The principle of judicial immunity covers the personal liability of the judge for 
judicial misconduct and the State’s vicarious liability for that misconduct. We will 
predominantly focus on the latter form of liability. As for personal liability of judicial 
officers, it is perhaps worthy of mention that the two decisive judicial rulings in that 
respect were the cases of Sirros v. Moore375 in 1975 and Re McC (A Minor)376 in 
1985. While the precise ambit of personal liability of officers of justice still has not 
been conclusively regulated, it is undisputed that that no judge, whether of a superior 
or an inferior court, is liable if acting within his/her jurisdiction, even if this is done 
maliciously.377 Moreover, judges of the High Court are immune from liability for any 
act of a judicial character, even in case of an ultra vires act, provided that the judge 
pursued it in the honest belief to be within his/her jurisdiction.378 Liability will only 
arise if in bad faith judges do what they know they have no power to do, such as 
knowingly acting outside one’s jurisdiction.379 This latter principle applies to any 
judicial officer, including justices of the peace.380  
 
In addition to the judges’ far-reaching personal immunity from suit, the State 
alias the Crown also cannot be held liable for erroneous acts committed by its judicial 
officers in the course of their duties. While waiving the Crown’s immunity from 
tortious liability in the Crown Proceedings Act 1947, the UK Parliament nevertheless 
fully preserved the Crown’s immunity in specific cases, including damages liability 
for harm caused by its judicial officers. In fact, Section 2(5) of the CPA 1947 
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postulates that “[n]o proceedings shall lie against the Crown [...] in respect of 
anything done or omitted to be done by any person while discharging or purporting to 
discharge any responsibility of a judicial nature vested in him.” The precise definition 
of what is to be understood by “responsibilities of a judicial nature” in s. 2(5) CPA 
1947 has been clarified in the substantial amount of case-law on the matter.381 
Accordingly, any action against the Crown based on the acts of judicial officers will 
have no chance of success in the UK, no matter if the judicial officer concerned 
presides over a superior court or an inferior court.  
 
Due to the strong historical ties between the two Member States, the situation 
under Irish law is rather similar to the one we encounter in the UK.382 Until the 
creation of the Irish Free State in 1922, the country had been an integral part of the 
British legal system, of which the principle of absolute Crown immunity was 
unquestionably an important part. Nevertheless, even after gaining independence from 
the UK in 1922, it took the country another fifty years to fully abandon the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity. It was only in 1972 in the famous case of Byrne v. Ireland383 that 
the Supreme Court explicitly declared that the principle of sovereign immunity was 
incompatible with the Irish Constitution and that the State was in fact vicariously 
liable for the torts committed by public authorities in the course of their actions.384  
  
While Irish judges had enjoyed full immunity from suit for judicial acts under 
common law,385 it was not immediately clear whether the verdict in Byrne v. Ireland 
had also abrogated the principle of judicial immunity. In a follow-up decision in 1974, 
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Lord Salmon appeared to confirm the continuation of the doctrine of judicial 
immunity when he stated that “[i]t is well settled that judges, barristers, solicitors, 
jurors and witnesses enjoy an absolute immunity in respect of any civil action being 
brought against them in respect of anything they say or do in court during the course 
of the trial.”386 Subsequent jurisprudence further supported this idea that under Irish 
law persons discharging judicial functions still enjoy complete immunity from suit in 
the exercise of their judicial duties.387 Like the UK, the Republic of Ireland is 
therefore undeniably part of group I of our classification scheme, which is marked by 
a total exclusion of State liability for judicial breaches under domestic law.388  
 
In spite of the fact that British law generally adheres to the principle of granting 
redress for all wrongs as exemplified by the maxim of ubi jus ibi remedium,389 the 
doctrine of judicial immunity represents an insurmountable impediment to those 
seeking redress for any damage caused by the judiciary. Even more so, judicial 
immunity is a principle that on the basis of its indiscriminate operation even obstructs 
those individuals from seeking redress, who have been victims of severe judicial 
misconduct or who have suffered serious loss as a result of a judicial error. As 
mentioned above, the same situation arises under Irish law where in a similar manner 
the principle of absolute judicial immunity stands in stark opposition to Article 40.3 
of the Irish Constitution.390 This constitutional provision broadly stipulates that the 
State is required to defend and vindicate the personal rights of its citizens. However, 
the tension between those two legal principles is somehow alleviated by Articles 34 
and 35(2) of the Irish Constitution, which uphold the fundamental principle of judicial 
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independence.391 Similar to the wide interpretation of judicial independence under 
British law, in Ireland the protection of the independence of the judiciary also serves 
as one of the core justifications for the concept of absolute judicial immunity from 
suit.392 In sum, apart from very few exceptions,393 under British and Irish law we are 
faced with a complete absence of domestic legal remedies for damage caused to 
individuals on the basis of a judicial act. Accordingly, Crown or State responsibility 
for harm caused by the national judiciary is a concept foreign to the national legal 
orders of these EU Member States.  
 
 4.  Did the Francovich case-law prior to Köbler have a spill-over effect on 
the concept and/or the limits of Crown liability in England? 
 
The UK’s membership in the European Communities in 1973 resulted in a 
revolutionary modification of its legal system. In line with the general influence 
exerted by EC law on the legal framework of each Member State, the European 
Communities Act 1972394 provided for the incorporation of the Community acquis 
into the domestic legal order and consequently also introduced such fundamental 
principles as the primacy of EC law in the UK. While “any enactment passed or to be 
passed”395 was from then on to be interpreted in conformity with Community law, EC 
law also simply trumped inconsistent national rules.396 The ECA 1972 thereby 
clarified once and for all that in the event of a clash, Community law would take 
precedence over national law, including all future legislation. Or, in the words of Lord 
Denning, that if “it should appear that our legislation is deficient or inconsistent with 
Community law by some oversight of our draftsmen then it is our bounden duty to 
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give priority to Community law.”397 In practice, a landmark case regarding the 
application of the principle of primacy of EC law in the UK was the famous 
Factortame litigation, which led to a number of decisions both in the national courts 
in the UK and the Court of Justice of the EU.398 Furthermore, a significant new head 
of governmental liability was introduced when the UK joined in 1973. According to 
Community law and the CJEU’s famous Francovich-line, a breach of Community 
obligations could render the British government liable to pay compensation under 
rules, which still constitute a moving target under EC law in that they are subject to 
continuous development in the case-law of the CJEU in Luxembourg.399 
 
What impact did the UK’s membership in the EC have on the concept of the 
Crown in general and the non-contractual liability regime of the State in particular? 
Was the Francovich case-line of the CJEU well received by the courts in England and 
Wales? And did the Community legal structure have a lasting impact on the UK’s 
unique system of torts? As these questions involve a large number of different 
aspects, it is not possible to provide an exhaustive analysis of all the issues involved 
within the confines of this chapter. However, our aim is the more modest one of 
devoting special attention to the general impact EC law might have had so far on the 
liability regime of the Crown for damage caused by public organs in the exercise of 
their official duties. This way, we may also be able to make tentative predictions and 
draw preliminary conclusions on the future implementation of the newly-established 
Köbler doctrine under the existing legal framework of public liability in England and 
Wales.  
 
The development and the introduction of a remedy in damages for breach of 
Community law in the UK has been shaped in particular by two important judicial 
rulings, which lie almost thirty years apart. Already in a 1974 case the question arose 
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whether, parallel to the prevailing claims under national law, there were any 
additional defences available under the EC Treaty.400 At that point Lord Denning 
underlined once more that Community law was an integral part of the British legal 
order and that it also created “new torts or wrongs”,401 which were to be applied by 
the courts in the UK. However, from this declaration in 1974 it took another 20 years 
until Lord Denning’s dictum finally took full effect in 1996 in the joined cases of 
Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame.402 In fact, a number of obstacles had to be 
overcome following the introduction of the new ‘Community tort’ in the UK.403 It 
took several years before the national courts fully accepted that it was possible for a 
litigant to be awarded damages for a breach of Community law under conditions 
which were less restrictive than those countenanced by existing private law remedies 
in England and Wales.404 Difficulties arose in this context in particular in the UK as – 
contrary to many other European legal systems – English law does not accept a 
general right to damages for maladministration. Or, in the words of Lord Brown-
Wilkinson, such action “by itself, gives rise to no claim for damages”.405 In fact, in the 
UK any compensation sought “must be based on a private law cause of action”, such 
as negligence, breach of statutory duty, or misfeasance in public office.406  
 
A vivid proof for the initial scepticism on the part of the judges towards the new 
‘Community tort’ was the dictum of Lord Justice Nourse in the ruling of the Court of 
Appeal in Bourgoin SA and Others v Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries and Food407 in 
1986, in which he underlined that  
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[i]n this country the law has never allowed that a private individual should 
recover damages against the Crown for an injury caused to him by an ultra 
vires order made in good faith. Nowadays this rule is grounded not in 
procedural theory but on the sound acknowledgement that a minister of the 
Crown should be able to discharge the duties of his office expeditiously and 
fearlessly, a state of affairs which could hardly be achieved if acts done in 
good faith, but beyond his powers, were to be actionable in damages.408  
 
In theory, this judgment severely restricted the ability of an individual to obtain 
redress under British law on the basis of a claim for breach of Community law. Even 
though it was possible for an individual to bring a claim for damages if he or she 
could show that the breach of EC law amounted to a breach of statutory duty409 or 
misfeasance in public office,410 the elements required for both these torts were 
generally rather difficult to prove.411 However, over time the courts accepted the fact 
that Community law had expanded the list of torts applicable in the UK. Among the 
breaches of Community law committed by administrative and legislative authorities in 
the UK, it will be especially interesting for the purposes of our study to analyse the 
method which was used in the UK to internalize liability claims for legislative 
breaches of EC law. After all, the latter is a cause of action which is entirely unknown 
under domestic law in the UK. As we encounter a similar situation with respect to the 
judicial branch, this example provides us with a valuable precedent, which might 
allow us to draw analogies to a future reception of liability claims for judicial 
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a) Brasserie du Pêcheur/Factortame 
 
With the CJEU’s ruling in Francovich and Bonifaci v. Italy412 in November 
1991 the deadlock under English law seemed to have been broken. In this judgment, 
the CJEU declared that the full effectiveness of Community rules would be impaired 
if individuals were unable to obtain compensation whenever their rights had been 
infringed by a breach of EC law, for which a Member State could be held 
responsible.413 Accordingly, the CJEU established that in such a case the respective 
Member State would be liable for “loss and damage caused to individuals as a result 
of a breach of Community law”.414 In light of this decision, the House of Lords openly 
called into question whether the Bourgoin case had been decided correctly at the 
time.415 Nevertheless, until 1996 several judgments in the UK still cast doubts on the 
existence of a right to recover loss suffered through the enforcement of a domestic 
law, which was found to be incompatible with Community law. Furthermore, these 
cases also suggested that there was no procedure under domestic law whereby an 
individual could claim damages from the State for failure to legislate in accordance 
with Community law.416 
 
In 1996 the CJEU’s groundbreaking joint ruling in Brasserie du Pêcheur and 
Factortame417 significantly changed British law. The Factortame case first came to 
prominence when the Spanish fishing company Factortame appealed to the UK courts 
against restrictions imposed upon it by the UK government under the Merchant 
Shipping Act 1988.418 In brief, the enactment of this statute, which was allegedly 
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inconsistent with Community law, had caused the damage suffered by the applicants 
in the case. Therefore, the claimants sought compensation from the State for the loss 
they had sustained as a result of the harmful legislative act.419 In light of the 
contradictions that prevailed under British law between the dicta in the judgments in 
Bourgoin420 and Francovich421 at the time, the Divisional Court made a request for a 
preliminary ruling to the CJEU in order to clarify the conditions under which a 
Member State could incur liability for damage caused to individuals by a breach of 
Community law.  
 
The preliminary reference in the case raised the problem that courts in the UK 
were prevented by domestic law from awarding damages in instances like the 
Factortame case, which sought redress for breaches of law attributable to the national 
legislature. Notwithstanding the position under domestic law, the CJEU proclaimed 
that the State could be held liable in damages “regardless of the organ of the state 
whose act or omission was responsible for the breach”.422 In fact, in his Opinion423 in 
the case Advocate General Tesauro raised the specific issue of violations of 
Community law committed by the national legislature. The reasons for his full support 
for an alleged liability of the State for acts or omissions of the legislature were 
threefold. First, as mentioned before, the Advocate General explicitly referred to the 
unitary concept of the State under international law. The same principle, he claimed, 
was applicable under Community law, so that there was no need to differentiate 
between cases where the infringement originated in a legislative as opposed to an 
administrative act.424  
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Secondly, the Advocate General advanced the rationale that even the legislature 
had to comply with certain limits imposed by superior rules. As a corollary, the State 
was also bound to compensate individuals for the loss they had suffered by adhering 
to domestic laws, which in reality exceeded those limits.425 Finally, Tesauro 
underlined the fact that the UK had joined the EC on the basis of a contractual 
agreement. Particular features underlying the Treaty obligations included the 
supremacy of Community law and the doctrine of direct effect. Hence, liability for 
legislative acts that were in breach of such obligations to which Britain had 
contractually agreed was perfectly consistent with the Community legal order.426 In 
light of all those aspects, Tesauro concluded that for individual rights established 
under Community law the review of adequacy of protection afforded by each national 
legal system had to extend so far as to require Member States to develop new 
remedies. This was also the solution to be applied in the United Kingdom in this 
specific case.427 
 
In the Factortame ruling the CJEU explicitly confirmed that a public body could 
be held liable in damages if it had committed a sufficiently serious breach of a 
provision of European Community law, which was intended to confer rights on 
individuals, and if that individual suffered loss as a result. This was true irrespective 
of which organ of the State was responsible for the breach, i.e. the legislature, the 
executive or the judiciary.428 Moreover, the Court also announced that  
 
[i]n that regard, restrictions that exist in domestic legal systems as to the 
non-contractual liability of the State in the exercise of its legislative function 
may be such as to make it impossible in practice or excessively difficult for 
individuals to exercise their right to reparation, as guaranteed by 
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Community law, of loss or damage resulting from the breach of Community 
law.429  
 
Along the same lines, the CJEU followed up by proclaiming  
 
that […] it is on the basis of the rules of national law on liability that the 
State must make reparation for the consequences of the loss or damage 
caused; further, the conditions […] for reparation of loss or damage laid 
down by national law must not be less favourable than those relating to 
similar domestic claims (principle of equivalence) and must not be framed 
as to make it virtually impossible or excessively difficult to obtain 
reparation (principle of effectiveness).430 
 
b) Birth of the ‘Euro-tort’ 
 
With reference to the principle of national procedural autonomy, the core 
question for every Member State in this specific context is whether a breach of 
European Community law is actionable in the same way as a corresponding claim 
based on a violation of domestic law. If so, which remedy could possibly serve as the 
equivalent domestic law remedy to the underlying Community right which was 
infringed? Unlike French or Belgian law, English tort law does not recognise a 
general right to damages for unlawful administrative acts.431 Consequently, it is 
impossible to equate the Community-based right to damages for breaches of EC law 
with one single cause of action under English tort law. Moreover, as mentioned 
before, problems of a different nature arise in the UK with respect to violations 
committed by the legislature and the judiciary concerning the extent to which the 
domestic legal order is able to accommodate such ‘species’ of liability.432 In fact, the 
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Factortame litigation highlighted the lack of a suitable cause of action under domestic 
law in the UK on the basis of which a claim could have been brought for harm 
incurred by the enactment of a law or for damage caused by an act of the executive 
branch unless, perhaps, misfeasance could be established.433  
 
In many countries the rights created under Community law cannot be easily 
accommodated within the remedial structure of the different national legal orders.434 
This was also the case in the UK where there is a complete absence of an equivalent 
domestic cause of action for breaches of law committed by the national legislature or 
the judiciary. However, by virtue of the UK’s membership in the EU and the 
corresponding provisions of the European Communities Act 1972, appropriate 
remedies had to be available under national law in order to ensure the strict 
enforcement and the full effectiveness of the rights which individuals had acquired 
under Community law. Lacking such a suitable domestic cause of action, which 
solution was applied in the UK in the Factortame case? And could this method serve 
as a precedent and model for the difficult task of ‘transplanting’ individual rights 
established in the Köbler case into the domestic remedial framework in the UK? 
Finally, what are the precise standards required by the principle of national procedural 
autonomy in this context?  
 
With reference to the questions raised above, an interesting interpretation was 
provided by Mr Justice Toulmin in the Factortame ruling of 2001.435 In this case he 
defined tort as “a breach of non-contractual duty which gives a private law right to the 
party injured to recover compensatory damages at common law from the party 
causing the injury.” Mr Justice Toulmin finally concluded that a claim brought by an 
individual against the State for a breach of EC law constituted an action on tort within 
the meaning of the Limitation Act 1980. Accordingly, he suggested that ‘Euro-tort’436 
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would be the suitable expression to be used in this context.437 By this point, in theory 
the existence of a domestic remedy for breach of EC law was generally accepted in 
the UK. However the interpretation and application of the so-called Euro-tort in 
practice still left a number of questions unanswered. In light of the fact that so far 
every major leap forward in the development of the Euro-tort in the United Kingdom 
has been triggered by a judgment of the Court of Justice of the EU, the continuing 
advancement of the Francovich doctrine by the CJEU, such as recently in the case 
Traghetti del Mediterraneo SpA v. Italy438 or the Köbler case, still poses new 
challenges for judges in the UK. 
 
After the general recognition of an individual right to a remedy following a 
violation of Community law by a public authority, the discussion in the UK moved on 
to the problem of characterizing the separate cause of action for this kind of breach 
under domestic law.439 Controversy persisted as to the precise nature of the domestic 
claim, which was applicable in cases with a Community law component. Generally 
speaking, in order to ensure the full effectiveness of rights guaranteed under 
Community law, national courts had to search not only for a domestic action that was 
closely related to the claim asserting Community rights, but also for one which in its 
overall structure and application resembled the claim under EC law. The domestic 
courts were therefore advised to consider “the purpose and the essential characteristics 
of allegedly similar domestic actions”.440  
 
In theory, the classification of liability claims in damages resulting from a 
breach of EC law could have been handled in various manners in the United 
Kingdom. A first option, which originally advanced in academic writings but which 
eventually also prevailed in the jurisprudence, was to classify such cases as giving rise 
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to an autonomous cause of action under the legal system of England and Wales, 
without the necessity of fitting them into pre-existing domestic heads of liability. In 
this way, the ‘Euro-tort’ was a new cause of action and liability in damages simply 
took effect whenever the three conditions set out by the CJEU were met. In hindsight, 
this not only seemed to be the most straightforward way of proceeding, but also 
appeared to be the method which most closely resembled the British exceptionalist 
attitude with respect to the position of Community law within the domestic legal 
order.441 
 
By way of a contrast, a second option could have been to fit the claim under a 
domestic head of liability for breach of statutory duty. This possibility had actually 
been considered in Garden Cottage Foods Ltd. v. Milk Marketing Board,442 in which, 
after declaring a breach of Community law as actionable in damages, the House of 
Lords classified the claim as one for breach of statutory duty. In a similar vein, Lord 
Diplock declared with reference to Community law that  
 
[a] breach imposed by article 86 not to abuse a dominant position in the 
common market or in a substantial part of it, can […] be categorised in 
English law as a breach of statutory duty that is imposed not only for the 
purpose of promoting the general economic prosperity of the common 
market but also for the benefit of private individuals to whom loss or 
damage is caused by a breach of that duty.443 
 
However, this certainly implied that apart from the conditions set up under 
Community law, such a claim would also have to meet the traditional prerequisites 
required for a successful claim for breach of statutory duty under national law. Hence, 
it was essential for the claimant to show that Parliament had aimed to confer private 
rights of action and that the damage was of the kind intended to be protected by the 
statute. With respect to the standard of liability, contrary to the impression given in X 
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v. Bedfordshire, breach of statutory duty did not automatically imply strict liability. 
Instead, depending on the specific legislation in question the standard of liability 
could vary slightly.444 In addition to the restrictive elements drawn by the tort itself 
and its rather diffident application in the jurisprudence, the Community-based claim 
for damages would also need to be properly constructed and suitably modified to 
meet the requirements of EC law as outlined in the Francovich doctrine. 
Consequently, in its function of giving rise to the Community-based right to damages 
for breaches of EC law, a successful cause of action requires proof of a sufficiently 
serious breach of Community law. In light of all these aspects, it is obvious that there 
would have been a number of potential difficulties in conceptualising matters in this 
way.445 
 
 Last but not least, a third possibility which was considered in this context was to 
fit the claim for damages for breach of Community law under the heading of 
misfeasance in public office.446 However, considering the restrictive requirements 
which a claimant must show to bring a successful claim under this tort, this possibility 
was quickly ruled out as a viable option.447 The requirements of malicious, deliberate 
or injurious wrongdoing by a public authority simply make it rather difficult for an 
individual to establish a successful cause of action. Furthermore, in case of a breach 
of Community law by a public authority these stringent requirements could even 
render it “impossible or excessively difficult”448 for the applicant to obtain 
compensation. As a result, such a situation would clearly violate the principle of 
effectiveness, which constitutes, together with the principle of equivalence, the 
cornerstone of the maxim of national procedural autonomy of the Member States 
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under Community law.449 In line with the concerns raised above, the CJEU has 
repeatedly underlined that subjecting the damages claim in an analogous manner to 
specific rules of national law could in itself undermine the effective protection of the 
individual’s right to damages.450 This could be the case whenever national law 
requires the claimant to comply with a series of elements in addition to the conditions 
set up under EC law for such claims.451 
 
Thus, due to the specific structure of English tort law and the restrictions 
inherent in domestic torts, it was rather unlikely for the courts to find close 
substantive and procedural parallels between the individual right to damages under 
European Community law and the prevailing remedial claims in the UK.452 In 
addition, the assessment of a breach of EC law had to be undertaken in a way which 
was novel to English law. Therefore, already in 1989 the Divisional Court ruled in 
accordance with the CJEU’s dictum in Brasserie du Pêcheur453, when it described the 
cause of action for a violation of Community law as sui generis even though “of the 
character of a breach of statutory duty.”454 Moreover, in one of the first cases after the 
Factortame ruling, Three Rivers District Council v. Bank of England (No. 3), Mr 
Justice Clarke once again confirmed the CJEU’s opinion on this matter when he stated 
that  
 
[i]n such a case the claim should not be regarded as a claim for damages for 
the tort of misfeasance in public office, but rather as a claim of a different 
type not known to the common law, namely a claim for damages for breach 
of a duty imposed by Community law or for the infringement of a right 
conferred by Community law.455 
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 Only recently, the very same issue was raised once again in the context of the 
Köbler case. The debate naturally focused on the question to what extent the legal 
system of England and Wales would be able to absorb liability claims for judicial 
violations of European Community law. As stated above, one can generally detect a 
strong support in the case-law post-Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame in the UK 
for the view that the courts do not actually feel the need to fit these cases into one of 
the pre-existing domestic heads of liability. In this sense, judicial practice in the UK 
provides strong support for the idea of an autonomous cause of action under the 
heading of ‘Euro-tort’. As a consequence of that development, the remedial structure 
in England and Wales forged two parallel and yet independent remedial paths. It is 
therefore clearly divided today between cases with or without a Community law 
component. In line with the country’s strict dualist tradition, the emergence of such a 
twin-track system in this context implies that under national law the applicable 
remedial framework differs entirely with respect to cases of State liability for 
breaches of Community law on the one hand and instances of State responsibility 
caused by a violation of domestic law on the other. In other words, the Euro-tort in the 
UK, which applies only to cases with a Community law component, leaves untouched 
the residue of the rule, which denies the availability of a similar remedy under 
domestic law. Accordingly, this system leads to peculiar situations in which 
individuals suffering loss as a result of a breach of EC law have an avenue for redress, 
while those experiencing harm caused by a violation of purely domestic law remain 
without a remedy.456 Hence, depending on whether a Community law element is 
involved in a specific case will be decisive for the degree of protection and the 
remedial path available to the harmed individual under the national legal system of 
England and Wales. 
 
c) Spill-over effect into domestic law? 
 
In view of the emergence of a separate remedial track under national law for 
violations of Community law by public authorities in the UK, an interesting question 
arises in this context, namely as to whether, and if so, in what way, the Francovich 
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case-line by the CJEU might over time have (had) an impact on the corresponding 
situation under domestic law. After all, individuals in the UK are confronted with a 
total absence of an equivalent Francovich-type remedy under domestic law for harm 
caused to them by legislative or judicial acts. Moreover, with respect to administrative 
breaches the conditions for liability set up by the remedial framework under 
Community law are less restrictive than the strictly regulated scheme of torts in the 
UK. Accordingly, in a recent scoping paper, the Law Commission even spoke of an 
existing ‘gap’ in English law, referring to the absence of a remedy under domestic law 
in cases when a public authority acted unlawfully, but not in breach of EC law or of 
the ECHR.457 Even though the public act might have caused harm to an individual in 
such a case, he or she does not have a general cause of action under domestic law 
upon which to base a liability claim against the State, unless the case conforms to the 
additional conditions required under the different heads of tort.458 
 
It is obvious that domestic courts are not bound by EC law in cases where there 
is no point of Community law in issue. Equally, the liability standards set up by the 
CJEU will have no direct impact on cases which are purely based on domestic law. 
However, even in cases without an explicit Community law component, it is plausible 
that judges could have regard to the EC-related jurisprudence when developing 
domestic case law.459 In this manner, the remedial track provided for individuals 
under national law in case of a breach of Community law by a public authority might 
spill over into the parameters of liability established under English tort law.460 After 
all, from the point of view of the harmed individual, it seems unsatisfactory and rather 
arbitrary that the (non-)availability of a remedy under national law depends merely on 
whether the factual circumstances of a case happen to contain a Community law 
element or not.461 Therefore, it would be feasible that the application of Francovich-
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style remedies in the legal system of England and Wales creates an incentive for 
change under domestic law or even spurs reforms to 'soften up' the dismissive 
approach towards specific instances of State liability in the UK.462 Seventeen years 
after the CJEU's Francovich ruling, did the anticipated spill-over effect really happen 
or is this effect merely an illusion and wishful thinking by academics? And if it really 
occurred, did it lead to notable changes in the UK's legal framework of State liability?  
Even if it did not, the debate on possible reforms of the system of torts in the UK is 
alive and well. Over the years, concrete proposals for a general overhaul of the system 
have been put forward and Community law has undoubtedly played a significant role 
in this process. Furthermore, the impact of EC law has started to show in the 
jurisprudence of the national courts and even manifested itself in cases which did not 
relate directly to Community law.463 In March 2005 the Law Commission eventually 
launched a substantial reform project to review the law of remedies against public 
bodies in the UK.464 The publication of the aforementioned scoping report on 10 
October 2006 marked the first stage of what is designed to be an ambitious roadmap 
for reform.465 Already the question at the centre of the project reveals the wide scope 
of the envisaged changes: “When and how should the individual be able to obtain 
redress against a public body that has acted wrongfully?”466  
 
One of the key aims of this study by the Law Commission is to discuss and 
evaluate the introduction of a new head of liability in the UK for simple ultra-vires 
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acts committed by public authorities.467 As we have underlined several times in the 
course of this analysis, so far according to the principles of tort law, illegality which 
causes loss does not per se lead to liability in negligence.468 Instead, compensation 
can only be awarded if the authority’s act can be subsumed under one of the existing 
heads of tort in the UK. For the first time such a possibility had been introduced 
through the incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights into 
domestic law by the Human Rights Act 1998. Referring to this crucial momentum in 
the development of tort law, the Law Commission’s scoping report of 2006 notes that  
 
[t]o allow an action for damages […] would be a radical departure from the 
existing law, almost certainly requiring legislation. Such a change would 
move English law towards the system of French administrative law, where 
the liability of public bodies is founded upon ‘fault’ and mere illegality is in 
itself a fault capable of giving rise to liability without more, and towards EU 
law.469  
 
Apart from the proposed additions to the existing heads of tort in the UK, the 
project also aims to incorporate the most recent developments in EU law as well as 
under the Human Rights Act 1998 with respect to the general concept of public 
liability on tort into the existing remedial framework. Moreover, the reform proposal 
touches upon various other issues such as alternative remedies, statutory 
compensation schemes (including miscarriages of justice and criminal injuries 
compensation), as well as ex gratia payments.470 Furthermore, the Law Commission 
plans to study the interrelationship between different routes of redress and also aims 
to include an analysis of the element of fault as applied under European as opposed to 
domestic law in this context. Eventually, the Law Commission expects to propose a 
draft bill on the envisaged changes in the summer of 2009. 
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 Even though opinions may differ as to the extent to which Community law has 
had a direct and lasting impact on the remedial framework in the UK so far, it is 
undeniable that EC law does not remain unnoticed in the courts’ day to day work and 
that changes induced by Community law are currently under way in Britain. Recent 
developments under national law also bode well for the reception of the enlarged 
Francovich doctrine after Köbler into the remedial framework of the UK. Thereby, a 
Community-enhanced spill-over effect could possibly spur reform for the 
development of a remedial track for breaches of domestic law committed by the 
legislature and the judiciary in the UK too. 
 
 
II. Crown Liability for Judicial Breaches after Köbler? 
 
1. Preliminary reflections on possible theoretical foundations 
 
On the basis of the Francovich doctrine and in line with Köbler, a remedy in 
damages will have to be provided in the United Kingdom for cases when an 
individual has suffered loss as a result of an erroneous decision by the House of Lords 
or any other national court infringing an established right under EC law. According to 
the principle of national procedural autonomy, individuals have to be able to enforce 
their Community rights before domestic courts and “in the absence of Community 
rules on this subject”471 also have to be given the possibility of pursuing their claim on 
the basis of the applicable provisions of the national procedural law of each Member 
State. In this context the CJEU has repeatedly underlined that the respective remedial 
path under the national procedural framework of each Member State has to meet the 
double standards of effectiveness and equivalence.472 In other words, it is for the 
Member State “to designate the competent courts and lay down the detailed 
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procedural rules for legal proceedings intended fully to safeguard the rights which 
individuals derive from Community law.”473  
 
Due to the absence of an established State liability regime for violations of the 
judiciary under the legal system of England and Wales, an appropriate cause of action 
will have to be established so as to allow the wronged individual to pursue his or her 
claim à la Köbler before the ordinary courts. The problem that remains to be solved in 
this context is whether such a cause of action should be modelled on any of the 
existing heads of liability in the UK. That is to say when there is no suitable basis 
under domestic law, an entirely new remedial track will have to be created in order to 
ensure the full effectiveness of the right to a remedy as guaranteed under Community 
law. A similar situation had already occurred in the UK in the context of the 
Factortame litigation, which eventually led to the introduction of the new Euro-tort 
under the legal system of England and Wales. Already at that time, the courts in the 
UK provided strong support for the idea of an autonomous cause of action. In a 
similar vein, a liability claim à la Köbler would most likely follow the remedial 
scheme already established in the UK for legislative breaches of Community law after 
the CJEU’s famous joint ruling in Brasserie du Pêcheur/Factortame.474 After all, the 
situation under domestic law after the Köbler ruling in the UK is almost identical to 
the legal situation back then, when we were faced with a complete absence of an 
equivalent remedy for legislative breaches under national law.    
 
2. Maharaj v. Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago (no. 2) 
 
An encouraging sign for a possible development towards the legal recognition 
of the concept of State liability for erroneous judicial conduct in the UK emerged in 
the judgment of the Privy Council in Maharaj v. Attorney-General of Trinidad and 
Tobago (no. 2).475 Even though the ruling was given nearly thirty years ago, it remains 
a unique and groundbreaking precedent with respect to the question of State liability 
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for damages incurred by an erroneous judicial act. The case’s importance is also 
mirrored in the fact that the Law Commission could not fail to comment upon it in 
2000 in its report marking the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998.476 Before 
going into the substance of the case it should, however, be clarified that the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council constitutes the final appeal to Her Majesty in Council 
for a number of Commonwealth countries, including the independent Republic of 
Trinidad and Tobago. The rulings of the Privy Council are not binding on courts in 
England and Wales, but they are considered as highly persuasive, not least because 
the judges of the Privy Council are usually members of the House of Lords. In the 
same manner, opinions handed down by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 
are no longer necessarily binding on the courts of other Commonwealth countries, but 
they are usually of such persuasive authority as to be followed by them.477 
 
The significance of the Maharaj ruling lies in the fact that in it the Privy 
Council managed to convey in a perspicuous manner the theoretical concept 
underlying the liability of the State for breaches of law committed by the national 
judiciary. Moreover, due to the clear and concise reasoning of the Privy Council, the 
case could well serve as a valid archetype when it comes to the debate on a general 
recognition and on the precise application of such a principle under domestic law in 
the United Kingdom.478 Thus, the ruling constitutes without doubt a strong authority 
for the principle of State liability for erroneous judicial acts.479 The fact that the 
judgment was handed down in the Privy Council’s function as highest court for 
Trinidad and Tobago certainly does not reduce the significance this ruling has for the 
UK in terms of the guidance it offers for introducing the principle of State liability for 
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judicial breaches in a country where the judiciary generally enjoys total immunity and 
protection.  
 
The Maharaj case480 itself concerned a barrister who, while engaged in a case in 
the High Court of Trinidad, was imprisoned for contempt of court. Immediately after 
his arrest, the plaintiff applied to the High Court under section 6 of the Constitution of 
Trinidad and Tobago,481 claiming redress for an alleged violation of his right not to be 
deprived of his liberty except by due process of law. The latter was a principle 
enshrined in section 1(a) of the Constitution.482 However, the court dismissed his 
motion and ordered the barrister to serve his designated term of imprisonment. After 
his release, the claimant lodged an appeal, which was however dismissed by the Court 
of Appeal. Additionally, the barrister had also obtained leave to appeal to the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council against the judge’s initial committal order.483 The 
Privy Council quashed the judge’s initial order on the ground that a fundamental 
failure of natural justice had been committed in the course of the proceedings. As held 
by the Privy Council, the competent judge in the case had failed to inform the 
appellant in a detailed and explicit manner about the nature and the substance of the 
contempt of which he was charged. The subsequent deprivation of liberty without due 
process of law had therefore violated the appellant’s constitutional rights.484  
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Furthermore, the Privy Council argued that since the appellant had been 
deprived of his liberty without due process in contravention of section 1 of the 
Constitution, he was entitled to obtain redress from the State.485 According to section 
6(1) of the Constitution the claim for damages was “a claim against the State directly 
and not vicariously for something done in the exercise of its judicial power”.486 The 
ruling declared that redress had to consist of monetary compensation since it was the 
only practicable form of redress available in this case.487 In essence, section 6 of the 
Constitution in fact provided a new remedy even against unlawful judicial conduct. 
The question of what sort of liability had been imposed on the State under section 6 of 
the Constitution was addressed by Lord Diplock. He confirmed the general 
application of the principle of primary State liability in the specific case and defined 
this new form of redress as follows:  
 
The claim for redress under s. 6(1) for what has been done by a judge is a 
claim against the state for what has been done in the exercise of the judicial 
power of the state. This is not vicarious liability: it is a liability of the state 
itself. It is not a liability in tort at all: it is a liability in the public law of the 
state, not of the judge himself, which has been newly created by section 6(1) 
and (2) of the Constitution.488 
 
Even though the judgment spawned the principle of State liability for judicial 
breaches of law, it was nevertheless a concept whose application was subject to rather 
restrictive criteria. First of all, the rule immunizing judges from personal liability 
while acting in their judicial capacity remained entirely unaffected by this ruling. In 
his Opinion, Lord Diplock explicitly underlined the limited scope of application for 
this new form of redress. Besides the fact that the application of such remedy was 
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limited to cases infringing the human rights and fundamental freedoms enlisted under 
Chapter I of the Constitution, it was furthermore only applicable to errors of 
procedure amounting to “a failure to observe one of the fundamental rules of natural 
justice”.489 With respect to errors of fact or substantive law, the only remedy available 
to an individual against unlawful judicial conduct was to appeal. In case there was no 
higher court to appeal to, nobody could actually argue that there had been a judicial 
error at all.490 “The fundamental right is”, according to Lord Diplock, “not to a legal 
system that is infallible, but to one that is fair.”491 On that note he concluded that it 
was only in the case of imprisonment or corporal punishment already undergone 
before an appeal could be heard, that the consequences of the judgment or order could 
not be rectified through an appeal to the appellate court.492 
 
The solution suggested by the Privy Council in Maharaj displays two 
substantial advantages. While it imposes no personal liability on the judicial officer, it 
still provides an effective remedy to the individual, who would have otherwise been 
left without any form of redress. Moreover, even though this solution generally allows 
the claimant to seek redress for irreparable damage caused by a judicial act, it is 
nevertheless limited in its application to cases involving fundamental failures of 
justice that amount to a denial of due process and/or a violation of constitutional 
rights. Despite the fears voiced by Lord Hailsham in his dissenting opinion that the 
‘Maharaj type of liability’ would lead to a flood of liability claims, Lord Diplock 
rightly stated that even if an error existed which justified the reversal of a judicial 
decision, that failure would not in itself be enough to evoke liability à la Maharaj. 
This would especially hold for cases in which the consequences of the judicial act 
could still be corrected on appeal.493 The specific construction developed in Maharaj 
and its theoretical underpinning of primary State liability provided a convincing 
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solution in this case. Applauding the decision, Olowofoyeku concluded that on the 
basis of this judgment “the Privy Council not only has provided a precedent for the 
liability of the State for judicial acts but also has presented a sound theoretical basis 
for such liability.”494  
 
However, while this principle had been successfully applied under the 
constitutional framework of Trinidad and Tobago, a parallel application of it under the 
legal system of England and Wales would come up against a number of legal barriers. 
After all, two traditional impediments immediately stand in the way of applying the 
Maharaj principle in the UK. First, the fact that a judicial error is not considered a tort 
in the UK and second, the fact that judges are not presumed to be servants of the 
Crown (State) for the purposes of vicarious liability in tort. In addition to the 
aforementioned obstacles, there is also an important statutory impediment, which 
would eliminate any attempt to establishing primary State liability for wrongful 
judicial acts in Britain. Even though the Crown Proceedings Act 1947 had waived the 
Crown’s immunity from tortious liability, section 2(5) of the Act nevertheless 
provided an exemption from liability whenever the alleged violation was of a judicial 
nature.495 Hence, section 2(5) of the CPA represents an insurmountable obstacle to 
individuals seeking to obtain redress against the Crown for damage caused by an 
erroneous judicial act in cases which do not themselves possess any Community law 
component.  
 
It might seem like the exception in section 2(5) of the CPA constituted the final 
word on this matter, especially if the Act was interpreted to preclude all claims of 
State liability for judicial acts. However, in this respect the impact of supranational 
law such as the European Convention on Human Rights and the direct implications of 
Community law on the domestic legal framework significantly changed this 
seemingly irrevocable legal stalemate. The first exceptions to the strict immunity of 
the judiciary in the UK emerged under the Human Rights Act 1998, which 
incorporated parts of the European Convention on Human Rights under the legal 
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system of England and Wales. Similar changes have also been induced by Community 
law. In other words, tort law in the UK is undeniably changing and the stimulus for 
this development is coming from supranational legal sources. Hence, the reasoning 
and the conclusions of the Privy Council in the Maharaj ruling could serve as a sound 
theoretical basis in the UK to accommodate the current changes under domestic law, 
which are accruing from the recent developments on the Community level and 
especially the CJEU’s ruling in Köbler.496    
 
3. State (Crown) liability for judicial breaches in the context of the 
European Convention on Human Rights 
 
An aspect which plays an important role throughout this entire analysis is the 
comparison of the framework of State liability for judicial breaches under national 
law and EC law with the system established under the ECHR,497 to which the CJEU 
and various Advocates General have repeatedly referred throughout the established 
case-law on the question of Member State liability for breaches of Community law 
since Francovich.498 With respect to the newly established principle of Member State 
liability for judicial breaches under EC law it is therefore hardly surprising to discover 
that in the course of its deliberations in Köbler the CJEU once again explicitly hinted 
at the general principles of State responsibility as applied under the ECHR, and 
especially as contained in Article 41 of the Convention.499  
 
The significance of the ECHR in this context is certainly not confined to the 
UK’s legal system or merely to the countries included in group I, but instead extends 
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to the four groups of our classification and all the 27 EU Member States contained 
therein. Even though the European Union is not (yet) formally a Contracting Party to 
the ECHR,500 it is nevertheless obliged to respect the fundamental rights as outlined in 
the Convention as general principles of Community law.501 Moreover, due to the fact 
that all individual EU Member States are parties to the ECHR, the developments on 
the Convention-level undoubtedly have at least implicit ramifications for the situation 
under Community law. It is clear that the influence of the ECHR in its EU-wide 
application is altogether too big a question to be pursued exhaustively within the 
confines of this thesis. Given the breadth of the topic, the following section will 
therefore be limited in scope and deal only with those aspects that are most relevant in 
the specific context of our project.  
 
As suggested above, the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights502 
with respect to the application of the principle of State liability for judicial breaches is 
well established under the Convention-system and the practical examples are 
numerous.503 After the exhaustion of domestic remedies, the ECHR grants individuals 
direct access to the European Court of Human Rights to lodge complaints of harmful 
acts or omissions committed by national courts.504 The rule of prior exhaustion of 
domestic remedies also implies that in most cases only national judgments of final 
instance will reach the European Court of Human Rights.505 With reference to the 
possible violations of the Convention committed by the judiciary of a Contracting 
State, a distinction is generally drawn between breaches of the ECHR committed in 
procedendo as opposed to those violations of the Convention committed in 
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iudicando.506 The first of these two categories of breaches refers specifically to 
judicial violations of one of the procedural guarantees enshrined in the ECHR, the 
most prominent of which is certainly Article 6(1) of the Convention. Furthermore, 
judicial violations of the ECHR can also be committed in iudicando, which implies 
that a national court violated a substantive right protected under the ECHR such as to 
adversely affect the content of a final judgment. In the past examples of such cases 
included, inter alia, violations of Article 8 of the Convention,507 which protects the 
fundamental right to respect for private and family life, or breaches of Article 10 
ECHR,508 which concerns the right to freedom of expression. 
 
A prominent case in point, which highlights the implicitness of the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) when holding a State liable on the grounds of a 
violation of the Convention, but at the same time demonstrates the difficulties 
involved in identifying the perpetrator of the breach, is the case Dangeville v. 
France.509 In this judgment the ECtHR also raised a number of fundamental issues 
which reach beyond the mere demonstration of validity of the principle of 
responsibility of the State for judicial breaches of rights enshrined in the Convention. 
In relation to our topic, this case also deserves special attention as it deals with a court 
of last instance acting in breach of EC law. However, while the violation of 
Community law was implicitly confirmed in the ECtHR’s judgment, the Court, 
similar to the CJEU’s reasoning in the case Commission v. Italy,510 did not explicitly 
distinguish between legislative and judicial acts in this context and subsequently 
failed clearly to identify the legislature and/or the judiciary as the perpetrator of the 
violation.  
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In light of the application of a unitary concept of the State under the 
Convention, the ECtHR is certainly not obliged to single out which branch of the 
State was responsible for the violation. Nevertheless, it remains without doubt that in 
Dangeville a national court of last instance committed a severe breach of EC law in 
the course of domestic proceedings. In the end, instead of invoking (the then still 
unknown) Köbler-liability under Community law, the State was held responsible on 
the grounds of a breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, which guarantees the peaceful enjoyment of property. The 
implications of this case for the framework of State liability for judicial breaches 
under the Convention, but also with regard to the recognition of a similar concept 
under Community law, will be discussed in the following section.  
 
a) The case S.A. Dangeville v. France 
 
The case S.A. Dangeville v. France deals with the violation of Article 1 of 
Protocol No. 1 of the Convention by the French Conseil d’Etat and is, as stated above, 
yet another example for a breach of the ECHR by a national supreme court. The case 
revolved around a French company of insurance brokers, S.A. Dangeville, which 
invoked a tax exemption in France on the basis of the Sixth VAT Directive511 in all 
national instances, but was eventually denied such an exemption in the last instance 
by the Conseil d’Etat. It is crucial to highlight at this point that France had failed to 
transpose the relevant VAT Directive within the prescribed time-limit. Furthermore, 
the Conseil d’Etat did not yet recognize the direct effect of EC Directives and 
consequently simply refused to give effect to the directly applicable rights contained 
therein.512  
 
In the meantime another firm of insurance brokers had brought an identical 
claim before the French courts. The factual and legal circumstances in the two cases 
were exactly the same differing only with respect to the later submission date of the 
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second claim, which was lodged a few months after Dangeville had brought its case to 
court. For various reasons the proceedings in the second case stretched over some 
time and when the Conseil d’Etat eventually gave its decision in the case, it had 
meanwhile acknowledged the direct effect of EC Directives. In fact, the Conseil ruled 
in favour of the second applicant and granted the desired tax exemption to 
Dangeville’s competitor.513 At that point, however, Dangeville had already lodged a 
second application in order to claim its right on the basis of the change in the 
Conseil’s case-law concerning the direct applicability of EC Directives. Dangeville 
lodged a liability claim against France before the Conseil d’Etat, in which it requested 
compensation to the amount of the exemption denied. Even though the Conseil d’Etat 
had delivered a favourable judgment in the case of Dangeville’s competitor on the 
same issues of law, the Conseil dismissed Dangeville’s liability claim out of 
compliance with the authority of res judicata of its previous judgment in the case.514  
 
Eventually the company lodged an application with the European Court of 
Human Rights, in which it alleged a violation of its right of property as guaranteed 
under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the ECHR. The ECtHR subsequently considered 
the right to restitution of wrongfully paid tax as a ‘possession’ within the meaning of 
that Article. Moreover, the Court declared that Dangeville’s claim for State liability 
had been legitimate and argued that a refusal to rebate the amount of money to the 
company concerned infringed the right of property guaranteed by Article 1 of 
Protocol No. 1.515 What is also interesting in this case is that the ECtHR entirely 
disregarded the plea of res judicata, which had been raised by the Conseil d’Etat and 
instead added authority to the principle of direct effect and primacy of EC law. 
Accordingly, France had to compensate the applicant for a violation of its right to 
property, which had been committed by the French Conseil d’État.516  
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On something of a side note, it should be underlined at this point that the 
decision in Dangeville v. France also sparked some interesting observations on the 
general principle of res judicata, which is – as previously demonstrated – frequently 
used as an argument against possible State liability claims for judicial breaches under 
European Community law and which was in the present case overruled by the 
ECtHR.517 With reference to the maxim of res judicata, which we will scrutinise in 
chapter VI of our project, Dangeville also constitutes the perfect example for those 
cases, to which Advocate General Geelhoed recently referred in the Lucchini case, 
where he stated in his Opinion of 14 September 2006 that 
 
[i]t is evident from comparative research, however, that, despite the major 
importance to be attached to res judicata, its effect is not absolute. The 
various national legal systems permit exceptions to res judicata, albeit 
subject to strict conditions. This may be the case, for example, in the event 
of fraud or if a flagrant breach of fundamental rights is committed in the 
judgment which has become inviolable. The case-law of the European Court 
of Human Rights shows that res judicata cannot cover over any obvious 
violations of fundamental (Community) rights.518 
 
In the ECtHR’s judgment in Dangeville, France as a party to the Convention 
was finally ordered to compensate the applicant for a breach of the Convention. Even 
though the ECtHR does not clearly identify the perpetrator of the breach in the 
wording of the judgment, it is obvious that the Conseil d’État could have remedied the 
failure of the legislature to adequately transpose the EU Directive by rendering its 
provisions directly effective in the specific case. The Conseil’s refusal to do so 
certainly amounted to an error attributable to it. By acknowledging the principle of 
State liability for judicial breaches under the Convention-system in the specific EU-
law related case of Dangeville, the ECtHR also might have helped to set the tone for 
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the enactment of a similar concept under Community law. In this sense, Dangeville 
was in certain respects instrumental in paving the way for the recognition of the 
Köbler principle under Community law.519 
 
While we will elaborate further on the foregoing considerations concerning the 
principle of res judicata at a later point in our analysis,520 the imminent question, 
which arises with respect to our current model is a different one: how is the 
Convention and its application to the judiciary received in a country where the judicial 
branch generally enjoys absolute immunity from suit and where a principle of State 
liability for judicial breaches is explicitly precluded by law? And if the principle of 
State liability for judicial breaches of the ECHR nevertheless happens to be fully 
applicable under domestic law in the UK, could the prevailing situation with respect 
to such breaches of the Convention possibly provide us with suggestions, guidelines 
or even solutions on how to implement the Köbler principle in the legal system of 
England and Wales? In other words, is it possible to draw an analogy to Community 
law in this context?521  
 
b) The Human Rights Act 1998 and its application to judicial breaches 
 
Prior to the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998, the ECHR was not 
directly enforceable in the UK. While it was accepted that national courts increasingly 
had regard to the Convention in their jurisprudence, and to a certain extent interpreted 
common law in accordance with the ECHR, it was not until the Human Rights Act 
1998 that the obligation to adjudicate while taking account of the principles and rights 
protected under the ECHR (as developed by the Strasbourg organs) was eventually 
put on a statutory basis in the UK.522 The HRA 1998 did, however, not incorporate 
parts of the ECHR directly into domestic law, but instead required the courts to 
                                                 
519
 In this context see also HOFSTÖTTER, Non-compliance..., supra note 88, pp. 71 et seq. 
520
 See chapter VI, pp. 385 et seq.  
521
 As the focus of this chapter lies on the countries contained in group I of our classification scheme, 
the following analysis on the ECHR will also concentrate predominantly on these countries and their 
related case-law in this context. 
522
 CRAIG, Administrative Law, supra note 284, pp. 568 et seq. 




interpret legislation “so far as it is possible to do so” in accordance with the 
Convention.523 What remained in dispute in this context was the precise nature of the 
cause of action arising under UK law as a consequence of the adoption of the HRA 
1998.524  
 
On the basis of the HRA 1998, a complaint can be lodged directly in front of 
UK courts by the victim of an allegedly unlawful action committed by public 
authorities. Accordingly, in case of a breach of those principles enshrined in the 
ECHR, the domestic courts are competent to grant just and appropriate remedy or 
relief to the victim.525 However, according to section 8(3) of the HRA the court may 
only award damages if it is convinced that the award is necessary to afford just 
satisfaction. Furthermore, the principles applied by the ECtHR concerning the award 
of compensation under Article 41 ECHR have to be taken into consideration by the 
national courts not only when deciding whether to award damages in a specific case, 
but also when assessing the amount of compensation.526 For the purposes of our 
study, we are especially interested to find out to the extent to which these rights and 
remedies are applicable to acts performed by the judiciary. In other words, the pivotal 
question remains one of whether judicial acts in the UK can be incompatible with 
rights guaranteed under the European Convention on Human Rights.  
 
Section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 declares that it is unlawful for a 
public authority - including a court or tribunal527 - to act in a way which is 
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incompatible with a Convention right. Henceforth, section 7(1) of the HRA bestows a 
right on the harmed individual to bring proceedings in case a public authority 
allegedly acted in such an unlawful manner as to violate the Convention. Even though 
on the basis of the definition in section 6(3)(a) also courts, as public authorities, have 
to act compatibly with Convention rights, restrictions have nevertheless been included 
in the HRA 1998 for cases when acts are performed by members of the judiciary in 
the UK. By virtue of section 9(1), proceedings under section 7(1) with respect to 
judicial acts can only be lodged in the exercise of a right of appeal, through an 
application for judicial review, or in any other forum as may be prescribed by the law. 
 
c) The HRA and violations of Article 5(5) ECHR 
 
Section 9(3) of the HRA 1998 contains the crucial component with respect to 
violations of the Convention by judicial acts. This provision explicitly forecloses the 
award of damages under the HRA in the UK on the grounds of a judicial act, which 
has been conducted in good faith. In other words, apart from one exceptional case, all 
individuals in the UK who have suffered harm as a result of a judicial violation of the 
Convention performed in good faith remain, at least on the basis of the HRA, without 
the possibility of receiving damages for their loss. The only case when damages for 
judicial breaches of the ECHR can actually be awarded under the HRA 1998 is “to 
compensate a person to the extent required by Article 5(5) of the Convention.”528 
Article 5 protected the right to liberty and security of person and provides an 
exhaustive list of situations when someone may be lawfully deprived of their liberty 
(Article 5(1)). It also provides for the right to be told the reasons for one’s detention 
(Article 5(2)), to be brought promptly before a judge (Article 5(3)) and to challenge 
one’s detention (Article 5(4)). Article 5(5) ECHR is also a special provision within 
the Convention itself as it contains a separate provision expressly requiring domestic 
law to secure a right to compensation for someone who has been the victim of arrest 
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or detention in contravention any of the other parts of Article 5 summarised above.529 
According to section 9(4) and (5) HRA 1998 such an award is to be made not against 
the court directly, but against the Crown. Furthermore, the appropriate minister or 
government department has the right to join as a party to the proceedings.530  
 
Generally speaking, the Human Rights Act severely restricts the liability of the 
Crown for judicial acts which contravene Convention rights. In fact, damages are 
merely available where an individual has been detained without lawful authority, such 
as unlawful arrest or detention, regardless of the judge’s bona fides.531 In all other 
cases the issue of the judge’s bona fides has to be examined and nothing can be 
claimed if the judge is found to have acted in good faith, which tends to be the most 
likely outcome. Damages are merely available under the HRA in case the judicial act 
was committed by the judge(s) in bad faith. As mentioned before, the latter is an 
allegation which is extremely hard to prove.532 This very fact had already been 
confirmed by Cappelletti in 1983 when he stated with reference to harmful judicial 
behaviour that “[i]ntention is the most difficult to prove – a ‘probatio diabolica’ par 
excellence.”533 For all other cases involving harmful acts committed by the judiciary a 
last option to obtain damages would be to recourse to the ECtHR under Article 41 of 
the Convention. According to this provision, the ECtHR can “afford just satisfaction” 
to an applicant in cases when the domestic law of a Contracting State to the 
Convention, like in the present case, the UK, does not grant full reparation for the 
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violation of a Convention right.534 Generally speaking, one should, however, 
underline that in the past the ECtHR has interpreted Article 41 in a restrictive manner.  
 
In sum, compensation for damages can only be awarded on behalf of the Crown 
if a judicial act violates the right to liberty and security as defined in Article 5 
ECHR.535 In addition, a judicial act may not be challenged otherwise than by way of 
appeal or judicial review or (if any) under ministerial rules.536 The rationale behind 
these restrictions in the HRA 1998 with respect to judicial acts seems to be motivated 
by an attempt to avoid damages claims every time a judge makes a reasonable ruling 
on the basis of what he or she genuinely believes the law to be, but on appeal another 
court takes a different but equally reasonable view. From the claimant’s perspective, 
however, the said restrictions to such a claim for damages under the HRA construe an 
almost insurmountable barrier in the UK. Even in the case that a judicial act is found 
to be in blatant violation of the Convention, the aggrieved party might still have no 
right to claim damages under the Human Rights Act.  
 
With respect to the enactment of the Köbler doctrine under the legal system of 
England and Wales, the wording of section 9(3) HRA 1998 mirrors the deliberate 
intent still predominant under UK law to preserve the special status attributed to the 
judiciary, which includes the maxim of absolute immunity from suit for all acts 
performed by judicial officers. Similar to the restrictive approach in section 2(5) of 
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the Crown Proceedings Act 1947 with respect to the principle of Crown liability for 
judicial breaches, the Human Rights Act, which was enacted more than fifty years 
later, still does not show any significant changes concerning the awarding of damages 
for erroneous judicial acts under UK law. In light of these facts, it would probably be 
more than overly optimistic to anticipate a warm welcome for the Köbler doctrine 
under the legal system of England and Wales.  
 
A prominent example in the possible line of violations of the Convention 
committed by national courts is Article 6(1) of the Convention, which declares that 
“everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”537 Without going into all the 
complex details surrounding the scope and the application of Article 6 with respect to 
both civil and criminal proceedings, it is obvious that the overall guarantees and 
standards of a fair trial under the ECHR also had serious implications for the system 
established in the United Kingdom.538 And, the ECtHR has repeatedly ruled that, for 
example, undue delay in court proceedings constituted a violation of Article 6, rulings 
which have been applied to English courts too.539 In such cases the reasonableness of 
the length of proceedings is however assessed separately in each case with regard to 
its particular facts.540 In view of the explicit wording of Article 6 of the Convention, it 
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is therefore rather surprising that there is no special provision under English law, not 
even in the HRA 1998, recognizing the right to damages for victims of judicial 
breaches of Article 6. Moreover, in a joint report entitled ‘Damages under the Human 
Rights Act 1998’, which was published in October 2000 following the enactment of 
the HRA in the UK, the Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission 
explicitly confirmed that “[a] breach of Article 6 would not be sufficient to provide a 
basis for a claim for damages in respect of judicial action”.541  
 
Even though the ECtHR has repeatedly condemned the UK for breaches of 
Article 6 in the course of court proceedings,542 on a national level the situation 
appears to be different. A conviction may be overturned if any of the guarantees 
enshrined in Article 6 are breached during the course of an investigation, trial or 
punishment, though it is not automatic. However, in the course of national court 
proceedings victims of a violation of Article 6 will not be compensated in damages on 
the basis of the HRA 1998. Instead, it appears that domestically claims for damages in 
relation to Article 6 violations of the Convention are frequently subsumed under the 
heading of “miscarriages of justice” as regulated in section 133 of the Criminal Justice 
Act 1988, which allows for compensation for such miscarriages.543 Overall, the 
situation with respect to the awarding of damages for judicial breaches of Article 6 
ECHR in the UK is not entirely clear and leaves open a number of unresolved 
issues.544 
 
On this point the situation is rather similar in all the other countries pertaining to 
the first group of our classification scheme. While countries included in the remaining 
three categories generally recognize the principle of State responsibility for violations 
of the ECHR by the judiciary, group I is rather restrictive with respect to damages for 
judicial violations even when it comes to breaches of the Convention. Whereas 
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according to the HRA the UK has clearly restricted the State’s responsibility for 
judicial breaches of the Convention to violations of Article 5(5) ECHR and to acts 
done in bad faith, other countries such as the Netherlands, Greece, Ireland and 
Bulgaria have adopted a similar, but less restrictive approach in this context. As 
mentioned before, all the countries included in our first group broadly reject the basic 
principle of State liability for judicial breaches under domestic law, save for a handful 
of exceptions. These exceptions usually concern two different groups of cases, the 
first of which are breaches of the ECHR. As mentioned before, the ECHR is 
applicable in all the countries included in the first group of our study and special 
provisions with regard to the Convention are usually provided under the legal system 
of each Member State. By restricting the availability of damages in compensation for 
breaches of the Convention exclusively to violations of Article 5(5) ECHR and to acts 
performed in bad faith, the legal system of England and Wales nevertheless remains 
the most restrictive of the group.  
 
The remaining members of group I resort to special provisions under domestic 
law so as to render the ECHR fully applicable in spite of the traditional rejection of 
the principle of State liability for judicial breaches under national law.545 In Ireland, 
for example, the full applicability of the ECHR is guaranteed under the European 
Convention on Human Rights Act 2003, which - contrary to the HRA 1998 - does not 
contain special derogations concerning acts of the judiciary.546 In this respect the 
situation is similar to that found in Greece, Bulgaria and the Netherlands.  
 
The phenomenon we are facing in Greece and the Netherlands is a situation, 
which, in the course of our analysis, we will encounter in a number of countries in 
every group of our cartography. While the legislature in Greece is silent on the 
question whether the State is to be held liable for harmful acts of the judiciary, there is 
an established jurisprudence in the country, which has explicitly excluded judicial acts 
stricto sensu from the general applicability of Article 105 of the Introductory Law to 
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the Greek Civil Code.547 As far as Greece’s adherence to the ECHR is concerned, two 
noteworthy cases by the ECtHR concerning judicial violations of the Convention were 
the judgments in Tsirlis and Kouloumpas v. Greece of 29 May 1997 and in Karakasis 
v. Greece of 17 October 2000.548 Especially the former case is a vivid example of a 
clear violation of the Convention by a national court. The particular circumstances of 
the case revolved around two Jehovah Witnesses ministers who were both detained by 
military courts for their refusal to perform military service in Greece. In its judgment 
the ECtHR declared that the detention was arbitrary and violated Article 5 of the 
Convention. Moreover, the Court identified very clearly the perpetrator responsible 
for the violation by declaring that the military court had “blatantly ignored” 549 
previous case-law on the religious exemption.  
 
In the Netherlands the situation is rather similar. There is no explicit provision 
under Dutch law regulating the question whether the State is to be held liable for 
harmful acts of the judiciary.550 However, there is an established jurisprudence in the 
country, which has taken a clear stance on this issue.551 The Dutch Supreme Court, 
Hoge Raad der Nederlanden, issued a fundamental ruling on this question in 1971,552 
in which it broadly rejected the principle of State liability for erroneous acts by the 
judiciary. However, like in other countries pertaining to group I in the Netherlands the 
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State’s liability for judicial violations was also introduced in exceptional and 
explicitly regulated cases. Accordingly, the Hoge Raad ruled that the State’s liability 
could exceptionally be invoked for judicial violations which amounted to a breach of 
Article 6 of the ECHR and in fact, the Court has repeatedly confirmed this decision in 
subsequent rulings.553 This decision has been confirmed by many more recent ones, 
which accept liability of the State for judicial acts only when the judicial act 
constitutes an infringement of a fundamental principle, in a way that one cannot speak 
of a fair trial in the sense of Article 6 ECHR. Accordingly, the annotated judgment 
also related to a case where the rights of defence of the plaintiff had been infringed by 
the judgment for which the State was held liable.554 Furthermore, referring to the case-
law of the Hoge Raad on the effects in criminal-law cases of judgments given by the 
European Court of Human Rights, the College van Beroep voor het bedrijfsleven 
(Administrative Court for Trade and Industry) recently underlined once again the 
importance attributed to Article 6 ECHR under Dutch law in the course of the 
proceedings in front of the CJEU in the case Kühne & Heitz by stating that 
 
[t]he Hoge Raad der Nederlanden thus held, in a judgment of 1 February 
1991 (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie - NJ - 1991, p. 413), that the subsequent 
discovery of an infringement of a fundamental right laid down in Article 6 
of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms is one determining factor which may preclude 
enforcement of a decision given in a criminal law case which cannot be the 
subject of an appeal.555  
 
With reference to the two groups of exceptions which we can generally detect 
among the different countries in group I, a second set of cases in this respect are 
specific regulations concerning miscarriages of justice. The latter is a concept which 
tends to be defined in different ways under various national legal systems. In Greece, 
                                                 
553
 In this context see also the decision of the Hoge Raad, 29 April 1994, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 
1995, p. 727. STORME, "The liability...," supra note 274, p. 657. 
554
 See also Hoge Raad, 17 March 1978, NJ 1979, p. 204. 
555
 Case C-453/00, Kühne & Heitz NV v. Produktschap voor Pluimvee en Eieren [2004] ECR I-837, 
para. 16. 




for example, Article 7(4) of the Greek Constitution contains the principled obligation 
of the State to compensate “persons unjustly or illegally convicted, detained pending 
trial, or otherwise deprived of their personal liberty”.556 More detailed provisions are 
then provided in Articles 533 to 542 of the Greek Code of Criminal Procedure.557 A 
compensatory scheme for miscarriages of justice also exists under the legal system of 
England and Wales, which - as previously mentioned - is outlined in section 133 of 
the Criminal Justice Act 1988.558 The situation in Bulgaria is rather similar. In 
addition to the general provision on State liability in Article 7 of the Bulgarian 
Constitution,559 Article 2(1) of the 'Act on the Liability of the State and Municipalities 
for Damages Inflicted on Citizens'560 provides an exhaustive list of cases in which the 
Bulgarian State can be held liable for erroneous acts committed by judicial authorities. 
Amongst others, this list includes cases of unjustified detention and false criminal 
conviction. 
 
As discussed before, compensatory schemes for miscarriages of justice are 
widespread and common among the EU Member States.561 Nevertheless, it remains 
doubtful whether it is indeed correct to label such compensatory mechanisms for 
miscarriages of justice as examples of State liability in tort. As we have already 
argued in chapter II, it is in fact an issue that stands at the sidelines of the generic 
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debate on judicial accountability. Erroneous criminal sentences are generally 
considered to be neither a case of personal responsibility of judges nor one of State 
liability. Instead, these cases are usually instances of direct and strict liability of the 
State to provide the victim with an adequate indemnity, which has often been 
previously established by law and therefore does not grant full compensation for the 
damage suffered by the individual depending on the circumstances of each case.562 As 
a consequence, with respect to the system established in the UK, compensation 
payments of this sort have been said to resemble more social welfare or ex-gratia 
payments rather than tort actions.563  
 
d) Köbler in light of the ECHR: much ado about something? 
 
The system established under the ECHR sheds an interesting light on the 
question of State liability for erroneous acts or omissions committed by the national 
judiciary. Whereas the introduction of the Köbler doctrine under EC law initially 
stirred noticeable controversy in the various EU Member States,564 the same concept 
as applied under the ECHR did not provoke comparable reactions in these countries. 
An individual who is the victim of a violation of the Convention by a public authority 
of one of the Contracting States has a right to an effective remedy before a national 
authority. This principle applies irrespective of which branch of the State was 
responsible for the damage. Under the Convention system the State is therefore not 
only liable for legislative and administrative breaches of the ECHR, but also for 
violations of the Convention committed by the national judiciary. 
  
In view of the smooth application of this principle under the ECHR, the 
question arises whether the negative hype among the Community’s Member States 
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after Köbler in certain EU Member States was justified or at least comprehensible. 
Not least due to the CJEU’s repeated reference to the ECHR in its Francovich case-
law, there are undoubtedly a number of parallels between the application of the 
Köbler doctrine under EC law and the State's responsibility for judicial breaches in 
the context of the ECHR. By analogy these similarities, which we will highlight in the 
following section, could in fact facilitate the application of the Köbler principle under 
domestic law in England and Wales. Nevertheless, as we will uncover afterwards, the 
implications and basic differences between the system of State liability for judicial 
breaches of EC law and the State's responsibility for judicial violations of the ECHR 
weigh so heavily as to justify a clear differentiation in the application of the two 
concepts under national law. 
 
In accordance with classical international law, the Convention system adheres to 
a unitary concept of the State.565 The European Court of Human Rights has referred to 
this principle on several occasions in its jurisprudence and declared that “[t]he Court 
does not have to specify which national authority is responsible for any breach of the 
Convention: the sole issue is the State’s international responsibility.”566 In other 
words, this concept implies that public liability can be imposed irrespective of which 
organ of the State is responsible for the breach. Accordingly, the principle of State 
liability for erroneous judicial decisions has always been an integral part of the 
Convention system. In a similar manner, the Court of Justice already declared in the 
joint cases of Brasserie du Pêcheur & Factortame that  
 
in international law a State whose liability for breach of an international 
commitment is in issue will be viewed as a single entity, irrespective of 
whether the breach which gave rise to the damage is attributable to the 
legislature, the judiciary or the executive. This must apply a fortiori in the 
Community legal order since all State authorities […] are bound in 
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performing their tasks to comply with the rules laid down by Community 
law directly governing the situation of individuals.567  
 
The Court later explicitly re-confirmed the application of this principle in the Köbler 
case.568 
 
A further correlation between the two systems emerged from the rule of prior 
exhaustion of domestic remedies, which is a fundamental part of the Strasbourg 
court’s admissibility criteria.569 The requirement of prior exhaustion of all domestic 
remedies implies that any judicial decision at issue before of the ECtHR usually has to 
be that of a court of last instance, which will naturally be endowed with the authority 
of res judicata. Thereby, the system of the ECHR has once more served as a model 
for the CJEU in the context of its deliberations in the Köbler case. In its reasoning on 
the question of State liability for judicial breaches, the CJEU explicitly referred to the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights by stating that “[t]he case-law 
of that court shows that such a reparation may also be granted when the infringement 
stems from a decision of a national court adjudicating at last instance”.570 This 
argument has a great deal of merit and we will return to it at a later stage when 
discussing the question of whether the principle of res judicata generally constitutes a 
justified barrier to liability claims under EC law.571  
 
Moreover, the discussion surrounding the “Euro-tort” and the precise nature of 
the domestic claim in the UK re-emerged in an almost identical manner with the 
enactment of the HRA 1998 in England and Wales.572 As the European Convention 
on Human Rights is first and foremost to be applied under domestic law, there has 
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also been a vigorous debate on the nature of the cause of action based on the Human 
Rights Act under national law in the UK. Some have argued that the HRA creates a 
new form of action for breach of statutory duty,573 or that it is to be classified as “a 
new public law tort of acting in breach of the victim’s Convention rights”.574 Others 
have entirely rejected the idea that this remedy is a new government tort.575 As 
mentioned before, there is no automatic right to damages for unlawfulness under 
English law and the courts retain full discretion as to the remedy they grant. 
Furthermore, it is inaccurate to describe this action under the HRA as a public law tort 
if there is no right to monetary compensation. In this respect, it may perhaps be more 
apt to classify the action as a new legal instrument to award damages for 
unlawfulness.576 Similar to the method applied in the UK for the Euro-tort, the 
framework used with respect to HRA-related claims is also not to subsume the action 
under one of the existing heads of tort.577 
 
 Despite these correlations and in spite of the fact that in both cases, the Köbler 
doctrine as well as the rights enshrined in the European Convention on Human 
Rights, we are faced with exceptions to the general principle of Crown immunity for 
judicial breaches in the UK, the two concepts nevertheless differ substantially. The 
most fundamental difference to the Köbler principle under EC law is first and 
foremost that an individual, whose rights and freedoms recognized in the ECHR have 
been violated by a judicial act, is merely entitled to an effective remedy before a 
national authority in the respective Contracting State.578 The Contracting States have 
a wide discretion in this respect. The only obligation is to provide a remedy which is 
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effective (‘effectif’ or ‘utile’ in the French texts). Subject to this reservation they are 
free to map out a remedy, which may – according to the case – result in the physical 
termination of the act constituting the violation, its cancellation, its withdrawal, its 
alteration or non-application, civil damages, criminal or disciplinary sanctions and 
others.579  
 
According to the Francovich doctrine, on the other hand, “it is a principle of 
Community law that the Member States are obliged to make good loss and damage 
caused to individuals by breaches of Community law for which they can be held 
responsible.”580 In other words, under Community law defaulting Member States are 
obliged to grant full compensation to the harmed individual for the damage sustained. 
Whereas monetary compensation is therefore indispensable under EC law in this 
context, it is within any court's discretion to award damages in case of a violation of 
the ECHR.581 
 
Apart from this fundamental difference, what renders the problématique under 
Community law even more complex is the procedural dimension of the claim. With 
respect to the ECHR final decisions concerning judicial violations of the Convention 
are taken by the European Court of Human Rights, a court established outside any 
domestic legal framework. On the contrary Community law adheres to the principle 
of national procedural autonomy, which implies that from a procedural point of view 
a judicial violation of EC law might cause a direct conflict under domestic law 
between the court, which ruled in the initial case and whose decision consequently 
gave rise to the liability claim on the one hand, and the court, which finally has to 
decide upon the State's liability on the other. In sum, it appears that the Community 
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law principle enshrined in Köbler faces an even greater number of substantial 
impediments and procedural obstacles in its application under national law.582  
 
4. Applying the inapplicable?583 Crown liability for judicial breaches of 
Community law 
 
a) Theoretical basis and preliminary considerations 
 
Köbler v. Republic of Austria confirmed what had already been previously 
established in the CJEU’s judgment in Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame,584 
namely that the unitary concept of the State, as it persists under international law also 
fully applies for the purposes of Community law. Accordingly, the CJEU stated that  
 
[i]t is for each Member State to ensure that individuals obtain reparation for 
loss and damage caused to them by non-compliance with Community law, 
whichever public authority is responsible for the breach and whichever 
public authority is in principle, under the law of the Member State 
concerned, responsible for making reparation.585  
 
Thus, as explicitly stated in Köbler, the State can be held liable under Community law 
to pay compensation for damages caused to the injured party on the basis of a judicial 
act violating Community law rights.  
 
 However, does this principle also apply in a country where absolute Crown 
(State) immunity for judicial acts is guaranteed by statute?586 And if so, according to 
which framework would such a Community right be implemented under the domestic 
remedial scheme in the UK? As the reader might recall, we have already briefly 
touched upon this question earlier on in the context of the CJEU's Factortame 
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ruling.587 Hence we also acknowledged the fact that under national law breaches of 
law by the national legislature and the judiciary were excluded from liability claims 
against the Crown. Nevertheless, as we have demonstrated, Community law already 
'transplanted' the - until then unknown - principle of Crown liability for legislative 
breaches into the UK domestic legal framework, even though similar claims without 
Community-law relevance are not admissible under national law to this day. Even if it 
led to the development of a twin-track system in the UK divided between cases of 
State liability with or without a Community-law component, an autonomous cause of 
action, the Euro-tort, emerged as a result under national law.588  
 
As for the judiciary, the situation is even more precarious. Not only has Crown 
liability for judicial violations been explicitly ruled out by statute, but the judiciary as 
such enjoys a special status within the British system of government. According to 
the principle of national procedural autonomy this begs the question in which way the 
right to a remedy as guaranteed in the Köbler ruling could be grafted onto domestic 
law in order to secure the individual’s right? Which national court would be 
competent to rule in such a case? And which court would be competent to decide in 
case of a liability claim for a violation of Community law committed by the House of 
Lords? Moreover, to what extent could the Köbler principle in the future have an 
influence on the domestic rule of absolute judicial immunity as regulated in section 
2(5) of the Crown Proceedings Act?   
 
Pending the CJEU’s final decision in the Köbler case, the United Kingdom 
government - in line with the reasoning of the Austrian and the French governments - 
already raised serious doubts with respect to the practical application of the Köbler 
principle.589 The UK called into question the very essence of this principle and 
brought forward an array of arguments against its application, referring to the 
principles of legal certainty and finality of litigation, as well as the maxim of res 
judicata, which would, according to the UK government's submission in the Köbler 
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case, altogether be weakened by such actions. Moreover, in the eyes of the UK 
government an extended Francovich-doctrine would undermine the authority and the 
reputation of the judiciary and endanger the independence of the judicial branch, 
which was a principle that could not be compromised.590 
 
The UK also reminded us of the fact that under the legal system of England and 
Wales – apart from judicial violations of Article 5 ECHR - no action could be brought 
against the Crown based on a harmful judicial act. As regards the application of the 
Francovich doctrine to judicial breaches of Community law the government summed 
up its position by stating that compared to the powerful concerns mentioned above 
“[t]he advantage to be gained from acknowledging that damages may be obtained in 
respect of judicial decisions is therefore correspondingly small.”591  
 
The government's submission also underlined the fact that a Köbler-type claim 
would raise serious procedural difficulties in the UK. In fact, due to the country’s 
unitary court system and the strict doctrine of stare decisis, it would be difficult to 
find a national court competent to rule in such cases.592 In addition to that, the UK 
added that the law generally discouraged re-litigation of judicial decisions, save by 
means of appeal. Hence, in an attempt to protect the interests of the parties involved 
and in order to underline the principle of legal certainty, the UK government 
concluded that an “[a]cknowledgment of State liability for a mistake by the judiciary 
would throw the law into confusion and would leave the litigating parties perpetually 
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b) Structural deficiencies: quis iudicabit? 
 
 The argument raised by the United Kingdom concerning the procedural 
entanglements generated by the application of the Köbler doctrine under national law 
is in fact a concern which is frequently raised in the literature not only with reference 
to the UK’s judicial structure, but also with respect to other EU Member States.594 In 
addition to the substantive impediment of absolute judicial immunity, it is essentially 
the unitary court system in the UK and the strict doctrine of stare decisis that render it 
difficult to determine the court competent to adjudicate on a liability claim against the 
State for an alleged judicial breach of EC law.595 In theory, with the application of the 
Köbler principle in the UK any individual, who is not satisfied with the final decision 
in his or her case could start a new action against the UK Government by claiming 
compensation for a harmful judgment by the court of final instance, which was 
supposedly in breach of EC law. This new action could however not be lodged in 
front of the House of Lords as the highest court in the UK, simply because the latter 
has no jurisdiction to rule as a court of first instance. Assuming that the harmed 
individual lodges the liability claim in the High Court instead, this Court would then 
have the duty to decide in the course of the liability proceedings whether the State 
had to compensate the claimant for his/her loss. In application of the Köbler criteria, 
the High Court would therefore be compelled to interpret and ‘evaluate’ the earlier 
judgment of the House of Lords, which gave rise to the liability claim in the first 
place. In other words, in the course of the proceedings the High Court would face the 
delicate task of having to rule on the question whether the Lords’ judgment did in fact 
amount to a breach of Community law manifest enough to warrant damages. Such an 
assessment is undoubtedly tantamount to an indirect revision of the House of Lords’ 
final ruling. In sum, this would create the confusing situation whereby a court at the 
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bottom of the judicial hierarchy re-assesses a judgment previously pronounced by the 
highest court in the country.596  
 
Subsequently, if the High Court thought that there was any doubt as to the 
correctness of the Lords’ ruling, there is a reasonable likelihood that it would react in 
the same way as the Civil Court of Vienna in the Köbler case and refer the question 
for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU on the basis of Article 234 EC.597 As the UK 
government rightly stated it would first and foremost be questionable in view of the 
requirement of impartiality to have proceedings on the responsibility of a State for 
acts or omissions of its judicial organs heard by the national courts of that State, 
unless those courts were to make preliminary references to the CJEU.598 Therefore, 
also in the interest of impartiality the domestic court would search for a way to 
alleviate the burden of having to challenge indirectly the presumption that the Lords’ 
judgment was correct by involving the CJEU in the case.  
 
In response to such a reference, the CJEU would be able to rule on the content 
and the interpretation of European law.599 The preliminary rulings procedure under 
Article 267 TFEU outlines a clear division of competences between the national 
courts and the CJEU and hence establishes a framework for close cooperation 
between the national courts and the CJEU, which is based on the assignment of 
different functions. This has been confirmed even in the case-law of the Court 
itself.600 Should the CJEU therefore stay within the limits of its mandate under Article 
234 EC, then it would eventually be up to the national court of first instance to decide 
on the severity or, more precisely, the ‘manifestness’ of the Lords’ breach. Where the 
High Court’s decision subsequently progresses up the national appellate structure, it 
would eventually end up in front of the House of Lords, which is however the judicial 
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organ responsible for the breach in the first place.601 This would mean that a group of 
Law Lords was to rule on an earlier judgment previously taken by their colleagues. 
 
A second possibility would be that the CJEU might, as it did in the Köbler case, 
go as far in the course of the preliminary rulings procedure as to express an opinion 
on whether the Francovich conditions for liability were satisfied in the specific 
case.602 Thereby, the CJEU would automatically rule on the question whether the 
breach of Community law by the national court was manifest enough to invoke the 
liability of the State. However, in this case the danger would be that the CJEU’s 
involvement via the preliminary rulings procedure in Köbler-type cases under 
national law would work to the detriment of the delicate balance in the relations 
between the EU’s Court of Justice and the national courts of last instance. In the 
absence of an EU-wide common appellate structure, the relationship between the 
national courts of last instance and the CJEU is traditionally based on cooperation 
rather than hierarchy. In light of the creation of such a quasi-appeal to the CJEU by 
national courts of first instance when faced with a Köbler-like claim, this cooperative 
relationship could suffer as it clearly undermines the position of national courts of last 
instance.603  
  
In sum, precisely such a scenario would raise a number of problems for the 
domestic legal system in the UK. First, as claimed by the UK government in Köbler, 
it reduces legal certainty by allowing litigants a second chance to raise the legal 
question, which should have been resolved in the primary action. After all, for 
individuals this would open up a possibility of ‘appealing’ to the CJEU against the 
national courts’ interpretation of EC law. Secondly, there are legitimate concerns that 
the application of the Köbler principle would disturb the domestic legal hierarchy in 
the UK.604 
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c) Post-Köbler developments? 
 
While all the different objections voiced in the submission by the UK 
government and others in the Köbler case certainly weigh heavily, there are 
nevertheless a number of facts that also need to be taken into serious consideration. 
As highlighted before, the European Communities Act of 1972605 provided for the 
incorporation of Community law into the strictly dualistic legal framework in Britain. 
Through an Act of Parliament, the ECA 1972 established that Community law should 
prevail over domestic law in case of conflict, including “any enactment passed or to 
be passed.”606 By this fact, even then parts of the sovereign powers of the British 
Parliament were transferred to the Community level. This means that on the basis of 
the principle of subsidiarity specific provisions of national law, such as section 2(5) of 
the CPA, would have to be set aside for example for the overriding Community law 
principle of an individual’s right to receive compensation from the State in case of a 
violation of his or her Community rights. Ever since the judgment in Brasserie du 
Pêcheur/Factorame, but surely since Köbler, this would be the case whenever the 
conflicting doctrine of judicial immunity in the UK would render the award of such 
compensation impossible and therefore operate to deny the individual rights and 
remedies guaranteed under European Community law.607 
 
 Thereby it is important to remember that similar to cases of legislative breaches 
of EC law, a domestic remedial avenue to be pursued by an individual in case of 
judicial breaches of domestic law does not exist under British law. Similar to the 
solution applied in Factortame,608 the cause of action with respect to Köbler-type 
claims could therefore also be classified as a tort-like action sui generis or ‘Euro-tort’, 
which would again be based on the fundamental conditions set up by the CJEU in the 
Francovich line. This way, the most likely outcome would be the confirmation of the 
prevailing “dual-track approach” in the UK. In other words, the application of the 
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‘Euro-tort’ – a holding that applies only to cases, which have a Community law 
component – will leave untouched the principle of absolute judicial immunity under 
English law. The individual would then once again be forced to pursue a different 
procedural path under domestic law depending on whether there is a Community law 
component involved in the specific case or not. Each track will then lead to different 
results and a different degree of protection.  
 
So far the gradual expansion in the application of the Euro-tort by British courts 
has always been the result of decisions taken by the CJEU.609 The ongoing 
development of the Francovich principle, as aptly demonstrated in Köbler, inevitably 
poses renewed challenges for the UK courts. Even though a host of questions still 
remain unanswered in this context, the existence of the Euro-tort for judicial breaches 
of Community law is, at the latest since the Köbler ruling, an undeniable fact. One 
who has undoubtedly understood the relentlessness of this development is Lord 
Bingham, who in his dissenting opinion in the case D v. East Berkshire Community 
Health NHS Trust recently commented on the changes facing English tort law. Even 
though in this particular case he spoke with reference to the ECHR, the message 
which emerges from it is simple and can easily be conveyed to Community law: 
 
[T]he question does arise whether the law of tort should evolve, analogically 
and incrementally, so as to fashion appropriate remedies to contemporary 
problems or whether is should remain essentially static, making only such 
changes as are forced upon it, leaving difficult and, in human terms, very 
important problems to be swept up by the Convention. I prefer evolution.610 
 
Based on the concluding words of Lord Bingham, the UK will also eventually have to 
endorse the changing reality of Community law. 
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III. Graphic Overview of GROUP I 
 
State liability for judicial 
breaches only in truly 
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CHAPTER IV.                                                                            
RESTRICTED SCOPE OF STATE LIABILITY FOR JUDICIAL 
BREACHES ACCORDING TO THE SOURCE AND/OR THE NATURE 
OF THE JUDICIAL ACT CAUSING THE BREACH                       
(GROUP II) 
 
The focus of this chapter is a discussion of those national systems which fall 
under the second group of our classificatory scheme. The distinctive feature which 
characterises the Member States of this group is that in each case we find State 
liability regimes which restrict the scope of liability for damage caused by the 
judiciary according to either the source or the nature of the judicial act. The 
noteworthy differences to group I, which has been discussed in the previous chapter, 
are therefore twofold. First, instead of a total preclusion of State liability for judicial 
breaches as it is the case for countries falling under group I,623 we are now faced with 
national systems which in principle recognize the basic concept of State liability for 
harm caused by judicial authorities. However, and this is the second distinctive 
feature separating group I from group II, the restrictions imposed on the scope of 
liability in group II always concern the source624 and/or the nature of the judicial act 
itself.  
 
As the reader will recall, the Member States in the first group of our cartography 
feature rare and selective exceptions in national systems, which traditionally reject 
any form of State liability for judicial breaches. It is yet another significant feature of 
group I that these limited exceptions allowing for the State’s liability for judicial 
violations usually depend on the distinct nature and/or the source of the legal rule 
infringed. This is the case, for instance, if the judiciary acts in breach of a specific 
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international treaty or convention, to which the respective country is a signatory.625 In 
other words, for the exceptions we encounter in group I, the emphasis lies on the 
source and/or the nature of the legal rule violated by the judicial act. In group II of our 
analysis, on the other hand, we are now dealing with countries basing the limitations 
to their general framework of State liability for judicial breaches purely on the source 
and/or the nature of the judicial act, which is responsible for the violation in each 
particular case. In sum, if we were concerned with the nature and/or the source of the 
legal rule infringed before, we should now focus on the nature and/or the source of the 
actual harmful act performed by the judicial organ(s). 
 
The method of restricting the ambit of State liability qua the source and/or the 
nature of the judicial act appears to be a popular solution among different EU Member 
States. Countries pertaining to this particular group are, inter alia, Sweden,626 
Romania, Italy,627 Slovenia, Austria and Germany.628 All of these countries impose 
restrictions on the invocation of State liability for judicial breaches either with respect 
to acts performed by specific courts or court organs (source) and/or with respect to 
specific predefined acts performed by any court or court organ within the national 
judicial hierarchy (nature). Apart from this distinction between the source and the 
nature of a judicial act, there is also another pertinent feature that allows us to split the 
countries belonging to this second group into an additional subgroup. However, it 
should be underlined at this point that there is no clear line separating the two 
subgroups from each other and that countries can also qualify for both of them. In 
other words, instead of being exclusive, the two subgroups overlap. Apart from the 
main differentiation between the source and the nature of the judicial act, the 
restrictions concerning the State’s liability for judicial breaches within group II can 
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either be of a positive or a negative nature. The latter implies that group II can be 
subdivided between those countries whose restrictions of the State’s liability for acts 
performed by the judiciary are of an exclusive (or positive) character, and those 
countries featuring restrictions of an inclusive (or negative) nature.629 Systems 
containing limitations of an exclusive character in theory recognize the principle of 
State liability for judicial breaches and only exclude a specific predefined group of 
cases from its application. As a result, these national systems tend to be much more 
receptive and positively inclined towards the concept of State liability for judicial 
breaches in general. The countries which feature restrictions of an inclusive character, 
however, start from the basic premise that there is no general principle of State 
liability for judicial breaches. Based on this negative assumption, they strictly limit 
the application of such form of liability to an exceptional and narrowly defined 
number of acts.  
 
While the additional distinction between exclusive and inclusive systems only 
takes place within the second group of our cartography, it is nevertheless an 
interesting feature, which allows us to categorize the different national systems even 
beyond the four core groups which we have identified already. Given the variety of 
different features included in group II, our aim in this chapter will be to demonstrate 
the widest possible spectrum of all the countries included in this group. Therefore, we 
will first discuss the case of a Member State featuring a general exclusion of State 
liability for breaches committed by specific courts (source) on the one hand, only to 
then move on to a country foreclosing certain acts (nature) entirely from its State 
liability regime on the other.630 In the latter case, the example chosen will be Italy, 
where we also have the unique opportunity of following the CJEU’s own analysis on 
the compatibility of the domestic liability regime with the Köbler principle in the case 
Traghetti del Mediterraneo Spa.631 
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 For a general overview of all the countries pertaining to group II and their division into various 
subgroups, see graph on p. 227. 
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For the former, the Austrian system of State liability and its restrictions in terms 
of attribution represent the prime example or the prototype for all the Member States 
classified under the heading of group II. In light of the Köbler case the choice of 
Austria was an obvious one for two reasons. First, there is the advantage of examining 
what procedural and/or substantive adjustments were required in Austria to implement 
the Köbler ruling. Second, as noted earlier, the Austrian case is a vivid example of a 
public liability regime that restricts the State’s liability for harmful acts committed by 
the judiciary according to the source of the damaging act. In other words, in Austria 
the invocation of State liability for harmful judicial acts has been limited depending 
on which court was ruling in the particular case.  
 
Overall, the Austrian system of regulation is of a positive nature in the sense 
that the general recognition of the concept of State liability for judicial breaches is 
merely restricted with respect to the national supreme courts. In fact, in Austria the 
three superior courts enjoy absolute immunity from suit for all their acts. Similarly, an 
almost identical concept of such limited application has been implemented in Sweden, 
where the State’s liability for harmful acts committed by judicial organs is also 
entirely excluded whenever the violation stems from one of the Swedish supreme 
courts.632 In the case of Austria and Sweden, we are therefore faced with what has 
previously been called restrictions of an exclusive character. Both of these systems 
differentiate on the basis of the source of the respective act and consequently, based 
on this criterion then only exclude acts of certain courts from the generally applicable 
State liability regime for judicial breaches. 
 
While one part of the Member States in group II base the restrictions to their 
State liability regimes on the source of the harmful judicial act, a similar form of 
limitation has been set up in other countries which also belong to the second group of 
our classification scheme. As mentioned before, this second set of countries contained 
in group II applies a slightly different method of restricting the public liability 
framework for erroneous judicial acts. Contrary to the first sub-group, where we were 
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concerned with the source of the allegedly harmful act, the restrictions applied in this 
second sub-group are based on the nature of the judicial act causing the damage. The 
method of using the nature of a judicial act as the decisive criterion for or against the 
State’s liability for damages caused by the judiciary is a concept applied, inter alia, 
under Italian, Romanian, German and Slovenian law. The limitations to the general 
State liability regime for judicial violations in these countries are therefore not 
targeted at the question of which particular court carried out the harmful act, but 
rather at which type of act had been performed by the national judicial officer(s) 
causing the damage. By using the notion of ‘type’ in this context we are once again 
referring to the specific nature of an act, which can be determined according to the 
explicit characteristics attached to it.  
 
In Germany, for example, State liability for judicial breaches is restricted to acts 
which constitute a crime according to the German Criminal Code.633 Thus, it is 
important to underline that the restrictions to the German State liability regime only 
apply to judicial acts stricto sensu. In cases when a judicial organ performs ministerial 
acts or administrative tasks, State liability can be fully invoked under the general 
provisions of Article 839(1) BGB.634 In Italy, on the other hand, we encounter a 
system that excludes entirely the State’s liability for any judicial act involving legal 
interpretation and the evaluation of facts and evidence.635 As we can deduce from 
these examples, the second sub-category of group II not only includes national 
systems featuring so-called restrictions of an exclusive nature, but also contains 
countries whose limitations to the State’s liability for judicial breaches are of an 
inclusive character. The latter, like Germany, recognise the liability of the State for 
judicial breaches only in cases when the harmful judicial act possesses additional 
characteristics which qualify it in terms of its nature. Starting from the premise that 
judicial violations generally do not invoke liability, the German system, as mentioned 
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before, only allows for the State’s liability whenever the judicial act constitutes a 
crime according to the German Criminal Code.636  
 
In sum, group II of our cartography comprises a large and also rather diverse set 
of countries. For the reasons outlined above and in order to cover the widest possible 
spectrum, the focus of the following section will first be on the legal situation in 
Austria, which is a country that also belongs to the first sub-category of group II as it 
features restrictions of a purely exclusive nature. In the course of our discussion of 
Austria’s legal framework with respect to State liability claims for judicial breaches, 
we will also briefly address the corresponding regime in Sweden. In the second part of 
this chapter we will then look at the Italian regime of State liability in light of the 
CJEU’s recent ruling in the case Traghetti del Mediterraneo Spa v. Italy.637  
 
 
State Liability for Judicial Breaches limited by the Source of the Judicial Act: 
 
The Case of AUSTRIA 
 
 
I. The Existing Regime of State Liability for Judicial Acts in Austria 
 
 
Despite the undeniable fact that the Austrian example is topical, a further reason 
for its relevance is that Köbler provoked immediate reactions from scholars in 
Austria, the repercussions of which even influenced a recent reform project on the 
Austrian Constitution, which was developed by a high-level group of experts at the 
time.638 In fact, not long after the CJEU’s ruling at the end of September 2003, the 
first initiatives and proposals emerged in the doctrine calling for a substantial 
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 The so-called ‘Richterspruchprivileg’ (or also ‘Spruchrichterprivileg’) of Article 839(2) para. 1 of 
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overhaul of the current legal framework of State liability in Austria, especially with 
respect to violations committed by the judiciary.639 As straightforward as the Austrian 
system might appear at first glance, the problems of its application have been evident 
in practice and became even more obvious in light of Köbler. Despite the various 
substantive legal inconsistencies surrounding the general framework of public liability 
in Austria, one of the most troubling issues in the past was related to unresolved 
procedural questions in this area. The current legal framework in Austria still does not 
provide for a clear division of competences with regard to public liability claims. 
However, by now there is at least some clarifying jurisprudence on the matter.640 All 
of the above questions will be addressed in the course of our analysis of the basic 
features of the Austrian State liability regime. 
 
1. Tour d’horizon of the general framework of State liability in Austria  
 
a) The Public Tort Liability Act (‘Amtshaftungsgesetz’) 
 
The acknowledgment of public liability for damages caused to an individual by 
organs of the State acting in the performance of their duties, and thus in the exercise 
of sovereign functions, is one of the basic pillars of the ‘Rechtsstaat’. In fact, it 
reflects directly the State’s inherent duty to act according to the law and the principles 
of equity and fairness.641 As in most EU Member States, in Austria the general 
analysis of all the issues related to the question of State liability also leads to a close 
interaction between substantive legal elements rooted in public and in private law. An 
explicit reference to the interface of public and private law elements can even be 
found in the normative provisions regulating the framework of State liability in 
Austria, which explicitly declare that the State as a public entity is liable according to 
the general principles of liability under civil law for any damage incurred by its 
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 A similar situation recently emerged in Portugal where the newly enacted law on State liability 
(Law no. 67/2007 of 31 December 2007) expressly addresses Köbler-like situations under national law.   
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 See especially Verfassungsgerichtshof, 10.10.2003, A-36/00.  
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 BERND-CHRISTIAN FUNK, "Staatshaftung auf der Grundlage von Gemeinschaftsrecht: Ein 
umstrittener und folgenreicher Beitrag des EuGH zur Stärkung der Rechtsgemeinschaft" (1997) Ecolex 
8, p. 553. See also ERNST HELLBLING, "Die Amtshaftung" (1949) Österreichische Juristen-Zeitung 14, 
pp. 365 and 371. 




administrative or its judicial organs in the exercise of official duties.642 Accordingly, 
the respective law on public liability in Austria is regarded as a lex specialis to the 
general rules on civil liability as outlined in Articles 1293 et seq. of the Allgemeine 
Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch (ABGB), the Austrian Civil Code.643 Hence, like in many 
other Member States the State liability regime in Austria is an emanation of the 
general framework of damages liability under civil law.644   
 
Contrary to, for instance, the British system of torts, which remains to a large 
part uncodified, the Austrian framework of public liability rests at least with respect to 
its substantive rules on a firm statutory basis. The general principle of State liability is 
embedded in the Austrian Constitution, the Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz (B-VG),645 and 
is further regulated in the Amtshaftungsgesetz,646 which is an ordinary law containing 
the detailed provisions for the enactment of the State’s liability for loss or damage 
caused to an individual by public organs in the exercise of their official duties. Article 
23(1) of the Austrian Constitution contains the core regulation on this question, which 
declares that 
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 Article 1(1) AHG. See FUNK, "Staatshaftung...," supra note 641, p. 553, FERDINAND KOPP, "Die 
Staatshaftung in rechtsvergleichender Sicht" in J. Aicher (ed.), Die Haftung für staatliche 
Fehlleistungen im Wirtschaftsleben (Vienna, Orac, 1988), pp. 55-56 and INGRID MEIER, "Prozeßkosten 
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and PHILIPP SUTTER, "Die Verjährung von Staats-, Amts- und Organhaftungsansprüchen" in M. 
Holoubek and M. Lang (eds.), Organhaftung und Staatshaftung in Steuersachen (Wien, Linde Verlag, 
2002), p. 311. 
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 Bundesgesetz vom 18. Dezember 1948, womit die Haftung des Bundes, der Länder, der Bezirke, der 
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[t]he Federation, the Länder, the districts, the municipalities and the other 
bodies and institutions established under public law are liable for the injury 
which persons acting on their behalf in execution of the laws have by illegal 
behaviour culpably inflicted on whomsoever.647  
 
The Constitution therefore defines in a general manner the basic concept of 
State liability (‘Amtshaftung’) and introduces a regime of public liability for damages 
caused by public authorities while acting in the performance of their official duties. 
The constitutional provision of Article 23(1) of the Constitution spells out the core 
elements of the national State liability regime and is complemented by the ‘Federal 
Law of 18 December 1948 regulating the liability of the Federation, the government 
of the Länder, the districts and the municipalities and the other bodies and institutions 
under public law for any damage resulting from the implementation of the law (Public 
Tort Liability Act - AHG)’.648 This law has been enacted on the basis of Article 23(4) 
of the Constitution in order to clarify and to refine the basic constitutional principle 
enshrined in Article 23(1) B-VG.649 
 
Furthermore, according to Article 23(1) B-VG in combination with Article 1(1) 
of the AHG the State liability regime in Austria is fault-based, which implies that the 
State is only liable if the conduct of its organs involves a certain degree of fault on 
their part. This basic feature of the system labels Austria not only as a member of 
group II, but also as a candidate for group III of our cartography. Austria is therefore 
one of the countries qualifying for two different groups of our classification scheme, 
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group II and group III. Accordingly, Austria will be categorized under both groups. 
As we will devote the entirety of the next chapter to the analysis of the third group of 
our classification scheme, we will at this point limit the discussion to the basic fault-
related elements of the Austrian concept of State liability. However, in the course of 
chapter V, which will be outlining the third group of our classification, we will then 
return to the fault-based elements peculiar to the Austrian legal framework of State 
liability.650  
 
Contrary to the basic concept of fault under Austrian civil law, which generally 
embraces both subjective and objective elements, the country’s Public Tort Liability 
Act (the AHG) is attached to an understanding of fault, which is reduced to objective 
criteria only.651 This particular feature of the Austrian public liability regime also 
arises out of the fact that according to Article 2(1) of the AHG State liability claims in 
Austria do not – contrary to claims of civil liability – require the harmed individual to 
identify unequivocally the perpetrator of the act. Instead, it suffices in this context to 
prove merely that the damage had been committed by an organ of the State, without 
having to name it precisely.652 Since the definition of fault based on subjective criteria 
necessitates a detailed analysis of the perpetrator’s behaviour in order to determine 
whether he or she acted negligently or with clear intent, the more general provisions 
concerning State liability in Austria do not require such proof.653 Nevertheless, the 
explicit referral to a fault-based public liability regime in Article 23(1) B-VG and 
Article 1(1) AHG therefore led to the introduction of a concept of fault, which is 
based on objective criteria.654 Rather than the subjective motivation of the perpetrator, 
fault in this case is defined from an objective perspective by the fact that the acting 
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organ did not apply the necessary common standards of diligence generally required 
when performing the harmful act. Subjective elements are to be entirely factored out 
in this case and a single standard of diligence applies.655 The “objective 
interpretation” of the condition of fault under Article 23 B-VG can be based directly 
on Article 2(1) AHG. Due to the fact that the constitutional provision of Article 23 B-
VG merely sets up the minimum standards for the State’s liability, the loosening of 
the requirement of fault in a federal law therefore does not constitute a violation of the 
Austrian Constitution.656 
 
Apart from the substantive restriction of State liability claims to acts of the 
executive and the judiciary, the Austrian AHG explicitly provides for two additional 
procedural limitations. First, a public liability claim cannot be lodged by an individual 
if the injured party could have avoided the loss or damage by making use of a legal 
remedy. Article 2(2) AHG stipulates that this rule applies if there had been a 
possibility of lodging an appeal or even the option of bringing a complaint in front of 
the Austrian Supreme Administrative Court.657 However, the sanction only concerns 
that part of the overall damage, which could have been avoided by making use of the 
regular appellate proceedings.658 This additional procedural element is a feature, 
which we will encounter repeatedly in various Member States, even in different 
groups of our classification scheme.  
                                                 
655
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URTZ, "Haftung...," supra note 657, pp. 267 et seq. 




b) State liability for breaches by the national legislature 
 
According to the precise wording of Article 23(1) B-VG, the State organs which 
are potentially able to trigger the State’s liability include any natural person acting “in 
the implementation of laws.”659 While the constitutional provision itself does not 
specify any further the public organs which are to be included under this definition, 
the official commentary to Article 23 B-VG clarifies that the expression “in 
Vollziehung der Gesetze”660 is to be interpreted as merely embracing the 
administrative and the judicial branches of the State.661 Consequently, it can already 
be tentatively assumed from the Constitution that the liability regime in Austria does 
not include the concept of State liability for acts or omissions by the national 
legislature.662 This view is supported by the total absence of either substantive or 
procedural legal provisions within the domestic legal order regulating liability claims 
of such sort. The related jurisprudence and the doctrine have interpreted the silence of 
the legislature in this context as being tantamount to a general repudiation of the 
concept of State liability for legislative breaches in Austria.663 Confirmation thereof is 
also provided in the wording of Article 1(2) of the Public Tort Liability Act (AHG), 
which unambiguously interprets the phrase of “in the implementation of laws” as to 
embrace only the executive and the judiciary.664  
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The exclusion of the legislative branch from the general State liability regime 
certainly runs contrary to the wide scope of attribution of public liability on the 
Community level, which embraces all three branches of the State. However, on this 
point the Austrian regulation is similar to that in a number of other Member States 
such as, for example, the Netherlands, Ireland, the Czech Republic, United Kingdom, 
Slovakia and Germany.665 All these countries reject the possibility of claiming 
damages from the State for allegedly harmful acts or omissions of the national 
legislature.666 As formulated in Article 23(1) B-VG and Article 1(2) AHG the public 
authorities assuming the State’s liability in Austria are reduced to those organs acting 
“in the implementation of laws”,667 which – as previously demonstrated – means the 
administrative branch and the judiciary.668 
 
c) State liability for judicial breaches: Analysis of Article 23(1) of the Austrian 
Constitution in conjunction with Article 2(3) AHG 
  
As regards the source of the judgment, 
only the Republic of Austria and the 
Kingdom of Sweden limit State liability 
to the decisions of ordinary courts, 
excluding those of supreme courts.669  
 
In Austria, the question of the applicability of the general State liability regime 
to judicial violations is also expressly regulated in the AHG. However, whereas 
Article 23(1) B-VG and Article 1(2) AHG broadly recognize the application of this 
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principle also to damages inferred by acts of the national judiciary, Article 2(3) of the 
AHG nevertheless restricts the invocation of such liability depending on the source of 
the judicial act by stating that 
 
[a] decision of the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court in civil and 
commercial, social security, employment law and criminal law matters, and 
the Supreme Administrative Court shall not give rise to a right to redress.670 
 
Article 2(3) AHG unequivocally declares that the State’s liability for any 
decision or act of the three Austrian superior courts is excluded without reservation.671 
As a result, in order to shield decisions of final instance courts from indirect review in 
the course of liability proceedings, all judgments taken by the Austrian Constitutional 
Court (‘Verfassungsgerichtshof’),672 the Supreme Administrative Court 
(‘Verwaltungsgerichtshof’)673 and the Supreme Court in civil, commercial, social 
security, employment law and criminal law matters (‘Oberste Gerichtshof’)674 are 
precluded without exception from the general, constitutionally-based principle of 
State responsibility for acts performed by the national judiciary.675  
 
While, as we have seen in the previous chapter the United Kingdom provides 
for a comprehensive veil of immunity for all acts of the judiciary in section 2(5) of the 
Crown Proceedings Act 1947,676 the Austrian system is more selective in this respect 
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and shields only those judicial acts which emanate from one of the three highest 
courts within the national judicial hierarchy from public liability claims. Put briefly, 
apart from the requirement of a qualified fault, the basic restriction to the concept of 
State liability for judicial breaches in Austria is the rule that no claim for indemnity 
can be based on an act performed by either one of these three courts.677 Moreover, the 
judgment of a court of final instance also automatically protects all those rulings 
issued by lower instance courts in the course of the same proceedings, which ruled in 
accordance with the final ruling. Interestingly enough, this means that in case one of 
the three superior courts issues an erroneous judgment, Article 2(3) AHG not only 
protects this final decision, but also all concurring – even if erroneous – judgments 
declared by lower instance courts in the course of the proceedings in the same case.678 
The rationale behind this rule is once again based on the need to protect the three 
courts of last instance from an indirect review of their jurisprudence qua liability 
proceedings, which are lodged against a concurring judgment of a lower instance 
court in the same proceedings. 
 
Nevertheless, the fact that the constitutional provision of Article 23 B-VG 
contains no direct reference to the special immunity awarded to the highest courts in 
the country initially led to controversy in the literature. While Klecatsky679 classified 
the exemption contained in Article 2(3) AHG as amounting to a violation of the 
Austrian Constitution, the writings of Walter and Mayer,680 as well as those of Walter 
Schragel681 all base the rationale behind Article 2(3) AHG on the unwritten principle 
of litis finiri opportet. This maxim, which conforms to the principle of res judicata, 
embraces the argument that for the purposes of arriving at a final decision there ought 
to be a limit to the principle of legal protection of the individual. Moreover, according 
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to their opinion, this was the only way to avoid a potential cascade of actions for 
damages against final decisions taken by one of the Austrian supreme courts.682 In 
support of the latter opinion, Klagian even suggested elevating section 2(3) AHG to 
the rank of a constitutional norm.683  
 
The same arguments resurfaced again in the observations of various 
governments in Köbler and are still used by critical voices in the literature today to 
oppose an all-embracing concept of State liability for judicial breaches on the national 
level.684 In fact, a similar set of arguments reoccurs throughout the EU-wide debate on 
this question. As we have previously observed in the case of the Netherlands, the 
United Kingdom and Ireland, in Austria too one of the core objections against the 
implementation of a comparable State liability regime was that the particular role of 
courts of last instance within the national judicial hierarchy had to be protected. What 
this entails is shielding them from the possibility that a direct or indirect review of 
their final decisions in the course of an action for damages against the State would not 
only violate the principle of res judicata, but would also prolong the proceedings ad 
infinitum. This reasoning underlined once again the importance of the principle of 
finality for judicial proceedings.685 
 
In the literature on this question, authors try to caution against the potential 
danger of an infinite circularity of legal proceedings. Accountability of courts of last 
instance qua State liability would entail that, for instance, a judgment of the Oberster 
Gerichtshof could give rise to a claim for damages and lead to an indirect revision of 
the final judgment in secondary proceedings. Accordingly, even an implicit review of 
the case in the course of liability proceedings would constitute a direct affront to the 
principle of legal certainty, which stipulates that proceedings should come to an end at 
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the level of courts of last instance.686 In sum, the three superior courts constitute so-
called ‘Grenzorgane’,687 which are organs bound by law, but whose decisions cannot 
be subject to any legal control including direct or indirect review by another organ of 
the State.688  
 
Finally, and somewhat connected to the previous argument, the Austrian 
Constitution guarantees an institutional balance and parity between the three national 
supreme courts.689 The possibility of claims for damages for an allegedly erroneous 
decision of a national supreme court would invoke the competence of the special 
‘Supreme Liability Chamber’ of the Oberste Gerichtshof,690 which, according to the 
law of civil procedure, generally constitutes the final instance in State liability 
proceedings. However, a final judgment by the aforementioned Chamber would not 
only impair the constitutional imperative of maintaining an equal balance between the 
national supreme courts in Austria, but it would also elevate the position of the 
Supreme Liability Chamber of the Oberste Gerichtshof to the highest judicial 
instance, which would be charged with the questionable duty of reviewing – even if 
only in an implicit manner – final decisions taken by one of the other national 
supreme courts.691 Such a possibility would, according to the aforementioned authors, 
severely disturb the established national judicial hierarchy and as noted before, also 
impinge on the constitutional guarantee of absolute parity between the three superior 
courts.692 In light of the debate on whether Article 2(3) AHG was compatible with 
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Article 23(1) B-VG, Meier argued that the restrictions contained in Article 2(3) AHG 
were justified precisely because of the paramount duty to respect the constitutional 
principle of parity between the OGH, the VfGH and the VwGH. At the same time this 
implies that apart from the three Supreme Courts, liability proceedings can be based 
on an act by any other court, even if ruling in the function of court of last instance, 
can never be excluded by law.693 
  
While, as we mentioned before, the relevance of these principles was initially 
challenged in the literature,694 their weight and significance was in the end explicitly 
confirmed in the jurisprudence. The groundbreaking ruling in this respect was the 
judgment of the Oberste Gerichthof of 25 August 1993.695 In this specific case the 
Oberste Gerichtshof was directly confronted with the question as to whether the 
quasi-immunity of the superior courts was justified under the Austrian Constitution. 
Hence, the OGH was finally forced to clarify whether Article 2(3) AHG was in fact 
compatible with the constitutional principles enshrined in Article 23 of the B-VG.  
 
The case, which dealt with an alleged violation of procedural guarantees in 
criminal case, prompted the claimant to initiate liability proceedings against the State. 
Based on the argument that decisions of superior courts in Austria could never give 
rise to State liability, the claim had been dismissed in the first two instances. In the 
final instance, the Oberste Gerichtshof was then asked to rule on whether the 
established Haftungsprivileg, i.e. the principle of immunity of superior courts in 
Austria, was justified under the general constitutional principle of State liability as 
defined in Article 23 of the Austrian Constitution. In its landmark ruling of 25 August 
1993 the Oberste Gerichtshof stated that even though the legal provision establishing 
the exclusion of the three superior courts from the general State liability scheme was 
not at constitutional, but rather at federal law level, the reasoning behind this 
exception was motivated by a number of reasons and principles, which found their 
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origin in the Austrian Constitution.696 Therefore, the OGH eventually proclaimed that 
Article 2(3) of the Public Tort Liability Act was in full compliance with the general 
constitutional principle of State liability as regulated in Article 23 of the Austrian 
Constitution.697  
 
After this ruling, the general principle of quasi-immunity of the superior courts 
in Austria has remained almost unchallenged. Nevertheless, exceptions to this so-
called ‘Haftungsprivileg’ have been established under national law. First, similar to 
the situation in the countries pertaining in group I, an exception to the general 
immunity clause was introduced by the European Convention on Human Rights. As 
demonstrated in the previous chapter, judicial violations of the Convention most 
frequently relate to guarantees enshrined in Article 6 of the ECHR.698 Austria has 
been a signatory to the ECHR since 1958 and under national law the Convention 
occupies the status of directly applicable federal constitutional law.699 Therefore, 
judicial violations of the ECHR mark without doubt an exception to the superior 
courts’ protective immunity in Austria. While a court’s violation of the Convention 
does not affect the validity of the judgment itself, it nevertheless allows for “just 
satisfaction” to be awarded to the harmed individual.700 Moreover, under Austrian law 
there are also special provisions to compensate victims of unjustified detention on 
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remand and false conviction.701 However, as previously stated, compensation 
payments of that sort are strictly speaking not to be regarded as acts of State 
liability.702   
 
This feature of the Austrian regime of State liability, an absolute immunity from 
suit for decisions of particular courts or specific judicial instances, is a characteristic 
trait of national liability regimes pertaining to group II of our legal taxonomy. The 
immunity of the superior courts of Austria is not to be equated with a system 
precluding State liability claims for all judicial acts, such as in the United Kingdom, 
nor is it similar to a national framework excluding State liability for judicial breaches 
for all judicial acts which have acquired the authority of res judicata. The latter is a 
system which we will encounter in group IV of our classification scheme and which 
applies to countries such as Belgium and Luxembourg.703 Even though it is the case 
that in Austria judgments of the three supreme superior will also inevitably be cloaked 
with the authority of res judicata, the restrictions in group IV nevertheless extended 
further than that to preclude liability claims for all judicial acts having acquired the 
status of res judicata, be it the decision of a supreme court or any other ruling by a 
court of lower instance, which has not been appealed within the designated timeframe 
and has thus become final and practically irrevocable.704  
 
d) The Swedish model 
 
A public liability regime which shares the particularities we find in the Austrian 
case and at the same time also features restrictions to its liability scheme that go 
beyond the immunity of the highest courts, is the framework of State liability in 
Sweden.705 Generally speaking, Swedish State liability is a fault-based regime, which 
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implies that the State is only liable in cases of intentional or negligent acts.706 This 
additional feature qualifies the country not only for group II of our classificatory 
scheme, but additionally also renders it an eligible candidate for group III, which we 
will, however, analyse in detail in the next chapter.707 The relevant procedural rules 
concerning liability claims against the State in Sweden are regulated in the Code of 
Judicial Procedure (Rättegångsbalken). The latter also awards exclusive competence 
to ordinary courts to rule in such cases.708  
 
Similar to § 2(3) of the Austrian AHG, Swedish law also contains a specific 
statutory provision, namely Chapter 3 Section 7 of the Swedish Tort Liability Act 
(Skadeståndslagen), which lists the exceptions to the general public liability regime. 
Acts of the Government (Regeringen), the Swedish Parliament (Riksdagen) and the 
two Supreme Courts (Högsta domstolen and Regeringsrätten) are exempted from the 
general scheme of State liability. Any claims for compensation which are raised 
against an act of the above organs are to be declared inadmissible. With respect to the 
two Supreme Courts, not only decisions, but also omissions, i.e. the failure or refusal 
to render a decision, are covered by the exemption in Chapter 3 Section 7 of the 
Swedish Tort Liability Act. Hence, like in the case of Austria, one of the most 
prominent features of the Swedish public liability scheme is the exemption of all acts 
of its Supreme Courts from liability claims against the State. Furthermore, this 
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protective shield extends also to those – even erroneous – judgments of inferior 
courts, which have later been conclusively decided by one of the two Supreme Courts. 
The latter principle is also acknowledged in a similar manner in Austria.709   
 
The reasons lying behind the exemption of Swedish Supreme Courts from the 
general liability scheme are twofold. First, as Advocate General Léger already stated 
in his Opinion in Köbler, “[t]he Swedish legislation excluding State liability for the 
acts or omissions of supreme courts seems to have been the result of the absence of an 
appropriate national court or tribunal to hear any action for damages of that type.”710 
Moreover, there is a general belief that the risk of fault in decisions by the highest 
courts in Sweden is small enough so as to justify the quasi-exclusion of damages 
claims.711 Consequently, the immunity of the Supreme Courts in Sweden can only be 
lifted in one specific case: as soon as the harmful judgment in question has been 
revoked (declared invalid or changed), the Chapter 3 Section 7 exemption no longer 
applies and State liability claims can even be invoked against a judgment issued by 
one of the two Supreme Courts. In practice, these limitations imply that when it 
comes to acts performed by the Swedish Supreme Court (Högsta domstolen) or the 
Supreme Administrative Court (Regeringsrätten), damages can only be awarded if the 
harmful judgment has been rescinded and changed in a new trial.712 On a final note it 
should also be mentioned that under Swedish law separate regulations have been 
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e) Procedural aspects: questions of competence 
 
As in Sweden, in Austria the competence to rule on liability claims against the 
State generally also lies with the ordinary courts. The primary reference regarding the 
rules of competence is Article 9(1) of the AHG, which declares that proceedings 
concerning the State’s liability for breaches of law would fall within the inherent 
jurisdiction of the courts of first instance in civil and commercial matters.714 This 
implies that the competence in such cases primarily lies with the Austrian Regional 
Civil Courts, the Austrian Landesgerichte.715 State liability claims are to be lodged 
exclusively against the State and can never be brought against the organ responsible 
for the breach.716 Accordingly, in cases of State liability brought about by breaches of 
domestic law, competence is attributed to the civil courts in first instance. Moreover, 
Article 9(4) AHG is a special rule on delegation, which is particularly interesting in 
light of the focus of our study. It states that in case the liability claim is based on an 
act performed by a decision of a court of first or second instance and would the same 
court be competent, directly or in the course of the appellate procedure, to rule on the 
liability claim, it will be incumbent on the higher instance court to reassign 
competence in this case.717 It follows from this provision that if, for example, the 
Landesgericht is faced with the problem of having to decide upon a liability claim 
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directed against one of its own decisions, it is the Oberlandesgericht’s duty to 
delegate the case to a different court of first instance.718  
 
2. Community law ante portas: the application of the Francovich-line in 
Austria in light of the principle of national procedural autonomy 
 
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, there is no explicit statutory basis for 
the concept of Member State liability within the primary and secondary sources of EU 
law. Instead, the European Community’s framework of liability of its Member States 
has been developed entirely by the EU’s Court of Justice in its extensive case-law on 
the matter.719 As previously discussed, in its longstanding jurisprudence the CJEU has 
established the principle that a Member State failing to comply with its obligations 
under the EC Treaty would be liable for the damage or loss caused to an individual.720 
However, in line with the concomitant principle of national procedural autonomy, the 
onus is on the Member States to “designate the courts having jurisdiction and to 
determine […] the protection of the rights which citizens have from the direct effect of 
Community law.”721 In order to achieve this aim, two feasible options are usually 
available under national law. First, the national judiciary can resort to the direct 
applicability of Community law as a self-standing cause of action under national law 
with its own set of procedural guarantees, a method which is used in England and 
Wales.722 Alternatively, in case there is a comparable domestic legal basis, the courts 
can interpret national law in conformity with Community law principles, as it has 
been, amongst others, the traditional practice in France.723  
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The challenges arising under the latter option certainly lie in the quest for a 
suitable substantive and procedural ‘avenue’ under national law through which the 
Community right can be smoothly ‘transplanted’ into the national remedial 
framework. Therefore, not only with respect to Austria, but also with respect to the 
other 26 EU Member States, a set of fundamental questions instantly emerges in this 
context: which legal basis is used under national law in order to enact State liability 
claims for breaches of Community law? Furthermore, which national court is 
competent to rule on such issues? And finally, which norms of national procedural 
law are applicable in these cases? In an attempt to address some of these questions for 
the case of Austria, the following paragraphs will be divided into two sections dealing 
with the substantive issues involved on the one hand and the procedural aspects at 
stake on the other. 
 
At the outset of this analysis it is important to highlight that – similar to the 
situation in most EU Member States724 – there is currently no explicit provision 
within the Austrian legal framework regulating the enforcement of State liability 
claims based on a violation of European Community law.725 In the absence of the 
creation of an explicit legal basis under national law and in light of the principle of 
national procedural autonomy, it is therefore for the judiciary to ensure the full 
application of Community rights, which includes the individual’s right to damages for 
harm caused to him/her by a breach of Community law.726 In order to safeguard the 
aggrieved parties’ right to reparation, the predominant opinion in the Austrian legal 
doctrine as well as the jurisprudence of the national superior Courts acknowledge the 
application of the national framework of public liability as regulated in the AHG.727 
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However, the AHG is only applicable insofar as it is strictly interpreted in conformity 
with the principles established on the Community level.728 As a result, similar to the 
case of France, which we will examine in the following chapter, in Austria national 
law also provides the framework through which the Community right takes effect on 
the domestic level.729  
 
A direct comparison of Article 23 B-VG and the AHG with the fundamental 
principles of Member State liability under Community law reveals some similarities, 
but also a number of discrepancies between the two systems. These differences are 
clearest with respect to the limits, the content and the overall requirements of State 
liability. It is the first of these issues, the assessment of the limits of State liability on 
the national versus the Community level, which is of principal interest for the 
purposes of the present discussion. In fact, on the specific question of attribution, i.e. 
the process of assigning acts by public authorities to the sphere of a State’s liability 
regime, the two systems are by no means entirely congruent. On the Community 
level, the CJEU has repeatedly declared in its jurisprudence that the concept of 
Member State liability embraces breaches of Community law committed by any 
organ of the State.730 Does the AHG comply with the wide scope of attribution 
presupposed by EC law, which invokes the State’s liability for violations of 
Community law “whichever public authority is responsible for the breach”?731  
 
Based on a preliminary assessment, it can be assumed that liability claims for 
administrative breaches of Community law can be subsumed under the corresponding 
national provisions of the AHG as far as they are in conformity with the requirements 
established on the Community level. And in fact, this method appears to be 
uncontested in practice.732 However, similar to the case of England and Wales where 
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we encounter an extensive scheme of legal protection shielding acts by the legislature 
and the judiciary from liability proceedings, we are now faced with similar but not as 
far-reaching restrictions under Austrian law. As mentioned before, in Austria the 
State’s liability is expressly precluded for legislative wrongs as well as for erroneous 
acts by the national superior courts. Hence, if an individual claims damages due to a 
violation of Community law by the legislature or by a national superior court, several 
intricate legal issues will have to be considered under national law concerning the 
interaction between the related Community law principle and the domestic legal basis 
for the claim. The principle of parliamentary sovereignty and the quasi-infallibility of 
the national superior courts in the context of Austria’s State liability regime evidently 
stand in stark contrast to the CJEU’s inclusive approach on the question of 
attribution. In theory for cases with Community-law relevance the conflicting 
national rules in Austria should remain inapplicable as Community law is granted 
primacy.733  
 
a) State liability for breaches of Community law by the national legislature 
 
In a judgment of 30 January 2001, the OGH expressly confirmed that while the 
principle of State liability for legislative breaches was a familiar concept under 
European Community law, it was a concept unknown to the legal system in 
Austria.734 Despite the absence of a similar framework under Austrian law, when it 
came to breaches of EC law by the national legislature, the Austrian courts not only 
answered in the affirmative to the question of competence, but also clearly opted for 
an analogous application of the national framework on State liability for 
administrative breaches of domestic law to violations of Community law committed 
fully or in part by the national legislature.735 In contrast to the solution introduced in 
the United Kingdom in this context, where the Factortame litigation and the newly 
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created Euro-tort also owe their existence to the absence of a suitable domestic cause 
of action for damages caused by the enactment of primary legislation,736 the silence 
of the Austrian legislature regarding the concept of State liability for legislative 
breaches was solved through the analogous application of the national liability 
regime for administrative breaches. This specific procedural avenue was used to 
‘transplant’ the respective Community right into the domestic system of remedies. 
 
In this way, the courts vowed to respect the conditions which had been set up by 
the CJEU in its case-law, namely the principle of equivalence and the principle of 
effectiveness.737 With explicit reference to the principle of primacy of Community 
law, the Regional Civil Court of Vienna underlined in one of its rulings that the 
national legal order had to be interpreted in such a way as to guarantee for the full 
enforcement of Community law. Consequently, the AHG would have to ensure the 
individual’s access to justice with respect to his/her claim of State liability for 
breaches of EC law.738 It was subsequently confirmed on appeal by the Oberste 
Gerichtshof that in the absence of a domestic law regulating the State’s liability for 
breaches incurred by the national legislature, the rules contained in the AHG should 
be applied accordingly, but only as far as the procedural and substantive regulations 
were in conformity with Community law.739 Otherwise, the total absence of a suitable 
national legal basis with respect to claims of State liability for breaches of 
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Community law would lead to the direct application of the Community right as a self-
standing cause of action under domestic law.740  
 
b) Procedural aspects: questions of competence 
 
While in Britain the procedural question of Crown liability with respect to 
administrative breaches of EC law had quickly been resolved, in Austria the basic 
process of identifying the national courts competent to rule on State liability claims 
for breaches of EC law by a public authority already stirred a considerable amount of 
controversy in the literature.741 At the centre of the debate was the question of which 
procedural provisions to subsume such claims under. Generally speaking, there are 
two feasible legal bases under national law which could potentially regulate the 
procedural competence regarding State liability claims involving Community law.742 
The primary reference in this context is Article 9 of the AHG,743 which states that 
disputes concerning State liability for breaches of national law fall within the inherent 
jurisdiction of the courts of first instance in civil matters, i.e. the Austrian 
Landesgerichte. Considering the analogous applicability of the AHG for substantive 
issues concerning cases of State liability for breaches of Community law in Austria, 
the same legal basis could be applied for the regulation of the procedural questions 
involved. In that case, the national courts competent to rule on liability claims for 
breaches of national law by a public authority would be equally competent to decide 
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upon liability claims related to breaches of Community law. This solution has even 
been supported in the jurisprudence.744 
 
However, part of the Austrian legal doctrine supported the view that decisions 
concerning State liability claims with a Community-law component ought to be 
subsumed under Article 137 of the B-VG.745 The constitutional provision of Article 
137, which regulates the so-called ‘Kausalgerichtsbarkeit’ of the Austrian VfGH 
broadly addresses residual claims under public law, which fall outside the scope of the 
Public Tort Liability Act. As a consequence, matters related to State liability for 
breaches of EC law would fall under the exclusive competence of the Austrian 
Constitutional Court since according to Article 137, the Constitutional Court is 
competent to decide on all “pecuniary claims on the Federation, the Länder, the 
Bezirke, the municipalities and municipal associations which cannot be settled by 
ordinary legal process nor be liquidated by the ruling of an administrative 
authority.”746 Whereas similar claims under private law are subject to ordinary legal 
process, the majority of pecuniary claims based on public law against the State, the 
Länder or the communities are resolved by administrative decree. The Constitutional 
Court therefore only has residual jurisdiction in those cases, which fall outside the 
ambit of the ordinary judicial process. These cases constitute exceptions and are 
usually rather rare.747 Nevertheless, voices in the Austrian literature were supportive 
of the idea that State liability cases with a Community-law component constituted 
such an exception and therefore qualified for the application of Article 137 B-VG. 
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Therefore the Constitutional Court would be given jurisdiction to rule in all 
Community-related cases concerning the liability of the Austrian State.748 
 
An important decision by the Austrian Constitutional Court in 2001 eventually 
silenced this controversy in the academic literature. The so-called ‘Brenner Maut’-
decision by the Constitutional Court on 6 March 2001 seemed to finally settle the 
issue.749 The Court’s decision essentially reiterated the CJEU’s earlier declaration that 
in light of the principle of national procedural autonomy, the question of competence 
had to be decided according to national procedural rules. Thereafter, the 
Constitutional Court conclusively renounced its own competence to rule in such cases 
and instead explicitly confirmed the general competence of the courts of first instance 
in civil and commercial matters.750 Nevertheless, the Court singled out two exceptions 
to the general rule of competence. First, the Court seemingly left unresolved the 
question of competence concerning breaches of Community law by one of the 
national superior courts.751 Secondly, the Court declared that it would assert 
competence in the cases of legislative breaches of EC law. Thus it established that 
only in cases when individuals claimed damages for violations of EC law committed 
by the national legislature, would the proceedings be conducted according to Article 
137 B-VG. The latter proclamation triggered fierce reactions in the literature by those 
who favoured the overall competence of the ordinary courts also in instances when the 
breach of EC law had been committed by the national legislature.752 In sum, with this 
decision the Constitutional Court basically confirmed that not only the substantive, 
but also the procedural rules of the Amtshaftungsgesetz, would apply to State liability 
claims based on breaches of Community law. According to section 9(1) of the AHG, 
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both types of claim, whether with a domestic law origin or a Community law 
component, are therefore inherent to the jurisdiction of the national courts of first 
instance in civil and commercial matters. 
  
Controversy persisted, however, over the procedural question as to which court 
was competent to decide on liability claims for legislative breaches of EC law. While 
the Oberste Gerichtshof had already claimed competence to rule on cases of State 
liability for breaches of Community law committed not only by the executive, but also 
by the national legislature,753 the Constitutional Court subsequently adopted a rather 
different stance in its decision of 6 March 2001.754 In its most recent jurisprudence, 
the Constitutional Court reiterated the line of reasoning that it had previously 
established in 2001. In a decision of 10 October 2003, which was pronounced only a 
week after Köbler, the Constitutional Court confirmed its initial opinion on the 
question of competence, namely that as a rule, State liability claims for violations of 
Community law were to fall within the jurisdiction of the courts of first instance in 
civil and commercial matters.755 However, it also insisted that the competence of the 
ordinary courts to rule on such issues was strictly limited to instances of liability 
claims against the State based on harm caused by those public authorities, which fell 
under the definition of Article 23(1) B-VG. For liability claims, however, which were 
based on breaches of Community law by the national legislature, the Constitutional 
Court re-confirmed the application of Article 137 B-VG.756 As the reader will recall, 
Article 137 of the Austrian Constitution attributes competence to the Constitutional 
Court itself for those pecuniary claims on the Federation, the Länder, the Bezirke, the 
municipalities and municipal associations, which cannot be settled by ordinary legal 
process nor be liquidated by decree of an administrative authority.757  
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In sum, as mirrored in the case-law, the position adopted by the 
Verfassungsgerichtshof in its jurisprudence on the matter and the stance taken by the 
Oberste Gerichtshof on the same question remain in contradiction to each other. The 
contentious point is that both courts claim to be competent to rule in cases of State 
liability for breaches of Community law by the national legislature. Moreover, the 
question of competence concerning judicial breaches of EC law also remained 
unresolved. When a large constitutional reform project, the so-called ‘Österreich 
Konvent’ (the Austrian Constitutional Convention) took up its work in Austria in June 
2003, also the disputed questions of competence in State liability proceedings were 
addressed in the course of the debate. The Convention758 was an official reform 
commission consisting of high-level experts, judges, lawyers, academics as well as 
political representatives from the governing parties and the opposition, which were 
divided into ten topic-specific Working Groups devising proposals for a substantial 
reform of the Austrian Constitution.759 In the course of the deliberations in Working 
Group IX, “Legal Protection and the Judiciary”, consensus could be achieved on the 
question of competence in State liability proceedings for breaches of EC law by the 
national legislature. As noted in the Convention’s final report of 28 January 2005, 
jurisdiction in such cases is to be awarded to the Constitutional Court on the basis of 
Article 137 B-VG.760 However, so far the legislature has not introduced any changes 
in the wording of Article 137 B-VG. Furthermore, the proposal to proceed with an 
express constitutional amendment regulating cases of State liability for breaches of 
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II. The Austrian Regime of State Liability after Köbler 
 
Es fällt doch ein Schatten 
auf die weiße unbefleckte 




 Köbler had significant and unparalleled consequences for the prevailing 
system of State liability for judicial breaches in Austria. The early judgments of the 
CJEU’s case-line with respect to the question of State liability for breaches of 
Community law, namely the rulings in cases such as Francovich,763 Wagner Miret,764 
and Faccini Dori,765 had been delivered before Austria’s accession to the EU on 1 
January 1995. However, EU accession certainly entailed the full recognition of the 
acquis communautaire and the need for Austria to ensure the full application of the 
Community law principles, such as the principle of Member State liability for 
breaches of Community law. Soon after Austria’s accession, the CJEU ruled in the 
cases of Konle766 and Rechberger,767 both of which were references for preliminary 
rulings according to Article 234 EC by Austrian courts, the Landesgericht für 
Zivilrechtssachen Wien and the Landesgericht Linz respectively, concerning, inter 
alia, the application of the Francovich liability. This also implied the full recognition 
of the concept of State liability for those acts or omissions by the national legislature, 
which were in violation of Community law. This principle and the individual’s right 
attached to it had to be fully protected under Austrian law, despite the fact that a 
similar remedy did not exist under national law with respect to domestic claims. 
Nevertheless, as we have just seen, such a possibility has been granted to individuals 
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in Austria who attempt to obtain reparation for damage inferred by a violation of 
Community law through an act or omission of the legislative authorities. 
 
New legal challenges of course arose after Köbler.768 With the explicit 
acknowledgment of the principle of Member State liability for breaches of 
Community law committed by the judicial organs of a State, the Austrian legal order 
was faced with an inevitable clash between the general Community-law maxim as it 
had been established by the CJEU Köbler and the constitutionally-anchored principle 
which excluded all acts or decisions by one of the three Austrian superior courts 
entirely from the ambit of State liability.769 While the national system remained fully 
applicable in cases that were purely concerned with the State’s liability for breaches 
of domestic law, a more intricate situation emerged in relation to the extended 
Francovich-doctrine and its application under national law in Austria according to the 
principle of national procedural autonomy. The analysis of this delicate situation 
under Austrian law and the viability of the solutions proposed to resolve it, are at the 
core of the analysis set out in the forthcoming section.  
 
1. Possible implications and necessary institutional adjustments in the light 
of Köbler 
 
The fact that in a number of Member States, such as Austria, Greece, Ireland 
and the UK, the concept of State liability for wrongful judicial acts is, contrary to the 
impression conveyed in Advocate General Léger’s Opinion in the Köbler case,770 
either heavily restricted or entirely excluded under domestic law, did not prevent the 
CJEU from introducing such a principle for the purposes of Community law. 
Naturally, the newfound Community principle will not remain unnoticed by the 
Member States as it is their utmost duty under Community law to ensure that those 
rules take full effect and to protect the rights they confer upon individuals.771 While 
some Member States so far have nevertheless successfully managed to ignore the 
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Köbler case in part due to the absence of individual applications of such sort, Austria 
was directly affected by the Köbler judgment and was therefore immediately urged to 
consider the possible ramifications and the necessary institutional adjustments created 
by the ruling. This also implied that the validity of Article 2(3) of the AHG had to be 
re-assessed in the light of Community law.772  
 
In Sweden, a country which, as we have seen, shares most of the characteristics 
of the Austrian State liability regime, the Köbler case also brought about similar 
considerations. Nevertheless, it appears that Sweden had already become increasingly 
attentive to the demands of Community law long before Köbler. Already in 1997 an 
official report had explored the compatibility of the Swedish framework of non-
contractual liability of the State and the local authorities with the concept of State 
liability for judicial breaches under Community law. The report had been 
commissioned by the Swedish Government at the time of Sweden’s accession to the 
EU in 1995 and was subsequently commissioned by a special Commission of Inquiry. 
The study was focus on a comparison of the Swedish State liability regime with the 
CJEU’s criteria established under Francovich.773 The report clearly stated that the 
limitations contained in Chapter 3 Section 7 of the Swedish Tort Liability Act774 were 
incompatible with the CJEU’s case-law, which required that also Acts of Parliament 
as well as rulings of the Swedish Supreme Courts must be subject to the Community’s 
rules on State liability as established in the Francovich case-law. Furthermore, the 
report argued that in a case with Community law relevance, Chapter 3 Section 7 of the 
Swedish Tort Liability Act would need to be set aside as it rendered impossible the 
exercise of an individual’s right under Community law. The Commission 
recommended repealing Chapter 3 Section 7 altogether.775 
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The report did not in the end lead to any immediate legislative changes. 
However, what is remarkable in this context is that long before the Köbler ruling the 
Commission of Inquiry already treated it as self-evident that the acts and omissions of 
courts could give rise to State liability under Community law. This shows a 
remarkably progressive attitude by the Swedish authorities towards individual rights’ 
protection under Community law even as early as 1997. 
 
a) An explicit constitutional framework provision for cases of State liability 
with Community law relevance in Austria?  
 
The immediate reactions to the Köbler case in Austria can also be partly 
explained by the fact that just at the time of the Köbler ruling in September 2003 the 
‘Österreich-Konvent’776 was in session in Austria. As noted before, the Austrian 
Constitutional Convention constituted a special reform body in Austria, which was 
put to work in June 2003 with the objective of drawing up reform proposals for a 
substantial overhaul of the Austrian Constitution.777 Modelled after the European 
Constitutional Convention, the ‘Österreich Konvent’ included ten different Working 
Groups, each focusing on different subject areas and working towards a draft of a 
revised and recodified version of the Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz, the Austrian 
Constitution.778 In the course of the deliberations in Working Group IX of the 
Konvent, which dealt with a broad array of issues related to the judiciary in Austria, 
an important point of discussion and intense reflection was inter alia the future inter-
relationship of the three superior courts in Austria and the question of how to preserve 
the constitutional maxim of absolute parity between the OGH, the VwGH and the 
VfGH. This particular debate naturally also addressed some of the unresolved issues 
                                                 
776
 The Austrian Constitutional Convention; detailed information on the composition and the goals of 
the ‘Österreich-Konvent’ is available on the official website at www.konvent.gv.at. 
777
 A full-text version (in German) of the final report of the Austrian Constitutional Convention can be 
accessed at www.konvent.gv.at/K/DE/ENDB-K/ENDB-K_00001/pmh.shtml. Thereby, see especially 
Part III, results of Working Group IX, “Legal Protection and the Judiciary”, pp. 199-221. 
778
 The Austrian Constitutional Convention started its work on the far-reaching reform proposal of the 
Austrian Constitution on 30 June 2003. At the beginning of 2005, after about 19 months of work, the 
Konvent completed its project without having reached a consensual agreement on a revised proposal of 
the Austrian Constitution. Only the areas where consensus was achieved have since partly been 
implemented under Austrian law. For detailed information and full access to documents see 
www.konvent.gv.at. 




regarding the compatibility of the Austrian regime of State liability with the 
requirements set under Community law in light of the principle of national procedural 
autonomy.779  
 
In the Convention’s final report, which compiled all the conclusions reached in 
the different Working Groups, Working Group IX expressly underlined that Article 
2(3) AHG, the principle of immunity of the three superior courts, would be 
inapplicable with respect to public liability claims based on breaches of Community 
law.780 However, despite this exception in cases of State liability à la Köbler, the 
report concluded that the immunity of the three superior courts would not otherwise 
be affected.781 Moreover, the final report highlighted the complete absence under 
domestic law of an explicit legal framework regulating the general procedural and 
substantive questions related to the principle of Member State liability for breaches of 
Community law.782 In light of the principle of legal certainty,783 Working Group IX 
thereafter discussed the implementation of separate legal provisions within the 
Austrian Constitution, which would specifically regulate the issue of State liability for 
breaches of Community law embracing all three branches of the State. After all, the 
principle of legal certainty demanded that within the domestic legal order every 
individual should have at least the right to know with utmost certainty to which court 
he or she should address a specific claim.  
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However, arguments were also advanced against the introduction of additional 
constitutional provisions in this context. A large group of the Committee of Experts 
considered it premature to proceed towards a final constitutional codification of an 
issue, which still had not been conclusively regulated in the jurisprudence of the 
CJEU. In light of the dynamic developments on the Community level in the field of 
State liability and the uncertainties, which persisted within the relatively young 
jurisprudence of the CJEU on this question, the Working Group finally agreed that it 
was not advisable to prejudge the issue.784 Therefore, it was recommended that 
Community-related claims for liability of the State simply had to be subsumed under 
the provisions of the AHG. However, even if one might agree that a comprehensive 
normative regulation of the question of Member State liability might not be feasible 
under national law, it nevertheless seems almost indispensable in the Austrian case as 
a means to find a quick, coherent and definite solution under domestic law with 
respect to the unresolved procedural questions of competence, which are still not 
entirely resolved today.785  
 
b) Structural deficiencies: quis iudicabit?  
 
The State’s liability for breaches of EC law by one of the superior courts not 
only raises questions of competence, but also creates serious procedural difficulties 
under Austrian law. Whereas Article 9(4) of the AHG, which would also be applicable 
in cases with Community-law relevance, will prevent a situation whereby the same 
court would be charged to rule on a liability claim based on its own judgment,786 the 
procedural stalemate appears to be unavoidable at the country’s highest level of 
courts. State liability proceedings inferred by a judgment of one of the three superior 
courts in Austria would provoke not only serious procedural difficulties, but could 
also lead to a violation of the constitutional principle of parity between the three 
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courts.787 This would be the case whenever the ‘Supreme Liability Chamber’ (the 
Amtshaftungssenat)788 of the OGH, which generally constitutes the last instance in 
State liability proceedings under national law, ruled in final instance in cases of State 
liability claims for harm caused by a judgment of one of the superior courts. 
Moreover, it could even lead to a situation whereby the OGH would be charged to 
decide on a State liability claim for harm caused by one of its own judgments, which 
would then result in the OGH acting as “judge in its own cause”. In light of all the 
aforesaid, the division of competences as regulated under national law would elevate 
the Amtshaftungssenat of the OGH to the highest court in the country.789   
 
Due to the absence of an explicit normative basis under domestic law, the 
procedural competences in State liability proceedings with a Community-law 
component in Austria still remain shrouded in uncertainty. Furthermore, despite 
conflicting national jurisprudence and ongoing discussions in the literature, there has 
so far been no initiative from the legislature to resolve once and for all the contended 
question of which national court should be competent to rule on breaches of 
Community law inferred by the judiciary, especially in those cases where the damage 
has been caused by one of the superior courts. In a prominent decision of 2001,790 
the Constitutional Court had declared that it was competent to rule in cases of State 
liability for legislative breaches of EC law. In this well-known ‘Brenner-Maut’ 
decision, which has already been discussed in the previous sections of this chapter, the 
Court not only claimed to be competent to rule on public liability claims for 
legislative breaches of Community law, but also seemed to imply to be the 
responsible court in cases when the breach of EC law had been caused by one of the 
other superior courts.791 The Constitutional Court had in fact very carefully chosen 
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the wording of its decision on that particular point. After confirming that it was in the 
ordinary courts’ competence to rule on State liability claims for administrative 
breaches of EC law, the Court added that “anderes mag in Ansehung des § 2 Abs 3 
AHG iVm Art. 137 B-VG gelten,” which could be loosely translated as ‘a different 
solution might have to be applied with respect to Article 2(3) AHG in combination 
with Article 137 of the Austrian Constitution.’792 
 
However, by drawing the connection between the national exemptions to State 
liability claims in Article 2(3) of the AHG on the one hand, and Article 137 B-VG, 
which refers to the residual jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court in cases that fall 
outside the scope of the Amtshaftungsgesetz, on the other, the Court’s intention in this 
particular decision seemed to be rather evident. Briefly put, in an implicit manner the 
Court also claimed to be competent in such cases.793 
 
A clear confirmation of the Court’s ‘Brenner-Maut’ decision actually followed 
soon after in a further judgment by the Constitutional Court of 10 October 2003,794 
which was pronounced only two weeks after Köbler. This case is also rather 
interesting from a substantive perspective because the Court already applied the 
conditions set forth by the CJEU in Köbler to test whether the Supreme 
Administrative Court, the Verwaltungsgerichtshof (VwGH), had committed a manifest 
breach of EC law in a previous decision. However, the Court eventually ruled out a 
violation of Community law by the VwGH in this specific case.795 Nevertheless, it is 
probably safe to say that the Austrian Constitutional Court became the first court in 
the EU to apply the Köbler conditions only two weeks after Köbler itself.  
 
The case concerned a State liability claim by an individual who had allegedly 
been harmed by a procedural cost decision issued by the VwGH. Briefly put, in this 
case the VwGH had denied the claimant the full restitution of the procedural costs, 
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which had been accumulated in the course of a preliminary rulings procedure before 
the CJEU. Without entering into the factual details of the case at this point, as far as 
the procedural competence is concerned the ruling also contained an affirmative 
reference to the Court’s previous decision on the question in the ‘Brenner-Maut’ case. 
In fact, this time the Constitutional Court emphatically proclaimed that Article 2(3) of 
the AHG was based on the telos that the ordinary courts, which were competent to 
rule according to the AHG, were not empowered to examine the legality of a superior 
court’s decision, not even in an implicit manner in the course of State liability 
proceedings.796 Furthermore, the Court stated that in light of the fact that the principle 
of primacy of EC law would preclude the application of Article 2(3) of the AHG in 
cases with a Community-law component, the procedural questions attached to this 
issue were to be resolved following a separate procedural path available under 
domestic law in Austria. In concreto, the Court was referring to Article 137 B-VG, 
which serves as the residual legal basis for cases that cannot be subsumed under the 
provisions of the AHG. According to the VfGH, Article 137 would therefore apply in 
cases of State liability for breaches of Community law incurred by the national 
legislature or by a decision of a superior court.  
 
The question of competence regarding liability claims for breaches of EC law 
by the national superior courts was also discussed in the course of the deliberations in 
the Austrian Constitutional Convention, but even there no consensus could be reached 
on this question. Instead, the debate in Working Group IX directly referred to the 
jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court in the “Brenner-ruling”797 and suggested the 
application of Article 137 B-VG in this context.798 With respect to the question of 
codification, the Working Group had previously concluded that there was no need for 
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the creation of an explicit constitutional amendment on the matter.799 Moreover, the 
Working Group also failed to propose a solution to the intricate case-scenario 
whereby a State liability claim could arise even for an erroneous decision of the 
Constitutional Court itself. Which court would in this case be competent to decide 
upon such a claim? According to the principle of ‘nemo iudex in res sua’, Article 137 
B-VG could certainly not apply as it would lead to an indirect revision by the 
Constitutional Court of its own ruling in the case. Furthermore, judgments by the 
Constitutional Court on questions of State liability for breaches of EC law by either 
the OGH or the Supreme Administrative Court could theoretically be the subject of 
yet another liability claim, which would create the problem of infinite regression. All 
these aspects were not addressed in the course of the deliberations of the Austrian 
Constitutional Convention and have, in fact, not been exhaustively discussed in the 
literature. Thus, for the moment a solution to this intricate problem is not immediately 
available under Austrian law. 
 
c) The rebirth of the ‘Austrägalsenat’? 
 
In an attempt to respect the constitutionally-guaranteed parity of the three 
superior courts and to find a rather quick and simple solution to the problem, the 
constitutione ferenda has toyed with the idea of introducing a special ‘Liability-
Senate’ to rule on State liability claims for breaches of EC law in such cases.800 The 
idea behind this proposal is that the ‘Liability-Senate’ would be responsible to decide 
on State liability claims based on decisions of the three superior courts. The effect of 
the creation of an additional superior instance to rule on such claims, it was argued, 
would be twofold. Not only would it free lower courts from the burden of having to 
rule on State liability claims based on decisions by a court of last instance, but it 
would also maintain the balance and parity between the three superior courts as none 
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of them would have the power to rule on State liability claims brought about by 
decisions of one of the others.801  
 
According to several similar proposals the special Senate competent to decide 
on State liability claims based on erroneous decisions of the superior courts could in 
fact be modelled on a similar institution, which existed in Austria between 1867 and 
1918, but was subsequently abandoned in the course of the Kelsenian reform of the 
Austrian Constitution, the Austrägalsenat.802 This special ‘Liability-Senate’ was 
created in Austria in 1867 to decide on conflicts of competence between the 
Administrative Court and the Constitutional Court, which before 1918 was called the 
Reichsgericht. The Austrägalsenat consisted of four ad-hoc members from each of the 
(then) two Supreme Courts and met once a year under the chairmanship of the 
President of the Supreme Court of Justice or his deputy.803 Recent academic 
comments have suggested that a renewed ‘Liability-Senate’ would strongly resemble 
the features of the old Austrägalsenat. Concerning the composition of the special 
Senate, the idea is apparently to have three representatives from each of the three 
superior courts with a rotating chairmanship.804 Similarly composed institutions 
serving, inter alia, the purpose of solving conflicts between the highest courts of equal 
rank have been established and are still in use in certain Member States. In France, as 
we will see in the following chapter, we can find a comparable body in the Tribunal 
des Conflits. In Germany we encounter a similar institution in the Gemeinsamer Senat 
der obersten Bundesgerichte805 and in Greece, the Anotato Eidiko Dikastirio, which is 
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composed of judges from the various highest courts in the country, also exercises a 
similar function.806   
 
However, while the creation of the special Senate in Austria might at first 
glance tackle the problem, the implementation of an additional instance in State 
liability proceedings would eventually constitute not more than a mere postponement 
of the pressing questions at stake. What are the limits of State liability for judicial 
breaches? Could a decision of a body like the Austrägalsenat not in itself constitute 
the basis of a liability claim? Are we faced with a never-ending chain of liability 
claims and indefinite question-marks over the basic guarantee of legal certainty? 
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State Liability for Judicial Breaches limited by the Nature of the Judicial Act 
 
 
With the case of Austria we have looked at a national system that shares the 
pertinent characteristics of those countries belonging to group II of our classificatory 
scheme. Furthermore, based on the sub-groups we have created at the beginning of 
this chapter, the Austrian State liability regime typifies those countries falling under 
sub-group I.807 As the reader will recall, all the countries adhering to group II impose 
restrictions on the invocation of State liability for judicial breaches either with respect 
to acts performed by specific courts (source) and/or with respect to specific 
predefined acts performed by any court or court organ within the national judicial 
hierarchy (nature). This additional distinction has allowed us to create sub-groups 
even within our general group II. While this chapter has already highlighted some of 
the classic features of the State liability regimes shared by other Member States in 
sub-group I, we would nevertheless like to add a short synopsis of those systems of 
State liability falling under sub-group II of our taxonomy. In a nutshell, these are the 
Member States where the principle of State liability for judicial breaches is limited by 
the nature of the judicial act. We are therefore concerned with countries featuring 
State liability frameworks of an inclusive or negative nature.808 Countries adhering to 
the second sub-group of our group II are, for example, Germany, Slovenia and 
Italy.809 Since the CJEU has only recently issued a significant ruling concerning Italy 
in this context,810 we will seize the opportunity to have a brief look at the Italian 
system of State liability for judicial breaches in the following paragraphs.811 
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III. The Italian System of State Liability under Scrutiny 
 
1. Commission v. Italy – A lost opportunity? 
 
In December 2003, only a couple of months after the Köbler, the case of 
Commission v. Italy812 presented the Court with its first opportunity to rule on an 
infringement procedure initiated by the European Commission against a Member 
State based on the fact that a large fraction of the national courts, including a national 
supreme court, and the administrative authorities in that country had repeatedly 
decided a particular legal question contrary to Community law. Briefly put, the 
European Commission had instituted an infringement action against Italy based on 
Article 226 EC on the grounds that the latter maintained in force a law, which was 
repeatedly interpreted and applied contrary to Community law in the practice of the 
tax administration and the country’s judiciary.813 In its application the Commission 
particularly pointed out the flawed interpretation of Article 29(2) of the Law No 
428/1990 by the Italian Supreme Court of Appeal, Corte suprema di cassazione, 
whose jurisprudence served as an example for so many other courts in Italy. This was 
the first time the Commission had declared so openly that an alleged infringement 
consisted in a national judiciary’s misapplication of Community law.814  
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However, in its final ruling in the case the Court of Justice did not go so far as 
to condemn Italy for breaches of Community law as a result of the erroneous 
interpretation of law by the judiciary. Instead, it based its reasoning on the fact that 
 
by failing to amend Article 29(2) of Law No 428/1990, which is construed 
and applied by the administrative authorities and a substantial proportion of 
the courts, including the Corte suprema di cassazione, in such a way that 
the exercise of the right to repayment of charges levied in breach of 
Community rules is made excessively difficult for the taxpayer, the Italian 
Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under the EC Treaty.815 
 
Therefore, according to the Court’s ruling in the case, the infringement of EC law 
committed by the national courts was merely the result of an unclear legislative 
provision on this issue. Consequently, the CJEU argued that the breaches of EC law 
originated from the Italian legislature’s failure to lay down detailed rules of evidence 
on this particular question.816 Hence, the judiciary was cleared of the allegation of 
causing the violation of EC law in this context; the ‘culprit’ was identified as the 
legislature.  
 
Contrary to the Köbler case, the Court in this case was not forced to find an 
infringement merely on the basis of a judicial act and in fact availed itself of the 
opportunity to circumvent it. It is nevertheless surprising that the CJEU opted to target 
only the legislature in this particular case, leaving the judiciary blameless with respect 
to the committed violations of EC law. This is even more surprising in light of the fact 
that only two months before, the CJEU had severely attacked the judiciary in the 
Köbler case. Hence, this case would have given the Court the chance to clarify some 
of the aspects left unclear in the Köbler ruling. One can of course only speculate why 
the CJEU opted to proceed in this way, but it appears as if the Court was increasingly 
aware of the danger that continuous attacks on the national judiciaries’ (non-
)application of Community law (and especially on the practice of the national 
                                                 
815
 Ibid, para. 41. 
816
 Ibid. 




supreme courts), might jeopardize the Court’s long-time cooperation with the highest 
courts in the different Member States.817 The comments made by Peter Wattel, a 
member of the Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad), in his article on the Köbler ruling 
could be interpreted as a first sign of the disgruntlement of the Member States’ 
highest courts.818 In light of these considerations, the CJEU’s ruling in Commission v. 
Italy could be regarded as a diplomatic solution to the Court’s dilemma of having to 
balance between the effectiveness of Community law on the one hand and the 
preservation of what Komárek has called the “sincere cooperative relationship”819 
with the national supreme courts on the other.820  
 
2. ‘Second time lucky’ – the CJEU’s judgment in Traghetti  
 
Soon after the Court’s ruling in Commission v. Italy, the case of Traghetti del 
Mediterraneo SpA v. Italy821 presented the CJEU with a second opportunity to rule on 
the non-compliance of Italian courts with Community law. This time the Court seized 
the occasion to do so.  
 
a) Facts of the case 
 
The case concerned a dispute between the Italian shipping company Traghetti 
del Mediterraneo SpA and the Italian State over direct subsidies, which had been 
awarded to Tirrenia di Navigazione, a competing national shipping company, by the 
Italian State. In 1981, Traghetti had brought a claim against its competitor before the 
Tribunale di Napoli, seeking compensation for the damage Tirrenia had caused it due 
its low fares, which could only be maintained through the State aid the company had 
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previously received. Traghetti’s action for compensation on the grounds of unfair 
competition and abuse of a dominant position was, however, dismissed in the first 
instance by the Tribunale di Napoli and subsequently, on appeal by the Corte 
d’appello di Napoli and the Corte suprema di cassazione. All courts denied the 
illegality of the aid provided by the Italian State to Tirrenia.822 
 
After the dismissal of Traghetti’s claim in last instance by the Corte Suprema di 
Cassazione, the plaintiff brought a State liability action before the Tribunale di 
Genova stating that the decision taken by the Corte Suprema di cassazione in the case 
was based on an erroneous interpretation of Community law, and moreover, that the 
Court had wrongly assumed that there was settled case-law by the CJEU on the issue. 
Therefore, the plaintiff argued, the Corte Suprema di cassazione had not only violated 
EC law, but also neglected its duty to refer the question to the CJEU for a preliminary 
ruling in line with its duty under Article 234(3) EC.823 The Italian State immediately 
rejected the liability claim by the plaintiff on the grounds that according to Article 
2(2) of the ‘Law No 117 about the reparation of damages caused by judicial acts and 
the personal liability of judges’,824 State liability could never be invoked on the basis 
of a judicial decision whenever the liability claim related to the court’s interpretation 
of provisions of law. Faced with conflicting arguments by the two parties, the 
Tribunale di Genova made a reference for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU according 
to Article 234 EC.825  
 
b) The preliminary questions by the Tribunale di Genova 
 
The Tribunale di Genova initially submitted two preliminary questions to the 
CJEU, the first of which inquired whether the Francovich-line established by the 
Court could be extended to also include breaches of Community law committed by 
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the judiciary. In light of the Court’s affirmative ruling in the Köbler case, which was 
decided soon after the Tribunale’s reference, the national court later withdrew this 
first question.826 The second question, which directly concerned the established 
framework of State liability for judicial breaches under Italian law, was, however, 
maintained. The CJEU was essentially confronted with the question of whether a 
Member State’s liability for judicial errors in the course of the application of 
Community law was impeded 
 
in a manner incompatible with the principles of Community law by national 
legislation on State liability for judicial errors which:  
–    precludes liability in relation to the interpretation of provisions of law 
and assessment of facts and of the evidence adduced in the course of the 
exercise of judicial functions,  
–    limits State liability solely to cases of intentional fault and serious 
misconduct on the part of the court.827  
 
In order to provide a satisfactory answer to the latter question, the CJEU not only had 
to elaborate in more detail on the general conditions of Member State liability for 
judicial breaches of Community law as outlined in the Köbler ruling, but was also 
forced to test the compatibility of the Italian framework of State liability for judicial 
errors in light of the criteria set out in EC law. 
 
c) State liability for judicial breaches in Italy – the epitome of group II (2) of our 
classificatory scheme 
 
While public liability in Italy is generally grounded on Article 2043 of the 
Italian Civil Code,828 since 1988 the liability of the State for judicial violations has 
been regulated separately in the ‘Law No 117 about the reparation of damages caused 
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by judicial acts and the personal liability of judges’.829 Already at first glance one can 
ascertain that the Italian system strongly resembles other Member States pertaining to 
group II of our taxonomy, namely those countries that restrict the scope of State 
liability for damage caused by the judiciary according to either the source or the 
nature of the judicial act. While in the case of Austria the limitations are based on the 
source of the erroneous judicial act (sub-group I), in Italy and the rest of sub-group II 
of group II of our taxonomy, limitations are based on the nature of the judicial act 
causing the damage.830 
 
Apart from the restrictions related to the nature of the judicial act, another 
prominent feature of the countries affiliated with sub-group II is the inclusive (or 
negative) character of their limitations. As outlined in the introductory paragraphs of 
this chapter, when it comes to judicial violations, countries featuring restrictions of an 
inclusive character to their public liability frameworks start from the basic premise 
that there is no general principle of State liability for judicial breaches under national 
law.831 Based on this negative assumption, those countries subsequently strictly limit 
the application of such liability to an exceptional and narrowly-defined number of 
acts. Among the seven Member States in the second group of our classification, the 
countries of Germany, Slovenia and Romania adhere to such an inclusive approach, 
while the other four countries, namely Austria, Sweden, Poland and Italy, feature 
restrictions to their systems of State liability, which are exclusive (or positive) in 
character.832 What is furthermore rather noteworthy is that, as far as the Member 
States featuring limitations of an inclusive character are concerned, the exceptions to 
the basic rejection of State liability for judicial breaches in these countries are all 
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cases of criminal or disciplinary offence committed by judicial organs. As noted 
above, we can identify a common nature to these exceptions in Germany, Slovenia 
and Romania.  
 
In Germany, for instance, where the basic questions of State liability are 
addressed in Article 34 of the German Basic Law833 in conjunction with Article 839 
of the German Civil Code,834 Article 839(2) BGB declares in a general manner that 
liability for judicial acts is limited to cases when the breach of duty committed by the 
judiciary constitutes a criminal offence.835 
 
Verletzt ein Beamter bei dem Urteil in einer Rechtssache seine Amtspflicht, 
so ist er für den daraus entstehenden Schaden nur dann verantwortlich, 
wenn die Pflichtverletzung in einer Straftat besteht. Auf eine pflichtwidrige 
Verweigerung oder Verzögerung der Ausübung des Amts findet diese 
Vorschrift keine Anwendung. 836 
 
Similar to the problématique raised in the Traghetti judgment, we are therefore 
confronted with yet another restriction to the principle of State liability for judicial 
breaches referring to the nature of the judicial act generating the breach. As under 
Italian law where Article 2(2) violates the principle of effectiveness under Community 
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law and therefore cannot be applied in cases with a Community-law component, also 
the German Spruchrichterprivileg violates the principle of effectiveness in that it 
makes it difficult or almost impossible to bring a successful claim against the State for 
violations of Community law by its judicial organs.837  
 
Rather similar to the German system of State liability for judicial breaches is the 
respective regime under Estonian law. The general right to compensation is already 
regulated in Article 25 of the Estonian Constitution,838 which has been interpreted to 
apply equally to damage caused by public authorities. According to Article 15(1) of 
the Estonian State Liability Act,839 Estonia features a system of State liability for 
judicial breaches comparable to the one in Germany in that  
 
[a] person may claim compensation for damage caused in the course of 
judicial proceedings or extrajudicial hearing of a matter concerning an 
administrative offence or a lease dispute, including damage caused by a 
court decision, a decision made in the matter of an administrative offence or 
a decision of a lease committee, only if a judge or the official who 
extrajudicially heard the matter of the administrative offence or the lease 
dispute committed a criminal offence in the course of these proceedings.840 
 
Acknowledging that there is a basic principle of State liability even for judicial 
acts, Italy, just like Austria, Sweden and others, belongs to the group of countries 
featuring restrictions of an exclusive (or positive) nature. Moreover, the Italian system 
of State liability for judicial breaches, which is at the focus of the CJEU’s ruling in 
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Traghetti, also belongs to subgroup II of our taxonomy.841 In Italy, the Law No 
117/1988 on judicial responsibility was enacted following a referendum held in 
November 1987, which led to the abrogation of the previous liability regime, which 
was based on Articles 55, 56 and 75 of the Italian Code of Civil Procedure. The latter 
system had been even more restrictive in its approach to State liability for judicial 
errors.842 Contrary to the old system, Article 2(1) of the Law No 117/1988 generally 
opens up a wide scope of liability of the State for damage caused to an individual as a 
result of a judicial act.843 Nevertheless, Article 2(2) of the same law immediately 
introduces the exceptions to this general rule. Accordingly, the concept of State 
liability for judicial breaches is limited in that “[i]n the exercise of judicial functions 
the interpretation of provisions of law or the assessment of facts and evidence shall 
not give rise to liability.”844 This means that in Italy, State liability claims can never 
be lodged against an allegedly harmful judicial act if the infringement committed by 
the national court relates to its interpretation of legal provisions or its assessment of 
facts and evidence. Consequently, the restrictions established in Article 2(2) of the 
Law No 117/1988 exclude a large part of the judges’ activities from the scope of the 
general State liability regime.845   
 
With reference to the preliminary questions submitted by the Tribunale di 
Genova in the Traghetti case, in which the Court had asked the CJEU whether a 
restriction as formulated in Article 2(2) of the Italian Law No 117/1988 was 
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compatible with the principles laid down under Community law, the Court had a very 
clear and straightforward answer. In line with the Opinion of the Advocate General in 
the case, the CJEU expressly stated that excluding  
 
any possibility that State liability might be incurred where the 
infringement allegedly committed by the national court relates to the 
assessment which it made of facts or evidence would also amount to 
depriving the principle set out in the Köbler judgment of all practical 
effect with regard to manifest infringements of Community law for which 
courts adjudicating at last instance were responsible.846  
 
In a similar manner, the CJEU rejected the provision exempting judicial acts of 
legal interpretation from the public liability scheme.847 In fact, the Court stipulated 
that any such invasive restriction of the principle of Member State liability as had 
been established under Article 2(2) of the Italian Law No 117/1988, violated the 
principle of effectiveness and was therefore incompatible with Community law. In 
light of the principle of national procedural autonomy and the conditions imposed on 
the Member States regarding the standards of equivalence and effectiveness,848 which 
we have already outlined in chapter I of the thesis, restrictions of such sort would 
“make it impossible or excessively difficult to obtain reparation”.849 Exempting the 
courts’ legal interpretation and their assessment of facts or evidence from the general 
scope of a State’s liability would not only weaken the procedural guarantees of 
individuals under EC law, but considering that a large part of the judiciary’s duty, 
especially with respect to courts of last instance consists in interpreting and assessing 
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the applicable law and facts of a case, a domestic restriction of this kind would be too 
invasive and would render the Köbler doctrine nugatory.850  
 
The Court’s arguments in the Traghetti ruling appear to be justified, especially 
in light of the fact that the interpretation of law is such a fundamental function of the 
judiciary in general and of the highest courts in particular. After all, highest courts 
have the task of unifying the interpretation of national law. Indeed, the same function 
has been awarded to the CJEU, namely to ensure the uniform interpretation of 
Community law, which also underlines the importance of the duty of national courts 
of last instance to refer questions for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU according to 
Article 234(3) EC. From the perspective of Community law, substantive or procedural 
restrictions under national law similar to the ones set up in Italy in Article 2(2) would 
render it impossible or excessively difficult for an individual to obtain compensation. 
The CJEU’s reasoning in this case is therefore intrinsically linked to the conditions 
established in its jurisprudence on the principle of national procedural autonomy, and 
especially the compliance with the principle of effectiveness.851 
 
A restriction like the Italian Article 2(2) of the Law No 117/1988 will continue 
to be fully applicable under national law. However, whenever the individual’s claim 
for compensation from the Italian State stems from a judicial violation of Community 
law, the limitations contained in Article 2(2) are to be set aside. This has been 
expressly confirmed by the CJEU in its Traghetti ruling.852  
 
d) A double-tuned system - Italy’s added affiliation with group III 
 
The second part of the preliminary question referred to the CJEU by the 
Tribunale di Genova in the case Traghetti del Mediterraneo SpA v. Italy concerned 
yet another inherent restriction to the Italian system of State liability for judicial 
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breaches. In addition to the limitations defined in Article 2(2), Article 2(1) of the Law 
No 117/1988 further declares that  
 
[a]ny person who has sustained unjustifiable damage as a result of judicial 
conduct, acts or measures on the part of a judge who is guilty of intentional 
fault or serious misconduct in the exercise of his functions, or as a result of 
denial of justice, may bring proceedings against the State for compensation 
[…].853 
 
Following the general definition in paragraph 1, Article 2(3) of the Law No 117/1988 
subsequently defines the notion of ‘gross negligence’ as used in the first paragraph of 
the Article, whereas Article 3(1) of the Law No 117/1988 provides a more detailed 
account on how to interpret the concept of ‘denial of justice’, which is equally 
mentioned in Article 2(1) of the same law. 
 
The additional features of the Italian system of State liability for judicial 
breaches actually lead us directly to the next group of our classificatory scheme, 
which is group III.854 While we will certainly analyse the characteristic traits of this 
group by means of a selected national example, the last aspect of the CJEU’s 
judgment in Traghetti provides the perfect transition to our next group.  
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CHAPTER V.                                                                                           
RESTRICTED FORM OF STATE LIABILITY UNDER         
DOMESTIC LAW LIMITED BY THE                                                 
DEGREE OF FAULT IN A JUDICIAL ACT                                              
(GROUP III) 
 
Group III of our classificatory scheme embraces all those Member States which 
impose limits to their concepts of State liability for judicial breaches according to the 
degree of fault inferred from the judicial act. An interesting example in this respect is 
the case of Italy, one of the countries adhering to more than one group of our 
classificatory scheme. While we have discussed the implications of the Köbler-
doctrine on Italian law in light of the CJEU’s judgment in the case Traghetti del 
Mediterraneo SpA v. Italy861 at the end of the previous chapter, Italy also introduced 
limitations to its State liability regime for judicial breaches which additionally render 
the country a valid candidate for our third group. In fact, on the basis of restrictions 
contained in Article 2(1) of the Law No 117/1988, the Italian system also limits the 
State’s liability to cases of “intentional fault or serious misconduct” on the part of the 
court, as well as to instances of “denial of justice”.862 Hence, apart from its affiliation 
with group II, Italy also qualifies for the third group of our taxonomy.863  
 
As we have seen in chapter I of our study, under Community law Member State 
liability for harm caused to an individual by a judicial breach attributable to a court of 
last instance can only be incurred in the exceptional case that the court has committed 
a ‘manifest’ infringement of EC law.864 With reference to the second part of the 
preliminary question lodged in front of the CJEU in Traghetti, the Italian court 
essentially asked whether the additional restrictions contained in Article 2(1) of the 
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Italian law No 117/1988 were compatible with the requirements set up under 
Community law. The second half of the Tribunale’s preliminary question therefore 
raised the issue to what extent the CJEU’s requirement of a ‘manifest breach’ as 
formulated in the Köbler ruling conforms to the various degrees of fault as required 
under the national laws of several Member States. This last aspect will also be a key 
point of analysis in this chapter. While we will discuss all the intricacies of this 
question in the forthcoming paragraphs, we will anticipate that in reply to the Italian 
Court’s query in Traghetti, the CJEU ruled that a State’s liability for judicial breaches 
preconditioned by fault or grave negligence was in conformity with Community law 
as long as the criteria were not stricter than those set up under EC law.865 With respect 
to breaches of Community law a stricter conditionality required for the claim of State 
liability under national law is therefore not permissible. A stricter conditionality under 
national law would limit the individual’s right to a remedy and violate the principles 
of equivalence and effectiveness, both of which are firmly anchored in the 
Community legal order.866 
 
Other Member States that are faced with the same implications of the Court’s 
ruling in Traghetti are, apart from Italy, countries such as Spain, Denmark, France, 
Sweden and Austria.867 Under Swedish law, for example, the requirements of fault 
and negligence in this context are based on objective, rather than subjective criteria. 
This implies that the scenario of how the State should have acted constitutes the 
benchmark for the evaluation of the act.868 Thereby, the clarity of the legal 
framework, the margin of discretion of the public authority and the “excusableness” 
of the mistake are taken into account when evaluating the degree of fault. 
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 For an interesting comparison between the system of public liability for judicial acts in France and 
in Italy, see JACQUES VAN COMPERNOLLE and G. CLOSSET-MARCHAL, "La responsabilité du fait des 
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 See the tabular overview of all the Member States adhering to group III on p. 307. 
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As we have already mentioned in chapter I, the CJEU’s terminology in 
requiring a ‘sufficiently serious breach’ in this context had created difficulties for the 
Member States in terms of squaring such a breach with the existing regime of State 
liability under national law. In the Court’s ruling in Brasserie du Pêcheur/Factortame 
the CJEU had declared that the element of fault was not a relevant factor in the 
classification of a violation of EC law and rather required the breach to be 
‘sufficiently serious”.869 In the Köbler judgment the CJEU once again refused to 
introduce the notion of ‘fault’ in relation to the required qualification of a breach. 
With respect to judicial breaches of Community law, especially countries pertaining 
to this third group of our classification will be faced with the question of how the 
Court’s requirement of a ‘manifest breach’ corresponds with the degree of fault they 
have established for such cases under national law. Briefly put, “[w]hat degree of 
fault, if any, is required”870? This was precisely the question which had been referred 
to the CJEU by the Italian Court in the Traghetti case.  
 
Another interesting example in this context is France. Contrary to Italy, France 
merely adheres to group III of our classificatory scheme, but it nevertheless features a 
hybrid-system when it comes to questions of State liability for judicial breaches. The 
particular situation under French law and the impacts of the Köbler regime on the 
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The Case of FRANCE 
 
 
I. The Concept of State Liability for Judicial Breaches in France 
 
1. Double duality: Dual structures – dual solutions   
 
a) The principle of separation of the courts in France 
 
In France the development of two separate regimes of public as opposed to 
private law liability was the consequence of a fundamental disjuncture between the 
different branches of courts and the concomitant principle of strict separation of their 
respective areas of competence.871 The reasons for a court structure divided between 
the justice judiciaire872 and the justice administrative873 are historical and rooted in 
the principle of separation of powers as defined by Montesquieu.874 A central and 
well-known tenet of his beliefs was the idea that the State should consist of three 
distinct and separate powers: the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. Their 
separation would be a prerequisite for the effective protection of individual freedoms. 
At the end of the 18th century, the fathers of the French revolution advanced a further 
principle from that formulated by Montesquieu, which mirrored their deep suspicion 
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 CHRISTIAN DADOMO and SUSAN FARRAN, The French Legal System, 2nd ed. (London, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1996), p. 46. 
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 The juridiction judiciaire is defined as “ensemble des tribunaux de l’ordre judiciaire (tribunaux 
répressifs, tribunaux civils, commerciaux, prud’homaux, ruraux et de securité sociale) soumis au 
contrôle de la Cour de cassation.” As in RAYMOND GUILLIEN and JEAN VINCENT, Lexique des termes 
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ensemble.” Definition as in Ibid, p. 365. Henceforth also referred to as ‘public law/administrative 
courts’ or ‘administrative jurisdiction’. The aforementioned English translations of justice judiciaire 
and justice administrative follow JOHN BELL et al., Principles of French Law (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1998), p. 37. 
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 See, inter alia, MONTESQUIEU, De l’esprit des lois (1748) L. XI., Ch. VI.: “Il n’y a point encore de 
liberté si la puissance de juger n’est pas séparée de la puissance législative et de l’exécutrice. Si elle 
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car le juge serait législateur. Si elle était jointe à la puissance exécutrice, le juge pourrait avoir la 
force d’un oppresseur.” 




of the judicial branch at the time.875 It was established that ordinary courts should not 
be competent to decide upon disputes involving the executive power and its members, 
because it would force the administrative branch to assume a subordinate position 
with respect to the judiciary.  
 
The principle of strict separation of administration and judiciary was initially 
laid down in the Act of 16-24 August 1790, which governed the relationship between 
the judiciary and the two remaining branches of the State, and established the clear 
separation of the judicial and the legislative branch. It also prohibited ordinary courts 
from preventing or suspending the application and implementation of Acts of 
Parliament. Furthermore, judges were banned from interpreting such Acts.876 
Accordingly, Article 13, Title II of the Act proclaimed that  
 
[t]he functions of the judiciary are and remain distinct and separate from 
those of the administration. Judges shall not, without incurring criminal 
liability, interfere in any manner whatsoever with the actions of the 
administration nor summon administrators to appear before them in order to 
account for their functions.877  
 
In 1795, this provision was reiterated in the Décret of 16 fructidor an III, which 
stated that courts were banned by law from subjecting administrative acts, whatever 
their nature, to judicial review.878 These two provisions still provide the only 
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 The suspicion stems from the monarchial times. The revolutionaries were determined to stop the 
resurgence of a strong judiciary. In their view, judges interfering with the State’s affairs would go 
against the sound functioning of the State and the principle of separation of powers. See also 
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legislative guidance for the division of competences between the ordinary and 
administrative courts in France today.879 
 
While these legal provisions prevented ordinary courts from interfering with 
administrative affairs, they did not identify any special court so empowered. This 
situation lasted until 1800 when the Conseils de Préfecture and the Conseil d’État880 
were created. The Conseil d’État was only fully recognized as a court decades after its 
creation, when it was conferred with justice déléguée, i.e. the power to review 
administrative action, by the Act of 24 May 1872. From then on, the pouvoir 
administratif had its own supreme court for administrative matters, which operated 
separately from the justice judiciaire.881 Because of this historical evolution, broadly- 
speaking France is now faced with a dual system of courts divided between the ordre 
judiciaire, which exercises both civil and criminal jurisdiction and the ordre 
administratif.882 The courts pertaining to the ordre administratif have exclusive 
jurisdiction in cases relating to public law and involving individuals in the juridictions 
de droit commun on the one hand, and the State, a civil servant, a State corporation or 
any public authority on the other.883 For cases of conflict, there is the Tribunal des 
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 The French terminology in relation to courts is diverse. A set of different expressions, such as 
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juridictions judiciaires, les juridictions administratives, les juridictions en dehors des ordres (Tribunal 
des Conflits, Conseil Constitutionnel), and les juridictions politiques. 
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 Juridictions de droit commun, i.e. courts of general jurisdiction, are the courts which have 
jurisdiction to try all cases, except those for which other courts have been given special jurisdiction by 
statute. The latter courts, on the contrary, are called juridictions d’exception, or specialized courts. 
These courts can only hear cases for which they have been given express jurisdiction. Overall, the 




Conflits, which was created in 1872 and has since had the function of deciding 
whether a case should be heard by the administrative courts or the private law courts, 
i.e. whether the case is a matter of public or private law. The Tribunal des Conflits 
thereby determines which court has jurisdiction. Only when there are irreconcilable 
decisions by both jurisdictional branches relating to a specific issue can the Tribunal 
des Conflits itself decide the case.884 
 
While the Conseil Constitutionnel has not gone as far as to give the principle of 
separation of powers constitutional value, it has stated in the past that the 
establishment of a separate system of courts is a constitutional requirement.885 In other 
words, the merger of the two aforementioned ordres juridiques would be impossible 
under the 1958 Constitution. The existence of an independent system of ordinary 
courts is expressly provided for in Title VIII of that Constitution. Moreover, even 
though the principle of a separate system of administrative courts was not expressly 
laid down in the Constitution, it was recognized by the Conseil Constitutionnel in its 
decision of 22 July 1980,886 which referred to the fundamental principles recognized 
by the laws of the Republic and, in particular, to the Act of 24 May 1872 on the 
organization of the Conseil d’État.887 In a further decision of 23 January 1987888 the 
Constitutional Council ruled that the principle of separation of ordinary and 
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judiciaire consists of a few courts of general jurisdiction, the administrative judicial hierarchy is 
characterized by a number of specialized courts with diverse functions and specific jurisdiction. One 
common feature of both court structures is the existence of a supreme court at the top of each order, i.e. 
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LAROCHE-FLAVIN, La machine judiciaire (Paris, Éditions du Seuil, 1968), pp. 25 et seq. 
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Principles, supra note 873, p. 40. 
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administrative courts had no constitutional value per se, but that there was, however, a 
principle recognized by the laws of the Republic according to which,  
 
with the exception of those matters which by nature are reserved for the 
judicial authority, the annulment or amendment of decisions taken, in the 
exercise of public power, by the executive authorities, their agents, local 
governments, or those bodies under their authority or control, fall, in the 
last resort, within the jurisdiction of the administrative courts.889  
 
Put briefly, the Conseil Constitutionnel proclaimed that the existence of a system of 
administrative courts with distinct powers of judicial review for acts of public 
authorities was a fundamental principle recognized by the laws of the Republic. 
Indeed, the role of the Conseil d’État as an administrative court was finally confirmed 
by a series of laws adopted during the Second, Third and Fourth Republics.890  
 
b) Dual concepts of private and public law liability 
 
The two-fold division of courts in France has rendered it difficult to draw a clear 
line of demarcation between the competences of the courts of the ordre judiciaire and 
those of the ordre administratif. There is no statute or legislative provision which 
provides for a delimiting catalogue of competences and which stipulates the kind of 
disputes that are reserved exclusively for administrative or ordinary courts. The 
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existing criteria of demarcation were developed purely by academics and through 
adjudication. Overall, the delimitation between ordinary and administrative courts in 
France is far from straightforward. Frequently the decision appears to be taken along 
the lines of which type of law is involved in a particular case. However, this in turn 
creates the difficult problem of trying to define concisely what is part of 
administrative law and what constitutes civil or criminal law. In this context, the two 
key criteria of French administrative law, which are represented by the notions of 
puissance publique and service public, are an indispensable tool in deciding on the 
jurisdictional question.891 
 
The issue of jurisdictional delimitation in France also heralded a conflict 
concerning the general question of State liability. What court would be competent to 
rule on public liability claims? Already in 1855, in the decision Rotschild892 the 
Conseil d’Etat (at the time acting as judicial authority in case of conflict) had rejected 
the claim by ordinary courts that they were competent to hear cases of liability 
concerning public authorities based on Articles 1382 et seq. of the Civil Code.893 
                                                 
891
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 Arrêt Rotschild, 6 décembre 1855, D., 1859, 3, 34: “Considérant […] que ces rapports, ces droits et 
ces obligations ne peuvent être réglés selon les principes et les dispositions du seul droit civil et comme 
ils le sont de particulier à particulier; que, notamment en ce qui touche la responsabilité de l’Etat en 
cas de faute, de négligence ou d’erreur commises par l’administration, cette responsabilité n’est ni 
générale, ni absolue, qu’elle se modifie suivant la nature et les nécessités de chaque service.” 
893
 The key provisions concerning civil liability under French law according to the Code Civil are the 
following (English translation by Bussani and Palmer in BUSSANI & PALMER (eds.), Pure Economic 
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Article 1382: Any act whatever of man which causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it 
occurred to make reparation. 
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Almost twenty years later, in the famous Blanco894 ruling, the Tribunal des Conflits 
finally provided an answer to the question of judicial competence for State liability 
claims in general. As suggested above, the notion of service public played a decisive 
role in the decision-making process. Moreover, the ruling in Blanco also forged a 
distinct public liability regime, which was separate and independent from the private 
law framework of liability as promulgated in the French Civil Code.895 
 
The case itself dealt with a request by Mr. Blanco to hold the State liable 
according to Articles 1382ff of the Civil Code for damages sustained during the 
exercise of a public service. The harmed individual, Agnès Blanco, had been run over 
by a cart owned by the public sector Tobacco Administration, which was crossing the 
street between different buildings of the State-owned tobacco factory in Bordeaux. 
The Tribunal des Conflits, dealing with the case after referral from the tribunaux 
judiciaires, enunciated the principle of State liability, but explicitly rejected the 
application of the rules contained in the Code Civil relating to tort. Finding that 
Articles 1382 et seq. of the Code Civil applied only to relations between private legal 
entities, the Court ruled that public authorities should not be liable for their actions on 
the same basis as private individuals.896 The Court went on to hold that there was a 
specific, separate type of responsibility, which purely concerned the relations between 
the individual and the State.  
 
In sum, in the Blanco ruling the Tribunal des Conflits proclaimed the newly-
founded principle of State liability for public authorities and defined it as:  
 
la responsabilité qui peut incomber à l’État pour les dommages causés aux 
particuliers par le fait des personnes qu’il emploie dans le service public, 
ne peut être régie par les principes qui sont établis dans le Code civil, pour 
                                                 
894
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les rapports de particulier à particulier: que cette responsabilité n’est ni 
générale ni absolue; qu’elle a ses règles spéciales qui varient suivant les 
besoins du service et la nécessité de concilier les droits de l’État avec les 
droits privés.897 
 
State responsibility was therefore declared an autonomous regime separate from 
the general civil law provisions on liability. Being entirely case-law based in origin, 
the public liability regime developed in the same fashion and has remained in the 
hands of the judges instead of the legislature. Even today, the rules pertaining to 
liability for public authorities are for the most part uncodified. The “autonomy” of the 
regime of State liability, however, does not imply that it bears no resemblance to the 
regime of private law liability in France. For example, the conditions of liability or the 
reparation of damage are similar in private law and administrative law.898  
 
The question remained, however, of which court was competent to deal with 
actions concerning liability for official acts and compensation claims. With reference 
to the principle of separation of powers,899 the Tribunal des Conflits accorded 
jurisdiction to the administrative courts to hear actions brought against the State “for 
loss caused to individuals by the actions of persons whom it employs in the public 
service […]”.900 Hence in the Blanco case a general competence to rule over matters 
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concerning the liability of public authorities was accorded - with few exceptions901 - 
to the administrative courts.902 
 
The significance of the Blanco judgment was not recognized immediately. In 
fact, it was only at the beginning of the twentieth century that scholars identified the 
Blanco ruling of 1873 as a harbinger of State liability in France and commented upon 
this remarkable decision. Dickson stated in this context that the Blanco ruling 
heralded a situation where  
 
[l]e Tribunal des Conflits, le Conseil d’État et la Cour de cassation sont 
donc aujourd’hui absolument d’accord pour reconnaître, que c’est à la 
juridiction administrative, et plus exactement au Conseil d’État, juge 
ordinaire du contentieux administrative, qu’il appartient, en principe, de 
statuer sur toutes les demandes d’indemnités dirigées contre l’État à 
l’occasion du fonctionnement des services publics ou à raison des 
imprudences, des négligences et des fautes de toute sorte imputables au 
personnel qu’il emploie pour assurer ce fonctionnement.903  
 
Today it constitutes a rule of thumb that the administrative courts are competent 
to rule upon disputes, which – broadly speaking - are concerned with relationships of 
public law (rapports de droit public).904  
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At present, even though the majority of State liability claims still fall within the 
purview of the administrative courts, the French civil courts have gained jurisdiction 
over activities as closely linked to the functions of the State as the police judiciaire.905 
Today the justice judiciaire is also charged to decide in cases such as accidents caused 
by vehicles belonging to the administration;906 claims concerning “commercial” or 
“industrial” public services;907 certain accidents at school;908 certain claims against tax 
authorities;909 cases which entail a flagrant irregularity (voie de fait) by the 
administration infringing a fundamental freedom or a property right;910 and activities 
of the judicial organs (justice judiciaire),911 including the police judiciaire, which is 
predominantly concerned with the prevention of criminal activity.912 
 
c) Two extra-contractual liability regimes: responsabilité pour/sans faute 
 
While the existence of the general concept of State liability had been confirmed 
in the Blanco ruling in 1873, the Tribunal des Conflits had applied rather restrictive 
criteria to the concept of public liability.913 The State’s liability for its public servants 
should, according to the Tribunal des Conflits, be considered neither a general nor an 
absolute principle, and it should be based on a distinct set of rules, which are different 
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from the rules on liability under civil law.914 On the basis of this premise, the 
juridiction administrative developed an elaborate concept of State liability through 
adjudication, well aware of the fact that it was not generally applicable, but still 
contained a number of so-called “îlots de irresponsabilité”.915  
 
What were the defining contours of this liability regime? To answer the question 
four key elements need to be highlighted, which all represent essential attributes of 
the newly created principle of State liability. These elements relate to its autonomy, its 
sources, its ambit of application and the general idea behind the system.916 The notion 
of autonomy had already been underlined in the Blanco ruling, where the Tribunal des 
Conflits advocated a separate regime of State liability independent from the 
framework of responsibility set up under civil law. The concept of public liability, 
whose essential contours had emerged from the Blanco ruling, was subsequently 
clarified in the jurisprudence of the Conseil d’État partly by analogy to civil law. Over 
time, the principle continued to grow and develop solely on a case-law basis.917 Like 
the principle of non-contractual liability at the Community level, the framework of 
public liability in France is entirely judge-made; “loi praetorienne” as it is often 
referred to. In fact, after more than 130 years of development in this way, the concept 
of State liability is now firmly embedded in a rich yet refined jurisprudence.918  
 
The ambit of responsibility for acts of public authorities, in the narrow sense of 
the word, embraces the entire State apparatus, which in France consists of the 
collectivités territoriales - communes, departments, and regions - and all other public 
administrative bodies exercising delegated State power. Understood in a wider sense, 
it also includes all three branches of the State, i.e. the executive, the legislature, and 
the judiciary. Over time each of these ‘fragments’ of the State found its particular 
niche under the umbrella concept of liability for acts of public authorities and 
developed its own defining features, distinct conditions and case-specific 
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requirements for liability.919 As for the underlying rationale in Blanco, the case 
provides the classic dichotomy of the public power between the necessity of 
regulatory action by the State qua imperium and its concurrent duty to protect 
individuals from harm caused by such public acts. By using the general legal concept 
of liability as a device to mediate between these duties, the case essentially represents 
the continuing conflict between the individual versus the public interest. On the one 
hand, there is the interest of the individual in receiving compensation for harm. A 
broader level of reasoning would suggest that there is also a more general interest 
behind such a scheme of liability in that it serves as a sanctioning mechanism and as a 
tool for the prevention of future harm. On the other hand, there is the predominant 
interest of the State in guaranteeing the effective operation of the public service. By 
the same token, there is a further State interest in ensuring that public authorities are 
free to act without too great a fear of constantly being called to account for their 
actions.920 
 
At present, the framework of extra-contractual liability for actions of public 
authorities in France differentiates between the concept of “responsibilité pour faute” 
and the regime of “responsibilité sans faute”.921 Essential to the applicable liability 
regime are the nature and the degree of fault.922 However, both two variants share the 
same rules with respect to the remaining prerequisites for claiming liability, such as 
the elements of damage and causality, as well as the issue of reparation. In the 
following paragraphs, it is the author’s aim to provide the reader with a brief general 
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overview of the public liability regime in France. The reader should be aware of the 
fact that the subsequent excursus has been included for the sake of completeness with 
the aim of providing a broad overview of the issues at stake.923 
  
i) Responsabilité pour faute for administrative acts 
 
The first alternative of the double-sided concept of State liability in France is a 
fault-based regime, which is in substance rather similar to the general concept of 
tortious liability contained in Articles 1382ff of the Civil Code. The maxim of 
responsibility for fault constitutes the theoretical basis for the general regime of 
liability for all public authorities in France. In practice, however, this concept applies 
only to acts of administrative and judicial authorities and not the legislature. In terms 
of fault liability for administrative acts, the notion of faute de service924 remains a 
crucial concept in determining what constitutes an administrative fault.925 In the 
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relevant case-law, the notion of faute de service has generally been interpreted 
broadly.926 
 
The French definition of the word ‘faute’ is not to be equated with the German 
understanding of ‘Verschulden’927 and in this context also differs substantially from 
the generic interpretation of ‘fault’ under English law.928 A definition of the French 
term faute was provided by the Conseil d’État in the judgment Driancourt, which 
stated that the condition of fault was already met if one could objectively detect a 
single substantive illegality with respect to the damaging act in question.929 Under 
French law, mere illegality is in itself a fault fully capable of inducing liability 
without the need for any additional qualification of the public act. Under the fault-
based framework, liability is invoked whenever an administrative action or act is 
found to be unlawful.930 
 
Modern French administrative liability is premised upon the parity between 
public law illegality and administrative fault. The two concepts are so closely 
intertwined that liability can be invoked whenever an administrative act is found to be 
illegal.931 Just as a legal administrative act can never be wrongful,932 the fact that an 
act is illegal also automatically implies that it is wrongful no matter what the cause for 
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its illegality might be.933 In short, under French liability law for administrative actions 
the notion of fault is to be equated with public law illegality. In this context the two 
concepts almost constitute a pleonasm. This principle was reconfirmed by the Conseil 
d’État in its judgment of 26 January 1973, which also abandoned the previous concept 
of “erreur d’appréciation non fautive”.934 From that point on, the Conseil d’État 
upheld the principle that whenever the illegality of an act had been confirmed by a 
final judgment “cette illégalité, à supposer même qu’elle soit imputable à une simple 
erreur d’appréciation, constitue une faute de nature à engager la responsabilité de la 
puissance publique.”935  
 
In an exceptional number of cases, a more restricted definition of fault has been 
applied, though these have become fewer with the passage of time. Especially in those 
areas where public officials are required to make a particularly difficult judgment,936 a 
more qualified misconduct is often required in order to invoke liability.937 For these 
cases, liability presupposes the existence of a qualified fault, i.e. a “faute lourde”. On 
the one hand, the public services concerned tend to operate within certain fields, 
which are particularly difficult and sensitive, like the police or the fire service.938 The 
higher threshold of a qualified fault for liability grants these authorities some sort of 
blanket protection when executing their difficult public duties. On the other hand, the 
                                                 
933
 CHAPUS, Droit Administratif..., supra note 898, n°1253; Conclusions Genevois sous CE, Mme 
Carliez, supra note 928, p. 103.  
934
 Ville de Paris/Driancourt, AJDA 1973, p. 245, Rev. adm., 1974, p. 29, note Moderne. 
935
 The Conseil d’État thereby confirmed that such illegality, even assuming that it was the result of a 
simple error of assessment, constituted a tort which would engage the responsibility of the public body 
(see the ruling of 6 octobre 1976, Ministre de l’Agriculture/Epoux Grimard, Rec. Lebon, p. 297). The 
same principle was confirmed in the judgments of 22 mai 1974, Sieur Charrois, Rec. Lebon, p. 393 and 
of 28 mars 1980, Yverneau, RDP, 1980, p. 1744. This principle, however, does not apply to cases 
where the occurrence of a qualified fault is explicitly required. In this case, the existence of a simple 
illegality does not suffice to fulfil the requirement of a qualified fault, as confirmed in CE, 21 juin 
1972, Foucault, Rec. Lebon, p. 461. 
936
 BELL et al., Principles, supra note 873, p. 192. 
937
 For further details and instances when faute lourde is required see CHAPUS, Droit Administratif..., 
supra note 898, n°1462 et seq. 
938
 For medical cases the requirement of faute lourde was abandoned in the case CE Ass., 10 avril 1992, 
Époux V.  




concept of faute lourde also applies within particularly delicate areas, for example in 
respect of tax authorities.939  
 
Apart from the condition of fault, no specific criteria, which would serve to 
restrict liability, have to be fulfilled, save for the standard requirement of causality 
between the damage and the act concerned. Finally, in a successful liability claim in 
these cases the only form of compensation available is monetary damages.940 
 
ii) Responsabilité sans faute for loss caused by administrative and legislative 
acts 
 
The alternative framework of State liability for harm caused by public 
authorities is a no-fault regime, which is, however, only applicable under particular 
conditions.941 The applicability of liability sans faute is conceivable in the case that 
either the public act has not been illegal, or that there is no faute lourde, or that under 
certain circumstances the illegality of the act cannot be established.942 Contrary to the 
concept of responsabilité pour faute de service the construct of responsabilité sans 
faute is based upon the idea that the Conseil d´État will not question the legality of the 
impugned public act. Consequently, the effectiveness of the public act concerned 
remains entirely undisputed.943 
 
The application of this concept has predominantly been based upon two distinct 
principles: the principle of ‘égalité devant les charges publiques’ and the theory of 
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risk. Firstly, no-fault liability is inextricably linked to the fundamental maxim of 
equality before public burdens - ‘égalité devant les charges publiques’ - which 
constitutes a core concept under French administrative law.944 The rationale 
underlying this principle is that actions lawfully conducted by public authorities, 
which have been undertaken in the general interest, may nevertheless impose a special 
burden on a particular individual or a specific group of people. In case the community 
benefits from a lawful, public act at the expense of an individual, this legal safety net 
comes into place, which aims to compensate the harmed person for lawfully caused 
loss. This scenario includes specific cases where damage occurs as a result of (a) legal 
administrative decisions (individual acts or general regulations945), or (b) laws 
legitimately passed by the legislature, which, however, naturally cause damage to 
specific individuals.946  
 
The second key element is the theory of risk. The main reasoning behind this 
principle is the fact that activities undertaken by public authorities, even when 
conducted without fault, may under specific circumstances create an elevated risk for 
society. If an individual suffers harm after the risk that is attached to such behaviour 
materializes, the State has to indemnify the victim irrespective of whether the 
authorities’ actions were wrongful or not. In short, the application of responsabilité 
sans faute covers different areas of public sector activity.947  
 
No-fault liability for administrative and (as will be shown later) legislative acts 
should generally be considered as an exceptional device used by the courts to ensure 
equitable justice. The crux of this concept is to grant compensation for loss even 
though the illegality of the respective public act cannot or ought not to be ascertained. 
This form of liability allows compensation to be awarded to an individual in return for 
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the ‘sacrifice’ he has made for the benefit of the public interest.948 It is also tied to the 
individual’s exposure to risk-related behaviour exercised by the State. 
 
However, the regime of liability sans faute has been subjected to rather 
restrictive prerequisites for its application, which may be to the detriment of the 
victim. Within the context of no-fault liability, the individual’s right to reparation is 
conditioned by the need to prove the existence of a specific and severe damage 
amounting to an abnormal burden.949 Specific is to be understood as affecting only 
particular members of society. Abnormal presupposes the existence of damage with 
such a degree of severity that it lies beyond the inconveniences we experience in 
everyday life.950 However, the no-fault regime is generally not applicable if the 
authority in question has excluded the right to compensation from the outset.951 As 
stated above, in this context one has to distinguish between two different scenarios: 
no-fault liability for legislative acts and liability sans faute for administrative acts.952 
 
The first prerequisite for responsibility sans faute for actions undertaken by the 
autorités administratifs is the occurrence of a specific and severe damage that has 
been inflicted upon an individual for reasons of public interest. It is difficult to 
describe systematically how the Conseil d’État classifies the notion of abnormal 
burden and the definition of public interest. In addition, the jurisprudence so far has 
not provided a standard definition of what constitutes a severe damage. It seems that 
the Conseil d’État follows a case-by-case approach in that it takes into account the 
different circumstances of every single case before it arrives at a final decision.953 The 
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only element which is not required in order to invoke liability sans faute is proof of 
illegality of the public act. Moreover, the only form of compensation available in 
these cases is monetary damages. 
 
With respect to the question of State liability for legislative acts the situation in 
France is rather peculiar. Generally speaking, the Conseil Constitutionnel has the 
power of legislative review only before the enactment of a specific law. No other 
court is competent to review legislative acts. As a result, courts in France are simply 
not able to rule upon the illegality of a validly enacted legislative provision due to its 
incompatibility with the Constitution.954 In the case of loss caused to an individual by 
a legislative act, the Conseil d´État was therefore confronted with an insoluble 
dilemma. While it had no power to decide on the legality of legislative acts, it also 
could not find that there was no responsibility on the part of the legislature because of 
the obvious harm that had been inflicted upon an individual as a result of the act 
concerned.  
 
In its La Fleurette decision,955 the Conseil d´État – in an attempt to resolve the 
stalemate - implemented an ‘emergency solution’, which involved the introduction of 
an alternative concept to the conventional framework of responsabilité pour faute. 
The newly created regime of responsibility of the State in its function as legislature 
was again based on the principle of equality before public burdens, and provided 
compensation to the affected individual without having the Court decide explicitly on 
the illegality of the act concerned. The regime of no-fault liability offered a viable 
solution to bypass the question of illegality (and fault), but still guaranteed the 
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claimant his or her right to compensation in case of specific and severe loss caused by 
a legislative provision. The ratio of the regime was also based on the principle of 
equality before public burdens.956 In short, the concept of responsabilité sans faute 
was originally born out of the need to tackle the problem of State liability for 
legislative acts.957 
 
Given the fact that laws naturally tend to have a rather general scope of 
application, the condition of specificity of the damage, which is required in this 
context, is difficult to establish. Moreover, State liability for legislative breaches can 
never be incurred by an omission or inaction of the legislature.958 And, as stated 
above, this principle is also inapplicable in cases where the framers of the law have 
explicitly excluded any right to compensation.959 Yet with respect to cases of State 
liability for legislative breaches, the basic construct of liability sans faute prevails 
today. 
 
This brief overview on the origin and the development of the two forms of 
liability leaves unanswered the question of how to view their relationship to one 
another. In general, liability sans faute is to be regarded as an exceptional regime of 
liability, which may only be invoked if liability based on fault cannot be established. 
Hence, liability pour faute has priority while the secondary regime of liability sans 
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faute can only be invoked in case of non-existence of a fault.960 Moreover, these 
liability regimes are mutually exclusive. Finally, it is worth mentioning that liability 
sans faute has to be invoked ex officio by the judge on his or her own motion in the 
interest of the victim after he or she has been refused compensation on the basis of 
liability pour faute.961 
 
There are three decisive rules of thumb when distinguishing the regime of no-
fault liability from the principle of liability pour faute. First, in the case of the more 
restrictive regime of no-fault liability, damage is only reparable if it reaches a certain 
level of gravity. Under the framework of liability pour faute, any damage is reparable. 
Second, in the case of no-fault liability the victim does not have to prove the 
occurrence of a fault, simply the existence of a causal link between the damage 
sustained and the act of the public authority. Third, with respect to liability sans faute, 
there are only two reasons that could possibly reduce the liability of public authorities, 
i.e. force majeure and contributory negligence by the victim.962  
 
2. The principle of State liability for judicial breaches  
 
In line with this general trend, the judiciary was eventually confronted with 
growing pressure to face responsibility for its actions. The ‘service public’ today is 
faced with the challenge of assuring every citizen’s right to a well-functioning, day-
to-day service provided by the public authorities. In order to satisfy demands for 
transparency and accountability for public actions, not only the administration, but 
also the judiciary has introduced various solutions by legislative reform or through the 
jurisprudence of its supreme courts.963 Under French law the assessment of State 
liability for judicial breaches of law emanates from either the ‘juge judiciaire’ or the 
‘juge administrative’ depending on whether the damage has been caused by the 
‘justice judiciaire’ or the ‘justice administrative’. 
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a) The principle of State liability incurred by the Justice Judiciaire 
 
The development of a general framework of State liability for harm incurred by 
the ordinary judiciary, i.e. the justice judiciaire,964 can roughly be separated into four 
different phases. At first there was no such regime. Similar to the situation we initially 
encountered in England and Wales,965 the French State enjoyed absolute immunity 
when it came to liability claims for violations incurred by the judiciary. Over time, 
however, the shield of protection slowly started to crumble, mainly due to judicial 
activism, which finally elevated the process to a second stage. Starting with its 
judgment in Giry,966 the Cour de Cassation introduced a first exception to the ruling 
principle of State immunity and created an interim regime of State liability, which 
was marked by a framework of liability sans faute. It took the legislature until 1972 to 
catch up with the emerging judicial trend towards holding the State liable for breaches 
of law by its judicial organs. 
 
The Loi de 5 juillet 1972967 constituted the starting point of a third stage in the 
development of State liability for breaches committed by the justice judiciaire. This 
particular period was distinguished from the two previous phases in the sense that it 
provided the first legislative recognition of the extension of the existing regime of 
State liability to include the (ordinary) judiciary as a possible tortfeasor. In 2006, an 
amendment to this law completed the evolution of the system. The following 
paragraphs will provide for a more detailed and chronological analysis of the long-
winded road which lead towards the contemporary regime of State liability for 
violations caused to an individual by the justice judiciaire. 
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i) The framework of liability for acts of the judiciary before the Law of 5 July 
1972 
 
Unless the liability of the State was explicitly prescribed by law, the French 
State remained largely behind an uncodified shield of protection against liability 
claims brought by individuals for violations incurred by the ordinary judiciary. Since 
this principle had not been codified, customary law remained the guarantor for such 
quasi-immunity of the State with respect to such claims. It rendered the State 
irresponsible for any violations of such sort. The jurisprudence judiciaire gave the 
principle of non-accountability a wide field of application, in that it embraced not 
only judicial acts as such, but also different activities adhering to the administration of 
justice.968 The adoption of the State’s quasi-immunity with respect to judicial 
breaches had generally been justified on the basis of three main objectives. First, the 
argument was used that a possible regime of State responsibility for judicial breaches 
would gravely interfere with the principle of State sovereignty as well as the maxim 
of judicial independence and the retention of judges’ freedom of thought and 
protection from outside pressures. The second objection to a general liability regime 
of the State was a procedural one, based on the fact that instead of a liability action, 
the individual would always have the possibility to challenge a judicial decision 
through appeal to a higher court. Finally, it was argued that the indirect revision of a 
judgment in the course of an action for liability would violate the fundamental 
principle of res judicata.969  
 
The force of these arguments meant, there were only a handful of exceptions to 
the wide-reaching immunity of the State with respect to liability claims for judicial 
violations. Traditionally, the principle of State liability was only applicable in fields 
where special legislation foresaw such a possibility for the claimant.970 Overall, this 
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accounted for a rather limited, but yet specific number of cases.971 In the field of 
criminal or correctional justice, the cases of ‘erreur judiciaire’ and ‘détention 
provisoire injustifiée’ marked two noteworthy exceptions to the general immunity 
scheme of the State in France. At present, both of these cases which still constitute 
exceptions to the general regime of State liability are regulated under French criminal 
law. The first falls under the rubric of revision of criminal judgments. As mentioned 
before, reparation for judicial errors in criminal law is a feature we find not only in 
most of the countries included in group III of our classification scheme but in our 
entire study. In Finland, another Member State classified under group III, a similar 
mechanism has been established by the Finish Act on Compensation from State Funds 
for the Arrest or Detention of an Innocent Person (Act No. 422/1974).972 Similar 
frameworks are applied even in those Member States, which usually exclude entirely 
the concept of State liability for judicial breaches.973 In France such instrument has 
first been established in the Loi du 8 Juin 1895 following the Dreyfus case.974 
According to this law, a defendant, who had obtained revision of his case, was eligible 
for some kind of indemnity, which would be awarded in the same appeal court 
decision. Today the case of an erroneous criminal conviction is regulated by Article 
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626 of the Code de Procedure Pénale,975 which provides for the revision of the case 
by the Cour de Cassation and awards effective remedy and reparation of damages for 
the victims of the conviction.  
 
Moreover, individuals who have been subject to unjustified detention on 
remand (‘détention provisoire injustifiée’) are granted compensation by the State 
according to the procedure foreseen in Articles 149 and 150 of the Code de Procédure 
Pénale.976 Under these provisions, the State guarantees compensation without a pre-
condition of fault for those individuals who – after having been placed in pre-trial 
detention – benefit from either a suspension of their case, or from exculpation or 
acquittal. Initially, the victim was required to prove that his or her detention had 
caused exceptionally serious harm “manifestement anormal et d’une particulière 
gravité”.977 However, this requirement was repealed in the law of 30 December 1996 
concerning detention on remand (Article 9). Finally, the law of 15 June 2000 also 
provided for a revision of the procedural regime. Instead of the previous procedure of 
submitting requests directly to a commission linked to the Cour de Cassation, the 
claims now have to be addressed to the presidents of the cours d’appels, whose 
decisions may be appealed to a special body called ‘Commission nationale de 
reparation des detentions provisoires’. Overall, the State is in charge of providing 
compensation, but has the right of recourse against those individuals whose false 
testimony was at the origin of the detention on remand.978 
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 A number of exceptions, which allowed for liability claims to be brought forward against the State 
for violations committed by the judicial authorities, and which had to be explicitly stipulated by law, 
also included the Loi du 14 décembre 1964 concerning civil tutelage. This law instituted the 
responsibility of the State for any type of fault in cases of damage sustained by the person under 
tutelage, which was committed by the competent judge (‘le juge des tutelles’). The claim is dealt with 
before the Tribunal de Grande Instance (see, for example, Civ., 26 juin 1979, Consorts Morineau, Gaz. 
Pal., 2 janvier 1981).  




ii) An interim regime of State liability sans faute introduced by the jurisdiction 
of the Cour de Cassation979 
 
The fact that the law was silent on the customary principle of irresponsibility of 
the State with respect to judicial breaches finally spurred the courts to challenge this 
unwritten dogma. In a judgment of 23 November 1956 in the case Giry,980 the Cour 
de Cassation formally introduced – “sur base des principes généraux qui commandent 
tout à la fois le droit public et le droit privé” - a regime of State liability sans faute 
with respect to activities of the police judiciaire,981 which was based and founded on 
the principle of equality in front of public burdens. Consequently, apart from the 
traditional cases of liability, which were explicitly stipulated by law, the ordinary 
courts also had the competence to rule on the liability of the State by applying the 
general rules of liability of public authorities.982  
 
The specific case concerned an individual, Dr. Giry, who had assisted in an 
operation conducted by the police judiciaire in his professional capacity and who had 
been injured in an explosion, which occurred in the course of this police investigation. 
Subsumed under the general definition of collaborateur occasionnel des services 
publics, Dr. Giry was able to benefit from a strict responsibility regime such as the 
one generally applied in the jurisprudence of the administrative courts.983 The Cour de 
Cassation went on to confirm the decision taken in Giry in various subsequent 
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judgments, which concerned either (a) damage caused by the use of dangerous 
weapons and firearms (“armes ou d’engins dangereux”)984 or - as in the case of Giry - 
(b) damage inflicted upon occasional collaborators of the public service area 
(“collaborateurs des services publics”).985 However, it was predominantly in the 
ambit of activities of the police judiciaire that the courts seized the opportunity to 
debate and elaborate on the underlying principles of responsibility, which were 
grounded in the jurisdiction of the administrative courts.986 The Court, for example, 
engaged in a similar rhetoric and reasoning in the ruling Polès of 24 November 1965. 
It set aside the rules of “la prise à partie” and further developed a completely 
autonomous theory on State liability with respect to acts performed by the police 
judiciaire.987 In sum, the above-mentioned cases are illustrative of the fact that even 
before the adoption of the new law in 1972, a modified framework of liability had 
been construed in the jurisprudence of the Cour de Cassation, which was applicable 
in at least two areas, i.e. for all damage caused by acts of the police judiciaire988 and 
for activities pertaining to the pre-trial phase of ‘instruction préparatoire’.989  
 
However, it was evident that these specific cases remained exceptions and that 
the liability regime sans faute was only applicable within very narrow confines. 
Moreover, these cases concerned acts which were not ‘proper’ judicial acts as 
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understood in the classical, narrowly defined sense of the word. All other instances 
were premised on the assumption that State liability for judicial breaches could only 
be invoked if explicitly provided for by law or on the basis of the procedure of la 
prise à partie, within which the State only acted as the financial guarantor for 
personal fault of a judicial organ and not for fault committed by the judiciary as a 
collective body.990 In sum, until 1972 the situation in France was characterized by a 
general principle of non-accountability of the State with respect to judicial breaches, 
which was tempered by two legislative exceptions991 and the slow but progressive 
evolution of the jurisprudence in this context. 
 
Despite the codification of the issue in 1972 prescribing that State liability for 
the malfunctioning of the judicial authorities was tied to the occurrence of a faute 
lourde or a denial of justice,992 the Cour de Cassation consistently followed its 
previously established line of jurisprudence. Thus, if one refers – like the Cour de 
Cassation in the judgment Giry - to the “règles du droit public”,993 the responsibility 
of the State could still also be invoked in the absence of fault (for instance in cases of 
use of dangerous firearms) or in the case of faute simple. The interpretation of the 
rather woolly legislative provision was such that it allowed for the exclusion of all 
acts conducted by the police judiciaire outside the confines of its field of 
application.994 Hence, the jurisprudence of the ordinary courts further triggered the 
evolution of the rules pertaining to public authorities, i.e. with respect to special 
operations by the police judiciaire, for which the regime of State liability sans faute 
still applied.995 The application of these rules in the aforementioned case of Giry 
would have prevented the latter from benefiting from the regime of responsibility 
without fault, which had been instituted by the jurisprudence on administrative 
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matters favouring occasional collaborators of the public services. From then on, the 
Cour de Cassation would constantly reaffirm this line of jurisprudence. While an 
important evolution in the jurisprudence was emerging, it was the turn of the 
legislature to finally address the problem. 
 
iii) The regime of State liability introduced by the Law of 5 July 1972996 
 
The Loi du 5 juillet 1972 established an overarching principle of State liability 
for judicial breaches and covered the entire justice judiciaire. Article 11 of the law 
provided that “[l]’État est tenu de réparer le dommage causé par le fonctionnement 
défectueux du service de la justice.” Entirely abandoning the old principle of non-
accountability of the State with respect to judicial acts,997 Article 11, which regulated 
from then on the State’s responsibility for harm inflicted upon individuals by a 
malfunctioning of the justice judiciaire. Article 11, which was later reformulated in 
Article L.781-1 of the Courts of Justice Act,998 declared in a general manner that the 
State was held to repair the damages caused by the malfunctioning of the (ordinary) 
judicial branch. However, the legislature immediately qualified this principle by 
specifying that, if the State was bound to repair the damage which occurred as a result 
of the malfunctioning of the judiciary, this responsibility could only be invoked under 
the occurrence of grave fault or denial of justice.999 The legal provision was later 
reformulated in Book 7 of the Code de l’Organisation Judiciaire. Under the heading 
of Title VIII, “Liability for defects in the functioning of the judicial power”, Article 
L.781-1 read as follows: “The State shall be liable for the damage caused by defects 
in the functioning of the judicial power. Such liability is engaged only upon gross 
negligence or a denial of justice […].” It further declared that “[t]he State shall 
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assume the burden of liability towards the victims of injury caused by the personal 
fault of judges and other magistrates, without prejudice to its recourses against 
them.”1000 The aforementioned provisions were recently reiterated and re-codified in 
Articles L.141-1 and L.141-2 Code de l’Organisation Judiciaire.1001 However, with 
respect to their content the norms remained unaltered.1002 
 
While the law of 1972 and particularly its Article 11 outlined the general pillars 
of such liability, it remained silent on issues such as the question of competence to 
rule upon such liability claims, the precise interpretation of the notions of grave fault 
and denial of justice, the ambit of applicability of the law, and its relation to the 
existing case-law of the Cour de Cassation on the issue. Therefore, the following 
paragraphs will lay out a more expansive conceptualization of the substance, content 
and the questions, which were seemingly left unanswered by the legislative 
provisions. 
 
iv) The regime of liability created by the Loi du 5 Juillet 1972 
 
The legislature overtly sought to exclude the creation of a liability regime sans 
faute in this particular context and severely limited the number of possible actions for 
compensation. With this objective in mind, a liability regime based on fault was 
implemented. Moreover, the legislature was not satisfied with the occurrence of a 
simple fault, but instead insisted on a qualified fault as a pre-condition in order to 
engage the responsibility of the State. The travaux préparatoires of the law of 1972 
appear to indicate that the imperative concept of ‘faute lourde’ was to be interpreted 
according to the meaning attributed to it under administrative law. Thereby, it seems 
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to be covering a larger field of application than the notion of “faute lourde 
professionnelle”, which had been previously employed in the law of 7 February 1933 
as an example for the causes, which conditioned the successful inception of la prise à 
partie.1003 According to the wider interpretation, the notion of faute lourde not only 
embraces instances of perfidy, fraud and corruption, but also those acts, which were 
committed with particularly severe fault or gross negligence, in a manner that an 
assiduous judicial officer would never act. 
 
According to the newly established law, the party bringing the claim of liability 
also carried the burden of proof of the alleged fault by the judicial officer. It was then 
for the judge to rule upon the question of whether the judicial service had in fact been 
malfunctioning. Consequently, the judge could oblige the State to repair the damages 
caused by the wrongful act. Recent jurisprudence in the field, though rather scarce, 
gives reason to believe that today the notion of faute lourde is to be interpreted in a 
fairly restrictive sense. This in turn forms the crux of the argument, which attempts to 
account for the fact that until today the majority of asserted claims for liability in front 
of ordinary courts tend to fail or are simply dismissed. 
 
v) The Loi du 5 juillet 1972 behind the backdrop of the jurisprudence by the 
Cour de Cassation: co-existence by means of interpretation 
 
At first uncertainty pre-dominated over the question of whether the newly 
adopted law would challenge the regime of no-fault liability, which had previously 
been established by the ruling in Giry for activities performed by the police judiciaire. 
With the new law emerging amidst the proactive jurisprudence by the Cour de 
Cassation, Perrot implied that the new law “risque de constituer un recul par rapport 
aux solutions de la jurisprudence antérieure qui tendait à admettre une responsabilité 
sans faute sur le seul fondement de l´égalité devant les charges publiques”.1004 The 
same concern was echoed by René Chapus when he argued that the law of 1972 
seemed to conflict with the earlier jurisprudence of the Cour de Cassation, which had 
emerged from the case of Giry. As the reader will recall, this case had opened up the 
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remarkable opportunity for victims of harm incurred by the justice judiciaire to claim 
strict responsibility, i.e. responsibility without fault, or responsibility for faute simple. 
The matter was finally clarified in a judgment of 10 June 1986, where the Cour de 
Cassation interpreted the normative framework provided for by the law of 1972 in a 
strict and narrow manner. The Court held that the newly adopted liability regime only 
embraced the acts of courts as well as those acts which were not detachable from 
them.1005 It followed from the Court’s reasoning that any activity performed by the 
police judiciaire was not to be subsumed under the Loi du 5 juillet 1972. 
Consequently, the regime of liability sans faute remained applicable to all activities 
performed by the police judiciaire.1006   
 
Chapus had posited his argument on the assumption that if the intention of the 
legislature had been to improve the position of the victims, it coercively followed that 
the law was to be construed accordingly. Therefore, Chapus argued that the Loi du 5 
Juillet 1972 had to be interpreted in a restrictive manner in two ways: first, to allow 
for a fluid attunement between the legal provisions of 1972 and the jurisprudence by 
the Cour de Cassation, the expression “service de la justice” as used in the law 
merited special interpretation. In order to avoid entirely depriving victims of the 
responsibility regime without fault or for faute simple, as previously established in the 
jurisprudence of the ordinary courts, the “service de la justice” had to be understood 
as a body whose acts comprised the courts’ activities and also those acts that 
inevitably could not be detached from the courts. Consequently, in line with the 
reasoning of the Cour de Cassation, Chapus elaborated on this compromise and 
eventually concluded that activities of the police judiciaire did not fall within the 
ambit of the Loi du 5 juillet 1972. Secondly, whenever the assessment of State 
responsibility was based on (what is now) Article L.141-1 of the Courts of Justice 
Act,1007 the classification of “faute lourde” or denial of justice was always conditioned 
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by the circumstances of each individual case and inevitably by the subjective 
perception of the facts of the case by the competent judge.1008  
 
Looking at the latest jurisprudence of the Cour de Cassation, one can indeed 
observe that there is a tendency in practice to bend and stretch the notion of faute 
lourde. However, the limits of interpretation imposed by EU law are nevertheless 
respected.1009 In a recent judgment, the supreme jurisdiction defined faute lourde, 
generally speaking, as including all deficiencies characterized by an act or a series of 
acts that demonstrate the unfitness of the judicial branch to fulfil the mission with 
which it has been charged.1010 Refusing to abandon the pre-condition of faute lourde 
for faute simple, the Cour de Cassation – with due respect for the right to a fair trial as 
guaranteed under Article 6 of the ECHR - redefined the notion of fault and based it on 
objective criteria.1011 To better understand how this judgment diluted the definition of 
the notion of ‘faute lourde’, it is necessary to take into account its interpretation in the 
antecedent case law. In a judgment of the Tribunal de grande instance of Paris in 
1999, for instance, ‘faute lourde’ was described as a violation which had either been 
caused by such gross mistake that a magistrat, who was generally diligent in his 
duties, would not have committed or a violation which comprised the person’s clear 
intention to harm, or which was the result of an extreme, atypical and wrongful 
behaviour.1012 In the latter, the expression of faute lourde had still been defined with 
reference to almost exclusively subjective criteria.1013 
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 With respect to these definitions, an ordinary judge did not consider it to be a grave fault by the 
registry of the court and a Tribunal de Grande Instance to assume competence and to rule in a case that 
should have been decided by the Tribunal de Commerce (Cass., civ. (1ère ch.), 20 février 1996, Lucas, 
Dalloz 1996, IR, p. 83). The same classification applied to a case where a judge made insinuating and 
detrimental remarks with respect to a lawyer (Cass. civ. (1ère ch.), 13. octobre 1998, Dalloz 1998, IR, p. 




The notion of denial of justice was initially confined to a restrictive conceptual 
definition termed from the legislation regulating the procedure of “la prise à 
partie”.1014 Hence, before 1972 the condition of denial of justice was prevalent in 
instances where the judge refused to rule in a case without a valid motive, under the 
pretext of silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law, or also by pretending to wait 
for a ruling from another court or some expert’s report. In this context, denial of 
justice was limited to personal failure by the judge.  
 
Within the ambit of the Loi du 5 juillet 1972, however, the assumptions 
affirming denial of justice as an autonomous concept of fault were more permeable. 
According to Menuret, the definition had a wider interpretation as a result of the 
relevant case-law and was one favoured by Favoreu which he had already proposed 
early on in his writings.1015 According to the latter, it was preferable to consider denial 
of justice as the failure of the State’s duty to judicially protect of the individual rather 
than as a mere breach of duties by a judge.1016 As a corollary, hypotheses amounting 
to a denial of justice included from then on, in addition to the “traditional” cases, 
instances of excessive length or unjustified delay of proceedings;1017 “tout 
manquement de l’Etat à son devoir de protection juridictionnelle d’un individu”.1018 
                                                                                                                                            
246). On the contrary, grave negligence was affirmed in cases such as the invitation by the minister of 
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In sum, the requirements of faute lourde and denial of justice were subject to a rather 
far-reaching judicial interpretation. Further limitations on the definition of these two 
elements originated - as has already been discussed in detail - from exceptional 
dispositions in specific legal provisions.1019 
 
The most recent jurisprudence has even opened up the possibility for victims of 
damage committed by the justice judiciaire to make a claim based either on strict 
responsibility of the State, i.e. responsibility without fault, or based on liability for 
faute simple. In fact, a judgment by the Cour de Cassation of 23 February 2001 
reasoned that (former) Article L.781-1 might not be the only basis for claims of State 
responsibility for breaches committed by the justice judiciaire. The jurisprudence 
evolved to extend beyond the elements of what had constituted - until then - the basic 
conditions for invoking State liability. The scope of its application was deliberately 
widened to acknowledge the procedural demands of Article 6 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights as an additional valid legal ground for seeking to find 
the State liable for damage caused by the justice judiciaire.1020 Accordingly, in an 
attempt to clarify the interplay between the different legal bases at stake, the Cour de 
Cassation ruled that the existence of a separate liability regime for damages incurred 
by the ordinary judiciary, which did not deprive the individual from his or her right to 
a judge, would not be in contradiction with the requirements of Article 6 ECHR. In 
short, the Conseil Constitutionnel confirmed the compatibility of the condition of 
faute lourde with the demands of Article 6 ECHR and its requirement to warrant an 
individual’s right to a fair trial.1021 This judgment also provides further evidence for 
the fact that, within this specific context, ever-greater recourse has been had to the 
guarantees enshrined in the ECHR, especially Article 6(1). This certainly held true for 
the specific question of the State’s responsibility for breaches by the justice judiciaire 
in France.1022 
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vi)  Ambit and scope of application of the Loi du 5 Juillet 1972 
 
Generally speaking, Article L.141-1 of the Courts of Justice Act in its current 
form could be viewed as an umbrella provision covering all elements of jurisdiction of 
ordinary courts, which would, more precisely, include all judicial acts from the 
preliminary hearings to the judgment in the proceedings as well as the acts of 
execution administered by the service de la justice, i.e. the administration of justice. 
Excluded from the applicability of this Article are the entire administrative 
jurisdiction and all independent administrative authorities, even, in the case that the 
latter, when they carried out quasi-judicial functions, apply a court-like procedure or 
are controlled by a juge judiciaire.1023  
 
However, in addition to tracing out its broader limits of applicability, within the 
law’s general field of application it is also necessary to consider precisely which acts 
of the ordinary judicial branch the law of 1972 included or excluded. In line with the 
use of rather general terms in Article 11 of the Loi du 5 juillet 1972, one could assume 
that the liability of the State was engaged on the basis of all acts performed by 
members or auxiliary members of the ordinary judiciary.1024 Furthermore, the 1972 
law could theoretically also embrace all acts performed by judges, whether those acts 
were of a judicial nature or not, as well as all administrative deeds accomplished by 
auxiliaries in the process of preparing a judicial decision. Moreover, it remained 
unclear whether the 1972 law had abolished the old distinction between judicial acts, 
whose status of res judicata would not allow for a re-opening of the case qua claim 
for liability on the one hand, and non-judicial acts on the other, which could, in a 
specific area and under certain conditions, engage the liability of the State.1025  
 
According to the formula used in the jurisprudence, the list of eligible actors, 
who fall under (former) Article L.781-1, includes all judges as well as those 




 Article 11 of the law of 5 July 1972 promulgated that “[l]’État est tenu de réparer le dommage 
causé par le fonctionnement défectueux du service de la justice.” 
1025
 For a critical view on Article L.141-1/2 Code de l’Organisation Judiciaire see GEORGES 
WIEDERKEHR, "La responsabilité de l'État et des magistrats du fait de la justice" (1997) Justices, Revue 
Générale de Droit Processuel 5, p. 18. 




individuals who have been placed under the judges’ direct control and authority. This 
in turn implies that the status of the individuals concerned is in fact of little 
relevance.1026 As a rule of thumb, the Loi du 5 juillet 1972 regulates questions of 
liability for harm resulting from the general functioning1027 of the judicial service. 
Thus, the law only deals with damages caused to those parties, which are actually in 
the process of resorting to the public service of ordinary justice. Moreover, as 
previously demonstrated, the law does not embrace cases of liability for any acts 
performed by occasional collaborators of the public judicial service.1028 Instead, the 
latter category is judged according to a regime of responsibility sans faute.1029 The 
attempt to determine the type of acts subsumable under (former) Article L.781-1 
appears to be a little more difficult. In light of the focus of this present study, this 
issue will not be discussed in detail. However, what can immediately be extracted 
from its ambit of application are all cases of liability related to aspects of organisation 
of the justice judiciaire, which fall under the competence of the administrative 
courts.1030  
 
Generally speaking, the admission of the State’s responsibility for the activities 
of its judicial branch raises a number of rather delicate problems. One of them is the 
question of who is competent to rule upon acts attributable to the judiciary as a whole. 
In France, the administrative judge is competent to rule upon any violation lying in 
the ambit of his/her own branch of justice, i.e. the justice administrative. For the 
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justice judiciaire, however, the question of competence is divided between the 
administrative jurisdiction which deals with organisational issues in respect of the 
ordinary judicial service and the ordinary judicial branch, which deals with aspects 
related to its own functioning.1031 Overall, this legislation so far has only given rise to 
a rather insignificant number of cases. Among those, there are only a handful of 
judgments that have actually awarded any form of compensation to the harmed 
individual.1032 In fact, the literature has repeatedly referred to the respective normative 
provisions as “un texte mort né”.1033 
 
b) State liability for breaches incurred by the justice administrative 
 
While from 1972 onwards the liability regime for breaches by the justice 
judiciaire had finally been firmly embedded in a concrete and enforceable normative 
framework, the administrative judicial branch did not instantly follow the same logic. 
In fact, until rather recently, no matter what the specific administrative jurisdiction 
might have been, the activity of administrative judges was not at all susceptible to 
State liability. The 1972 law continued to be applicable exclusively with respect to 
breaches by the justice judiciaire. A separate regime of State liability for violations by 
the administrative judicial branch in France was eventually created and developed by 
the jurisprudence of the Conseil d’État. Hence while the early jurisprudence of the 
Cour de Cassation on this issue had over time led to a legal codification of the 
concept in form of the Law of 5 July 1972, the framework of State liability incurred 
by the justice administrative remained entirely judge-made. 
 
The ruling of the Conseil d’État in the case of Darmont1034 of 29 December 
1978 ended the quasi-immunity of the State with respect to breaches committed by the 
justice administrative. In this judgment, the Conseil d’Etat ruled out the identical 
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application of the normative framework, which had been established for the ambit of 
the justice judiciaire.1035 Leaving aside Article 11 of the Law of 5 July 1972, which 
according to its nature as a civil procedural norm – as the Court stated - only 
concerned ordinary courts, the Conseil d´État was nevertheless inspired by the 
codified solution and even refined the rule slightly. Subsequently, the Court took a 
more proactive approach and proceeded to determine the legal contours of the State’s 
liability for wrongful acts committed by the administrative judiciary. With special 
regard to the general principles ruling public liability, the Court proclaimed that only 
the occurrence of a “faute lourde” would suffice to engage the responsibility of the 
State for mistakes that were attributable to the administrative judicial branch.1036  
 
Emphasizing the specificity of the judicial function, the Haute Assemblée added 
a further element to its general definition of public liability. It stipulated that when the 
faute lourde resulted from the content of a definitive judgment itself, the authority of 
res judicata attached to a judgment would absolve the State of responsibility.1037 
Hence, in this case the authority that was directly linked to the judicial decision in 
question, was protected from liability claims if the judgment had become final and 
had therefore acquired the status of res judicata.1038 René Chapus argued that the 
same type of limitation with respect to judicial mistakes rooted in the content of a 
final judgment should be applied also with respect to the law of 1972 concerning 
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violations incurred by the justice judiciaire.1039 In light of the recent decision by the 
CJEU in the case Traghetti del Mediterraneo SpA, it remains however disputable 
whether such a limitation to the domestic liability regime as a whole would actually 
be in conformity with the standards required under European law.1040 
 
Ever since the ruling in Darmont, all decisions taken on this matter have 
rejected the application for liability of the State, hindered by either the obstacle of res 
judicata, i.e. a final or definitive judgment, or by the absence of the necessary ‘faute 
lourde’. Conversely, if the wrongful act is not related to the ambit and exercise of the 
judicial function, then, as in the case of responsibility of the State for damages 
resulting from the activities of the justice judiciaire, ‘faute lourde’ is not a 
condition.1041 The restrictive framework of State liability for breaches by the 
administrative judicial branch was condemned several times at the European level for 
unreasonable delay in the court proceedings.1042 As a consequence, the Conseil d’État 
has since slightly reversed its case law so as to accommodate the right to a hearing 
within a reasonable time requirement of Article 6(1) ECHR by setting aside the pre-
condition of faute lourde in such cases regarding the violation of the right to a hearing 
within a reasonable time as guaranteed under Article 6(1) of the ECHR. In fact, the 
Court decided that in this context, the State’s responsibility could already be invoked 
in the case of occurrence of a faute simple.1043 
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We can conclude that in the specific area of responsibility of public authorities 
for damages attributable to the ordinary and the administrative judicial apparatus, the 
system has developed from a general lack of responsibility of the State to a mosaic of 
different regimes of legislative or judicial origin, which are more or less widely open 
to victims according to the interpretation attributed by the responsible judge to the 
notion of faute lourde. However, while in theory the concepts of State responsibility 
for judicial breaches have reached a respectable level of maturity in France, the 
practical relevance of these concepts has yet to be shown. On a more pessimistic note, 
René Chapus has already made the final prediction that the responsibility of the State 
for the functioning of the judiciary is destined to remain only an exceptional form of 
liability.1044 
 
A rather similar situation arises in Hungary. According to a ruling of the 
Hungarian Supreme Court (Pfv.X.20.924/2001) of 2001, errors in judgment and 
interpretation shall invoke liability for damages only if they are grossly aggravating. 
However, it should be underlined at this point that the Hungarian Civil Code is 
currently undergoing a process of substantial reform and modernization. The core 
issues of the necessary amendments to the new Civil Code have been summarized in 
the so-called ‘Conception’. The document entitled “[t]he Conception of the new Civil 
Code” is accessible in English on the homepage of the Hungarian Ministry of Justice 
and Law Enforcement (http://irm.gov.hu/?mi=1&katid=193&id=217&cikkid=3309). 
Accordingly, rules pertaining to public liability for extra-contractual damage are 
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3. State liability for breaches of EC law: the phenomenon of mutual 
permeation 
 
France, as one of the founding fathers of the European Community, has not only 
served as a source of inspiration and a legal model in the development of the 
Community structures from the very beginning, but was in turn also exposed early on 
to the immediate as well as the more oblique influences of EC law upon its domestic 
law. This impact certainly included the early jurisprudence by the Court of Justice of 
the European Union on the question of extra-contractual liability of Member States 
for breaches of European Community law. As already discussed, the breach of 
Community law obligations may render a Member State liable to pay compensation or 
damages under rules that are in continuous development by the CJEU in Luxembourg. 
As vividly demonstrated in the CJEU’s recent judgment in the case of Traghetti del 
Mediterraneo SpA,1045 the concept of Member State liability under Community law is 
a moving target, which constantly requires the national legal orders to adjust to norms 
set at the European level.  
 
What impact did France’s membership in the EC originally have upon the 
domestic framework of non-contractual liability of the State? In what ways has 
Community law affected the nature of the domestic liability regime? What is the 
overall position accorded to EC law in the jurisprudence of the French courts? These 
questions certainly involve a heavyset of different aspects. An attempt to provide an 
adequate answer to all of them would easily constitute a thesis on its own. However, 
the aim here is the more modest and realisable one of devoting special attention to the 
impact EC law has had over time on the domestic liability regime of the State for 
breaches of law by the French State bodies. Analysing its impact on the domestic 
liability regime for administrative and legislative breaches, we may be able to detect 
certain patterns or possibly a reoccurring behaviour in reaction to changes at the 
Community level. This, in turn, might allow us to draw preliminary conclusions on 
the way the newly established Köbler doctrine could be received within the existing 
confines of French law. Based on the previous outline of the basic liability scheme of 
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public authorities in France, the focus will now turn to the question of how the 
domestic State liability regime accommodates a breach of Community law by the 
executive or the legislature.  
 
a) Has the Francovich line prior to Köbler already had a spill-over effect on the 
concept and/or the limits of State liability in France? 
 
According to the principle of national procedural autonomy, the CJEU leaves it 
to the Member States to determine the procedural and substantive conditions with 
respect to the remedies granted to the individual for damage sustained as a result of a 
Member State’s violation of Community law. With respect to France, the Conseil 
d’État has resorted to the corresponding national law on public liability. In theory, if 
national law serves as the vehicle by which the Community right takes effect on the 
domestic level, it has to be strictly interpreted in conformity with the principles 
established on the Community level.1046 However, one can observe certain 
congruence between the conditions required for the application of a national State 
liability claim and one that is based on Community law. In fact, as argued in the 
literature, French law and the Community regime of State liability are so closely 
related that legislation specifically regulating this aspect does not appear to be 
imminently necessary.1047  
 
With regard to France, the focus is certainly on the domestic court which is 
competent to rule upon questions of State liability. What has been the position of the 
Conseil d’État towards violations of Community law by public authorities in France? 
The application of Community law in the jurisprudence of the Conseil d’État has to 
be examined with particular care because from the very beginning the Conseil d’État, 
more than any other court in the European Community, had a tendency to interpret EC 
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law contrary to the CJEU.1048 This way of proceeding might have enhanced the 
Court’s initial attempt to preserve French national legal traditions, but in turn it also 
put a strain on the wide-reaching institutional and procedural autonomy granted to the 
Member States under EC law. In the literature, the Conseil d’État’s initial hostility 
towards Community law has even been termed as “Gallicanisme”.1049 With that in 
mind, the Court’s reaction to previous changes induced by the Francovich line of 
cases could form the basis for predicting how the Köbler doctrine could be received in 
French law. Once again, in this context it is important to divide the problem into 
different hypotheses, i.e. the various scenarios of violations of Community law 
incurred by the national executive, the legislature or the judiciary.1050 
 
i) State liability for breaches of EC law by the administrative authorities1051 
 
As frequently underlined in the doctrine, currently cases of administrative 
breaches of Community law do not appear to pose any particular problems of 
absorption under French law. In fact, according to Louis Dubouis,1052 the Francovich 
doctrine can be easily accommodated into the existing domestic framework of public 
liability for administrative breaches. Practice shows that France allows for a wide 
range of cases affirming State liability where the State qua administrator fails to fulfil 
its obligations, whatever the source of these obligations might be. The violation of EC 
treaty provisions, a violation of Community directives, regulations or Community 
decisions generally account for a wrongful behaviour, which entails the State’s 
obligation to repair the damage caused to an individual as a result of the illicit public 
act. As for the national regime of State liability pour faute, the illegitimacy of an act 
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due to a breach of Community law automatically also signals the existence of a 
fault.1053 
 
In line with the CJEU’s requirement of a sufficiently serious breach, the Conseil 
d’État would therefore first look for the commission of a fault, i.e. an illegality, by the 
respective public authority, be it a violation of national law or a breach of Community 
law. In this connection, liability for faute de service for breaches of Community law 
by the administrative branch includes not only individual acts, but also general 
regulations by the executive. However, where the act cannot be classified as wrongful, 
the Conseil d’État moves on to test whether the conditions for no-fault liability are 
fulfilled. Following this logic, liability sans faute could theoretically never apply in 
case of administrative breaches of Community law, as a violation of EC law 
provisions already suffices to prove the existence of a fault, which consequently 
invokes liability pour faute. In practice, however, the Conseil d’État did not follow 
this procedural ideal from the very beginning. In fact, the Court at first remained 
completely silent about the question of “fault” and adhered to the general concept of 
State liability without declared illegality.1054 Finally, in the decision Philip Morris1055 
of 28 February 1992, the Conseil d’État acknowledged the application of fault-based 
liability for administrative breaches of Community law.1056 
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Despite the early rulings by the Conseil d’État, the lower administrative courts 
in France also went through a period of adjustment with respect to the task of 
accommodating administrative breaches of EC law under the established domestic 
liability regime. A series of decisions taken by various administrative courts in 
reaction to the CJEU’s judgment1057 in a large dispute concerning wine imports 
between Italy and France, for instance, resulted in a different reasoning by the various 
national courts in the related cases. Charged to rule upon liability claims brought 
forward by several harmed companies, not only the courts’ reasoning diverged, but 
the case even cumulated in final judgments, which openly contradicted the CJEU’s 
earlier reasoning.1058 In short, this line of cases demonstrates the slow, but progressive 
evolution in the jurisprudence of the French administrative courts towards the 
application of fault-based State liability for breaches of Community law by the 
administrative branch.1059   
 
ii) State liability for breaches of Community law by the legislature1060 
 
From a Community law perspective, national courts should also no longer shirk 
from holding the legislature proper liable for breaches of Community law. In the 
Brasserie du Pêcheur judgment of 5 March 1996, the CJEU had after all repeatedly 
stated that the principle of State liability for violations of EC law would arise by 
virtue of Community law and apply irrespective of the State organ, which was 
responsible for the breach of EC law.1061 At first, the French Conseil d’État was rather 
reluctant to recognise the primacy of EC law, the directly binding nature of European 
directives and the significance of the preliminary ruling procedure under Art. 267 
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TFEU. Moreover, until 1989 the Conseil d’État refused to review national legislation 
for its compliance with EC law. Apart from the circumstances where no-fault liability 
had been admitted, an Act of Parliament did not normally entail liability, even if 
enacted in breach of international treaty law or Community law. As will be recalled, 
the principle of separation of powers – a principle traditionally followed with great 
rigour in France – implied that French courts simply were not able to rule upon the 
illegality of an effective legislative provision due to its incompatibility with the 
Constitution.1062 With respect to Community law, the Conseil d’État therefore initially 
used the traditional argument that it was only competent to control the validity of 
administrative acts and that if it checked statutory provisions it would be overstepping 
its competences. In doing so, it would thereby unilaterally change the institutional 
balance of the national constitution.1063 Hence, in case of conflict between 
Community and national law, the Conseil d´État initially applied the lex posterior 
rule, which meant that the law enacted at a later stage would apply. Consequently, 
until 1989 French administrative courts refused to review ordinary laws for their 
compatibility with Community law. 
 
The early jurisprudence1064 on this matter already dates back to the infamous 
Affaire Jacques Vabre,1065 a case decided by the Tribunal d’instance de Paris, which 
was subsequently appealed to the Cour d’appel de Paris on 7 July 1973 and finally 
reached the Cour de Cassation on 25 May 1975. The case concerned a national law in 
France, which was in contradiction with Community law. This case presented the first 
occasion for the courts to discuss whether national law could in fact be declared 
incompatible with the EC Treaty.1066 It also gave rise to first considerations both 
about the newly created hierarchy of norms that had resulted from the inclusion of 
Community law and its legal foundation, which the Cour de Cassation rooted in 
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Article 55 of the French Constitution. While the Cour de Cassation already 
recognized the primacy of Community law in the above-cited judgment of 1975 and 
agreed to review national law for its consistency with the EC Treaty, it took the 
Conseil d’État almost another fifteen years to do the same.1067 
 
It was only in 1989 with its judgment in Nicolo,1068 that the Conseil d’État’s 
approach finally changed. In this case, the Conseil d´État accepted that it could after 
all review the compatibility of Acts of Parliament with the Community treaty and set 
them aside if they proved to be incompatible. In this decision, the Court reasoned that 
the EC Treaty had priority over national law solely on the basis of Article 55 of the 
French Constitution. The Court reached this conclusion by equating the position of 
public international law with that of the EC Treaty. In this way, the Conseil d’État 
simply subsumed the latter under Article 55 of the French Constitution.1069 A similar 
stance was adopted towards secondary Community law with respect to regulations1070 
in 1990, and directives1071 in 1992. In a nutshell, in the groundbreaking ruling in 
Nicolo the new hierarchy of norms, i.e. the principle of primacy of primary and 
secondary Community law over national law, had finally been explicitly recognized 
by the administrative courts. This in turn was an indispensable precondition for 
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establishing the principle of State liability for legislative breaches of Community law. 
Therefore, it seemed to be a logical assumption that after the Court’s decision in 
Nicolo, the State qua legislature should also be held liable under the framework of 
liability pour faute for a breach of Community law. Theoretically, the same principle 
should apply to administrative acts, which were based on conflicting national law.1072 
However, even after the ruling in Nicolo, the Conseil d’État remained reluctant to 
declare Acts of Parliament in breach of superior rules of law, i.e. for example with 
respect to EC directives.  
 
In this context, a general distinction needs to be drawn between two different 
hypotheses: first, instances when the damage results from the application of a specific 
law, which is in conflict with Community law; and second, cases where the complete 
absence of a law constitutes the violation of Community law. In the case of an 
ordinary law which conflicts with Community law, some commentators went as far as 
to propose ways to avoid precisely this question. These evasive actions would apply 
in cases whenever a claim for damages was brought against the administrative 
authorities for an act or a decision, which was itself based on the specific legal 
provision in conflict with Community law. In such a situation, national law would no 
longer be considered the indispensable link between the Community directive and the 
administrative act. Hence, the incompatible act or decision by the administration was 
to be identified as the source of unlawfulness.1073 However, in the end even 
commentators had to admit that if one extends the claim for damages in a proper 
manner, one could not disregard the primary responsibility of the legislature.  
 
The jurisprudence initially followed the advanced line of reasoning by academic 
commentary. Even though it had by then acknowledged that an Act of Parliament 
could be reviewed for its compatibility with a Community directive, in the case of 
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Societé Arizona Tobacco Products1074 it was not the legislature proper which was held 
liable, but instead the relevant Government minister on the grounds that he had 
misused the discretionary power which the Act had conferred upon him in violation of 
Community law. In fact, according to the Conseil d’État’s reasoning, the 
administrative authorities (responsible for implementing the law) had caused the 
violation by failing to set aside a law, which was in conflict with Community law.1075 
The Conseil d’État at that point still tried to adhere to the classical understanding that 
it had no competence to review legislative acts. Instead, it traced the damage to an 
administrative act rather than to the national law, on which the act was originally 
based.  
 
There is, however, one specific case of a breach of Community law by the 
legislature which simply cannot be based on a subsequent administrative action, i.e. a 
breach of non-directly applicable Community law, which presents itself in the form of 
an omission by the national legislature to transpose a Community directive. This 
scenario is the second hypothesis set out above, where damage is caused by a breach 
of Community law generated from a complete absence of a national legislative 
provision.1076 Since French law did not offer a solution in itself, according to 
commentators, a new framework of liability for legislative breaches would have to be 
introduced for precisely those cases.1077 The extension of the existing framework of 
liability certainly went far beyond what the administrative judge had foreseen in the 
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judgment of La Fleurette.1078 However, it was reinforced by the decisions in Brasserie 
du Pêcheur and Factortame III, which both affirmed that “le principe selon lequel les 
Etats membres sont obliges de réparer les dommages causés aux particuliers par les 
violations du droit communautaire est applicable lorsque le manquement reproché est 
attribué au législateur national.”1079 According to the reasoning of the Conseil d’État, 
State liability for legislative breaches would therefore only apply in cases of 
legislative omission.1080 But even in those cases, liability has so far only ever been 
found under the conditions outlined in La Fleurette.  
 
Rather problematically, the strict prerequisites that are necessary in order to 
invoke liability sans faute do not appear to fulfil the conditions of the effective 
protection of rights required by the CJEU. In fact, non-fault liability à la Fleurette 
seems to be in conflict with the jurisprudence of the CJEU and the principles 
established in its Francovich ruling.1081 In 1992, the French courts were finally 
confronted with a fundamental case, which did not allow for a derivation from the 
question of whether the State could be held liable for breaches of Community law by 
the national legislature. At the same time, this case also had broader ramifications for 
this thesis’ key question concerning the State’s liability for judicial breaches of 
Community law, which will be the object of study in the following section.1082  
 
In the case of Dangeville,1083 the legislature had failed to transpose a 
Community directive, the Sixth VAT Directive,1084 into national law before the 
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required deadline. In its judgment, the Cour administrative d’appel explicitly 
confirmed that the State was indeed liable for the damage incurred by the shortfall of 
the legislative authorities. However, the Court declared this without ruling on the 
question of fault. Nevertheless, some authors have speculated that in this case the 
Cour administrative d’appel had actually applied the regime of liability pour faute.1085    
 
With respect to the status quo, the Conseil d’État still traditionally applies the 
device of liability sans faute when it comes to breaches of law by the legislature. 
However, over time there has been a partial change of direction in the case-law 
towards the application of a regime of liability pour faute. The latter development has 
so far only taken place in the context of legislative breaches of Community law. In 
fact, on the basis of Article 55 of the Constitution, the Conseil d’État now carries out 
an implicit control of legislative measures. There have also been proposals to 
introduce a requirement of faute lourde in order to limit the application of liability 
pour faute in cases of violations committed by the legislature.1086 Until now there has 
been no final word on this issue. Although the enactment of liability sans faute for an 
omission by the legislature would be conceivable in the context of Community law, it 
is nowadays neither used nor is it dogmatically correct.1087 So far, liability sans faute 
remains the only regime that has been explicitly applied in the jurisdiction of the 
highest courts when it comes to legislative inaction or omission.1088  
 
On a theoretical basis, Muscat1089 suggests that with respect to the liability 
regime applicable in the case of legislative breaches of EC law, we are faced with 
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three options. The first solution entails a generalization of the basic idea of lack of 
responsibility of the legislature as shown in the case of Arizona Tobacco products.1090 
The way to avoid targeting the legislature in a direct manner would be to identify an 
administrative act that would constitute the link between the law and the damage 
sustained by an individual. The administrative act would then form the basis of the 
liability claim, which would be directed against the administrative authorities instead 
of the legislature. However, it remains rather doubtful whether the exercise of 
bypassing the true perpetrator presents the most viable solution under French law. 
Nevertheless, Advocate General Tesauro had considered this approach in his 
conclusions in the case of Brasserie du Pêcheur.1091 The second alternative advanced 
by Muscat consists in the central idea of maintaining the mechanism of liability sans 
faute and at the same time removing the requirement of the damage to be of abnormal 
and special character. This solution is propagated by many authors, who refuse to 
submit the legislature to a liability regime pour faute. In this case, a dual track system 
of responsibility for legislative breaches would be established. Accordingly, the 
procedure for cases with a Community law component on the one hand would exist 
alongside the purely domestic legal framework on the other. A final solution brings 
the legislature into the framework of responsibility pour faute.1092 
 
Overall, it would appear that Community law is inducing a revolutionary 
development in French law in the field of State liability for legislative breaches. The 
ruling of the CJEU in the case of Francovich has reinforced the necessity of reform 
with respect to the question of liability for breaches committed by the legislature. 
Despite the supportive voices, the Conseil d’État so far has never actually applied this 
concept in any of its rulings. While the case of Dangeville represented for many a 
missed opportunity to move forward in this direction,1093 one might nevertheless be 
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able to detect some positive signals in the courts’ practice, which hint at a possible 
change in its line of jurisprudence.1094 
 
II. State Liability for Judicial Breaches under French Law after Köbler 
 
After an exhaustive discussion of the implications of Member State liability for 
breaches of Community law by the administrative authorities and the legislature in 
France, it is now appropriate to undertake a detailed assessment of the reoccurring 
debate concerning the State’s liability for breaches of (Community) law by the 
judiciary. As will now be shown, French law has traditionally been rather reluctant to 
recognize the liability of the State for judicial acts. Consequently, the implementation 
of the Köbler doctrine in France will pose an even greater hindrance to overcome.  
 
1. Application of the domestic framework for judicial breaches ceteris 
paribus? 
 
Similar to the case of legislative breaches of EC law, the initial challenge for the 
application of the Köbler doctrine in France is to find a procedural avenue under 
domestic law, by which liability for breaches of Community law by the judiciary can 
be invoked. In short, in France as in all EU Member States, we are faced with the 
essential question of how to ‘transplant’ this newly established Community principle 
into the existing national procedural framework. Moreover, if this proves impossible, 
what the remedial structures would need to be created in order to secure the full 
implementation of the Community rights under French law.  
 
While, as previously demonstrated, the case-law has given some vague 
indications in terms of which national procedural substructure to apply for cases of 
State liability for breaches by the French legislature, we are still venturing into 
unexplored territory when it comes to defining a suitable basis for the application of 
the Köbler doctrine in domestic law. The principle of national procedural autonomy 
generally begs the question as to whether the domestic legal requirements concerning 
State liability for judicial breaches of national law are in compliance with the 
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minimum framework conditions established at the Community level. Our analysis will 
aim to uncover these potential tensions between the core prerequisites of Community 
law and the procedural and substantive setting of national law. This standard 
procedure, which could be called a “compatibility test”, would eventually have to be 
performed in all the Member States in order to guarantee a comprehensive realisation 
of the Community rights under national procedural law.1095 
 
In the following section, we will therefore attempt to anticipate the possible 
conversion of the Köbler principle into the procedural framework in France in the 
following manner. As a first step, a direct contrast of the framework of State liability 
under French law, and the specific parameters developed by the CJEU in the Köbler 
doctrine, will help to identify the possible causes of the incommensurability between 
the two systems. The aim is to evaluate the national framework by means of the 
Community requirements as formulated in Köbler and to provide a satisfactory 
answer to the question of whether the national legal framework of State liability in 
France complies with the minimum standards set up by the CJEU. In other words, the 
following analysis seeks to evaluate whether the public liability regime for judicial 
breaches in France constitutes a satisfactory tool for the transposition of the 
Community right into domestic law, or whether adjustments to the internal legal 
framework need to be considered. In case there is a need to reframe the existing 
structures, one would have to consider creating a separate procedural track to be 
accessible for individuals under national law. The latter not only needs to be in 
conformity with the increasingly complex stratification of the judicial organisation in 
France, but would also have to adhere to the requirements set out in the jurisprudence 
of the CJEU.  
 
a) Procedural considerations under the French judicial framework: quis 
iudicabit? 
 
The ‘toolbox’ of possible national legal bases to accommodate the concept of 
public liability for judicial breaches of EC law is especially diverse and complex in 
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France. Due to the fundamental principle of the separation of courts, we are 
essentially faced with two different frameworks of State liability, both of which might 
in theory constitute a suitable legal basis. However, while at first glance there seem to 
be too many feasible alternatives, the rules pertaining to the principle of separation of 
courts in France already limit the number of possible options. The strict separation of 
competences in this context breeds a divided procedural framework, which is not only 
decisive for judicial breaches of national law, but which will also lend itself to 
breaches of EC law by the French judiciary.  
 
Procedurally speaking, there is a neat division between the two judicial orders 
within which liability claims are also treated separately. In other words, the 
competence to rule upon questions of public liability with respect to harmful acts 
committed by the national judiciary is divided under French law. As mentioned in the 
preceding paragraphs, the administrative judge is competent to rule on any violations 
within the ambit of his or her own branch of justice, i.e. the justice administrative. For 
the justice judiciaire, however, the jurisdiction is divided between the administrative 
courts for organisational issues pertaining to the ordinary judicial service and the 
ordinary judicial branch for issues relating to its own functioning.1096 In sum, a 
holistic analysis of the application of the Köbler principle under French law requires 
us to consider two different hypotheses: State liability for breaches of Community law 
generated by the justice administrative on the one hand, and public liability incurred 
by the justice judiciaire on the other.      
 
Where a liability claim is brought by an individual, administrative courts are not 
competent to rule on the question of State liability if the source of the violation 
consists in an act or a judgment by a civil court. Similarly, the justice judiciaire is not 
competent to decide upon public liability claims with respect to alleged breaches of 
law by one of the administrative courts. Therefore, a breach of EC law by a national 
court in France could easily lead to a situation where a French court of first instance, 
affiliated to one of the two judicial branches, would be confronted with the task of 
deciding upon an individual’s claim for compensation by the State for a harmful act 
                                                 
1096
 DEBBASCH and COLIN, Droit Administratif, supra note 893, p. 556. 




committed by a court belonging to the same judicial hierarchy. The principle of the 
strict separation of courts in France, gives rise to a procedure whereby an 
administrative or ordinary court competent to rule in first instance would be charged 
with the task of reviewing – even though in an indirect manner - the respective 
judgment, which had previously been proclaimed by a higher court within the same 
judicial branch. The strict division of competences in this respect certainly raises a 
number of intricate problems and procedural complications concerning the application 
of the Köbler doctrine. With due respect to the principle of national procedural 
autonomy, the central question is therefore: Quis iudicabit?  
 
First, when looking at the procedural rules pertaining to the justice 
administrative, we are faced with the following situation under national law. For 
reasons outlined in the previous paragraphs, an individual’s claim for compensation 
has to be lodged with an administrative court whenever the violation has been 
committed by the justice administrative. In fact, according to the criteria spelled out in 
Articles 312 to 314 of the Code de Justice Administrative, the competent court has to 
be at the level of a cour administrative.1097 The procedural competence for claims of 
such sort has been reconfirmed in practice in a number of instances such as in the 
cases of Pierrot, Consorts Lévi and Fouriat, discussed above.1098 In all of these cases 
an individual’s claim for damages was based on a decision taken by an administrative 
court and in all of them the application was lodged in first instance at an 
administrative court, i.e. the tribunal administratif de Nancy, the tribunal 
administratif de Lille and the tribunal administratif de Marseille respectively.  
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Nevertheless, to a certain degree these cases constitute exceptions, in the sense 
that even though the violation which was at the basis of the individual’s claim for 
compensation originated from the justice administrative, the responsible entities were 
not part of the administrative jurisdiction of general competence (juridictions à 
compétence générale), but administrative courts with specialised competences 
(juridictions à compétence spécialisée). The latter courts only have limited 
jurisdiction, being confined to a specific sphere of administrative law.1099 While this 
fact is insignificant in terms of the individual’s right to compensation, it has some 
relevance with respect to the procedure followed in the case. These precedents never 
concerned a situation where an individual had been harmed by a decision or act of an 
administrative court of general competence, i.e. les tribunaux administratifs, les cours 
administratives d’appel or the Conseil d’État. Consequently, the administrative courts 
of first instance competent to deal with the individual’s claim were only forced to 
review - in an indirect manner - decisions taken by specialised courts, which are 
somewhat separate from the direct hierarchical order of the jurisdiction of general 
competence.   
 
The idea that in the course of an individual’s claim for damages a tribunal 
administratif would have to rule on the commission of a faute grave by a cour 
administrative d’appel or even the Conseil d’État itself seems unthinkable in theory 
and lacks any precedent in practice. Such an incidence would upset the long-
established system of judicial hierarchy in France. In fact, that a court at the bottom of 
the judicial order should be competent to rule whether a hierarchically superior court 
has committed a faute grave in one of its judgments seems to contradict all basic 
logic.1100 Nevertheless, and especially from the perspective of Community law, this 
possibility has to be taken into account, not least in order to provide a remedy for an 
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individual who bases his or her claim (by analogy to the Köbler case) on a breach of 
Community law by a higher court.  
 
There appears to be no explicit procedural rule in the French Code de Justice 
Administrative, which provides a solution to this specific predicament. In the absence 
of clear normative guidelines, a court of first instance confronted with such a claim 
could choose to proceed in several ways. In a case concerning Community law, the 
administrative court of first instance could ask for a preliminary ruling by the CJEU 
on the basis of Article 234 EC. This would certainly not solve the procedural problem, 
but at least the CJEU could relieve some of the court’s burden of having to question a 
decision taken by a higher court. However, strictly speaking the CJEU would not be 
competent to decide the case. 
 
Besides the possibility of referring a preliminary question to the CJEU, which is 
after all only an option in a case with Community-law relevance, the French court of 
first instance could resort to a similar procedure provided under national law, which is 
regulated in Article L.113-1 Code de Justice Administrative.1101 According to this 
procedure, a tribunal administratif or a cour administrative d’appel may refer an 
unresolved question of law, which is necessary in order to resolve the specific case, to 
the Conseil d’État. The Conseil d’État can then rule in the form of an avis on the 
point of law within three months. Meanwhile, the hearing of the case in the lower 
court would be suspended.1102  
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In this manner, a court of first instance confronted with a similar situation as 
previously outlined, could refer a question for interpretation to the Conseil d’État. The 
latter would then be charged with designating the judicial instance competent to rule 
in the case. A first possibility would be for the Conseil d’État to pronounce itself 
competent. After all, there already exists a comparable situation under French law 
regulated in Article R.311-1 Code de Justice Administrative, in which the Conseil 
d’État is declared competent in first and last instance to rule on cases of State liability 
for excessive length of proceedings.1103 Similar to the issue at stake, the competence 
spelled out in this provision is also connected to a claim for compensation by an 
individual. Since the time delay in the course of the judicial proceedings might have 
been even caused by the Conseil d’État itself, the legislature seemingly did not 
perceive this possibility to be in conflict with the Conseil d’État’s general competence 
to rule on precisely these cases. Nevertheless, and it appears to be a rather tilted logic 
that the Conseil d’État could declare itself competent to rule on liability claims based 
on alleged violations of law committed by it.  
 
A second possible option, which steers away from the general competence of 
the Conseil d’État, would be to give a separate judicial entity the competence to rule 
over all cases of State liability for breaches of (Community) law by the justice 
administrative in general. Alternatively, the designated court or tribunal could at least 
decide in instances where the Conseil d’État itself turns out to be responsible for the 
breach. In fact, a similar proposal has been made in Austria.1104 Furthermore, the 
author has already suggested such a possibility for the case of England, where a 
mediating judicial instance could also be charged with the specific task of ruling in 
cases of judicial breaches of Community law.1105 Procedurally speaking, two potential 
alternatives for a suitable and impartial judicial entity in France, which could possibly 
be attributed the competence to rule at least in cases where the claim for State liability 
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is based on a manifest breach of law committed by the Conseil d’État itself, are the 
Tribunal des Conflits or the Cour de Justice de la République.1106  
 
The Cour de Justice de la République was established by constitutional 
amendment on 27 July 1993 based on Articles 68-1 and 68-2 of the French 
Constitution. It consists of fifteen members, twelve of whom are members of the 
French Parliament, who are elected by the National Assembly and the Senate 
respectively. The remaining three members are chosen from among the judges of the 
Conseil d’État. Together with the Haute Cour de Justice, the Cour de Justice de la 
République forms a separate jurisdictional order under French law, which is referred 
to as the juridiction politique. The Court’s main competence consists in deciding upon 
applications by individuals who claim to be a victim of a crime or other serious 
offence committed by a member of the government in the exercise of his or her duties. 
However, due to its status and its well-balanced composition, it would be feasible to 
extend the Court’s competences beyond the mere duty of holding members of the 
government accountable for their actions. The idea would be to assign the Court of 
Justice of the Republic the additional task of ruling upon questions of State liability 
for judicial breaches in general, or at least for breaches of law by a court of final 
instance. Hence, the Cour de Justice de la République would be competent to decide 
upon the question of whether in the specific case the judiciary has committed such 
manifest breach of law as to justify granting compensation to the individual harmed 
by the judicial act.  
 
The substantial problem with this proposal, however, is one of procedure. The 
competences of the Cour de Justice de la République have been exhaustively listed in 
Articles 68-1, 68-2 and 68-3 of the French Constitution. Since the implementation of 
this proposal would require an extension of the Court’s catalogue of competences, 
implementing it would require a constitutional amendment according to Article 89 of 
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the French Constitution.1107 Hence, it would certainly by no means be an easy and 
quick process to put this theoretical model into practice. Despite the obvious hurdles 
of implementation, however, the competence of the Cour de Justice de la République 
in this context remains a rather complicated, but nevertheless viable option. 
 
A better solution with respect to the existing procedural structures in France 
might be to award competence in these cases to the Tribunal des Conflits. Since there 
is no mention of the Tribunal des Conflits in the French Constitution, an extension of 
its competences would not require a constitutional amendment, but merely a simple 
amendment to an ordinary law. In addition, the Tribunal des Conflits is also easily 
accessible to both the Conseil d’État and the Cour de Cassation. Therefore, this 
proposed solution would not even necessitate any additional procedural adjustments.   
 
With respect to the justice judiciaire the situation in France is rather similar to 
that outlined in the previous paragraphs on the administrative courts. The case of a 
breach of (Community) law by the Cour de Cassation creates once again a situation in 
which a court of first instance – in this case presumably a Tribunal de grande instance 
– would be confronted with an individual’s claim for damages. In the course of the 
proceedings, the first instance court would have to decide upon the question of 
whether the Cour de Cassation has committed a manifest breach of (Community) law. 
Just as for an administrative court of first instance, this certainly constitutes a 
problem.  
 
Since the Code de l‘Organisation Judiciaire apparently does not provide for a 
solution to this practical dilemma, there is a reasonable likelihood that the Tribunal de 
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grande instance would choose to proceed in exactly the same manner as previously 
outlined for the administrative court. Once again, a first option for the court would be 
to resort to the CJEU via the mechanism provided under Article 234 EC. Moreover, 
the ordinary court could opt to ask the Cour de Cassation to provide guidance in the 
form of an avis. For the justice judiciaire the equivalent to Article L.113-1 Code de 
Justice Administrative can be located in Art. L.151-1 Code de l’Organisation 
Judiciaire.1108 It would then be for the Cour de Cassation to resolve the question of 
competence. It is rather doubtful that in such a case the Cour de Cassation would 
reconfirm the competence of the first instance court. Instead, the Cour de Cassation 
could declare itself competent to rule in such cases.  
 
However, seen through the procedural lens, it might also be a noteworthy 
alternative in this case to confer the competence on an impartial judicial instance. 
Similar to the solution, which has been proposed in the previous paragraphs with 
respect to the justice administrative, the Tribunal des Conflits and the Cour de Justice 
de la République are two courts operating outside the ambit of jurisdiction of the 
ordinary judicial branch on the one hand and the administrative courts on the other. 
Just like in the case of the justice administrative, either one of these two courts would 
constitute a viable forum for solving the problem. With respect to the competence of 
the Cour de Justice de la République, however, an additional procedural adjustment 
would need to be made to allow for a direct application to the Court. So far, the Cour 
de Justice de la République can only be consulted after a decision has been rendered 
by the Cour de Cassation. Over and above the required procedural change, the second 
option would furthermore necessitate – as already outlined before – a constitutional 
amendment based on Article 89 of the French Constitution in order to allow for an 
addition to the exhaustive list of competences of the Cour de Justice de la République. 
Under these considerations, the competence of the Tribunal des Conflits would appear 
to be the more feasible option in both cases, i.e. for the justice judiciaire as well as the 
justice administrative. 
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b) Does the domestic requirement of faute grave correspond with the notion of 
manifest breach as required in the Köbler case? 
 
One aspect which is vital for the general application of the Francovich doctrine, 
and in particular with respect to the question of State liability for judicial breaches of 
EC law, is the Court’s reading of the two concepts of “sufficiently serious breach”1109 
and “manifest breach”,1110 which is required by the CJEU as a prerequisite for 
invoking the liability of a Member State. The requirements laid down by the Court of 
Justice do not contain an open request for national courts to apply a fault-based 
assessment in this context.1111 Based on the principle of national procedural 
autonomy, the Court merely established the general condition of providing for an 
effective means of remedy for the harmed individual.1112 Contrary to the idea of a 
fault-based breach of Community law, the CJEU avoided an explicit reference to the 
notion of fault in its Francovich line of jurisprudence. Instead, the CJEU initially 
introduced the requirement of a sufficiently serious breach (“une violation 
suffisamment caractérisée”)1113 of EC law as a core condition for invoking a Member 
State’s liability under Community law.  
 
To answer the question posed by Vandersanden1114 in this context, according to 
the established jurisprudence of the CJEU the concept of a sufficiently serious breach 
cannot be automatically equated with a qualified fault on the part of the perpetrator. In 
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fact, the notion of a sufficiently serious breach has to be detached from the concept of 
fault.1115 According to the CJEU, the attitude displayed by the national authorities and 
their allegedly negligent behaviour are not necessarily the decisive elements in the 
definition of a sufficiently serious breach. In fact, there appears to be a strict 
dissociation of the concepts of breach and fault on the Community level. This 
interpretation in turn corresponds to the understanding of fault under French law, 
where the regime of extracontractual liability is based upon an equation of the notion 
of fault with a simple illegality.1116  
 
At this point, however, our analysis will take us even further and focus 
predominantly on the related, but ostensibly more complex definition of a “manifest 
breach” – a concept created by the CJEU in the Köbler ruling. Introduced by the 
CJEU as a qualified version of a “sufficiently serious breach”, it constitutes an 
indispensable pre-condition for invoking Member State liability for breaches of 
Community law, which were committed by the national judiciary. In the Köbler 
judgment the Court defines the concept of a “manifest breach” by using a 
descriptive, but non-exhaustive list of attributes, such as “the degree of clarity and 
precision of the rule infringed, whether the infringement was intentional, whether 
the error of law was excusable or inexcusable, the position taken, where applicable, 
by a Community institution and non-compliance by the court in question with its 
obligation to make a reference for a preliminary ruling under the third paragraph of 
Article 234 EC.”1117 Moreover, the Court declared that “an infringement of 
Community law will be sufficiently serious where the decision concerned was made 
in manifest breach of the case-law of the Court in the matter.”1118  
 
Where does the aforementioned definition of a “manifest breach” on the 
Community level leave us with respect to the general conditions set up under 
domestic law in France concerning State liability for judicial breaches? At the 
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outset, it should be noted that even for the definition of a manifest breach the CJEU 
did not resort to the notion of fault. So, once again we are not confronted with a 
fault-based framework of liability in this context. Under French law, however, the 
prerequisite for invoking State liability for breaches committed by either branch of 
the judiciary, the justice administrative or the justice judiciaire, requires the 
occurrence of a serious fault or a denial of justice.1119 
 
Similar to the situation under French law, the CJEU has already been confronted 
with the question of whether a limitation to State responsibility under national law, 
which is conditioned upon the occurrence of an intentional fault or serious 
misconduct, is compatible with the general requirements established in the Court’s 
Francovich line, and especially the conditions set out in the Köbler ruling. In 
Francovich1120 the CJEU had discussed at length the compatibility of the Italian law 
on State liability for judicial breaches with the framework conditions established on 
the Community level.1121 First, the Court acknowledged in a general manner that it 
was legitimate for national law to preclude the incurrence of State liability for judicial 
breaches according to the nature or the degree of fault involved.1122 However, in the 
same passage the Court stated that the criteria set up under domestic law could by no 
means be stricter than those conditions detected in the Court’s understanding of a 
“manifest breach” of the applicable law.1123 In other words, the conditions established 
under national law are to be regarded as fully compatible with Community law, if, as 
in the case of Italy and France, the notion of faute grave and denial of justice can be 
equated with the CJEU’s definition of a ‘manifest breach’. Obviously, compatibility 
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with Community law is also assumed whenever national law foresees more lenient 
conditions than the respective requirements set up by the CJEU in Köbler.1124  
 
According to Article L.141-1 of the Courts of Justice Act,1125 the 
classification of “faute lourde” or denial of justice under French law was always 
conditioned by the circumstances of each individual case and inevitably by the 
subjective perception of the facts of the case by the competent judge.1126 In the 
present context, this interpretation has to be reconciled with the CJEU’s 
understanding of a manifest breach of Community law. In order to satisfy the latter 
definition,  
 
the national court hearing a claim for reparation must take account of all the 
factors which characterise the situation put before it. Those factors include, 
in particular, the degree of clarity and precision of the rule infringed, 
whether the infringement was intentional, whether the error of law was 
excusable or inexcusable, the position taken, where applicable, by a 
Community institution and non-compliance by the court in question with its 
obligation to make a reference for a preliminary ruling under the third 
paragraph of Article 234 EC.1127  
 
In short, according to the Köbler doctrine, the elements of serious fault and denial 
of justice under French law cannot be more restrictive than the notion of a manifest 
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c) Additional hurdles to overcome under French law 
 
Analysing the jurisprudence developed by the Conseil d’État with respect to 
public liability for breaches of law by the justice administrative, one has to raise 
serious doubts whether the framework set up by the Conseil d’État in its precedent 
Darmont1128 complies with the standards laid down in Köbler. It is not the 
requirement of a serious fault that is in conflict with the Köbler doctrine, but an 
additional rule set up by the Conseil d’État in Darmont excluding State liability in 
cases where the qualified fault results from the content of a definite judgment 
itself.1129 In such a case, the authority directly linked to the judicial decision in 
question is protected from liability claims if the judgment has become final and 
therefore has achieved the status of res judicata.1130 As mentioned before, René 
Chapus even went as far as to argue that the same type of limitation with respect to 
judicial mistakes should apply to violations incurred by the justice judiciaire. In other 
words, breaches of law, which were rooted in the content of a judgment that had 
acquired the status of res judicata, should be exempted from State liability claims also 
with respect to (what is now) Article 141-1 Code de l’Organisation Judiciaire.1131  
 
In light of the CJEU’s recent ruling in Traghetti,1132 parallels between the 
Court’s evaluation of the restrictions established under Italian law and the hurdles set 
up by the French regime of State liability might become evident. In this judgment, the 
CJEU was confronted with the preliminary question of whether the affirmation of 
State liability was “impeded in a manner incompatible with the principles of 
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 DONY, "Le Droit...," supra note 893, p. 247. See also CHAPUS, Droit Administratif..., supra note 
898, n°1280; DEBBASCH and COLIN, Droit Administratif, supra note 893, p. 559. 
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also DONY, "Le Droit...," supra note 893, p. 247. 
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Community law by national legislation on State liability for judicial errors which 
precludes liability in relation to the interpretation of provisions of law and assessment 
of facts and of the evidence adduced in the course of the exercise of judicial 
functions.”1133 The latter restrictions were precisely those that applied to State liability 
claims for judicial breaches under Italian law. In its ruling, the CJEU stipulated that 
any such invasive restriction on State liability was incompatible with Community law. 
Not only would it weaken the procedural guarantees of individuals under EC law, but 
considering that a large part of the court of last instance’s duty consists in interpreting 
and assessing the applicable law and facts of the case, a domestic restriction of this 
kind would be too invasive and would render the Köbler doctrine obsolete.1134  
 
In anticipation of the Köbler ruling, Blanchet1135 had already speculated in an 
article published in 2001, that in the context of Community law, an additional 
limitation on the affirmation of State liability for judicial breaches like under French 
law, i.e. excluding liability in cases where the qualified fault resulted from the content 
of a definite judgment, would surely violate the principle of effectiveness as 
formulated by the CJEU in its decision in Palmisani.1136 In fact, this limitation, found 
in the jurisprudence of the Conseil d’État, is rather similar to the heavy restraints of 
normative restrictions established under Italian law, whose compatibility the CJEU 
recently discussed in the case of Traghetti.1137  
 
Even though the CJEU has repeatedly underlined that “the essential role played 
by the judiciary in the protection of the rights derived by individuals from Community 
rules and on the fact that a court adjudicating at last instance is by definition the last 
judicial body before which individuals may assert the rights conferred on them by 
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 Ibid, para. 36. 
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 BLANCHET, "L'usage de la théorie...," supra note 1037, p. 435. 
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Community law,”1138 the exclusion of State liability for final judgments under French 
law goes beyond the permissible conditions defined by the CJEU in the cases of 
Köbler and Traghetti. In analogy to the Italian case, the restriction on State liability 
under French law, which had been established in the case of Darmont, is probably not 
tenable with respect to State liability claims for breaches of Community law by the 
justice administrative.1139 Subsequently, the proposal to apply a similar restriction to 
judgments by the justice judiciaire would also become obsolete. Moreover, a 
noteworthy argument of Blanchet is the question of how the maxim of res judicata 
could possibly impede the realisation of State liability claims, when at the same time 
this principle does not seem to hinder the European Commission starting an 
infringement procedure on the same grounds.1140 However, until now these statements 
and predictions constitute mere speculation, which we will only be able to judge when 
the CJEU speaks out clearly on the compatibility of the French framework of State 
liability with the requirements of Community law.       
 
d) The Conseil d’État’s policy of ‘splendid isolationism’1141- the end of an era? 
 
The rather unique development and the distinct structure of the French public 
liability regime collide with a strong tradition of judicial protectionism in France.1142 
The potential influence of outside legal sources upon the principles of French public 
and private law was traditionally counterbalanced by the French judiciary and its 
strong focus upon national legal concepts. In light of this tradition, it is therefore not 
surprising that the Conseil d’État was at first rather hesitant to give full effect to 
(overriding) EC law principles in general and the established Community principle of 
non-contractual liability in particular. The domestic framework of public liability was 
initially shielded from any potential outside influence or modifications by European 
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Community law. Moreover, despite concerns among academic commentators that 
such protectionist approach would eventually isolate the French judiciary from a 
growing network of judicial cooperation in the EU, the Conseil d’État was until 
recently reluctant to compromise upon its status as the supreme judicial organ and the 
highest jurisdiction in France in matters concerning the administration and the State. 
In order to hinder the full application of Community law which would eventually 
prevail over national law and over its own dicta, the Conseil d’État on various 
occasions simply chose to bypass overriding EC law principles in its 
jurisprudence.1143    
 
i) The Conseil d’État and the question of preliminary rulings under Art. 267(3) 
TFEU  
 
A prime example of isolationist judicial practice in France was the Conseil 
d’État’s (non-)compliance with its obligations under Art. 267(3) TFEU, i.e. the 
Court’s well-defined obligation to refer questions for a preliminary ruling to the 
CJEU. In this context, Pierre Pescatore has statistically analysed that within a period 
of thirty years of Community law practice in France, the Conseil d’État has made a 
total of a mere seven referrals to the CJEU for preliminary rulings under Article 
234(3) EC. In contrast to 25 cases within the same timeframe in which it either 
refused to do so or simply ignored the possibility. These numbers can be contrasted 
with 35 referrals made by the Cour de Cassation within the exact same period of 
time.1144 Comparable figures had already been presented in an earlier analysis by 
Bruno Genevois.1145 His findings show that to 1 July 1980 the Conseil d’État invoked 
of Article 234(3) EC in only five out of 24 cases with Community law relevance. In a 
critical view of the Court’s practice, Genevois already predicted in the early 1980s 
what has in fact been confirmed today, namely that “[l]a doctrine verra sans doute 
dans le nombre restreint des renvois à la Cour de justice des Communautés 
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européennes une confirmation de l’idée selon laquelle le Conseil d’État ferait preuve 
de nationalisme ombrageux.”1146 In addition to turning a blind eye to its obligation to 
refer under Article 234(3) EC, the Conseil d’État occasionally even went as far as to 
rule contrary to Community law in a judgment with Community law relevance.1147  
 
Until recently, the CJEU had silently condoned this practice. However, the 
recent developments in its Köbler ruling might from now on provoke a firm and swift 
response by the CJEU to such overt defiance of EC law by the Conseil d’État or any 
other national court of last instance. And this time around it would be the established 
concept of non-contractual liability on the Community level having the decisive 
impact on French judicial practice. In the future, the CJEU could resort to its self-
proclaimed Köbler doctrine as an effective means of punishing non-compliant 
national courts of last instance which act in violation of Article 234(3) EC. As 
mentioned before, the CJEU had explicitly stated in Köbler that a violation of the 
obligations enshrined in Article 234(3) EC Treaty by a national supreme court would 
serve as a sufficient ground to invoke the responsibility of the State for a breach of 
Community law.1148 With this sword of Damocles hanging over EC-related 
judgments, national supreme courts might have received the necessary impetus for 
increased compliance with EC law, and especially with their obligations under Article 
234(3) EC. The full impact of the CJEU’s proclamation in Köbler will however only 
unfold once the Court has actually put this sanction mechanism into practice. After 
all, actions always speak louder than words. 
 
ii) The arrival of a “golden age”?  
 
Overall, one can observe that especially in the past few years the Conseil 
d’État’s hesitation in granting unconditional effect to EC law principles has been 
replaced with a more conciliatory attitude by the Conseil towards EC law and the 
Court of Justice of the EU as such. Thereby, the communication between the two 
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courts appears to be steadily improving over time.1149 In fact, in a recent article Denys 
Simon1150 already predicted the arrival of a “golden age” in the relations between the 
Conseil d’État and the CJEU, adding that the judicial bond between Paris and 
Luxembourg had never been stronger than now. Simon reached his optimistic 
conclusion after the analysis of two rather recent judgments by the Conseil d’État in 
the cases Gardedieu1151 and Arcelor,1152 as well as a similar ruling by the Conseil of 
11 December 2006.1153 In these specific cases, the Conseil d’État not only fully 
adhered to its obligations under EC law, but also partly overruled its longstanding 
jurisprudence in order to make way for the full effectiveness of Community law.  
 
Firstly, the decision of 11 December 2006 in the case Sté de Groot en Slot 
Allium BV1154 altered the Conseil d’État’s habitual tactic of restricting the full 
authority of those preliminary rulings by the Court of Justice, in which the CJEU’s 
dictum had reached beyond the ambit of the national court’s preliminary questions. In 
that judgment the Conseil suddenly changed its course of action insofar as it 
confirmed that any preliminary ruling by the CJEU – even one where the Court had 
overstepped its competences – was vested with the full authority of res judicata and 
was strictly binding on the respective national judge. Only shortly afterwards, in the 
Gardedieu judgment1155 the Conseil also revised its petrified stance on the general 
concept of State liability for legislative breaches. Apart from the regular application of 
the principle of responsabilité sans faute in such cases, the Conseil d’État finally 
acknowledged the concept of State liability for legislative breaches in a case where 
the implementation of a law violated an international agreement. Nevertheless, the 
Conseil refrained from explicitly classifying such a violation as falling under the 
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regime of responsabilité pour/sans faute.1156 And, last but not least, in the Arcelor 
decision,1157 delivered on the same day, the Conseil d’État elaborated with remarkable 
precision on the administrative judge’s obligations and limits when testing the validity 
and conformity of an administrative decree or order implementing a Community 
directive with respect to French constitutional principles.1158 According to Simon, all 
these judgments point to a “changement d’état d’esprit” towards Community law in 
the jurisprudence of the Conseil d’État.1159  
 
However, could this change in the Conseil’s attitude towards EC law not also be 
interpreted as the immediate result of the recent ‘threat’ spelled out by the CJEU in 
the Köbler ruling to ‘punish’ non-compliant courts of last instance with State liability 
claims? Alternatively, do these three cases truly signal a change of direction in the 
Conseil d’État’s longstanding difficulties in complying with its obligations under 
European Community law? Despite the “Europe-friendly” signals of the Conseil 
d’État in its most recent jurisprudence, it remains an open question whether these 
developments will really culminate in the “grand ralliement à l’Europe des juges”1160 
and mark the beginning of a new era in the relationship between the Conseil d’État 
and the EU’s Court of Justice. It might as well simply turn out to be a hasty 
conclusion to predict such a golden age. After all, not all that glitters is gold. 
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CHAPTER VI.                                                                            
PROCEDURAL OBSTACLES TO A COMPREHENSIVE 
RECOGNITION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF STATE LIABILITY FOR 
JUDICIAL BREACHES                                                                               
(GROUP IV) 
 
In the last group of our classification, we will turn our focus to those countries 
featuring procedural obstacles to the invocation of State liability for judicial breaches 
stricto sensu. While Member States pertaining to this last category recognize a general 
principle of State liability for judicial breaches under national law, the concept is 
nevertheless heavily restricted by different procedural barriers, whose purpose is in 
most cases to protect the principle of res judicata. We find such national procedural 
restrictions to claims à la Köbler for example in countries like Finland, Belgium, the 
Czech Republic, and Luxembourg.  
 
Furthermore, a number of Member States whose State liability systems we have 
already discussed in the context of one of our first three groups also feature other 
restrictions under national law, which additionally qualify them for group IV. A 
widespread procedural pre-requisite under national law is the rule of primary use of 
the national appellate procedure, to which a State liability claim would merely qualify 
as secondary proceedings. Like in the previous chapters we will classify all the 
Member States recognizing this rule and present them in a corresponding graph.1176 
Member States in possession of such ‘double-membership’ are, inter alia, Germany, 
Slovakia and Bulgaria. Nevertheless, our attention in this chapter will first be on those 
Member States pertaining only to group IV. One of those countries, which also serves 
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I. The Concept of State Liability for Judicial Breaches in Belgium 
 
It is interesting to note that the 
Kingdom of Belgium is the only 
Member State which has acknowledged, 
in its case-law, the general principle of 
the liability of the State for the actions 
of its courts.1177 
 
 
1. Tour d’Horizon of the general framework of public liability under 
Belgian law 
 
In Belgium the reparation of damage caused by the State in the exercise of 
official duties is broadly covered by two different concepts: la responsabilité civile on 
the one hand and the system of le contentieux de l’indemnité on the other.1178 
 
a) La responsabilité civile  
 
The famous case of Flandria1179 constituted the point of departure for an 
evolving jurisprudence with respect to the regime of civil liability for damages caused 
by public authorities in Belgium.1180 As early as 1920 the Cour de Cassation declared 
that on the basis of Article 144 (former Article 92) of the Belgian Constitution, public 
authorities, when acting in their official capacity, were not immune from tort actions 
brought by individuals whose rights had been infringed. In fact, the Flandria ruling 
created two essential rules of thumb concerning the basic framework of State liability 
in Belgium. Firstly, it was stipulated that the Constitution awarded to ordinary courts 
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and tribunals the exclusive competence to deal with liability claims based on civil 
law.1181 As a result, save for specific and clearly codified exceptions, all civil rights 
were put under the protection of the justice judiciaire and classified – no matter what 
the identity of the parties or what the specific nature of the act causing the violation – 
solely according to the nature of the law which had been violated. In case a State 
action violated an individual’s right, the ordinary judiciary had the power to declare 
such acts as being unlawful and thereafter award the victim an acceptable amount of 
compensation.1182 As a consequence, since 1920 the justice judiciaire has been 
regarded as the guarantor of the principle of legality in Belgium.1183  
 
Secondly, the Flandria judgment confirmed the basic rule that all questions of 
liability concerning public authorities were to be solved in accordance with the legal 
framework provided by civil law and were thus subject to Articles 1382 and 1383 of 
the Belgian Civil Code.1184 In his conclusions preceding the famous Flandria 
judgment, the public prosecutor Paul Leclercq had already insisted on the fact that the 
liability regime of civil law “s’applique au gouvernement comme aux particuliers, car 
comme les particuliers, il doit respecter les droits civils. Comme les particuliers, il est 
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 Thereby, the judgment was referring to (former) Article 92 of the Belgian Constitution. Ibid, p. 
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soumis à la loi.”1185 The Cour de Cassation subsequently adhered to Leclercq’s 
reasoning and found in its final judgment that all State authorities were subject to the 
law and that all their acts had to be within the limits of the law. In the same ruling, the 
Court then affirmed that any person who had suffered damage had the right to obtain 
redress from the ordinary judiciary, even if the damage had been caused by a public 
authority.1186  
 
Contrary to the separate regulation of private and public liability in countries 
such as France and Austria, Belgium (together with England) belongs to the group of 
countries which lack a self-standing legal framework of public liability. Instead, under 
conjoined systems such as that in Belgium, the concept of State liability emanates 
entirely from the basic framework of civil law liability. In other words, the same 
legislative grounds not only cover liability claims between individuals, but at the same 
time also protect  
 
une personne qui se dit titulaire d’un droit civil allègue qu’une atteinte a 
été portée à ce droit et qu’elle demande réparation du préjudice […] même 
au cas où l’auteur prétendu de la lésion serait l’État, une commune ou 
quelque autre personne de droit public […].1187  
 
According to Article 1382 Civil Code, liability in Belgium is generally 
conditioned on the simultaneous occurrence of the standard three elements, which we 
traditionally encounter in most national liability regimes. The three requirements are 
an effective or alleged fault, the occurrence of damage and the existence of a causal 
link between the alleged fault and the damage caused. In essence, the concepts of 
liability under private and under public law are built on a common foundation, the 
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principle of fault.1188 Similar to French law, the definition of fault in this context 
embraces any violation of a pre-existing obligation1189 or, as formulated by Bocken, 
“[…] the violation of a written or unwritten rule of conduct in force in a certain 
society at a certain moment.”1190 Such rule of conduct is defined in a broad manner 
and could in fact constitute a particular obligation contained in a law as well as a 
general duty of care, such as the duty to behave “en bon père de famille”.1191 Fault can 
evolve either from the violation of a statutory or a regulatory provision or from 
negligent behaviour, which marks a departure from the general duty of care. The 
damage does not necessarily have to result from the violation of a civil right, but can 
also appear through the infringement of simple interests, which are not protected by a 
particular judicial act. However, in such cases compensation will only be awarded 
when these interests are legitimate and constitute an advantage for the beneficiary.1192 
While running the risk of schematizing and over-simplifying the definition, Andersen 
broadly defines fault as being “toute contravention, si légère soit-elle, à la loi, en ce 
compris le manquement au devoir general de prudence.”1193 
 
With respect to the element of causality as a requirement in liability 
proceedings, the Belgian jurisprudence strictly follows the principle of equivalence 
and its essential maxim of ‘conditio sine qua non.’ Last but not least, the damage 
caused has to be fully repaired. In fact, reparation has to be such as to put the victim 
in the position he or she was in before the damage occurred. The principle of natural 
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restitution has priority over pecuniary compensation (restitutio in integrum), but only 
when natural restitution is still possible and reasonable.1194 
 
In Belgium the analogous application of the civil law definition of damage and 
its corresponding condition of causality (i.e. the principle of equivalence) to the 
system of liability for acts of public authorities in Belgium has not created any 
noteworthy difficulties in practice. For the concept of damage, the courts initially 
considered that only the violation of rights protected under civil law could provide a 
valid basis for reparation. Over time however, they also recognized public liability 
claims in case of, for example, the violation of political rights.1195 In a judgment of 13 
May 1982 the Cour de Cassation finally confirmed that in general “l’État est soumis 
aux règles qui régissent la réparation des dommages découlant des atteintes portées 
par des fautes aux droits subjectifs et aux intérêts légitimes des particuliers.”1196  
 
With respect to the question of reparation, the courts at first only saw 
themselves competent to requiring a public authority to pay a pecuniary form of 
compensation. However, in 1980 the Cour de Cassation decided that public 
authorities would not escape the rule of réparation en nature. From then on, the judge 
was allowed to impose on the tortfeasor any measures necessary to prevent or repair 
the damage.1197 Contrary to the basic elements of liability, such as damage, reparation 
and causation, the application of the definition of fault as formulated in Flandria and 
as understood in the context of civil liability, posed numerous difficulties with respect 
to liability claims based on violations committed by public authorities.1198  
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In sum, Belgian law, unlike French law,1199 does not subject State liability to a 
special administrative liability regime. And, unlike German law,1200 Belgian law does 
not have special rules in the Civil Code on this question. Belgian law submits liability 
for the conduct of public bodies to the same rules which apply to the conduct of 
individuals. In conformity with German law,1201 it confers jurisdiction over tort claims 
against public bodies to ordinary courts. In this context we can also distinguish 
between three different case-scenarios depending on which public power is held 
responsible for causing harm. The three different options, each of which we will 
discuss in detail, are claims of State liability for harm caused by the administration; 
harm caused by the legislature and harm caused by the judiciary.1202  
 
i) State liability for harm caused by the administrative authorities 
 
Most cases of State liability for damage caused by public authorities can be 
traced back to a violation committed by the executive organs of the State. At first, the 
principle of immunity for administrative acts was retained in Belgium in order to 
safeguard the administration’s areas of competence and to avoid any interference with 
its regulatory remit. Moreover, the judiciary adhered to a stringent interpretation of 
the principle of separation of powers, which banned the judicial branch from 
interfering in any way with administrative matters. However, over time the judiciary 
liberated itself from this reservation and progressively extended its sphere of 
control.1203  
 
The first possibility concerning damage caused by the administrative authorities 
in Belgium was of a violation of legal obligations. It has always been rather easy to 
invoke the liability of the administration for the violation of a specific legal 
obligation. In this case the principle of separation of powers could not withstand the 
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declaration by the courts that the administration had violated its legal obligations and 
that consequently the authorities were required to repair the damage caused to the 
victims of the violation. Secondly, there was the case of a violation of the general duty 
of care, la violation de l’obligation générale de prudence,1204 which the administrative 
authorities could commit in the absence of a set of clearly defined legal obligations. In 
this context the jurisprudence differentiated for a long time between les actes 
d’exécution on the one hand, and les actes de décision on the other. When a violation 
connected to an acte d’exécution had occurred, regular sanctions could be imposed on 
the relevant public authority. However, whenever the violation was connected to an 
acte de décision, the act could not be declared unlawful for the simple reason that 
such acts were considered to fall within the administration’s sphere of discretionary 
power to decide by which means best to achieve its objective.1205  
 
However, the distinction between the two sets of acts was abandoned in a 
decision by the Cour de Cassation on 7 March 1963, where the Court declared that 
“les pouvoirs que la loi attribue à l’administration dans l’intérêt général ne 
soustraient pas celle-ci au devoir de prudence, qui s’impose à tous.”1206 As a 
consequence, the administration from then on had to respect not only all the 
normative requirements and legal regulations, but also the general duty of care 
(l’obligation générale de prudence) in all of its acts, be it actes d’exécution or actes 
de décision. The universality of this principle was reconfirmed in a subsequent 
judgment of 26 April 1963, which expressly stated that  
 
aucune disposition constitutionnelle ou légale ne soustrait le pouvoir 
exécutif dans l’exercise de ses missions et de ses activités réglementaires à 
l’obligation découlant des articles 1382 and 1383 du code civil de réparer 
le dommage qu’il cause à autrui par sa faute, notamment par son 
imprudence ou sa negligence.1207 
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Finally, ever since the Cour de Cassation’s ruling of 11 April 1969 both acts 
and omissions by administrative authorities were subject to judicial control.1208 That 
judgment stipulated that in order to fulfil its duty of care, the administration was 
bound to take particular measures. In other words, if certain measures were not 
properly implemented or not implemented at all, the administration had committed a 
violation and consequently had to repair the resulting damage caused to the 
individual. Finally, the Cour de Cassation considered that the absence of 
administrative regulations necessary to ensure the execution of a particular law could 
also amount to fault even when the law did not set up a timeframe within which the 
regulations should have been implemented.1209 Apart from cases when it had been 
impossible for the administrative authorities to fulfil their regulatory duty, they had to 
ensure the execution of a law within a reasonable amount of time.1210 In sum, the State 
liability regime for administrative breaches in Belgium was fully embraced by the 
conditions set out in Articles 1382 et seq. of the Civil Code or, as formulated in the 
Court’s decision “qu’au niveau des principes, aucun fait positif ou négatif imputable 
à l’administration, (n’échappe) sous aucun aspect à l’application des articles 1382 et 
suivants du code civil.”1211  
 
As we have already indicated in the previous paragraphs, while the analogous 
application to State liability claims of the basic elements of liability as used under the 
civil law regime did not cause any notable problems, the requirement of fault as a 
prerequisite for any liability claim also against the State initially still lacked clearly-
defined parameters. The question of whether a simple violation of a legal provision 
was sufficient to amount to fault had long been discussed in the jurisprudence and the 
literature and had remained a point of contention. One side argued that not every 
simple legal violation resulted in fault and that an illicit act would only qualify as fault 
in the case where a reliable and proper public servant under the exact same 
circumstances would not have committed the same violation. The other side sustained 
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the very idea that without giving any further thought and consideration to the question 
of whether there was negligence or imprudence involved, every legal violation was to 
be equated with the notion of fault.1212  
 
The Cour de Cassation eventually addressed this thorny issue in two 
consecutive judgments. First, in a ruling of 19 December 1980, the Court elucidated 
its own particular definition of fault proclaiming that,  
 
le pouvoir exécutif agit fautivement lorsqu’il excède les limites de son 
pouvoir réglementaire et que la seule constatation que tout fonctionnaire 
placé dans la même situation aurait donné la même interprétation erronée 
que celle du fonctionnaire en cause n’exonère pas l’administration de sa 
responsabilité pour l’excès de pouvoir qu’elle a commis.1213  
 
In a nutshell, to the astonishment and consternation of those scholars who had 
suggested a qualified definition of fault, the Court found in favour of a broad and all-
embracing understanding of the concept of fault. In a later judgment the Cour de 
Cassation further elaborated on this question stating that in the absence of a cause of 
justification, the annulment of an administrative act by the Conseil d’État would, ipso 
facto, prove the authority’s fault and could then give rise to liability.1214 In other 
words, an annulment of an administrative act by the Conseil d’Etat automatically 
confirms the occurrence of fault and therefore renders it easier for the claimant to 
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lodge a liability claim against the State.1215 It is, however, not a requirement to obtain 
the prior annulment of the administrative act concerned in order for the individual to 
bring a liability claim. In fact, an individual merely has to bring a liability claim for 
the harm suffered as a result of an illegal public act. It is the competent court in each 
case which then has to verify if the administrative authority violated its legal 
obligations or not. This could be the case even where the administration has large 
discretionary powers.1216 
 
ii) An extended regime of responsabilité sans faute? 
 
In addition to the principle of State liability based on fault, the juridictions 
judiciaires had early on established a compensatory framework in the context of 
public works and disputes between proprietors based on the idea of responsabilité 
sans faute.1217 Initially, the Cour de Cassation had created the rule that when a 
property owner disturbed the equilibrium of rights existing between neighbouring 
proprietors through an act committed without fault and thereby imposed a heavier 
burden than usually acceptable on one of his or her neighbours, he or she had to 
compensate the troubled neighbour. While the overall principle was extracted from 
Article 11 of the Belgian Constitution, the Cour de Cassation traditionally based its 
jurisprudence in such cases on Article 544 of the Civil Code. Over time, the question 
emerged in this context whether the theory of equality of rights between proprietors 
had to be confined to disputes concerning the law of property or whether its 
application could in fact be extended to damages incurred by public authorities to 
other subjective rights outside this area.1218  
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The question first arose in 1970 in the Van Deeren case. This case, which 
concerned a State liability claim based on an individual’s unjustified detention on 
remand, occurred three years before the enactment of a special law regulating 
instances of unjustified detention on remand.1219 In this case the parents of the victim 
had sued the State, inter alia, for a violation of the equilibrium of rights existing 
between the individual and the society, as well as for breach of the principle of 
equality before public burdens.1220 The first instance court argued in its ruling that 
State liability for a violation of the equilibrium of rights between the individual and 
the society could not be invoked in connection with a public breach of a fundamental 
right committed without fault. This was especially true in an area where the general 
interest weighed heavier than the personal interest of the individual. Moreover, 
according to the judgment, the principle of equality of citizens before public burdens 
would only be applicable to cases related to the general functioning of public services, 
excluding those public services which sought to protect collective interests at times 
even over and above the interest of the individual.1221  
 
On 11 June 1974 this judgment was confirmed by a decision of the Cour 
d’Appel of Brussels.1222 Using a different argument, the Court underlined the fact that 
a judge could not apply a general principle of law unless it was in conformity with the 
will of the legislature. In this particular case the Law of 13 March 1973, on 
compensation for unjustified detention on remand, which had been enacted in the 
meantime, explicitly specified that compensation could only be awarded in cases that 
had occurred after the entry into force of this particular law. Accordingly, the Court 
inferred that the legislature had in fact never intended to compensate the victims of 
unjustified detention on remand in instances that took place before the entry into force 
of the law in 1973.1223  
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In the Luxora case, in which a judicial organ had prematurely announced the 
insolvency of a company, the company’s subsequent liability claim was based on the 
fault committed by the judges in the exercise of their non-judicial functions. 
Moreover, the claimants also sued the State for an alleged violation of the principle of 
equality before public burdens, underlining the exceptional damage which had 
occurred to Luxora as a result. The Cour d’Appel de Bruxelles, however, turned down 
the claim and refrained from awarding compensation.1224 Subsequently, the Cour de 
Cassation also rejected the appeal against this decision by virtue of the fact that a rule 
of law or an erroneous application of such law could in itself never constitute a 
violation of the principle of equality before public burdens.1225 This reasoning was 
certainly surprising in light of the fact that an unjustified declaration of insolvency ex 
officio, which lay within the ambit of application of the insolvency law, clearly 
violated the equality of traders in front of public burdens and consequently caused 
harm to the company.1226 
 
 Despite the hesitation in the jurisprudence, the proposition that the principle of 
equality had to be extended beyond the right to property to other subjective rights 
was, to a certain extent, echoed in the doctrine. In particular those authors, who were 
worried about the cases of unjustified detention on remand that had occurred before 
1973, found it unacceptable that such fundamental rights enjoyed less protection than 
property rights. After all, neither the Cour d’Appel of Brussels in its key decisions of 
1974 and 1985, nor the Cour de Cassation in its ruling of 1988 had formally rejected 
the application of the general principle of equality before public burdens in this 
context. However, both courts refused to apply the principle in practice using different 
grounds of justification. In the Van Deeren case, according to the competent court, the 
principle’s application failed in light of the fact that it would have been contrary to the 
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will of the legislature to award compensation in instances that had occurred before the 
enactment of the Law of 13 March 1973; in the Luxora judgment, the concept’s 
application was hindered by the failure to fulfil the indispensable prerequisite of the 
occurrence of an exceptional damage that had resulted from the violation incurred by 
the public power.  
 
b) Le contentieux de l’indemnité 
 
Whenever the principle of equality before public burdens has undeniably been 
violated to an individual’s detriment, the victim has had several possibilities under 
Belgian law to seek compensation for such exceptional and serious harm. Out of the 
compensatory regimes which explicitly refer to the concept of public liability sans 
faute, one form developed, as we have just seen, from the cases of neighbouring 
property disputes. In addition to that, there is a separate compensatory mechanism 
before the Conseil d’État, as well as a number of special legislative provisions, 
through which the State has established remedial schemes for victims of certain 
judicial errors.1227  
 
Nobody would contest the fact that an individual who has been put in detention 
on remand, but who is finally acquitted by a judgment in his/her favour, has suffered 
considerable harm through the temporary deprivation of liberty. In the same manner, a 
company, which was by mistake officially declared bankrupt by a court decision that 
was later revised on appeal, suffered irreparable damage because of this judicial 
malfunction. In both cases, it is not obvious whether the State organ had committed 
the act with fault.1228 In fact, the point common to the previous two examples is that at 
the time of decision nothing appeared to be patently wrong with the act which was at 
the origin of the damage. This should, however, not divert from the fact that certain 
individuals or certain groups of individuals frequently suffer much more from such 
acts of public malfunctioning than others. Today, the increasing regulatory 
intervention of public authorities in everyday life brings a growing risk that they will 
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cause damage, which often occurs even if the State cannot be charged with an illegal 
decision or faulty act.1229 Similar to the development in neighbouring EU Member 
States, in Belgium the recognition of a mechanism of responsibility sans faute was 
also therefore indispensable. And it was in this context that the general principle of 
equality before public burdens, l’égalité des citoyens devant les charges publiques, 
was introduced under Belgian law.  
 
Meanwhile, a complementary system of compensation for exceptional damage 
had been established in Belgium by the Loi du 23 décembre 1946. This system was 
grounded on the general maxim of equality before public burdens, a concept which 
we have already encountered under French law.1230 One of the objectives behind the 
creation of the Conseil d’État in the Law of 23 December 1946 was to set up a 
complementary system of State liability that would allow for the compensation for the 
damage that could not be invoked in front of the ordinary courts and tribunals.1231 
Thereby, the legislature notably considered all cases where harm had been caused by 
regular administrative acts, for which no fault could be identified, and which did not 
presuppose the violation of a particular subjective right. Under these premises the 
legislature introduced the concept of liability sans faute for administrative acts in 
Belgium.1232 The contentieux de l’indemnité allowed the Conseil d’État to award 
compensation to the victims of specific and exceptional damage on the basis of the 
general principle of ‘rupture de l´égalité devant les charges publiques’.1233 
Notwithstanding the fact that there was no requirement of fault on the part of the 
relevant authorities, the compensatory mechanism of le contentieux de l’indemnité 
still remained tied to several conditions. 
 
Firstly, the competence of the Conseil d’État was residual in this context, which 
implied that the Conseil could only rule in those instances where no other court was 
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competent to do so.1234 As is evident from the wording of this rule, the legislature 
expressed its intention to award the ordinary courts the general competence to deal 
with cases of State liability for acts of public authorities. As we have previously seen, 
the justice judiciaire is competent each time harm has been caused by a public 
authority that violates a subjective right or a legitimate interest. Therefore, the field of 
competence of the Conseil d’État essentially only concerned those instances where no 
fault had been committed, but a violation of a subjective right or legitimate interest 
had nevertheless occurred.1235 In a judgment of 16 December 1992, the Conseil d’État 
accentuated in detail – and in accordance with the predominant opinion in the 
doctrine1236 – the terms of its residual jurisdiction.1237 Therein, the Conseil declared 
that it did not have to interpret the requisite of absence of another competent 
jurisdiction in an abstract manner, but that it was competent to rule in all cases where 
other courts had dismissed a liability claim either for lack of competence or for lack of 
legal grounds.1238  
 
By leaving the general competence to decide in liability cases to the pouvoir 
judiciaire, the legislature had tried to prevent competition for competence between the 
juge judiciaire and the juge administratif. As a result, in Belgium the Conseil d’État is 
competent to decide upon the compensation to be awarded to an individual, whose 
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right to equality before public burdens has been harmed by a legal act, whereas the 
juge judiciaire is competent to find the State responsible on the basis of fault. Over 
and above that, the Conseil d’État is also incompetent to decide in cases where the 
harm consists of damage committed with fault to a civil or political right, or in case of 
a conflict outside the usual sphere of property disputes. Nevertheless, the Conseil 
cannot claim competence whenever compensation for damage has been regulated in a 
specific legal text preserving the competence of the justice judicaire or of other 
administrative courts. As a result, in the area of contentieux de l’indemnité the 
delimitation between the respective competences of the ordinary versus the 
administrative judge is not always evident and at times even appears to be fluid and 
artificial.1239 With respect to the topic of our thesis, under the condition that no 
tribunal and no administrative court is competent to compensate the victims of a 
judicial act, the aforementioned distribution of competences among the various 
judicial branches will rarely pose any difficulties. Besides that, with reference to the 
judicial power, special rules have only been established for the question of 
compensation concerning arbitrary detention on remand. In addition to being residual, 
the competence of the Conseil d’État was also subsidiary. This implied that recourse 
to the Conseil d’État could only be held if it had been preceded by a request to the 
public authority responsible for the damage and that the authority concerned had 
refused the request or had failed to respond within sixty days.1240  
 
Meanwhile, the third requirement, which was linked to the question of 
attribution, was also substantiated at different stages. In fact, the expression of 
‘autorité administrative’ had only been introduced in this context with the Law of 3 
June 1971. In its original version, Article 7 of the Law of 23 December 19461241 
stipulated that the damage must have been caused by the State, the province and/or the 
commune.1242 The State was therefore seen as a moral person, who was charged with 
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the exercise of sovereign power over a predetermined territory and whose powers 
were reified in the executive, the judiciary as well as the legislature. This broad 
reading had enabled the Conseil d’État to extend its competence even to cases where 
the perpetrator happened to be the legislature. However, all of this was on the 
condition that the legislature had not itself deliberately excluded or restricted 
compensation for harm and that the compensatory mechanism as such would not 
obstruct the efficacy of the law.1243 While the Law of 3 June 1971 had intrinsically 
intended to enlarge the competence of the Conseil d’État to include damages caused 
by public companies or other quasi-State entities, in practice the new law actually 
yielded the opposite result. Due to the textual reformulation, which consisted in 
replacing the words of ‘État, province, commune’ with the simple expression of 
‘autorité administrative’, the newly formulated Article 7 of the Law of 3 June 1971 
was subsequently interpreted as limiting the Conseil’s competence to merely those 
cases where damage had been caused by the executive branch.1244  
 
 Furthermore, similar to French law, the compensatory mechanism of le 
contentieux de l’indemnité required the damage to be of a special degree in terms of 
its nature and its importance. In other words, the damage had to extend beyond the 
sacrifices of societal life. The requirement of such ‘exceptional damage’ in this 
context is an indispensable prerequisite we therefore find not only under Belgian, but 
also under French law. Thereby, specific attributes delineate its ambit of interpretation 
in both countries and narrow its definition to damage, which can be material or moral, 
but which has to be existing, actual and certain. Moreover, the damage cannot be 
reasonably foreseeable and harm has to have been caused directly by an 
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administrative act. Finally, in light of a violation of the principle of equality before 
public burdens, the damage has to have a certain level of gravity and be excessive 
with respect to its nature.1245 
 
Last but not least, the Conseil d’État possesses discretionary power in its 
decision making, which allows it to take into account all the aspects of public and 
private interest. Consequently, the administrative judge has a wide margin of 
discretion with respect to his or her decision about the level of monetary 
compensation. What this rule concedes is that the awarded compensation does not 
necessarily have to be on a par with the harm caused, but is instead assessed with 
regard to all the circumstances involved in each case.1246 
 
i) State liability for harm caused by the legislature 
 
For a long time the question of State liability for legislative breaches in Belgium 
had merely been dealt with on a theoretical, doctrinal level. The exemption of the 
legislature from liability claims appeared to be an unchallenged legal rule, which 
seemingly did not need much justification.1247 Similar to our analysis of French law in 
chapter V of this thesis,1248 the irresponsibility of the Belgian State for legislative 
breaches was a direct consequence of the idea of absolute sovereignty of the law.1249 It 
was roughly the same objection which appeared under a less abstract formulation in 
the writings of those authors cherishing the law as the true expression of the citizens’ 
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will. The composition of the Belgian Parliament, which assured the representation of 
all different interests, guaranteed for the respect of those laws.1250 Until the early 
1980s the primary legislation in Belgium was entirely exempt from judicial review 
proceedings or from any other form of judicial control.1251 The law simply enjoyed an 
incontestable status under Belgian law. In support of the reasoning at the time, 
Morange alleged that a simple compensatory claim for damage incurred by a legal 
provision would, ipso facto, challenge the authority of the legislative power. This 
would be the case even if the judicial reasoning justifying such compensation did not 
presuppose fault-based behaviour by the legislature.1252 
 
In practice, the judiciary initially simply refused to apply Article 1382 of the 
Civil Code to cases where the damage was directly linked to a legislative act. The 
only area where national law was no longer covered by its veil of immunity and where 
the element of fault was easily attributed to legislative acts was the field of 
international law.1253 Yet, in a judgment of 5 June 1985, for example, the Tribunal 
Civil of Brussels had still declared inadmissible a claim of liability for the State’s 
failure to adjust a specific national law to the requirements of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. The Court still justified its decision on the grounds that 
it was not in the judge’s competence to control and to rule on acts of the legislature 
and that it was for the electorate to judge the work of Parliament.1254  
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As mentioned before, from 1948 to 1971 the Conseil d’État had been acting 
under limited jurisdiction on claims for State liability in cases of damage caused by 
legislative authorities. Thereby, the Conseil acted on the basis of the principle of 
equality before public burdens as defined in Article 7(1) of the Loi du 23 décembre 
1946, which concerned “[…] demandes d’indemnité relatives à la réparation d’un 
dommage exceptionnel résultant d’une mesure prise ou ordonnée par l’État, la 
province, le commune ou le gouvernement de la colonie […].”1255 However, the 
jurisprudence was rather hesitant with respect to the question of how much 
importance should be awarded to this provision in instances when the source of the 
alleged harm consisted of a national law. At first, the Conseil d’État declared that it 
was only competent to rule upon questions relating to damage caused by 
administrative organs. However, this declaration had to be read in its case-specific 
context at the time as in this particular case the Conseil had tried to obviate a claim 
seeking the State’s liability for a judicial breach.1256  
 
In 1954 the Conseil d’État issued an ambiguous opinion that covertly affirmed 
the Court’s competence in cases where damage had occurred as a result of a 
legislative provision. The Conseil d’État stated therein that it was competent to rule in 
such instances due to the fact that the damage did not stem directly from the law, but 
instead from an administrative act executing the law.1257 This judgment was heavily 
criticised by De Visscher, who argued in his observations on the case that it had 
artificially moved the cause of damage from being the law to the cause being an act of 
execution of the law. This was so even where the administration had applied the law 
in a correct manner.1258 Finally, after a few dissatisfying attempts, the Conseil 
elucidated its own particular understanding of the limits of its jurisdiction and 
eventually arrived at the conclusion that the definition of the State as such embraced 
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the entirety of the sovereign authority exercised over a predefined territory, including 
the legislative power.1259  
 
Nevertheless, the competence of the Conseil d’État with respect to 
compensatory claims remained residual. Generally speaking, the Conseil’s 
jurisdiction involved cases of claims for compensation in relation to which ordinary 
judges were powerless. Considering the fact that the ordinary judges had pro-actively 
widened the area of responsabilité aquilienne, that is fault-based liability for wrongful 
damage done to property by an administrative act, the Conseil d’État’s field of 
competence in this context had been reduced to a few cases. Whenever the harm 
emanated from an administrative act, the justice judiciaire was competent to deal with 
cases involving fault-based acts. If, on the other hand, damage originated from a 
legislative act, the competence of the Conseil d’État was not necessarily subject to 
similar restrictions concerning the question of fault. As the justice judiciaire initially 
refused to rule on such cases, the Conseil d’État finally proclaimed in the Nuyten et 
Flamey judgment of 21 May 1969 that it was competent to deal with liability claims 
based on damage, which resulted directly from a legislative act.1260 As mentioned 
before, in this case the Conseil d’État had defined the notion of ‘État’ in an all-
embracing manner as comprising the three branches of the State.1261 Finally, the 
Conseil simply based its competence on the ordinary courts’ self-inflicted declaration 
of incompetence.1262 Even if in cases where the harm originated from a legislative act, 
the Conseil’s reasoning did not insist upon the occurrence of fault but nor did it 
exclude such possibility.1263 Leaving some of those questions unresolved, the reform 
of 1971 completely reversed this decision and led once again to drastic changes with 
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respect to the judicial competence to rule on compensatory claims for damage caused 
by the legislature.1264 
 
As lamented by Leroy,1265 the newly introduced Loi du 3 juin 1971 modified the 
basic dispositions of the compensatory scheme that had been established until then 
and completely reshuffled the Conseil’s areas of competence. As already outlined, 
Article 7 of the Loi du 23 décembre 1946 initially declared that in order for the 
Conseil d´État’s competence to emerge in such cases, the damage must have been 
caused by the State, the province or the commune.1266 When the Law of 3 June 1971 
subsequently altered the wording of Article 7 to replace ‘État, province, commune’ 
with the simple expression of ‘autorité administrative’, the Conseil’s overall 
competence was reduced, contrary to the law-makers intentions, to compensatory 
claims, which were purely based on damage caused by administrative authorities.1267 
Thus, the practical application of the change in terminology yielded contrary results 
and noticeably limited the Conseil d’État’s ambit of jurisdiction.1268  
 
Despite these new restrictions, the Conseil nevertheless resumed competence in 
cases where damage had been incurred indirectly by a law. This was the case 
whenever an administrative act had been interposed between a legislative provision 
and the damage, and the administrative authorities were acting with a certain degree 
of discretion.1269 However, in the early 1980s legislative changes in Belgium once 
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again significantly altered the daily practice of the courts regarding the question of 
State liability for breaches of law incurred by the national legislature.1270  
 
Since 1984 the then newly established Cour d’Arbitrage has been awarded 
“specialised constitutional jurisdiction”,1271 which consisted of the competence to 
exercise partial judicial control by verifying the conformity of laws, décrets and 
ordonnances with certain principles enshrined in the Belgian Constitution.1272 Even 
though the Court’s ambit of review has been limited to test the conformity with only 
certain constitutional provisions, the general nature of these constitutional principles 
in reality opens up a wide field of analysis for the Court. Moreover, if requested by a 
court, a tribunal or a judge in the form of a prejudicial question, the Cour d’Arbitrage 
also has the competence to issue a preliminary ruling. In case a law turns out to be 
“unconstitutional”, the Cour d’Arbitrage has the power to suspend and subsequently 
annul the law.1273 The implications of such annulment by the Cour d’Arbitrage were 
regulated in the Loi du 10 mai 1985 relative aux effets des arrêts d’annulation rendus 
par la Cour d’Arbitrage, which was later amended by the Loi spéciale du 6 Janvier 
1989 sur la Cour d’Arbitrage.1274 It was on the basis of these legislative changes that 
the court eventually endorsed the possibility of holding the State liable for the 
enactment of a law, which violated certain constitutional principles. 
 
In his article on the question of State liability for legislative breaches, Leroy 
takes a pragmatic approach to show that the emergence of the Cour d’Arbitrage, with 
all its different functions, served as a catalyst for the development of a “logique de 
l’indemnisation” for legislative breaches too. In other words, in Leroy’s opinion, the 
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creation of a compensatory mechanism for harm caused by legislative breaches was 
only a logical implication of the Cour d’Arbitrage’s power of judicial review.1275 
Bearing all this in mind, Leroy’s approach was solidified by two main arguments. On 
the one hand, the procedure of recours en annulation of legislative acts had been 
paired with the possibility of lodging a request with the Cour d’Arbitrage for 
suspension of the legal norm concerned. Such an option had been granted in case the 
execution of the respective norm would risk causing serious and almost irreparable 
damage. However, according to Leroy, a possibility of suspending the application of a 
legal norm as a precautionary measure to avoid causing severe damage had to imply 
that in all other cases where the damage would not be as serious, there had to be a 
mechanism to repair the harm done to the individual.1276 If not, this would result in a 
differential treatment of harmed individuals comparable to an all-or-nothing approach 
depending on the gravity of the damage incurred. Such differentiation would clearly 
violate the principle of equality before the law and the maxim of non-discrimination. 
Given the fact that these principles form the constitutional backbone of all Belgian 
laws, such a procedure would constitute a contradiction in itself. In short, the 
suspension of certain legal norms only made sense if one presupposed that the damage 
caused by them would be repaired in all other cases.1277  
 
On the other hand, Leroy stipulated that the annulment of a law would 
necessarily imply the annulment of all its cases of application. These cases would 
consequently create an individual’s right to compensation for whatever harm had been 
caused by the application of the law. However, if at the same time the jurisprudence 
did not confirm the individual’s right to compensation for harm caused directly by an 
irregular legislative act, it would lead to an unjustifiable distinction between damage 
resulting directly from a law and damage caused by an executive measure that was 
based on the same irregular legal provision. Such differentiation in an individual’s 
right for compensation would again have untenable consequences.1278 The creation of 
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a procedure of cancellation of legislative acts was to be echoed in the normative 
framework of general public liability so as to safeguard the reparation of damage 
originating from a law, a décret or an ordonnace, which the Cour d’Arbitrage had 
declared unconstitutional. Leroy’s progressive arguments could be applied in the same 
manner to cases of State liability for judicial breaches in Belgium. However, this is a 
separate question which we will address in detail later. 
 
Consistent with the line taken in the literature at the time, the judiciary 
eventually found a way to reconcile the principle of unconditional respect for the law 
with the basic duty of judges to protect the subjective rights of Belgian citizens.1279 
The creation of the Cour d’Arbitrage1280 and its competence to partially review 
national legislation for compliance with specific principles of the Belgian Constitution 
significantly changed the regime of State liability for legislative breaches in 
Belgium.1281 As mentioned earlier on, in the course of such recours objectif the Cour 
d’Arbitrage had been awarded the power to suspend and subsequently annul the law 
in question. From there, it was then only a logical next step to introduce a right to 
compensation for those individuals who had been harmed by the application of such 
an unconstitutional norm. Nevertheless, an individual’s liability claim was only going 
to be successful in cases when the legislative power exceeded its competence or 
committed a constitutional breach. Moreover, only after the Cour d’Arbitrage 
confirmed a legislative irregularity in the process of an action for annulment (‘recours 
en annulation’) or in a reply to a preliminary question1282 was there the possibility of 
lodging a remedial claim against the State for damages caused by the legislative 
breach. Within these limits, the State’s liability for breaches of law by the legislature 
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neither violated the Belgian constitution nor was it irreconcilable with the basic 
constitutional principle of separation of powers.1283 
 
 The current situation under Belgian law is therefore that State liability claims 
for harm incurred by the legislature are limited according to the field of constitutional 
review accorded to the Cour constitutionnelle, as the prior annulment of the relevant 
norm by the Constitutional Court is a prerequisite for such claims. As mentioned 
above, with respect to the violation of international law by the legislature, individuals 
have an unconditional right to apply for compensation. This is the case since the 
supremacy of international law was explicitly recognized in a judgment by the Cour 
de Cassation in 1971. 1284 However, at this point it is important to add that such 
primacy only applies if the international norm is directly effective within the Belgian 
legal order.  
 
2. The principle of State liability for judicial breaches in Belgium 
 
Despite the fact that the Conseil d’État was faced with similar problems when it 
came to questions of compensation for damage caused to individuals by a judicial act, 
until the reform of 1971 the jurisprudence on the matter did not develop in a 
comparable way.1285 Even though the notion of ‘État’ as understood in the original 
version of the law of 1946 did not explicitly exclude the judicial branch, the Conseil 
d’État initially declared that it was not competent to rule upon liability claims for 
damages resulting from acts of the judiciary.1286 In the same manner, the Conseil had 
previously rejected the possibility of dealing with State liability claims for legislative 
acts. After the judgment in Nuyten et Flamey of 21 May 1969, however, in which the 
Court had proclaimed its competence to deal with liability claims for legislative 
                                                 
1283
 DONY, "Le Droit Belge," supra note 1178, pp. 160-161. 
1284
 For a brief overview on the question of State liability for legislative breaches see, amongst others, 
R. O. DALCQ, "Rapport de synthèse", La Responsabilité des Pouvoirs Publics: Actes du Colloque 
Interuniversitaire organisé les 14 et 15 Mars 1991 par la Faculté de Droit de l'Université Catholique 
de Louvain et la Faculté de Droit de l'Université Libre de Bruxelles (Bruxelles, Conseil de l'Europe, 
Legal Affairs; Bruylant, 1991), pp. 503 et seq.  
1285
 COMPERNOLLE, "Considérations sur la responsabilité...," supra note 1033, p. 49. 
1286
 See, for example, CE, 6 juin 1952, Mertens, RJDA, 1953, p. 7; CE, 23 novembre 1956, 
Indeherberg, RACE, 1956, p. 710; CE, 10 février 1966, Audouin, RACE, 1966, p. 119; et al. 




breaches, one could have expected that the Conseil would apply the same logic for 
cases where the damage resulted from judicial acts.1287 But despite the declaration of 
competence for legislative breaches, the Conseil reconfirmed its incompetence to rule 
upon claims for damages which had been caused by the State in the exercise of its 
judicial power.1288  
 
The amendments introduced by the Law of 3 June 1971 were not such as to 
change the Conseil’s generally restrictive tendency in this context. As mentioned 
before, the modified wording according to which the damage had to be incurred by an 
‘autorité administrative’ entirely excluded all compensatory claims concerning acts 
performed by any other branch of the State than the executive. Excluded were 
therefore also those acts, which emanated from the judiciary. Long before the 
judgment in the case Collard on 29 June 1977,1289 which corroborated the Court’s 
general refusal to rule over compensatory claims for damage resulting from a legal 
provision, the Conseil d’État had already re-confirmed that it was not competent to 
hear claims for compensation for damage which had been caused by a judicial act.1290 
Moreover, the theory of ‘l’équilibre entre les droits des propriétaires voisins’, which 
had been instituted by the judgments of the Cour de cassation of 6 April 1960, was 
essentially applicable to damages caused by public works in the ambit of the 
administration’s activities and can certainly not be applied to acts of a judicial 
nature.1291 
 
It was the inapplicability of all these compensatory schemes on damage 
resulting from a judicial act which finally led Jérome Sohier to propose a more pro-
active approach in the form of an intervention by the legislature.1292 In his article on 
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the issue he suggested two different possibilities on how to implement his proposal. 
The first concerned a modification of Article 11 des lois coordonnées sur le Conseil 
d’État with respect to the question of compensation. He suggested adding a paragraph 
declaring that the Conseil d’État was also competent under the same conditions to rule 
over questions of State liability for judicial breaches.1293 In addition, he proposed a 
second possible option, which considered the introduction of a specific regime of 
State liability sans faute for actions emanating from the judiciary, similar to the model 
that had been used in 1973 to remedy unjustified detention on remand.1294  
 
Generally speaking, the evolution of Belgian law with respect to the question of 
State liability for judicial breaches is quite remarkable and differs from any of the 
national prototypes we have encountered so far in the previous chapters. In Belgium 
the principles of public liability for breaches of law by the judiciary were not – as in 
most neighbouring jurisdictions1295 – based on a legislative framework. Instead, the 
prevailing system in Belgium owes its existence to the creativity of the national 
jurisprudence in developing such a principle in its case-law. This is an exceptional 
feature that the Belgian law on State liability shares with the prevailing system of 
Member State liability on the Community level, which, for want of a specific rule in 
the EC treaties, has been established on the basis of the CJEU’s jurisprudence. 
Likewise, it was against the background of an absence of national legislation that the 
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commises par les magistrats dans l´exercise de leurs fonctions: Note sur De Keyser et crts c. Etat belge, 
Cour de Cassation, 1re chambre, 19 décembre 1991" (1993) Revue Critique de Jurisprudence Belge, 
pp. 294. 
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judiciary in Belgium pro-actively enhanced the guiding principles on this question. As 
a result, two groundbreaking rulings by the Belgian Cour de Cassation finally 
affirmed the existence of a general principle of State liability for breaches committed 
by the judiciary in the exercise of its duties. Furthermore, the Court laid out and 
specified all the additional prerequisites and elements involved in order to invoke 
public responsibility for an erroneous judicial act.  
 
Traditionally, the dominant position in the doctrine and the jurisprudence in 
Belgium had rejected the hypothesis that the State could be held liable for breaches 
committed by the judiciary. The most common arguments put forward to oppose the 
introduction of such a regime consisted – similar to other Member States – in the 
classical objections that such a possibility would violate the principle of res judicata 
and that it would furthermore endanger the independence of the judiciary.1296 As in 
France, the only exception under Belgian law to initiate actions against a judge was 
the restrictive procedure of la prise à partie.1297 Over time, however, it became 
obvious that besides violations by the executive or the legislature, acts of the judiciary 
could also potentially cause serious material and moral damage to individuals. 
 
In a paper delivered at the XVth Colloquium of European Law,1298 which had 
been organised by the Council of Europe in June 1985, J. Velu had already argued on 
behalf of Belgium that even in the absence of fault, one would have to ensure that 
compensation for harm incurred by a judicial act was always granted in two cases. 
First, if the damage has its origin in an individual’s detention on remand, which is not 
followed by a sentence and where it would be gravely unjust if the individual had to 
deal with the harm himself. Secondly, according to Velu compensation had to be 
awarded where the damage had been caused by a final conviction in criminal law, 
which was annulled, or where harm was the result of a judicial error. However, the 
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latter possibility would not apply if the late revelation of new facts was entirely or 
partly the applicant’s fault.1299 
 
Acknowledging that severe damage could potentially also be caused by a 
judicial act, the legislature had in fact taken measures early on to remedy particular 
specified incidents, which included the cases mentioned by Velu. The liability of the 
State for judicial breaches in those instances was the result of a targeted intervention 
by the legislature, which was without doubt stirred by the growing necessity to award 
some form of compensation to the victims of such judicial error. However, in each 
case the remedial system of compensation is tied to additional conditions which need 
to be fulfilled. Moreover, compensation is refused when the consequences of the 
damaging act do not seem sufficiently serious. In part, this system remains in force 
until today and manifests itself in the special regulations outlined below.1300 
 
a) Responsibility sans faute as foreseen in particular legislative provisions 
 
i) Compensation for revision of a judgment in the area of criminal law 
 
In cases where it is likely that a judicial error has occurred in the course of 
judicial proceedings, ‘les demandes en révision’ constitute an extraordinary form of 
appeal in Belgium whereby a previous condemnation under civil or correctional law 
can be annulled.1301 Article 447 Code d’Instruction Criminelle,1302 as amended by the 
Law of 18 June 1894, foresees that in cases where the Cour de Cassation annuls a 
criminal conviction without remitting the case to a lower instance, or where the lower 
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court to which the case has been remitted acquits the individual, the acquitted 
defendant has a right not only to a public declaration clearing his name and 
establishing his innocence, but also to appropriate compensation from public 
funds.1303 The amount of monetary compensation is at the discretion of the 
government. Since 1973, in cases when the individual was either refused 
compensation, the amount of compensation had been miscalculated, or the 
government had not come to a decision on the issue within six months, the accused or 
his heirs may lodge an appeal with a special Commission, which has been established 
in the Loi du 13 mars 1973.1304 
 
Alternatively, a second possibility concerns the case where the individual’s 
sentence is only reduced. In this case the individual concerned does not have a right to 
compensation. However, out of considerations of equity, compensation can 
nevertheless be awarded. Consequently, it is only in the first case scenario that one 
can truly speak of strict State responsibility sans faute and an obligation of the State to 
award full compensation to the individual concerned. The second alternative merely 
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ii) Compensation for unjustified detention on remand 
 
The Law of 13 March 19731305 amending the loi du 20 avril 1874, also outlined 
the parameters of a compensatory scheme for victims of arbitrary detention on 
remand, which continues to be applicable even after the introduction of a new law on 
the same question in 1990.1306 The law set up two different regimes of compensation, 
which need to be distinguished in this context. On the one hand, there is the award of 
compensation for deprivation of liberty in breach of Article 5 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights1307 and, on the other, a compensatory framework for 
unjustified detention on remand. 
 
The first one of the two cases is regulated in Article 27 of the loi du 20 avril 
1874 and awards a right to compensation to every person who has been the victim of 
an arbitrary deprivation of liberty in violation of Article 5 ECHR. The claim has to be 
brought before the juridictions judiciaires and is to be directed against the State, 
represented by the Minister of Justice. The reparation corresponds to a civil right and 
the compensatory mechanism created by the legislature operates as a fault-based 
regime of public liability. 
 
Article 28 of the loi du 20 avril 1874, as amended by the loi du 13 mars 1973, 
constitutes a second option in this context. It offers a right for compensation to any 
individual who has been in unjustified detention for a period exceeding eight days. In 
contrast to the first option, no irregularity need have occurred during the judicial 
process and the competent judicial officers need not have committed a fault. This 
option therefore corresponds to a public liability regime sans faute: the State is liable 
even though the judiciary has not committed any fault.  
 
In order to receive compensation under this scheme three conditions 
nevertheless need to be fulfilled. Firstly, as stated above the detention must have 
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lasted more than eight days. Secondly, the (continuous) detention must not have been 
provoked by the behaviour of the individual concerned. Thirdly, the detention has to 
be unjustified within the meaning of Article 28(1) of the Law of 13 March 1973, 
which limits its application to four possible scenarios. Article 28(1) is applicable, 
firstly, if the applicant has been harmed directly by a judicial decision which has 
already achieved the status of res judicata. Secondly, in case the applicant is in 
possession of present facts or legal arguments, which would save him and also 
publicly clear his name. Thirdly, in instances when the accused has been arrested or 
was kept in detention even after the expiry of the action due to prescription; and last 
but not least, if the accused benefits from a dismissal of the case, which proclaims that 
the facts submitted in the case do not constitute an infraction.1308  
 
Consequently, an applicant who has been declared guilty of the facts which led 
to his/her detention on remand, but whose detention has turned out to be longer than 
the actual prison time to which he/she had been condemned, is not eligible to receive 
compensation. The entitlement to receive compensation has furthermore been waived 
for applicants who are eventually only condemned to pay a monetary fine or 
applicants, who have benefited from a suspension or from a deferral of their penalty. 
The special law of 6 January 1989 concerning the Cour d’arbitrage extends all those 
benefits to individuals who have suffered from detention as a result of a judgment that 
has been revoked following a quashing of the judgment by the Constitutional 
Court.1309 
 
Compensatory claims are to be directed against the Minister of Justice, who has 
to arrive at a decision within six months.1310 Furthermore, the applicant has the 
possibility to appeal to a special commission in cases when the compensation is 
refused altogether, the amount of compensation is thought to be insufficient or the 
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Minister has not rendered a decision within the required timeframe.1311 In this case the 
legislature has deliberately retained the power to handle such cases from the courts 
and tribunals in order to avoid a re-opening of the deliberations in the case. Such 
competence would only burden the responsible judge with an additional duty of 
having to decide on the compensation to be awarded to the individual. Moreover, the 
idea behind it was also to avoid putting a judge in the delicate position of having to 
criticise the ruling of a superior court, which had, for whatever motive, ordered, 
confirmed, or maintained the arrest warrant.1312 The power of discretion of the 
Minister of Justice in this case and, in the case of appeal, of the special commission 
was limited to decisions on the amount of compensation. However, for reasons of 
equity they could not refuse the compensation as such.  
 
As in most national legal systems, such special legislative provisions creating 
extraordinary compensatory mechanisms capture only a small fraction of the large 
potential of liability claims for judicial breaches. These cases constitute, for the most 
part, rare exceptions and are therefore also subject to special handling in practice. At 
the same time, the particularity of these isolated instances must have also implicitly 
reinforced the theory on the general irresponsibility of the State with respect to all 
other judicial acts. Eventually, during the 1980s several judicial decisions, among 
them false declarations of bankruptcy, evidently proved the fact that irreversible harm 
could also be caused to an individual as a consequence of an unjustified judicial act by 
a court which no possible appeal could have recompensed.1313 In response to these 
rulings a movement emerged in the literature which started to urge for a revision of 
the until then common principle of irresponsibility of the State for judicial 
breaches.1314 In the course of the critical debate, certain commentators considered that 
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the minimal protection of citizens through the regime of public liability would also 
have to include the concept of State liability for judicial breaches. Thereby, some 
authors directly attacked the traditional arguments of res judicata and the 
independence of the judiciary, which had so commonly been used to justify and 
defend the State’s irresponsibility in this matter.1315  
 
Already in 1985 in a paper presented at the XVth Colloquium of European Law 
in Bordeaux, Velu, who was at that time Advocate General at the Belgian Cour de 
Cassation, had outlined a desirable structure of public liability for judicial acts.1316 
Even though his article is by now more than 20 years old, it is still timely as it 
contains general recommendations and useful suggestions that apply to the current 
situation in Belgium which, after all, does not seem to have changed drastically over 
the past two decades. While Velu’s proposal covered a wide range of different aspects 
connected to the contentious issue of State liability for judicial breaches, he also 
suggested a set of principles that in his opinion were necessary in order to guarantee a 
minimum level of protection for litigants.1317  
 
Defending the prevalent position in the literature at the time, the authors 
Compernolle and Closset-Marchal also later subscribed to the opinion that the 
objection based on the argument of judicial independence was in fact not entirely 
supportive of the concept of total irresponsibility of the State.1318 In fact, as explained 
at length in their work, this objection misinterprets the true function of State 
responsibility and presents the problem from a false perspective. After all, it is not the 
personal liability of the judge which is at stake but the responsibility of the State.1319 
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As the prevalent legislative texts and regulations at the time concerning the procedure 
of ‘la prise à partie’ excluded any claims for compensation directed against a single 
judge, both authors rejected the fear that the State might resort to recursory actions 
against the acting judge.1320 Moreover, seen through the comparative lens, they 
pointed to the fact that several foreign legal orders had already successfully 
introduced a wide-ranging system of State liability for judicial breaches.1321 The 
bottom-line in the authors’ work is that the principle of independence of single judges 
and of the judiciary as a whole does not turn out to be incompatible with an all-
embracing system of public liability for erroneous acts committed by either one of the 
three branches of the State.1322 
 
What had more leverage was the second objection raised in this context, namely 
that the concept of State liability for judicial breaches would violate the principle of 
res judicata.1323 According to the traditional approach and the classical understanding 
of the legal maxim of res judicata, the finality and truth attached to any judgment can 
only be challenged by means of appeal. The literature at the time therefore suggested 
that the decision to allow for liability claims against the State on the basis of such 
final judicial decisions would represent a serious defiance of the principle of res 
judicata. Instead, for the applicant to lodge an appeal would constitute less of a direct 
challenge to the aforementioned principle.  
 
While Compernolle and Closset-Marchal in general acknowledged the 
significance of this objection, they nevertheless found considerable flaws in the 
interpretation and use of this fundamental principle. First of all, the authors consider 
that the objection of res judicata only applies to acts performed by so-called 
magistrats du siège, judges who perform judicial acts stricto sensu. This definition 
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consequently excludes all acts by the public ministry of justice as well as all acts 
performed by judges who operate outside the classical ambit of judicial work. 
Moreover, this argument provides no answer to the problem that despite the fact that a 
judgment is still open to appeal, the claimant may have suffered irreparable harm. In 
this case the damage would not disappear simply or even after the erroneous judgment 
in question had been annulled.1324  
 
In the midst of the ongoing discussion in the literature on the question of 
whether to reconsider the fundamental principle of irresponsibility of the State for 
judicial breaches and against the background of a total silence on the part of the 
legislature with respect to this issue, the Cour de Cassation finally handed down two 
fundamental judgments in the early 1990s on precisely this question. The Court’s 
dicta finally resolved the ongoing debate at the time.1325 However, even after those 
rulings by the Cour de Cassation, it remained undisputed that in Belgium, de lege 
lata, a judge could not and still cannot be held personally liable.1326 
 
b) Laying the foundations: the ruling in De Keyser v. Belgian State 
 
The point of departure and also, in hindsight, the most significant ruling in this 
respect was the famous De Keyser judgment by the Cour de Cassation on 19 
December 1991.1327 In this ruling the Belgian Supreme Court decided that the State 
was also liable for any tortious act perpetrated by the judiciary. It almost seems like 
the date of the judgment, 19 December 1991, could be more than mere coincidence. 
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On 19 November 1991, exactly a month before the decision in De Keyser, the CJEU 
gave its famous Francovich ruling on the fundamental tenets of the concept of 
Member State liability under European Community law.1328 In that respect, the 
Belgian approach towards the concept of State liability as a whole and especially as 
regards the question of attribution was already very inclusive and exceptionally 
advanced at the time.  
 
i) The pre-judgment phase 
 
The factual elements of the De Keyser case were straightforward. On 1 February 
1982 the Tribunal de Commerce of Brussels had proclaimed ex officio the insolvency 
of the company SPRL Anca. However, the announcement of bankruptcy by the Court 
had been made without a prior hearing in the course of the proceedings. After an 
appeal was lodged against the declaration by the company’s legal representatives, the 
Cour d’Appel of Brussels rendered a judgment on 16 December 1982, in which it 
proclaimed that as the Tribunal de Commerce had failed to hold a hearing in the case, 
the Court had in fact violated the principles of the adversial procedure in the process 
of giving its judgment.1329 Hence, in breach of Article 6 ECHR the Court had violated 
Anca’s rights of defence. As a consequence, the Cour d’Appel concluded that the 
declaratory judgment proclaiming the insolvency of the company had been declared in 
violation of the respective procedural guarantees set out by the ECHR. Due to the 
violation of Article 6 ECHR the ruling by the Cour d’Appel eventually resulted in an 
invalidation of the declaratory judgment, which had been given by the Tribunal de 
Commerce.1330  
 
In the meantime, however, the damage suffered by the company as a result of 
the declaration of insolvency had already amounted to irreparable harm. In fact, at that 
point the trustees had sold the company’s going business and SPRL Anca had already 
been liquidated. On the basis of Articles 1382 and 1383 of the Code Civil, the 
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liquidators thereafter launched a liability claim against the State demanding reparation 
for the damage suffered as a result of the false declaration of bankruptcy by the 
Brussels Commercial Court, which had ruled in the first instance. By judgment of 24 
December 1987, the first instance court in Brussels declared the application 
inadmissible on the grounds that apart from the exceptional cases of ‘la prise à 
partie’, the liability of the State could not be invoked for a judge acting in the exercise 
of his or her functions.1331 The Cour d’Appel of Brussels confirmed this decision in a 
judgment of 21 November 1989.1332 At first it seemed like the traditional stance 
towards the principle of State liability for judicial breaches had been re-confirmed by 
the jurisprudence. However, on 19 December 1991 the aforementioned ruling was 
quashed by the Cour de Cassation in what was to become its fundamental judgment 
in the De Keyser case. The maxim of total irresponsibility of the State with respect to 
acts performed by its judiciary had finally been overruled.1333 
 
ii) The ruling in De Keyser  
 
In the De Keyser ruling1334 the Cour de Cassation not only outlined the general 
scheme of State liability for harm incurred by public authorities, but devoted special 
attention to answering the specific and until then disputed question of whether the 
general public liability regime would also apply to a harmful act committed by the 
judiciary. In other words, could the judiciary be subsumed under the general 
definition of a public organ for whose actions the State would carry liability? The 
framework of liability and the applicable limitations to the system also prompted the 
Court to address not only the necessary protection for the principle of res judicata, but 
also its respect for the fundamental guarantee of the independence of the judiciary. 
   
As a first step, the Court clarified and reconfirmed the core principles which 
constitute the overarching pillars of the State liability regime in Belgium. The first 
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few lines of the judgment reiterated the importance of (former) Article 92 of the 
Belgian Constitution of 1831, which serves as the guarantor of the judicial protection 
of all civil rights.1335 The Court argued that in order to protect those rights in the 
broadest possible manner, the application of (former) Article 92 would only depend 
on the nature of the right at issue and not on the capacity of the litigating parties or the 
nature of the act, which allegedly caused the violation. Hence, the judgment once 
again confirmed that the State was subject to the basic legal framework under civil 
law concerning reparation of damage whenever one of its organs infringed a citizen’s 
right or legitimate interest. As mentioned before, contrary to the French approach, 
Belgium has a conjoined system of liability, meaning that the State’s liability in tort is 
regulated by the general civil law provisions on liability, which are contained in 
Articles 1382 and 1383 of the Belgian Code Civil. Accordingly, the State is liable for 
the conduct of its organs whenever they act within the limits of their statutory powers, 
or at least where any reasonable and cautious person would accept that the organ has 
acted in that manner. Furthermore, the Court reiterated that apart from the executive 
and the legislative branch, the judiciary and its actors also fully qualified as organs of 
the State.1336 
 
Forging a system of State liability for judicial breaches, the Cour de Cassation 
subsequently went beyond the mere acknowledgment of the judiciary as an integral 
part of the State. According to the judgment’s wording, the principles of separation of 
powers, the independence of the judiciary and its members, and the maxim of res 
judicata did not imply that the State was fully exonerated from general liability and 
from the reparation of damage caused by its organs. This was also the case for any 
harm the judicial organs had incurred in the administration of justice and even more 
so for harmful acts which formed the essence of the judicial function.1337 The Court 
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further clarified that the liability of the State was not automatically excluded 
whenever the responsible organ could not be held personally liable for any of its 
actions. An exemption from personal liability could occur either because the act’s 
perpetrator was unidentifiable or because the organ relied on a special exoneration 
such as the occurrence of an ‘erreur invincible’ or ‘force majeure’.1338 The same 
protection applied if the act constituted a fault giving rise to liability, from which the 
organ itself had simply been exempted.1339 
 
After spelling out those general guidelines, the Court proceeded to a detailed 
rendition of the concept of State liability for judicial breaches under Belgian law. In 
doing so, the Cour de Cassation proclaimed what in hindsight constitutes not only the 
core of the De Keyser ruling, but also of the Belgian State liability scheme for judicial 
breaches as such:  
 
[q]u'en l'état actuel de la législation, l'Etat peut, sur la base des articles 
1382 et 1383 du Code civil, être, en règle, rendu responsable du dommage 
résultant d'une faute commise par un juge ou un officier du ministère public 
lorsque ce magistrat a agi dans les limites de ses attributions légales ou 
lorsque celui-ci doit être considéré comme ayant agi dans ces limites, par 
tout homme raisonnable et prudent; que toutefois, si cet acte constitue 
l'objet direct de la fonction juridictionnelle, la demande tendant à la 
réparation du dommage ne peut, en règle, être reçue que si l'acte litigieux 
a été retiré, réformé, annulé ou rétracté par une décision passée en force 
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de chose jugée en raison de la violation d'une norme juridique établie et 
n'est plus, dès lors, revêtu de l'autorité de la chose jugée.1340 
 
In this ruling the Cour de Cassation established a system of State liability as had 
already been in place for administrative and the legislative breaches, but was 
henceforth also applicable to erroneous acts incurred by the judicial branch. The 
detailed terms of this liability regime were outlined following the general affirmation 
that the State was in fact to be held responsible for tortious acts by the judicial organs.  
 
However, the implementation of such liability was tied to specific conditions. 
According to the Court, the liability of the State could principally be invoked on the 
basis of Articles 1382 and 1383 of the Code Civil for any damage caused by fault of a 
judge or a public prosecutor under the condition that he or she had acted within the 
limits of his/her legal powers or at least would be regarded by a reasonable and 
cautious person as having done so. Following this ample definition, the Court 
introduced a significant restriction concerning acts pertaining to the essence of the 
judicial function. Yet it is not entirely clear which judicial acts precisely the Court 
intended to include in this specific category. According to the formulation used by the 
Court, acts which constitute “l´objet direct de la fonction juridictionnelle”1341 would 
most likely comprise all judicial decisions stricto sensu, i.e. judicial acts that are 
capable of acquiring the force of res judicata. With a view to protecting the authority 
of final judicial decisions as well as the coherence of the judicial system as such, the 
Cour de Cassation therefore introduced the general restriction that the claim for 
compensation could only be entertained if the act under review had previously been 
withdrawn, amended, annulled or retracted by a final decision on the grounds of a 
breach of a well-established legal norm, whereby the initial decision had lost the 
authority of res judicata.1342 Within these limits, according to the Court, the maxim of 
res judicata would be fully respected. Consequently, a liability claim on the basis of a 
final but erroneous judicial decision would have to be dismissed. In short, with 
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consideration to the aforementioned restrictions, the Court tried to reconcile the 
principle of State liability with the authority of final judicial decisions. Accordingly, 
having spelled out an entirely new concept of State liability, the Cour de Cassation 
finished its ruling by quashing the disputed judgment of the Court of Appeal.1343  
 
In sum, in the De Keyser ruling the Cour de Cassation eventually brushed aside 
the traditional objections usually advanced in this context. According to the Court, the 
independence of the judiciary was not endangered by the fact that the State could be 
held liable for a wrongful act performed by a judge. In addition, the argument related 
to the maxim of res judicata was no longer used. However, while acknowledging that 
the principles outlined in its previous case-law on State liability also applied to 
judicial actions, the Cour de Cassation at the same time introduced significant 
restrictions in this particular context. In order to preserve the coherence of the system, 
which did not allow for other ways to review a judgment than through the regular 
system of appeals, the decision by the Court specified that a liability claim against the 
State for damage sustained on the basis of a judgment was only admissible if the 
decision, which had caused the damage, had been previously withdrawn, amended, 
annulled or retracted on the ground of a breach of an established legal rule.1344 In fact, 
if this condition was fulfilled the judicial act would no longer have the authority of res 
judicata. As a result, the liability claim would rely upon the act of revision, revocation 
or annulment in order to confirm the irregularity of the relevant judgment. Thus, 
contrary to French, Italian or Dutch law but in harmony with the legal framework in 
Luxembourg, Belgian law does not limit the potential liability of the State for 
erroneous judicial acts according to the requirement of fault.1345 We encounter a 
similar situation in Luxembourg where the State’s liability for judicial breaches is 
expressly mentioned in the Law of 1 September 1988 on the liability of the State and 
other public entities, which admits State liability for the inadequate functioning of the 
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judiciary, including preparing acts, the judgments itself and consequences of a 
judgment.1346 
 
It is noteworthy that the annotated judgment was given exactly one month after 
the Francovich ruling on the Community level, in which the CJEU had established 
that the concept of Member State liability for breaches of Community law was a 
principle inherent in the system of the EC Treaty. As was put beyond doubt in this 
context in the CJEU’s subsequent judgment in the case Brasserie du Pêcheur, this 
principle of Community law applied regardless of  
 
whether the breach which gave rise to the damage is attributable to the 
legislature, the judiciary or the executive...since all State authorities...are 
bound in performing their tasks to comply with the rules laid down by 
Community law directly governing the situation of individuals.1347  
 
In the De Keyser case, the Cour de Cassation had not been asked to decide upon 
the detailed conditions necessary in order to invoke a public liability claim for judicial 
breaches nor was the Court asked to rule on the question of fault or the definition of 
causality. The essential outcome that emerged from this case merely concerned the 
basic question of whether such a claim was generally admissible under Belgian 
law.1348 While the wording of the judgment itself proves to be rather short, it is the 
detailed and meticulous analysis in the Opinion of Advocate General Velu, which 
provides a clear insight into the reasoning and line of argument that might have 
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c) Opinion by Advocate General Velu 
 
The extensive submission by the Advocate General in the De Keyser case is an 
ample discussion of the general concept of State liability for judicial breaches and it 
offers a systematic analysis of the objections that might prevent the implementation of 
such a regime in Belgium. Velu immediately acknowledged the distinctiveness of the 
status and the functions of the judiciary, which would call for certain restrictions and 
limitations to the general principle of State liability. Accordingly, Velu’s tripartite 
analysis was focused on the three core points of contention surrounding the 
introduction of such a system of liability, which were the principle of independence of 
the judiciary, the maxim of res judicata and, as a final element, the “théorie de 
l’organe”. The latter element elaborated on the debate of whether the judiciary, like 
the executive and the legislature, was to be classified as yet another organ of the State 
or whether it enjoyed a special position within the architecture of the State. The 
judgment of the Cour de Cassation in this specific case subsequently also touched 
upon all of these issues. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that an elaborate debate of the 
same points of contention can not only be found in the Opinion of Advocate General 
Léger in the Köbler case, but also in the CJEU’s final judgment in Köbler.1350   
 
i) The principle of independence of the judiciary 
 
Until today the basic guarantee of judicial independence is a reoccurring theme 
in the context of the debate on State liability for judicial breaches. Advocate General 
Velu dedicated the entire first section of his analysis to a detailed discussion of the 
principle of independence of a single judge and of the judiciary as a body in light of 
the principle of separation of powers. Despite the fact that the Advocate General was 
in favour of a public liability regime that embraced also the judiciary, he nevertheless 
underlined the importance of the principle of judicial independence and the basic 
maxim of separation of powers. Furthermore, Velu considered it to be an undeniable 
fact that personal liability of judges would severely impact the judicial decision-
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making process and stated, as the Court rephrased it in its later judgment that “si ces 
derniers devaient craindre, lorsqu’ils délibèrent, qu’ils puissent être impliqués 
personnellement, leur indépendance serait irrémédiablement compromise.”1351  
 
The independence of the judiciary constitutes a fundamental legal principle, 
which is not only protected under Article 6 of the European Convention of Human 
Rights, but which is also reiterated in several other international treaties as well as in a 
large number of different national constitutional and legal provisions. Under Belgian 
law, the principle of independence, the organisation and the fields of competence of 
the judiciary are regulated in what is now Articles 144 to 161 of the Belgian 
Constitution of 1994.1352 Furthermore, the independence of the judiciary is fully 
protected by Articles 1140 to 1147 Code Judiciaire, which regulate the exceptional 
procedure of ‘la prise à partie’.1353 To this assertion the Advocate General added that 
except for the limited cases of personal liability falling under Articles 1140 to 1147 
Code Judiciaire and for those instances when the judge has committed a criminal 
offence, it was neither debatable nor had it ever been a question of debate that the 
principle of judicial independence effectively shielded and protected judges in general 
from any civil liability claim based on Articles 1382 and 1383 of the Code Civil. In 
fact, as summarized by the Cour de Cassation in De Keyser “l’exercice serein de la 
difficile fonction de juger est inconciliable avec l’application aux juges eux-mêmes 
des règles de droit commun de la responsabilité.”1354 In other words, apart from the 
exceptional cases mentioned before, the members of the judiciary enjoy total 
immunity from personal liability proceedings.  
 
As much as Velu subscribed to all the abovementioned considerations, he also 
correctly pointed out that in reality the point of contention in the debate concerning 
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the State’s liability for the judiciary was an entirely different one.1355 In Velu’s 
understanding, the real question at stake was whether in the context of the principle of 
separation of powers, the axiom of judicial independence would hinder not so much 
the personal liability of a judge, but the liability of the State. However, the Advocate 
General dismissed such fear as unfounded, claiming that the principle of 
independence of judges and the judiciary was sufficiently safeguarded by the 
impossibility of invoking a judge’s personal liability. The few exceptions to this 
general rule were restricted to the rare cases when a judge had committed a crime and 
to those instances falling under the provisions of ‘la prise à partie’.  
 
An objection, which was raised by several authors in this context, was the 
argument that as long as the State had a right to initiate a recovery action against the 
judge who was responsible for the damage, the State’s liability for judicial breaches 
would still endanger the principle of independence of the judiciary. According to the 
Advocate General, however, even that particular objection did not have any validity 
since de lege lata recovery actions by the State were not even mentioned under 
Belgian law. But even in the event that they did exist, Velu dismissed all related 
concerns by comparing it to the situation in France, where despite the fact that the 
State could be held liable for judicial breaches and in spite of the State’s right to take 
recursory actions against judges, the principle of independence of the judiciary had 
never been threatened.1356 Another comparative example that was mentioned in this 
context was the case of Italy, where the Constitutional Court had ruled that the Italian 
State liability regime, which also legally acknowledged recursory actions by the State, 
was in full compliance with the constitutional provisions guaranteeing the 
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ii) The maxim of res judicata 
 
The second aspect in the list of contentious questions, which were central to the 
argument of the Advocate General, was the problem of how to reconcile the concept 
of State liability for harmful acts committed by the judiciary with the principle of res 
judicata.1358 In his analysis, Velu focused on the interplay between the maxim of res 
judicata and the legal framework that had been implemented in Belgium in order to 
provide for a coercive system of appeal. The crux of the problem was the question 
whether the finality of a judicial act would perpetuate a continuous conflict with the 
application of the concept of State liability for judicial breaches. Velu’s reasoning was 
based on the fact that in the course of liability proceedings the competent court would 
be required to review, even if only in an indirect manner, the contended judgment, 
which might by then, however, already be vested in the authority of res judicata. 
Moreover, Velu predicted that attempts by an individual to rebut an allegedly harmful 
judgment on all fronts would lead to the parallel application of (extra-) ordinary 
remedies in addition to the claim for damages against the State. This, according to 
Velu, would inevitably lead to serious substantial and procedural entanglements.1359  
 
An additional contention raised by the Advocate General, which is usually 
brought to the fore of the debate in this context, concerned the primary use of legal 
remedies that have been provided by the legislature in order to warrant an (extra-
)ordinary appeal against an allegedly unfair or harmful judgment. The viable option of 
appeal, as it was generally argued, would provide for a sufficient guarantee for the 
individual to combat any damage he/she had unjustly endured by an erroneous 
judgment. Judges could err like any other human being and precisely for that reason 
the legislature had appointed a higher judicial instance to revise judgments which had 
been wrongly decided by a lower instance court.1360 Generally speaking, arguments 
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broaching the principle of res judicata seem to be manifold and of timeless validity as 
they have persisted in the literature until today.1361 However, in support of an all-
encompassing system of State liability in Belgium, Advocate General Velu sought to 
counter every single one of these contentious points in his Opinion on the case, while 
at the same time providing insightful criticism and thoughtful commentary on the 
issue. 
 
First, the Advocate General asserted that in the context of State liability for 
judicial breaches the alleged violation of the principle of res judicata would only 
apply – if at all – to judicial decisions as understood in the narrow sense of the term. 
The latter definition embraced all judicial acts, which were bound to endorse the 
authority of res judicata. Terminologically speaking, the objection of res judicata 
would certainly not cover acts lying within the ambit of what constituted an inclusive 
or wide definition of judicial acts, which, for example, also incorporated 
administrative acts upholding the smooth functioning of the judicial apparatus. In 
light of the fact that the present analysis has from the very outset been limited to such 
narrowly-defined judicial acts or judicial acts stricto sensu, as we have frequently 
referred to them, Velu’s initial argument, even though significant, is not of direct 
relevance for the purposes of this study. 
 
Furthermore, the Advocate General argued that the principle of res judicata was 
inoperable with respect to judgments that have been annulled, withdrawn, amended or 
retracted. Such restrictions were based on the fact that technically, the principle of res 
judicata had a very narrow definition under civil law, presupposing the famous “triple 
identity” of object, cause and parties.1362 The maxim of res judicata only held in cases 
of identical claims that were based on the same foundation, existed between the same 
parties and had been formulated by them or against each other in the same capacity. 
When an application for damages was brought against the State for harm incurred by 
a final judicial decision, these conditions were generally not fulfilled as the claim was, 
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in most instances, introduced against a different party than the original adversarial 
party. Moreover, in such a case the object and the reasoning of the two claims were 
going to be different. Therefore, as Velu concluded in his Opinion in the De Keyser 
decision, the claim for general irresponsibility of the State could not be justified by 
the principle of res judicata.1363 
 
Opposing the idea of general impunity of the State for the actions of its organs, 
Velu also held that there was a substantial number of judicial acts (in the wide sense 
of the term), which could not be reviewed within the regular system of appeals 
provided for by procedural law.1364 Specific judicial decisions were taken in first and 
last instance and such rulings could only be contested by use of extraordinary 
remedies such as a public liability claim. Another important point raised by Velu was 
the fact that the national legal remedies guaranteed under procedural law were to a 
larger extent targeted at securing the legality of a judicial decision rather than at 
satisfying the victim’s demand for compensation. Resorting to the system of (extra-
)ordinary remedies by appeal, annulment or withdrawal constituted in most instances 
an effective way to put an end to the continuous harm, which would emerge from a 
judicial decision in the future. The act of appeal, withdrawal or annulment of a 
judicial decision, however, did not necessarily compensate the victim for the damage 
he/she had sustained in the past. In this context, Velu also contested the widely used 
argument that an individual could easily resort to extraordinary remedies such as ‘la 
prise à partie’. Moreover, the Advocate General underlined that, contrary to common 
belief, the silence on the part of the legislature concerning the question of when to 
open a procedure of ‘la prise à partie’ against a judge did not automatically imply that 
for those cases concurrent liability of the State could simply be excluded.1365  
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According to Velu, all the aforementioned arguments countered the idea of a 
general immunity of the State. However, there were nevertheless two fundamental 
arguments with respect to State liability, which in the eyes of Velu justified certain 
limitations to the application of Articles 1382 and 1383 Code Civil. The first 
argument revolved around social considerations of legal certainty and the idea of a 
settled legal order in which each case had a definite ending. The Advocate General, 
however, strongly disputed the far-reaching assumption that even though State 
liability claims were not entirely excluded on the basis of res judicata, they 
technically still resulted in an indirect process of review of the contested decision. 
While acknowledging the importance of the principle of legal certainty, Velu did not 
subscribe to the view that it would pose a danger to the general coherence of the legal 
system if the competent court were allowed to challenge indirectly the presumption 
that the contentious judgment had been correct. 
 
A second limitation to the wide application of Articles 1382 and 1383 Code 
Civil was, according to Velu, justified in case the individual had somehow contributed 
to the damage. Not only would that warrant a reduced amount of compensation for the 
individual, but it would even give good reason for making no award of compensation 
at all. This was the case whenever the individual could have avoided the damage 
entirely or at least could have received reparation for harm, if he/she had appealed the 
judgment. In fact, an individual who erroneously missed out on lodging an appeal 
against a judicial decision which has caused him harm, cannot hold the State liable for 
the damage that he/she had to incur as a result. In short, no compensation should be 
awarded for damage that could have been avoided if it were not for the individual’s 
own negligence.1366 Accordingly, this rule confirmed the general principle that a State 
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liability claim against a judicial decision on the basis of Articles 1382 and 1383 of the 
Belgian Civil Code had to be rejected when the individual did not previously exhaust 
all local remedies.1367 In view of these considerations, Velu concluded that the 
principle of res judicata and all connected principles, such as the primary use of 
remedies, still did not provide a sufficient argument for upholding an all-embracing 
immunity of the State. However, according to Velu, these arguments nevertheless 
provided a justification for the fact that the State’s liability and the application of 
Articles 1382 and 1383 Code Civil in this context had to be restricted. 
 
iii) La théorie de l’organe 
 
A third argument, which was commonly raised against the introduction of a 
general principle of State liability for judicial breaches was based on the reasoning 
that one could not hold the State liable for an erroneous act, for which not even the 
responsible organ was liable. In other words, the State should be able to benefit from 
the impunity which had been accorded to one of its organs. Velu, however, also 
opposed this theory stating that it did not seem logical that the State would 
automatically benefit from the quasi-immunity, which the legislature had accorded to 
single judges. Accordingly, Velu argued that despite the validity of this theory, at 
times the dissociation of the liability of the State and the liability of one of its organs 
was fully justified and necessary. Subsequently, Velu outlined three different case-
scenarios in which a dissociation of the liability of the State and its organ had to be 
applied.1368 First, the State’s liability was not necessarily excluded if its organ could 
not be held liable because the perpetrator responsible for the harmful act could not be 
identified among all the State organs.1369 Secondly, the State could be held liable even 
if the organ was protected from liability on special grounds of justification, such as in 
case of damage that arose from an invincible mistake due to an act of God (‘la force 
majeure’).1370 Last but not least, the State’s liability was not automatically excluded 
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whenever the organ had explicitly been exempted by law from any type of liability 
proceedings.1371 Therefore, Velu concluded that despite the application of the ‘théorie 
de l’organe’ in this case, the State should be liable for the fault committed by its 
organs. 
 
In sum, the general rule concerning State liability for judicial breaches in 
Belgium is the following. The State can be held liable on the basis of Articles 1382 
and 1383 Code Civil for harm incurred by a judge or a public officer, who is working 
under the auspices of the judiciary. However, the State’s liability only applies to 
instances when the judge or public officer has acted within the limits of his/her legal 
powers or whenever any reasonable and diligent person would consider those acts to 
lie within such ambit. Nevertheless, and it is here where the first serious limitation 
comes into play, if the act is a judicial act in the narrow sense of the word, an 
application for damages is only permissible if the respective legal act has been 
annulled, withdrawn or amended for breach of a legal rule and if it has been replaced 
by another decision, which has itself already acquired the status of res judicata. It is 
therefore a prerequisite that the contended judicial act has lost its status of res judicata 
in the course of the proceedings.1372    
 
As stated before, already in 1985 in his contribution to the XVth Colloquy on 
European Law in Bordeaux, Advocate General Velu had delivered an outline of the – 
in his view – essential elements governing public liability for judicial acts.1373 A few 
years later a similar attitude was expressed by Dony in this context, when she praised 
the legal framework in Belgium as respecting the coherence of the judicial system and 
the pre-established structure of appeals.1374 Furthermore, also Van Compernolle and 
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Closset stated unequivocally that the principle of res judicata deserved utmost 
protection and therefore required that:  
 
[d]ans les cas précis des actes juridictionnels, pour préserver le principle 
selon lequel l’autorité de la chose jugée ne peut être remis en cause que 
par l’exercice des voies de recours, on pourrait exiger que l’action en 
responsabilité et en réparation ne puisse être engagée qu’après le retrait, 
la réformation ou l’annulation dans le cadre d’un recours, de la décision 
incriminée.1375  
 
In other words, through the process of annulment, withdrawal or amendment, a 
decision or judgment which constitutes the source of harm will lose its authority of 
res judicata. Subsequent to the annulment or withdrawal of the impugned decision, 
the damages claim will appear as a logical consequence. While the annulment, 
withdrawal or amendment of a judgment immediately prevents harm from continuing, 
it is, however, not certain that the victim will in fact be compensated for the damage 
he/she has sustained until that point. In this case, only a damages claim would ensure 
full compensation.1376 An additional prerequisite for the damages claim is, however, 
that the decision of annulment, withdrawal or amendment has already acquired the 
authority of res judicata. This way the coherence of the legal system in Belgium is 
preserved. But for Velu, what remains paradoxical in this context is that it really is in 
final decisions, when it is no longer possible to appeal a judgment, that the possibility 
of bringing a State liability claim appears to be most justified for the individual. By 
contrast, this remedy for the harmed individual seems less warranted once the judicial 
decision that has caused the damage has been withdrawn, annulled or amended.1377 
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A regime of State liability for the malfunctioning of the judiciary is necessarily 
a compromise between contradicting claims. With respect to all the rights and 
legitimate interests of the individuals harmed by a judicial decision, when establishing 
a regime of State liability for judicial breaches under national law, it is also necessary 
to protect the overall coherence of the system, which could be endangered if 
erroneous judgments of various jurisdictions were indirectly reviewed by lower 
instance courts in the course of public liability proceedings. Nevertheless, Velu did 
not completely endorse the principle that State liability could only be invoked against 
a judgment which had been withdrawn, amended or annulled. In certain instances, 
compensation was to be awarded even if the aforementioned conditions were not 
fulfilled. This is the case, for example, whenever a judicial decision has the effect of 
depriving an individual of his freedom contrary to the obligations arising under 
Article 5 ECHR.1378   
 
iv)  The notion of fault 
 
With respect to the notion of fault as applied to the judicial power, Velu 
outlined in his final observations that under Articles 1382 and 1383 Code Civil fault 
was dependent on two aspects. First, fault could emerge in the form of an ‘erreur de 
conduite’, which was to be evaluated according to the expected standards of conduct 
when compared to the standard of a careful and circumspect judge in exactly the same 
situation.1379 The judge’s error of conduct also had to manifest itself in concreto and 
not in abstracto. Furthermore, it had to involve imprudence or negligence on the part 
of the judge, the degree of which went beyond of what could be tolerated in the 
particular context and under the specific circumstances of the case.1380 
 
 Secondly, fault has been committed whenever a judge violated a directly 
applicable rule of law, which ordered him/her to act or refrain from acting in a certain 
way. Accordingly, the second category of fault consisted of simple breaches of law by 
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the judiciary. This was of course only applicable under the condition that there was no 
legitimate justification for the court’s action, such as the occurrence of an erreur 
invincible or force majeure.1381 In his observations on the De Keyser case, Advocate 
General Velu provided an astute definition of such fault when he stated that  
 
[…] en principe, pour l’application des articles 1382 et 1383 du Code 
civil, constitue, en soi, une faute, indépendamment de toute considération 
d’imprudence ou de négligence, la violation par une autorité d’une norme 
lui imposant de s’abstenir ou d’agir de manière déterminée établie par le 
droit national ou par un traité international ayant des effets directs dans 
l’ordre juridique interne.1382  
 
Overall, the definition of fault as formulated by the Advocate General in De Keyser 
acquired general validity and was later echoed in the famous Anca judgment by the 
Cour de Cassation on 8 December 1994.1383 
 
Even though only a minor point in his analysis, another important element was 
brought to the fore by Velu, namely the wish to protect the integrity of the judicial 
hierarchy. The issue reflects the concern that according to national procedural rules, 
the judge competent to deal with the public liability claim might be faced with the 
task of having to review, even if only in an indirect matter, a judgment that had been 
previously made by a higher court within the same hierarchical line of courts. Hence, 
a disturbance of the judiciary’s established system of precedent through a public 
liability claim was and remains a common concern in this context and was in fact also 
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raised by various governments in the Köbler case.1384 It is in an attempt to dispute 
those concerns that Velu’s arguments may have some leverage, even though at the 
time the Advocate General refused to place much importance on this procedural 
objection. In fact, Velu simply argued that there was no general principle under 
Belgian law prohibiting such a situation.1385 Velu underlined further that it had never 
been contested until then that a court of first instance was generally competent to rule 
on a liability claim for harm incurred by a judge, even if that judge belonged to a 
hierarchically superior court. Moreover, under Belgian law even the dismissal of a 
specific judge and the classification of his/her behaviour in the process were, 
according to Articles 828 to 847 Code Judiciaire, conferred upon the court to which 
the judge belonged.  
 
In addition to the aforementioned examples, according to Articles 479 to 503 
Code d’instruction criminelle and Article 4 de la loi du 17 avril 1878 contenant le 
titre préliminaire du Code de Procédure Pénale, it was clear that in case a judge 
committed a crime1386 outside or during his or her judicial functions, the Cour d’Appel 
would be competent to rule on related civil and public liability claims. This rule was 
applied not only with respect judges who belonged to the same jurisdiction, such as 
the Cour d’Appel or Cour du Travail, but also concerning judges who sat on the 
higher courts such as the Cour de Cassation, the Cour d’Arbitrage or the Conseil 
d’État.1387 
 
The same holds true for Article 27 of the Law of 13 March 1973 concerning the 
compensation to be awarded to a victim of unjustified detention in violation of Article 
5 ECHR.1388 The law explicitly stipulates that in such a situation the general 
competence to deal with liability claims against the State lies with the juridictions 
ordinaires. However, the law does not include a separate restriction requiring that the 
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evaluation of the judge’s act can only be carried out by a judge of equal or higher 
rank. Over and above the situation under domestic law, the Advocate General reached 
out beyond the Belgian borders to the regulations under German and Italian law to the 
position in German and Italian law on the matter and concluded that even under 
foreign jurisdictions the framework of State liability for judicial breaches had 
generally been attributed to the ordinary judiciary. The rules of competence, however, 
have also been set out without including any objections to the fact that the judge, as 
the perpetrator of the damage, might be “evaluated” by judges of the same or even a 
lower instance.1389 In line with the Advocate General’s opinion, the Cour de 
Cassation finally concluded, contrary to the CJEU’s Köbler ruling, that  
 
dans ces limites la responsabilité de l’Etat du chef d’un acte 
dommageable du pouvoir judiciaire n’est ni contraire à des dispositions 
constitutionnelles ou légales, ni inconciliable avec les principes de la 
séparation des pouvoirs et de l’autorité de la chose jugée; qu’elle n’est 
incompatible non plus avec l’indépendance du pouvoir judiciaire et des 
magistrats qui le composent, […].1390  
 
It was, however, only later that the Cour de Cassation announced in its case-law the 
precise conditions necessary for invoking the responsibility of the State for damage 
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d) Cour de Cassation: Arrêt du 8 décembre 1994  
 
i) From the decision in the De Keyser case to the ruling in Anca 
 
Immediately after the Cour de Cassation’s annulment of the initial judgment in 
De Keyser, the case was remitted for decision to the Cour d’Appel of Liège.1392 At this 
point, one might have logically concluded from the previous decisions in the case that 
the judgment in the first instance must have contained a finding of a violation of 
national law or of an international legal norm with direct effect in the internal legal 
order. The Court of Liège, however, did not immediately confirm such a violation, but 
instead first chose to examine first the alleged misconduct of the responsible judge. In 
the course of the Court’s deliberations, however, the conceptual difference between 
the two definitions of fault became increasingly blurred. The Court announced that the 
alleged error of the responsible judge had to be evaluated in light of the standards of 
conduct applied to any diligent and prudent judge facing the same situation. Thereby, 
the central question was whether an official declaration of bankruptcy automatically 
gave raise to a duty to perform a preliminary audit. Since the effective legal 
regulations in Belgium were silent on this particular issue, the question remained 
unresolved.  
 
After a thorough investigation, the Cour d’Appel de Liège concluded in its 
judgment of 28 January 1993 that considering all the circumstances of the case, the 
Tribunal de Commerce of Brussels had in its ruling merely taken a position with 
respect to a disputed legal question. Hence, the Cour d’Appel concluded that the 
judiciary had committed an excusable error.1393 Accordingly, the Court acquitted the 
responsible judge of any fault.1394 As a result, the State was not to be held responsible 
for the detrimental consequences suffered by the applicant following the declaration 
by the Tribunal de Commerce de Bruxelles of the company’s insolvency. In the 
Court’s wording, the excusability of the judicial act was justified by the fact that in 
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Belgium the legal framework regulating insolvency proceedings was still equivocal, 
ambiguous and therefore rather controversial. Under such conditions and 
notwithstanding the annulment of the initial judgment by the Cour de Cassation, the 
Cour d’Appel de Liège acquitted the Tribunal de Commerce de Bruxelles of any 
fault.1395  
 
Subsequently, a new complaint was lodged by the applicants with the Cour de 
Cassation.1396 The liquidators of the company launched a claim arguing that the 
decision by the Tribunal de Commerce of Brussels had already been overturned on 
appeal on the grounds that Anca’s insolvency had been declared in violation of the 
applicant’s rights of defence. However, in its ruling of 8 December 1994, the Cour de 
Cassation dismissed the applicant’s arguments and finally rejected the application to 
revise the ruling which had been pronounced by the Cour d’Appel de Liège. In its 
reasoning, the Court stated that at the time the legal question of whether to perform a 
preliminary audit before an ex officio declaration of insolvency had in fact been a 
disputed and controversial legal issue. The Court went on to argue that in light of such 
an unresolved legal situation, the Cour d’Appel de Liège rightfully acquitted the 
judges at the Tribunal de Commerce, who had declared Anca’s insolvency without 
having undertaken a previous audit, of any faulty behaviour.1397 Generally speaking, 
the Cour de Cassation rejected the suggestion that in cases of State liability for 
judicial errors any breach of law resulting in the alteration of a judgment would 
classify as fault.1398 Such a position had in fact been supported by the Advocate 
General in the case, Roger Dalcq, who considered that the judge’s general obligation 
to apply the rules of law was to be interpreted in the narrowest possible manner.1399 
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In his contribution on the subject, Compernolle endorsed the approach of the 
Cour de Cassation on this question.1400 He welcomed the fact that the Supreme Court 
had rejected such generalist approach regarding the definition of fault and also 
pointed out that the interpretation of a rule of law could at times be a rather delicate 
task, especially if the question at stake was so controversial. With such a broad 
definition of fault, Compernolle concluded, an individual would even be able to raise 
a claim against a judge following his/her interpretation of a rule of law for the sole 
reason that a higher court did not share the same interpretation. To avoid such 
development, the possibilities of basing a liability claim against the State upon a fault 
committed by a judge had to stay within reasonable limits, which at the same time 
should also take into account the special status of the judiciary. Compernolle then 
echoed the opinion also expressed by the Cour de Cassation in Anca, namely that a 
judicial act evoking State liability must correspond to an erroneous act, which no 
other diligent and prudent judge placed in the same situation at the relevant point in 
time would have committed.1401 This, in fact, is a formulation which we have already 
encountered in the observations of Advocate General Velu in the De Keyser case.1402 
In sum, the State responsibility regime for erroneous acts committed by the judiciary 
strongly resembles the general regime of (civil) liability.1403 
 
Even though the second attempt to challenge the judgment issued by the Cour 
d’Appel de Liège had been rejected by the Cour de Cassation, the Court nevertheless 
used the opportunity to clarify some of the principles it had already partly addressed 
in the De Keyser ruling. In fact, this final judgment of the Cour de Cassation offered a 
comprehensive overview of the notion of fault in cases where judicial conduct had 
been at the centre of the State liability proceedings. Accordingly, the Court premised 
its analysis on two different hypotheses, which were to clarify the definition of ‘fault’. 
Consistent with the definition of fault advanced by Advocate General Velu in the De 
Keyser case, the Court declared in Anca that  
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la faute du magistrat pouvant, sur la base des articles 1382 et 1383 du 
Code civil, entraîner la responsabilité de l’État consiste, en règle, en un 
comportement qui, ou bien s’analyse en une erreur de conduite devant être 
appréciée suivant le critère du magistrat normalement soigneux et prudent, 
placé dans les mêmes conditions, ou bien, sous réserve d’une erreur 
invincible ou d’une autre cause de justification, viole une norme du droit 
national ou d’un traité international ayant des effets directs dans l’ordre 
juridique interne, imposant au magistrat de s’abstenir ou d’agir de manière 
déterminée.1404  
 
In this passage, the Cour de Cassation generally distinguished between an error 
of conduct on the one hand, and a violation of a legal norm, which required the judge 
to act or react in a specific manner, on the other. The latter could also arise from the 
violation of an international treaty having direct effect in the internal legal order.1405 
Crucial to the affirmation of the first hypothesis was that the judge’s misconduct had 
to be assessed in relation to the conduct of a “normally careful and circumspect judge 
placed in the same circumstances at the relevant point in time”.1406 Hypothesis two, on 
the contrary, which dealt with the violation of a legal provision, was to be seen 
entirely separate from the judge’s behaviour itself. What was decisive in this second 
case was merely the factual and objective assessment of whether or not the judge had 
violated a rule of law. After all, as the Advocate General had phrased it in his 
observations on the case, the judge’s adherence to the established legal order was a 
result-oriented duty rather than an obligation to use the correct tools and the right 
attitude in the decision-making process.1407 Finally, on a more general note, the Court 
reiterated its dictum in De Keyser that it was an indispensable precondition for any 
liability claim based on an alleged violation of an established legal norm that the 
judicial act in question had previously been withdrawn, amended, annulled or 
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retracted by a final judicial decision. In short, it was crucial that the contended judicial 
act was no longer res judicata.1408 
 
ii) The Opinion of Advocate General Roger Dalcq 
 
Advocate General Dalcq interpreted the Court’s judgment in Anca as an 
unfortunate restraint on the wide implications and the broad scope of actions that had 
initially been opened up by the Court’s earlier De Keyser ruling in 1991.1409 In his 
observations on the case, Dalcq openly criticised the approach taken in the judgment 
of the Cour de Liège, which was later confirmed on appeal by the Cour de Cassation. 
Dalcq argued that notwithstanding the clear definition of what constituted a judicial 
breach in De Keyser, the Court of Appeal had apparently failed to apply those 
guidelines correctly to the Anca case. Therein, in Dalcq’s view, the Court’s opinion 
stood in stark contrast to the two previously outlined hypotheses, which classified the 
notion of fault as either an instance when a judge had committed an error of conduct, 
which was to be evaluated in light of a “normally careful and circumspect judge 
placed in the same circumstances at the relevant point in time”,1410 or a case when a 
judge had simply violated a valid legal norm. As the Advocate General pointed out in 
his observations, the first option would only be applicable in truly exceptional cases. 
After all, a judge’s conduct within the ambit of his/her judicial activity was almost 
always going to be based on a legal norm. Consequently, most judicial breaches 
would automatically fall under the second hypothesis.1411  
 
However, in the case at hand, Dalcq criticised the view that the judge’s simple 
breach of a rule of law had been subjected to a behavioural assessment with respect to 
conduct of a normally careful and circumspect judge. The Court of Appeal had only 
taken into account the first hypothesis, the error of conduct, despite the fact that the 
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previous judgment by the Cour de Cassation had obviously been annulled on the 
grounds of a violation of the claimant’s rights of defence as stipulated in Article 6 of 
the ECHR.1412 Faced with a doubly stringent set of requirements to establish a judge’s 
fault, it was rather predictable that the Court was going to decide against the 
applicant’s claim for compensation. According to Dalcq, it was rather surprising that 
on appeal the Cour de Cassation upheld the decision taken in the second instance by 
the Cour de Liège.1413  
 
Seen from a different angle, the judgment by the Cour de Liège attesting to an 
absence of fault might nevertheless have nevertheless been justified. After all, the 
Cour de Cassation had spelled out very clearly in the initial De Keyser ruling of 1991 
that on the grounds of a breach of a well-established legal norm, the claim for 
compensation could only be entertained if the act under review had been previously 
withdrawn, amended, annulled or retracted by a final decision.1414 With due regard to 
this rule it remains questionable whether at the time when the company Anca was 
declared insolvent, the legal norms on the individual’s rights of defence in the course 
of insolvency proceedings truly shared the characteristic of a well-established legal 
norm.1415  
 
Generally speaking, it is remarkable to observe that based on the core principles 
of civil liability, the framework of State liability for judicial breaches in Belgium has 
been gradually built up in the courts’ case-law. In this sense the two key decisions of 
De Keyser and Anca provide vivid proof of the creative force of the judges in 
Belgium. However, it is also incontestable, for want of a systemic and holistic 
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approach to the issue, which could have been provided by the legislature, the gradual 
development of the liability regime for judicial breaches in the jurisprudence triggered 
a number of lacunas and unresolved problems in this area.1416 Moreover, the archaic 
provisions on the procedure of ‘la prise à partie’ in the Code Judiciaire, which are 
still in force today, prevent the State from instituting recursory actions against 
individual judges following the State’s liability in such cases.1417 At this level, a 
legislative reform initiative by the legislature might be beneficial in order to smoothen 
out the system. Overall, new rules would, however, only need to introduce minor 
adjustments to a functioning and sophisticated system of State liability for judicial 
breaches, which has essentially already been established in an almost conclusive 
manner by the jurisprudence in Belgium. 
 
3. State responsibility based on a violation of Community law 
 
For Belgium, our prototype representing the fourth category in our system of 
classification, the principle of national procedural autonomy constitutes the direct link 
between the concept of Member State liability as established in the CJEU’s 
jurisprudence on the one hand, and the direct ramifications of this Community right 
on the national State liability regimes on the other. Already in the Francovich ruling 
the Court had insisted:  
 
it is on the basis of the rules of national law on liability that the State must 
make reparation for the consequences of the loss and damage caused. In the 
absence of Community legislation, it is for the internal legal order of each 
Member State to designate the competent courts and lay down the detailed 
procedural rules for legal proceedings intended fully to safeguard the rights 
which individuals derive from Community law.1418  
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Therefore, relying on the national procedural framework of each Member State, the 
Community “was not intended to create new remedies in the national courts […] other 
than those already laid down by national law.”1419  
 
Under the scrutiny of the guiding principles of effectiveness and equivalence, 
the national procedural framework in all the different Member States forms the crucial 
building block, through which an individual may secure his/her Community right. In 
order to safeguard the effective protection of the individual’s Community rights, 
which also include the right to compensation after he/she has been harmed by a 
breach of EC law, the national procedural structures should in theory constantly adjust 
to the developments on the Community level. After all, when talking about the 
principle of Member State liability under EC law, we are faced with a moving target: 
The evolution of the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the EU. In short, the 
principle of national procedural autonomy constitutes the backbone of effective rights 
protection within the Community. As in our previous three categories, we will 
therefore once again address the question of the extent to which in Belgium our 
prototype of category four, the prevailing scheme of State liability under national law 
has lived up to the demands and parameters required by Community law.1420 The next 
step would then be to inquire whether the Community principle has in fact already 
had notable impacts or so-called ‘spill-over effects’ on the national framework of 
public liability. While we will address this question rather briefly for administrative 
and legislative breaches in Belgium, the spotlight will once again be on the past, 
present and future repercussions of the Köbler case on the public liability regime for 
judicial breaches in Belgium. 
 
a) Did the Francovich line prior to Köbler already have a spill-over effect on 
the concept and/or the limits of State liability in Belgium? 
 
Similar to the developments in other Member States, European Community law 
has had a serious impact on the hierarchy of norms in the Belgian legal system. Proof 
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of such had already been provided as early as 1965 when the CJEU proclaimed the 
fundamental principle of primacy of EC law in the groundbreaking Costa v. ENEL 
ruling.1421 Abiding to the dictum imposed by Community law, the Belgian Cour de 
Cassation subsequently handed down a landmark judgment on 27 May 1971, in 
which it fully acknowledged the pre-eminence of international as well as European 
Community law over national law in Belgium.1422 According to the Court’s reasoning, 
it was the special nature of international law and the specificity of the Community 
legal order that justified their primacy over national law.1423  
 
In case of a breach of EC law by the Belgian executive or the judiciary, this 
violation mostly seems to correspond to the violation of a national legal obligation by 
either one of those two branches of the State. The liability proceedings against the 
State are handled accordingly. When it comes to breaches of Community law by the 
legislative power, however, the only suitable procedural path provided under Belgian 
law would be the remedial framework of State liability based on fault. Even though it 
might pose some difficulties, it still constitutes the only feasible option available 
under the current procedural framework in Belgium. The procedure of ‘le contentieux 
de l’indemnité’ disqualifies itself for the simple reason that under this framework it 
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i) Breaches of Community law committed by the administrative authorities 
 
The question of State liability for breaches of EC law by the administrative 
authorities did not receive much attention in the literature; those authors who have 
expressed themselves on this very aspect have had no hesitation to qualify such 
violation of EC law as an illegal public act based on fault. In this sense and with 
reference to the French judgment in the case Alivar,1425 Quertainmont noted that 
contrary to the French solution of applying the concept of responsibility sans faute 
when it comes to violations of Community law by the French administration “en 
Belgique, par contre, on peut penser que l’illégalité résultant, en matière 
d’interventionnisme économique, d’une violation du traité de Rome, serait considerée 
comme fautive et engagerait la responsabilité quasi-délictuelle de l’Etat.”1426 
 
The jurisprudence on this question is also scarce and rather uncontentious. The 
courts generally show no reluctance to invoke the responsibility of the State in case of 
breaches of Community law incurred by an act of the executive. In fact, already in a 
decision of 9 June 1966 the Tribunal Civil de Bruxelles had stated that an “arrêté 
royal” that had been adopted in 1961, was in breach of EC law. In this specific case 
the administrative act had conditioned the sale of fertilizers in Belgium upon a 
specific amount of azotes which had to be contained in the product. A company 
claimed that this administrative order was incompatible with (former) Articles 30 and 
following of the original EEC Treaty,1427 since the provision was discriminatory with 
respect to imports of fertilizers from other Member States. Subsequently, the company 
brought a liability claim against the Belgian State claiming compensation for the 
losses it had suffered as a result of the “arrêté royal”. As confirmed in the ruling, it 
was within the competence of the justice judiciaire to judge the legality of 
administrative decisions.1428 
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The Cour de Cassation had the opportunity to comment on this issue in a 
judgment of 13 May 1982. Advocate General Velu had previously argued in his 
Opinion on the case that a violation of national law or an international legal norm with 
direct effects in the internal legal order automatically constituted as fault. However, 
the Cour de Cassation did not go as far as that and restricted the faulty character of 
administrative acts to a violation of constitutional or ordinary law, without a reference 
to international law.1429 In a further judgment of 9 February 1990, the Tribunal Civil 
de Bruxelles had to deal with a claim by several Italian and Spanish citizens who had 
been excluded from the selection process for a specific job posting based on the 
argument that they did not have Belgian nationality.1430 The Court insisted on the 
narrow interpretation of (former) Article 48 of the Treaty1431 and concluded that in the 
present case an exclusion of non-nationals was not justified under Community law. 
Furthermore, the Court explicitly speaks of a fault committed by the administration 
and found that the State had to compensate them for lost opportunity. 
 
Finally, there was a decision by the Tribunal Civil de Liège of 21 February 
1992, which confirmed the liability of the State and the payment of compensation to 
the claimant for breach of EC law.1432 The case dealt with an EU citizen who had been 
refused the right to residency in Belgium because he had not been affiliated to any 
social security regime there. Eventually, the Court emphasized that the State’s 
requirement and pre-condition for settlement, which previously asked for an 
affiliation to a social security regime, was clearly against Community principles. 
Hence, the Court proclaimed that the Belgian State had to pay compensation for fault 
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ii) Breaches of EC law committed by the legislature 
 
Could an individual launch a State liability claim for the damage caused to 
him/her due to a violation of Community law by the Belgian Parliament? So far, 
fundamental arguments such as the absolute sovereignty of the legislature, the general 
incompetence of the judiciary to review national law or the absence of a procedure to 
test the laws’ compatibility with the principles enshrined in the Constitution had 
always been used as a pretext to reject the idea of the State’s responsibility for 
legislative breaches.1434 However, as we have already mentioned, the situation in 
Belgium changed significantly when the Cour d’Arbitrage was awarded the 
competence to undertake a partial review of legislative acts to assess their 
compatibility with certain constitutional principles.1435 As a consequence, only under 
the condition that the Constitutional Court declared a legislative act unconstitutional 
could an individual, who had been harmed by the incriminated norm, bring a liability 
claim against the State. Hence, under national law a claim for State liability due to 
shortcomings of the legislature was from then on permitted, but remained strictly tied 
to these conditions. After the CJEU’s judgment in Brasserie du Pêcheur, however, it 
was clear that such a right also existed under Community law and that therefore, even 
in the absence of a similar entitlement under Belgian law, the State would have to 
provide a suitable remedy in order to ensure the effectiveness of the individual’s 
Community right.1436  
 
However, as the reader might recall, with respect to fault-based violations by the 
legislature of European or international norms which have direct effect, the 
individual’s right to compensation had already been established by the Cour de 
Cassation in the famous Le ski judgment in 1971.1437 Therefore, long before the 
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creation of the Cour d’Arbitrage in Belgium, the Cour de Cassation had already 
clearly rejected the application of a national law that was contrary to Community law. 
In this ruling the judges had neither annulled nor retracted the national law concerned, 
but simply declared that Community law had stripped it of its effectiveness.1438 In 
view of the impossibility at the time of subjecting national laws to constitutional 
review and hence, of awarding compensation for breaches committed by the 
legislature under national law, the question that immediately emerged after the Le ski 
judgment was whether the courts’ duty to review national law for its compatibility 
with international norms or EC law did not at the same time imply that the courts also 
had the competence to review national law regarding its compatibility with 
constitutional principles in Belgium.1439  
 
The doctrine in Belgium always seemed unanimously positive when it came to 
the question of possible State liability claims for breaches of EC law incurred by the 
national legislature. A repeated point of reference in this context was the Permanent 
Court of International Justice’s ruling in the Case concerning certain German 
interests in Polish Upper Silesia, in which the Court had declared as early as 1926 
that from the viewpoint of responsibility under international law legislative provisions 
were to be handled in the same way as judicial decisions or administrative acts.1440 
 
In a similar manner, Kovar had predicted at a conference in 1975 that 
“l’affirmation de la primauté sur la loi du droit international et du droit 
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communautaire ayant effet direct dans l’ordre juridique interne doit nécessairement 
s’accompagner d’une évolution parallèle sur le plan de la responsabilité de l’État 
législateur”. Furthermore, he requested open access to national remedies for 
individuals who have been harmed as a result of a breach of EC law.1441 Likewise, the 
conclusion of Andersen’s well-known report on the topic was that the legislature was 
no longer protected by its veil of immunity when it came to questions of conformity 
with the EC treaty.1442 The crucial question in Anderson’s work was  
 
[p]ourquoi ne pourrait-on pas considérer qu’en prenant une loi, qui porte 
atteinte aux droits subjectifs que les citoyens puisent directement dans le 
traité, le législateur a commis une faute, mettant ainsi en cause sa 
responsabilité sur pied des articles 1382 et 1383 du code civil?  
 
He argued that the solution, which had been applied in the Le ski case, could easily be 
extended to legislative breaches of national law. 
 
In an article entitled “La responsabilité du législateur en raison de la 
méconnaissance de normes supérieures de droit international”1443 Simonart 
confirmed that:  
 
l’obligation d’effacer les conséquences d’actes contraires au droit 
communautaire […] doit revêtir, semble-t-il, un caractère général et paraît 
devoir s’étendre à toute forme de réparation, en ce compris l’octroi de 
dommages et intérêts. Dans cette mesure, les articles 1382 et suivants 
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paraissent devoir trouver application en cas de non conformité à une règle 
directement applicable.1444  
 
Salmon summed up the situation tellingly by stating that “s’il advient qu’une loi porte 
atteinte aux droits subjectifs que les citoyens tirent d’un traité directement applicable 
en droit belge, la loi n’est plus couverte par son immunité et le juge pourrait 
considérer que le législateur a commis une faute aquilienne.”1445 
 
In the jurisprudence one can find a number of judgments (unfortunately most of 
them unpublished), which did not hesitate to order the State to pay for damages 
caused as a result of a breach of international or European Community law by the 
legislature.1446 In fact, instances of public liability based on a violation of Community 
law for shortcomings by the legislature in Belgium emerged as early as 1960.1447 A 
further instance of a legislative breach of an international obligation, in this case the 
European Convention of Human Rights, occurred in 1976 when the Belgian judiciary 
was faced with a State liability claim on the grounds of a judgment by the ECHR, 
which confirmed a violation of the Convention by the legislature. Interestingly, the 
legislature’s violation of the ECHR in this case did not consist in a legislative act, but 
rather in an omission to legislate. 
 
A noteworthy case of a breach of Community law by the Belgian legislature had 
also been the notorious pension affair concerning European Community servants of 
Belgian nationality.1448 The Belgian civil servants had complained about the fact that 
Belgium had not taken the necessary steps to ensure the transfer of pension rights, 
which they had acquired under Belgian law to the pension system at the Community 
level. Even though a judgment by the CJEU of 20 October 1981 confirmed that 
Belgium had indeed violated its obligations under the Treaty, the internal situation did 
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not change for years. Finally, the Tribunal Civil de Bruxelles ruled in an 
(unpublished) judgment on 9 February 1990 that the State was liable for the 
legislature’s negligence shown on part of the legislature and demanded not only the 
implementation of the correct legislation with respect to the pension regime, but also 
or the State to pay compensation.1449 
 
A more recent example, once again affirming the principle of the State’s 
liability for legislative breaches of EC law, was the ruling by the Cour d’Appel de 
Liège of 25 January 1994 concerning discriminatory legislation on university entrance 
fees in Belgium.1450 In a judgment of 2 February 1988, the CJEU had declared the 
Belgian regulation on university entrance fees to be discriminatory on the basis of 
nationality and therefore in breach of (former) Article 7 EC.1451 Subsequently, those 
individuals who had suffered harm as a result of the discriminatory national rules 
lodged an action for damages against the State. In its reasoning the Cour d’Appel de 
Liège pointed out that according to the Belgian legislation in force the State could be 
held liable for damage caused to individuals on the basis of Articles 1382 and 1383 of 
the Civil Code even if the damage had been caused by fault of the national 
legislature.1452 However, under national law it was understood that in case the liability 
was grounded on the fact that the legislature had exceeded its competence or had 
committed a constitutional breach, the Cour d’Arbitrage would have to confirm this 
irregularity in the process of either an action for annulment (‘recours en annulation’) 
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or in the course of a preliminary question.1453 Under national law, public liability for 
legislative breaches was therefore limited to those designated areas which were 
subject to constitutional review. Such precondition did not apply to breaches of 
international law or European Community law. In order to establish the absence of 
fault, the legislature would have to prove the occurrence of an unavoidable error or 
another reason for exemption. Otherwise, the State was fully liable under the 
conditions outlined in the CJEU’s Francovich line of cases.1454 
 
 
II. State Liability for Judicial Breaches under Belgian Law after Köbler 
 
1. Breaches of EC law committed by the judiciary: application of the 
domestic framework for judicial breaches ceteris paribus? 
 
The question of State liability for breaches of EC law by a judicial organ has 
not, until recently, been explicitly addressed in the doctrine. In the jurisprudence, the 
only related case in this respect had been the previously discussed Anca case, which 
originated in the famous De Keyser judgment by the Cour de Cassation of 19 
December 1991.1455 The Anca case, however, did not specifically deal with a disputed 
issue under Community law, but was instead referred to the breach of a right protected 
under the European Convention on Human Rights.1456 Nevertheless, the principled 
position by the Cour de Cassation in this case, which was taken against the absence of 
a legislative background, allows us to draw some general conclusions concerning the 
question of State liability for violations of individual rights by a judicial decision. In 
this manner, the following analysis will try to outline the avenues which could 
possibly open up for the individual under national law in case of a breach of EC law 
by a national court in Belgium. Which conditions would apply to such compensatory 
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claims for breaches of EC law? And finally, which substantive or procedural hurdles 
would such claims need to overcome?  
 
We will try to find answers to these specific questions by continuing to examine 
the case of Belgium, one of our selected national prototypes. In broader terms, 
however, these answers will mirror in its essentials the prevailing system of State 
liability for judicial breaches in all the countries which have been included in group 
IV of our general classification scheme.1457 Based on the apparent lack of substantive 
legal restrictions in this context, at first glance the legal framework in these Member 
States appears to be rather open regarding the permissibility of State liability claims 
for judicial breaches. However, the countries classified under group IV of our 
categorization actually use an entirely different set of impediments to limit such 
claims for compensation. These countries pre-condition liability claims for harm 
incurred by a judicial violation on the compliance with several procedural 
requirements. As to the individual’s access to local remedies, such procedural 
prerequisites constitute stumbling blocks, which are entirely different in nature from 
those restrictions we have encountered so far in our three previous groups. Contrary to 
the current example, the hurdles applied in groups I to III were mostly substantive in 
nature.1458  
  
 In Belgium the De Keyser case and its follow-up decision in Anca left us with a 
framework that conditions the admissibility of State liability claims for judicial 
breaches upon the compliance with several procedural prerequisites, which had been 
spelled out clearly in the jurisprudence. Already in the De Keyser ruling the Cour de 
Cassation neatly summed up all requirements by stating that 
 
[…] the claim for compensation could only be entertained if the act under 
review had been previously withdrawn, amended, annulled or retracted by 
a final decision on the ground of a breach of a well-established legal 
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norm, whereby the initial decision had lost the authority of res 
judicata.1459  
 
Similar procedural restrictions as the one used in Belgium can be identified in a 
number of other EU Member States, such as the Czech Republic, Bulgaria and 
Slovakia.1460 Nevertheless, the number of countries, which rely exclusively on rules of 
procedure to control the flux of State liability claims for judicial breaches, is fairly 
low. Far bigger is the number of EU Member States which apply these procedural 
restrictions in combination with already existing substantive restraints in this context. 
We encounter such “mixed systems” for example in Austria, Bulgaria, France or 
Slovakia.1461 According to the principle of national procedural autonomy, these 
restrictions will most likely be applied in an equal manner to cases of State liability 
for judicial breaches of national as well as Community law. 
 
2. The notion of res judicata – A procedural impediment to liability claims?  
 
‘I prefer injustice to disorder.' With 
these blunt words - the absoluteness of 
which I hasten to repudiate - Johann-
Wolfgang von Goethe took sides in what 
is probably the most complex dilemma 
in law as a whole: the tense relationship 
between the desire for justice and the 
need for certainty.1462 
 
While the maxim of absolute State immunity in its most comprehensive form, 
i.e. in its application to all governmental functions, is a relict of the past that does not 
exist in any of the 27 EU Member States today, a particular aspect of the principle 
seems to have resisted all social pressures and reformist trends that strived for far-
reaching transparency and accountability of all public functions: the bastion of 
immunity of the State and its officials for damages to individuals caused by erroneous 
                                                 
1459
 Cass. (1re ch.), 19 déc. 1991, De Keyser, supra note 232, p. 152. 
1460
 See graphs at the end of this chapter, pp. 408-409. 
1461
 See second graph on additional procedural safeguards on p. 409. 
1462
 Advocate General Colomer in his Opinion in the Case C-310/97P, Commission of the European 
Communities v AssiDomän Kraft Products AB, Iggesunds Bruk AB, Korsnäs AB, MoDo Paper AB, 
Södra Cell AB, Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags AB and Svenska Cellulosa AB [1999] I-5363, para. 1. 




judicial decisions has survived in one form or another in most EU Member States.1463 
Generally speaking, based on underlying values such as legal certainty and the 
principle of judicial independence, the judiciary still enjoys a consolidated 
Community-wide status of protection, though in varying degrees in different national 
systems. According to the prevailing system in each Member State, the protectionist 
attitude towards the judiciary finds its expression, inter alia, in special regulations, 
procedural hurdles and substantive limitations and restrictions governing not only the 
personal accountability of judges, but also instances of State liability for judicial 
breaches. In this context, a handful of arguments are usually raised in support of the 
exalted position of the judicial branch, the most resounding of which appears to be the 
Latin maxim of res judicata facit jus.1464  
 
a) Res judicata pro veritate accipitur 
 
Legally speaking, a refined system of appeals is typically thought of as a normal 
and sufficient way for individuals to seek revision of a judgment by a higher court. 
There is usually at least one avenue of appeal or review to correct an administrative or 
judicial decision that, in hindsight, turns out to be wrong in law. The problem is, 
however, that such appeal or review decisions might also be wrong. In such a case, 
additional remedies could then be available. At some point, however, in the interest of 
the principle of legal certainty, the possibility of challenging a previous decision will 
come to an end. After the exhaustion of the regular system of appeals, every legal 
dispute will be brought to an end by a final, irrevocable decision. In other words, at 
that point “law must bow her head to certainty.”1465   
 
As a result, a judgment which has become final, assumes the authority of res 
judicata. This implies that even if that judgment is hypothetically wrong in fact and/or 
in law, the final decision remains effective and at the same time creates its own right, 
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i.e. ‘facit jus’. Save for very special and rare exceptions, no other evidence can call 
into question the truth such judgment creates.1466 In connection with the concept of 
legal certainty, which the principle of res judicata serves, it is therefore theoretically 
untenable that a judgment, which ‘creates the law’ could at the same time be ‘against 
the law’. In Cappelletti’s eyes, however, such strict interpretation of the principle of 
res judicata constituted pure “theoretical absolutism.”1467 In other words, while 
according to Cappelletti res judicata could in theory be conceived in absolute terms, 
in practice such a perception would not be feasible.  
 
b) Competing values – Do we prefer injustice to disorder?1468 
 
In his famous reflection on judicial responsibility and in response to a definition 
of values coloured by “theoretical absolutism,” Cappelletti repeatedly reminded us in 
his writings that “legal principles are not absolutes.”1469 In fact, the essence of his 
argument was that legal principles were merely as strong as the goal or value 
encapsulated by them. In light of the fact that every society is faced with a multitude 
of diverse and sometimes conflicting values which co-exist legitimately, it is obvious 
that in practice no single value can assert absolute validity. Consequently, the legal 
principles evolving from these values can also never enjoy unlimited authority.1470 
Instead, depending on the circumstances of each case, legal principles and their 
corresponding values always have to be balanced with competing interests and 
ideologies, which is a process that requires a fair amount of deliberation and 
forethought.1471  
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As stated before, it is generally recognized that the core value behind the maxim 
of res judicata is the principle of legal certainty.1472 ‘Interest rei publicae ut sit finis 
litium’ – which translates as it being in the public interest to put an end to any legal 
litigation, irrespective of the question of whether or not the final judicial decision is 
right. While committed to the principle of legal certainty on the one hand, the quest 
for justice and effective judicial protection of the individual constitutes yet another 
fundamental aim which stands at the forefront of any legal litigation. A rigorous 
application of the principle of res judicata might at times come at the expense of 
justice, especially in cases when a final judgment is evidently flawed in fact and/or 
law. In theory, we are therefore confronted with a conflict of two value-laden legal 
principles, both of which claim to possess supreme authority. Rigorous adherence to 
the absolute validity of these two maxims is certainly not the solution to such conflict 
of values. Rather, as mentioned before, both principles and their related values need to 
be weighed against each other in each specific case in order to find a pragmatic and 
reasonable compromise, which can then be applied in practice. This is precisely the 
approach which had been endorsed early on by the Court of Justice of the EU. As 
early as 1961 the Court ruled that:  
 
the principle of respect for legal certainty, important as it may be, cannot be 
applied in an absolute manner, but that its application must be combined 
with that of the principle of legality; the question which of these principles 
should prevail in each particular case depends upon a comparison of the 
public interest with the private interests in question […].1473  
 
Far from granting absolute validity to the concept of res judicata in the Köbler 
case, the CJEU is usually engaged in a balancing exercise between the competing 
values of legal certainty on the one hand, and the principle of legality and the 
individual’s right to justice on the other. Generally speaking, the core issue for the 
CJEU to resolve was whether there was a general requirement to reopen a judgment, 
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which had become final, in order to ensure the full operation and effectiveness of 
Community law.1474 The Court of Justice had already been confronted with similar 
conflicts of values on several occasions. These cases primarily revolved around the 
principles of effectiveness of Community law and effective legal protection on the 
one hand, and the maxim of res judicata as the guarantor of legal certainty on the 
other. Accordingly, Caranta referred to “this fundamental legal dilemma” as “striking 
a balance between the competing claims of law and certainty.”1475 Eventually, the 
tension between the desire for justice and the need for legal certainty, which Advocate 
General Colomer once described as “what is probably the most complex dilemma in 
law as a whole”,1476 inevitably necessitated such a balancing approach by the CJEU. 
Thereby, the CJEU had frequently paid tribute to the principle of res judicata.1477  
 
For example, in 1999 in the well-known Eco Swiss ruling,1478 the CJEU 
confirmed the fundamental value of the maxim of res judicata, acknowledging at the 
same time that it was a basic legal principle shared by all national systems. Moreover, 
the Court concluded that the principle of res judicata, when weighed against 
effectiveness, had to prevail.1479 In a similar manner, the Court of Justice began its 
decision in the Köbler case by affirming the importance of the maxim of res judicata. 
The Court stressed that “in order to ensure both stability of the law and legal relations 
and the sound administration of justice” it was essential that final judicial decisions, 
which have become definite “after all rights of appeal have been exhausted or after 
expiry of the time-limits provided for in that connection can no longer be called in 
question.”1480  
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Only recently, a similar case concerning the reopening of a final administrative 
decision, which in light of the CJEU’s subsequent case-law had been contrary to 
Community law, led the Court to a slightly different outcome from its balancing 
exercise in Eco Swiss. In this particular case,1481 the Dutch Administrative Court for 
Trade and Industry (College van Beroep voor het bedrijfsleven) referred a preliminary 
question to the CJEU asking whether under Community law, in particular under the 
principle of Community solidarity contained in Article 10 EC, an administrative body 
was required to reopen a final administrative decision in order to ensure the full 
operation of Community law as the Court had interpreted it in a subsequent 
preliminary ruling.1482 The central question in the case Kühne & Heitz was once again 
whether the principle of res judicata at the national level affected the general duty to 
give full effect to Community law and at the same time the duty to guarantee effective 
judicial protection.1483 
 
At the start of its decision, the Court underlined once more the importance of 
the value of legal certainty and the maxim of res judicata as a general principle 
recognized by Community law. Contrary to the Advocate General’s Opinion in the 
case, which had recommended that res judicata be set aside to give full effect to 
Community law, the Court engaged once more in a balancing exercise, trying to 
reconcile the fundamental value of legal certainty with the principle of effective 
judicial protection.1484 In earlier decisions, such as in the cases Peterbroeck1485 and 
van Schijndel,1486 the Court had already hinted at the fact that the principle of 
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effectiveness did not require national courts to set aside every single domestic rule 
which could potentially cause difficulties in the exercise of a Community right.1487 
Accordingly, the CJEU also confirmed the prevalence of the maxim of res judicata in 
Kühne & Heitz and held that in principle, administrative authorities would not be 
required to reopen final administrative decisions.1488 However, given the domestic 
legal framework in the Netherlands, the CJEU exceptionally opened up a possibility 
of granting effective judicial protection even past the point of res judicata. In fact, the 
Court generally allowed for a reopening of a final administrative decision, but only 
under rather strict conditions and, most importantly, only in cases where such 
possibility was explicitly provided under national law, as was the case in the 
Netherlands.1489 While in Kühne and Heitz and in the Court’s subsequent Kapferer 
ruling the pre-eminent position of the principle of res judicata remained almost 
unchallenged, most recently the CJEU’s position appears to have somewhat changed 
as shown in its reasoning in the Lucchini case.1490  
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Notwithstanding this fascinating and as yet unresolved conflict at the 
Community level in finding the right balance between the values of legal certainty and 
the protection of the individual’s rights, what remained undisputed in the related case-
law was the prominence of the principle of res judicata under national and under 
Community law. However, while seen from one angle the contentious question in the 
Köbler case was predominantly one of balancing different legal values; seen from a 
different angle the whole problem related back to the absence of a uniform definition 
of the scope and application of the maxim of res judicata under Community law. 
Despite the growing jurisprudence on these questions and the importance attributed to 
the maxim of res judicata therein, the Court’s case-law still leaves open a host of 
unanswered questions with respect to the exact definition, scope and application of the 
principle of res judicata under Community law. As Groussot and Minssen aptly 
describe it, the principle of res judicata is still in statu nacendi.1491 And it was 
precisely the vagueness surrounding this concept that stirred some of the controversy 
in Köbler. 
 
c) Res judicata: questions of interpretation 
 
In the countries included in our study, the principle of res judicata weighs 
heavily and to various degrees also finds express mention in the respective national 
legal framework on public liability. In France, for example, Article 1351 of the Civil 
Code explicitly refers to the Latin maxim of ‘res judicata pro veritate accipitur’,1492 
by providing a translation of this principle into French.1493 Moreover, Article 480 of 
the French Code of Civil Procedure addresses the same concept in its application as a 
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procedural barrier.1494 In Germany too, a country which appears to have a rather 
liberal approach in providing for the liability of the State for harm caused by the 
wrong-doing of public officials in the exercise of their official duties, the principle of 
res judicata has had a significant impact on the general scheme of public liability. 
With the so-called Haftungsprivileg, the law in Germany contains a serious limitation 
to the far-reaching responsibility of the State.1495 This rule of exception stipulates that 
under German law (apart from administrative breaches only) damage caused by acts 
of non-judicial public officials and by those judicial acts which are not endowed with 
the authority of res judicata, can be subject to State liability claims. On the other 
hand, damage incurred by a final judicial decision, which has already acquired the 
status of res judicata, can never serve as a basis for such compensatory claims. In 
cases where harm is caused to an individual by a judicial act endowed with res 
judicata, the State’s responsibility only ever arises in Germany under two conditions: 
if the violation constituted a criminal act according to Article 839(2) of the German 
Civil Code and if the final judicial decision was repealed through extraordinary means 
of appeal, which under exceptional circumstances have the power to lift the status of 
res judicata.1496 Similar references to the principle of res judicata can also be found in 
other EU Member States.1497 
 
With the intention to warrant the principle of legal certainty, the common 
understanding of the maxim of res judicata across all Member States and also under 
EU law is that it awards finality to a decision after the exhaustion of all available 
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remedies. In short, for the sake of legal peace and legal certainty, the concept of res 
judicata prohibits the reopening of an already adjudicated question in a separate 
judicial procedure and thereby prevents the never-ending reassessment of a 
dispute.1498 Accordingly, in light of the general importance of this principle, the CJEU 
fully supported the position voiced by the French and the United Kingdom 
government on this point in the Köbler case.1499 Opinions, however, varied as to the 
precise definition and the ambit of this fundamental principle.1500 At the centre of the 
discussion was the question of whether the concept of res judicata also stretched as 
far as to ban an indirect reopening of proceedings qua a State liability claim for 
damage caused by an allegedly wrong but final judgment.1501 After all, in order to 
establish whether there had been a judicial violation for which the State could be held 
responsible, a State liability claim would require at least an indirect revision of the 
final judgment by the court competent to rule on the question of liability. 
 
Beyond the general definition of res judicata as the guarantor of legal certainty, 
a nuanced interpretation of this fundamental principle is commonly used in certain 
national legal orders such as in Austria and in Germany.1502 Consequently, these 
countries accord two separate dimensions to the maxim of res judicata and thereby 
distinguish between the principle’s formal definition on the one hand (Rechtskraft im 
formellen Sinn), and its substantive understanding (Rechtskraft im materiellen Sinn) 
on the other.1503 Under French law a similar distinction is drawn between the two sub-
concepts of ‘force de la chose jugée’ as opposed to ‘l’autorité de la chose jugée’. The 
difference between the two approaches essentially lies in the scope of elements of a 
judicial decision, which acquire binding force and which cannot be questioned in 
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another procedure. Generally speaking, the formal understanding of res judicata 
restricts the binding force of a final judgment to ‘the subject- matter in dispute’;1504 or 
the ‘Streitgegenstand’ in German, which is defined by the actual claims asserted by 
the parties in litigation and decided upon by the court.1505 Hence, a judgment that is 
not subject to further appeal represents the conclusive adjudication of the claims 
submitted to the court for decision and thereby acquires the status of res judicata in its 
formal sense. Thus, the decision on the subject-matter in dispute has binding force and 
cannot be re-litigated in another procedure. Such binding force, however, will exist 
only in relation to the extent of the claims raised in the procedure. Overall, the formal 
understanding of res judicata is closer to the notion of exhaustion of local remedies 
and to the validity and certitude of adjudicated issues in other cases.1506 
 
While every judicial decision has to acquire the force of res judicata in its 
formal sense before it can attain the status of res judicata in the substantive sense, a 
formal accomplishment of res judicata does not automatically imply that the decision 
will eventually acquire that same status but also in its substantive meaning. A formal 
understanding of res judicata plainly ascertains that an adjudicated issue cannot be re-
litigated. According to a substantive interpretation of res judicata, on the other hand, 
not only the final legal decision, but also the entire substantive outcome of the 
proceedings is protected. The latter definition of res judicata is farther-reaching in 
that it aims to prevent the subsequent entering into force of any opposing decision on 
certain litigation. The CJEU, however, has so far not appropriated these sub-concepts 
to the principle of res judicata in its jurisprudence. 
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d) Res judicata: the CJEU’s interpretation 
 
While we encounter different interpretations of the maxim of res judicata under 
the legal framework of the various EU Member States, what is decisive for the 
purposes of the current study is the question of the interpretation given to the principle 
of res judicata under Community law. The interpretation of this principle by the 
CJEU will not only clarify the general scope of res judicata in proceedings under EC 
law, but will also answer the question of whether the maxim of res judicata also 
extends to public liability claims against a final judgment under Community law. 
There is no explicit provision separating the principle of res judicata in its formal 
interpretation from the application of this concept in its substantive form under EC 
law.1507 However, Articles 27(2) and 34(3) of the European Regulation on 
Jurisdiction and Enforcement address the question of whether the subject-matter of a 
pending case or the subject-matter of a prior judgment for the purposes of the res 
judicata effect should be determined under national procedural law or guided by 
common European standards.1508 As apparent from the related case-law, the CJEU 
opted for the establishment of common European standards.1509 
 
According to a formal understanding of this principle, the final decision having 
acquired the status of res judicata would not hinder the individual from bringing a 
State liability claim for a judicial breach related to a final ruling. As the question of 
possible State liability is addressed in what constitutes secondary proceedings to the 
primary litigation, not only the parties involved in the dispute change, but also the 
subject-matter of the litigation will necessarily be different.1510 Consequently, when 
applying a strictly formal conception of res judicata in the Köbler case, the final 
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judgment would not be able to preclude Köbler’s subsequent liability claim against 
the Austrian State. After all, while the primary proceedings revolved around the 
question of whether the claimant was eligible to receive the length-of-service 
increment of his salary as a university professor, the secondary proceedings were 
concerned with the subject-matter of the alleged violation of Community law by the 
Austrian Supreme Administrative Court in its final judgment which had concluded the 
primary proceedings.1511  
 
In the Köbler case several intervening governments, among them Austria and 
France, pleaded that the right to reparation for damage caused by a definite judicial 
decision, which allegedly was in breach Community law, would violate the principle 
of res judicata.1512 Similar concerns were raised by the United Kingdom government 
on this point.1513 Accordingly, it appears to be the case that the Member States’ 
concern for a violation of the principle of res judicata were based on a substantive 
understanding thereof, according to which also an indirect review of the final 
judgment, which was responsible for the damage, was also precluded.1514 Which 
approach, however, did the Court of Justice take in this context?  
 
Generally speaking, the CJEU has been rather reticent in its case-law with 
respect to the precise definition of the principle of res judicata under European 
Community law.1515 Moreover, the scarce references in its case-law over time have 
sent mixed messages on the scope and interpretation of the maxim of res judicata at 
the Community level.1516 Contrary to the Court’s reticence, it has generally been in 
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the Advocates General’s Opinions that the question was addressed more thoroughly. 
Advocate General Lagrange, for example, had proclaimed as early as 1963 in the Da 
Costa case that “its binding effect is only relative and exists only in so far as there is 
identity of parties, cause and object.”1517 Accordingly, the triple identity of the 
subject-matter, the cause of action and the parties in the dispute formed the backbone 
of Lagrange’s understanding of res judicata. The same definition was applied forty 
years later by Advocate General Léger in the Köbler case where he argued that  
 
[a]ccording to the prevailing traditional definition, the legal authority of a 
judicial decision – and, as a consequence, res judicata – is applicable only 
in certain circumstances, where there is a threefold identity – of subject-
matter, legal basis and parties – between a dispute already resolved and a 
subsequent dispute. The legal authority of a decision is thus in principle 
relative and not absolute.1518  
 
As stated above, the principle of res judicata has not been explicitly regulated in 
the EC Treaty, but in its case-law the Court of Justice has repeatedly referred to the 
importance of this concept as the guarantor of legal certainty and the sound 
administration of justice.1519 Thereby, as recently demonstrated in the Köbler ruling, 
the Court seemed to lean towards a narrower reading of this principle. Of late such a 
formal interpretation of res judicata has also been confirmed in the Opinion by 
Advocate General Geelhoed in the Lucchini case.1520 In essence, the CJEU rejected 
the substantive interpretation of the principle of res judicata in Köbler and instead 
endorsed a rather narrow and formal understanding thereof. Thereby, the Court 
strictly adhered to the cumulative occurrence of the triple identity – cause, object and 
party – when assessing whether a claim was precluded by the procedural hurdle of res 
judicata. In support of such interpretation, the Court underlined in the Köbler ruling 
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 Opinion of Advocate General Léger in C-224/01, Köbler, supra note 1, para. 101. 
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 See the CJEU’s wording in Ibid, para. 38. See also cases mentioned under FN 1516. 
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that “it should be borne in mind that recognition of the principle of State liability for a 
decision of a court adjudicating at last instance does not in itself have the consequence 
of calling in question that decision as res judicata.”1521 The CJEU maintained a strict 
distinction between primary and secondary proceedings by insisting that the 
secondary remedy of reparation did not require a review of the previous judicial 
decision, which had caused the damage. Consequently, despite the importance 
attributed to the principle of res judicata, the Court concluded in Köbler that it was 
simply not justified in practice to disclaim entirely the existence and the validity of a 
principle of State liability for erroneous judicial acts.1522  
 
It is in light of all the above considerations that one should read the negative and 
often even harsh reactions in the literature concerning the CJEU’s reasoning in the 
Köbler ruling with respect to the principle of res judicata. Commentators are naturally 
influenced by their respective national legal background in the way they approach and 
interpret the principle of res judicata. Frequently it is in the countries adhering to 
group I of our classificatory scheme that a broader interpretation of the principle of 
res judicata is amongst others a reason for the reluctant attitude towards the CJEU’s 
solution in Köbler. Taking into account the national legal background of various 
commentators, it is therefore not surprising that in a country like the Netherlands, 
where we are faced with a total exclusion of the principle of State liability for judicial 
breaches, voices in the literature accused the CJEU of simply ignoring the principle of 
res judicata in its Köbler ruling and merely paying “lip service”1523 to its 
importance.1524 These considerations also throw a different light on the harsh critique 
of Adrian Zuckerman, Professor of Civil Procedure at the University of Oxford, in his 
comments on the CJEU’s interpretation of the principle of res judicata in Köbler, 
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1522
 C-224/01, Köbler, supra note 1, para. 40. In a similar vein, TRIDIMAS, "State Liability...," supra 
note 91, p. 157; see also HOFSTÖTTER, Non-compliance..., supra note 88, p. 104. 
1523
 WATTEL, "Köbler, Cilfit and Welthgrove...," supra note 152, p. 177. Peter Wattel is Advocate 
General in the Netherlands’ Hoge Raad. 
1524
 For a more detailed analysis of the Dutch legal framework surrounding the question of State 
liability for judicial breaches see chapter III on pp. 152 et seq. 




which he labelled as “unconvincing”,1525 and on the Court’s classification of damages 
claims as secondary proceedings to the original action, which he described as 
straining “legal technicality to the point of farce”.1526 His dismissive attitude towards 
the concept of State liability for judicial breaches, as established by the CJEU in 
Köbler, is undeniably influenced by the longstanding legal tradition in the United 
Kingdom of according absolute immunity to the judiciary and protecting the finality 
of litigation inter alia through an all-encompassing interpretation of the principle of 
res judicata.1527  
 
e) The limits of res judicata under the principle of national procedural 
autonomy 
 
After a detailed elaboration of the definition and scope of the principle of res 
judicata on the Community level, it is now time to analyse to what extent national 
procedural rules may actually preclude or limit State liability with regard to the 
general principles and restrictions that were established in Köbler. With reference to 
the principle of national procedural autonomy, the CJEU has outlined very clearly that 
in the absence of Community rules it is for the Member States “to designate the courts 
having jurisdiction and to determine the procedural conditions governing actions at 
law intended to ensure the protection of the rights which citizens have from the direct 
effect of Community law.”1528 In this respect the Court established two core principles 
to assess the Community legality of national procedural law. The first, the principle of 
equivalence demands that national procedural rules be not less favourable than those 
governing similar domestic situations and the second, the principle of effectiveness 
assures that it is not impossible in practice or excessively difficult to exercise the right 
conferred by the Community legal order.1529  
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 Case 33/76, Rewe-Zentralfinanz, supra note 143, para. 5. 
1529
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Does the existing procedural framework under Belgian law allow for the full 
effectiveness of the individual’s right to claim compensation in case of a violation of 
Community law by the national judiciary? Is the principle of res judicata, which is 
applied as a procedural hurdle to State liability claims in countries classified under 
group IV, in conformity with Community law? To what extent are additional 
procedural barriers under national law justified and applicable towards compensatory 
claims by individuals for judicial breaches of EC law?   
 
i) Res judicata as an absolute procedural obstacle? 
 
In response to the question of whether the subject-matter of a pending case or 
the subject-matter of a prior judgment for the purposes of the res judicata effect 
should be determined under national procedural law or guided by common European 
standards, the CJEU has established early on in its case-law that a common European 
standard should be applied.1530 As the principle of res judicata itself does not enjoy a 
uniform application under the national procedural law of the various EU Member 
States, it appears obvious that on the Community level the procedural rule of res 
judicata should be guided by common European standards, which the CJEU already 
outlined in its jurisprudence on the question.1531 In fact, starting with the Eco Swiss 
case,1532 the Court has provided a definition of the maxim of res judicata as applied 
under Community law, which appeared to lean more towards a formal understanding 
of this principle. This interpretation has subsequently also been re-confirmed in the 
CJEU’s Köbler ruling. To follow the Court’s reasoning in Köbler would therefore 
also require a rather narrow reading of the principle of res judicata for cases with a 
Community law focus under national law.1533  
 
In the course of the development of the CJEU’s case-law on Member State 
liability we have already encountered a comparable situation to the one faced by 
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countries in group IV of our classification scheme, even if in a slightly different 
context. In the famous Factortame case the Court had to deal with the question of 
whether in a case with Community law relevance a procedural rule under English law, 
which prevented a court from granting interim relief, should be set aside.1534 Back 
then, the Court, with reference to the Simmenthal judgment,1535 answered that 
 
any provision of a national legal system and any legislative, administrative 
or judicial practice which might impair the effectiveness of Community law 
by withholding from the national court having jurisdiction to apply such 
law the power to do everything necessary at the moment of its application 
to set aside national legislative provisions which might prevent, even 
temporarily, Community rules from having full force and effect are 
incompatible with those requirements, which are the very essence of 
Community law.1536 
 
Thus, the Factortame ruling has a clear bearing on the situation we are facing 
under Belgian law just now. In case national procedural rules do not comply with the 
principle of effectiveness and the principle of equivalence, both of which guarantee 
for the full effectiveness of Community rights, a Factortame-like situation arises 
where those national rules impairing the effectiveness of Community law are to be set 
aside. In other words, in the case of Belgium and all the other countries contained in 
group IV of our classification scheme, the principle of res judicata as applied under 
national law has to meet the standards and limits that have been set up by the CJEU 
concerning the principle of national procedural autonomy. As we have seen in the 
previous analysis, the Court of Justice most recently applied a rather narrow 
interpretation of the maxim of res judicata, which leans more towards a formal 
definition of this principle.1537 Thereby, the triple identity of cause, object and parties 
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is an indispensable precondition whenever a plea of res judicata is entertained as a 
procedural bar to re-litigate a specific claim under EC law.  
 
According to the rule of national procedural autonomy, in a case with 
Community-law relevance, the definition, scope and application of the principle of res 
judicata can therefore under no circumstances be less favourable than the application 
of the same principle under domestic law. Due to the fact that contrary to most 
Member States the CJEU applies a minimalist reading of the principle of res judicata 
in this context, the principle of equivalence will probably not cause any major 
difficulties in practice. After all, it is the Member States’ broader understanding of res 
judicata which increases the instances when res judicata operates as a procedural 
hurdle and hence, renders it impossible for the individual to lodge his/her claim for 
liability.  
 
However, it is the second requirement, the principle of effectiveness, which 
might cause problems at times. In fact, the principle of effectiveness requires that the 
particular procedural rule, namely the principle of res judicata, does not render it 
“impossible in practice or excessively difficult”1538 to exercise the individual’s right 
conferred by the Community legal order. The application of the national procedural 
barrier of res judicata in cases related to EC law is therefore not entirely contrary to 
Community law. As in the case of Traghetti, where we were dealing with the limits of 
substantive national restrictions to the principle of State liability, the application of the 
national procedural element of res judicata will also have to meet the standards 
established by the CJEU. The rather broad interpretation of the maxim of res judicata 
under the legal framework of several Member States might allow for a wider scope of 
application than under the rather restricted definition of the same principle under 
Community law. In fact, the application of the principle of res judicata in certain 
Member States might at times be so wide as to make it impossible in practice or 
excessively difficult for the individual to exercise his/her Community right and 
therefore, de facto exclude a State liability claim for judicial breaches of EC law 
entirely.  
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Although it remains possible under the principle of national procedural 
autonomy for national law to define the criteria relating to the procedural assertion of 
the claim, which must be met before State liability can be incurred for an infringement 
of Community law attributable to a national court, under no circumstances may such 
criteria impose requirements stricter than those set out by the CJEU in the Köbler 
judgment and others on the interpretation, scope and limits of the principle of res 
judicata.1539 Accordingly, a wide scope of interpretation, such as the substantive 
definition of the principle of res judicata as applied in several Member States would 
violate the principle of effectiveness and therefore be contrary to Community law. 
Consequently, in the case of Belgium as well as in all the other Member States 
belonging to group IV of our classification scheme, the application of the procedural 
rule of res judicata cannot be stretched as far as to bar entirely State liability claims 
for judicial breaches. In other words, Community law prohibits national procedural 
legislation, which generally excludes State liability, for damage caused to individuals 
by an infringement of Community law attributable to a court by simple reason of the 
fact that the judgment has acquired the force of res judicata.1540 Applied to the 
specific case of Belgium, this means that the procedural barrier of res judicata as 
established in the De Keyser and the Anca ruling, violates the effective protection of 
individual rights under Community law. Therefore, in cases with a Community-law 
focus, this general restriction under national law will have to be lifted. An analogous 
conclusion arises, for example, for Luxembourg, Portugal, the Czech Republic and 
Bulgaria, which, at least as far as this question is concerned, face the same 
constellation as Belgian law.1541 
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ii) Additional procedural safeguards: the primacy of appellate review 
 
Generally speaking, there is usually at least one venue of appeal to correct a 
judicial decision that in hindsight turns out to be wrong in law. It is, however, the 
responsibility of the individual who is raising doubts in this respect to make use of the 
system of appeals and to fulfil the requirements attached to launching such a claim. In 
order to assess the importance of appellate review as the overriding procedure to 
challenge a judicial decision, in a number of Member States belonging to the fourth 
group of our classification scheme, an additional procedural hurdle to State liability 
claims for judicial breaches has been established. The procedural obstacle in Member 
States such as Hungary, the Czech Republic and Belgium consists in the absolute 
primacy of appellate review, meaning that it excludes entirely the application of the 
principle of State liability for judicial breaches in case the harmed individual has 
intentionally or negligently failed to resort first to the regular system of appeals. Even 
outside the realms of group IV, namely in countries belonging to group I, II and III, a 
number of Member States apply the principle of primacy of appellate review as an 
additional procedural hurdle to pre-existing substantive impediments against the 
invocation of State liability claims for harm caused by a judicial decision. Under 
Estonian law, for example, Article 7(1) of the State Liability Act stipulates that  
 
[a] person whose rights are violated by the unlawful activities of a public authority 
in a public law relationship […] may claim compensation for damage caused to 
the person if damage could not be prevented and cannot be eliminated by the 
protection or restoration of rights […].1542  
 
In Austria, a country which has been classified under group II and III, the primacy of 
appellate review is explicitly regulated in Article 2(2) of the Liability of Public Bodies 
Act1543 and in Finland the same principle can be found in Chapter 3 Section 4 of the 
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Finish Tort Liability Act.1544 Equivalent legal provisions regulating the primacy of 
appellate review exist furthermore in countries such as Germany, Spain, Poland and 
Slovakia.1545 
 
Seen from this perspective, the principle of res judicata is not only an 
imperative to the principle of legal certainty and the efficiency of the judicial process, 
but it also has a scope that goes beyond those two aims.1546 In fact, according to 
Normand, the principle of res judicata “devient alors un moyen de contrôle et de 
sanction de la diligence des parties, un instrument de rationalisation et de 
moralisation des stratégies judiciaires.”1547 In Normand’s understanding the maxim 
of res judicata therefore also serves as a tool to control and to sanction the diligence 
of the parties in the course of litigation. Should they intentionally or negligently fail to 
resort to the regular system of appeals, they will consequently also lose the right to 
lodge a liability claim against the State for damage caused by the judicial decision. 
Due to the contributory negligence of the claimant, the principle of res judicata is 
awarded precedence in such cases. In other words, in the name of res judicata the 
primary use of the system of appeals constitutes a procedural hurdle to be overcome 
by the claimant. In this sense, the principle of res judicata almost constitutes an 
instrument of rationalization and moralization of the judicial strategies entertained by 
the different parties.1548  
 
From a national law perspective, such a solution appears to be reasonable and 
justified.1549 The question, however, is whether this procedural impediment to public 
liability claims for judicial breaches is also in conformity with the requirements of 
European Community law? By this question, we are essentially asking whether 
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Community law precludes the application of a procedural provision of national law, 
such as Article 2(2) of the Austrian Liability of Public Bodies Act, which seeks to lay 
down the principle of primacy of appellate review in so far as the application of that 
provision precludes a State liability claim against a judicial decision which has been 
found to be incompatible Community law.1550 
 
In response to this question, we must first remind ourselves of the guiding 
principles behind the maxim of national procedural autonomy, which we have already 
briefly addressed in chapter I of our study. As the CJEU has only recently reiterated in 
the Arcor case,  
 
in the absence of relevant Community rules, the detailed procedural rules 
designed to ensure the protection of the rights which individuals acquire 
under Community law are a matter for the domestic legal order of each 
Member State, under the principle of the procedural autonomy of the 
Member States, provided that they are not less favourable than those 
governing similar domestic situations (principle of equivalence) and that 
they do not render impossible in practice or excessively difficult the 
exercise of rights conferred by the Community legal order (principle of 
effectiveness).1551 
 
Accordingly, in view of the Court’s traditional dictum concerning the limits of 
national procedural autonomy, a national procedural rule such as the primacy of 
appellate review also has to be evaluated in light of the principles of equivalence and 
effectiveness.1552 In order to assess the application of the procedural principle of 
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primacy of appellate review in light of Community law, the CJEU will follow the 
method already used in the Peterbroeck judgment.1553 In that case the Court had 
proclaimed the general rule that  
 
each case which raises the question whether a national procedural provision 
renders application of Community law impossible or excessively difficult 
must be analysed by reference to the role of that provision in the procedure, 
its progress and its special features, viewed as a whole, before the various 
national instances.1554  
 
In sum, the central question in this context is whether the procedural principle of 
primacy of appellate review renders it impossible in practice or excessively difficult 
for the individual to exercise his/her right under Community law to lodge a State 
liability claim for harm caused by a final judicial decision. This question will certainly 
have to be answered by reference to the Court’s approach of considering the role, the 
progress and the features of this procedural provision in the different context of each 
national legal system. 




 Ibid, para. 14. 
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III. Graphic overview of GROUP IV 
 
 
Graph a): Procedural Obstacles to a Comprehensive Recognition of State 
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Final Analysis & Concluding Remarks 
 
 
It follows from this comparative legal analysis that the principle of State 
liability for the acts or omissions of supreme courts can be acknowledged as 
a general principle of Community law.1567 
  
                                        Advocate General Léger in his Opinion in Köbler.  
 
“A sceptic demands proof.”1568 – and indeed, it was our scepticism in response 
to the Köbler ruling that prompted us to embark on this comparative journey. Now, at 
the end of it, it is time to return to our initial questions and to compare the fruits of our 
labour with the results achieved in the Advocate General’s comparative assessments 
in Köbler to see whether our initial scepticism was justified or not. Before we do that, 
we will, however, remind ourselves of the premises that had constituted the basis for 
our research study, i.e. the results of Advocate General Léger’s comparative findings 
and the EU-wide spectrum of State liability regimes for judicial breaches which he 
had laid out in paragraphs 77 to 85 of his Opinion in the Köbler case and introduced 
with the following statement: 
 
To my understanding, all the Member States accept the principle of State 
liability for judicial acts. All – except for the moment Ireland – accept that 
principle in respect of judgments themselves where they infringe legal rules 
applicable in their territory, in particular where there is a breach of 
fundamental rights.1569  
 
It was only then that he presented us with the detailed results of his comparative 
assessment in paragraphs 79 to 81, namely that 
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[a]s regards the nature of the legal rule, only the United Kingdom and the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands clearly limit the scope of State liability to 
cases of infringement of the rules laid down in Article 5 (deprivation of 
liberty)  or Article 6 of the ECHR (relating to the guarantees of a fair 
hearing in procedendo, that is while the judgment is being prepared, and 
not the guarantees in iudicando, that is those relating to the content of the 
judgment itself). 
All the other Member States - excluding the Hellenic, Portuguese and 
French Republics, where the situation is evolving and more nuanced - 
accept the principle of State liability irrespective of the nature of the legal 
rule infringed.  
As regards the source of the judgment, only the Republic of Austria and the 
Kingdom of Sweden limit State liability to the decisions of ordinary courts, 
excluding those of supreme courts. […].1570  
 
Subsequently, the CJEU declared in its final ruling with explicit reference to the 
Advocate General’s comparative findings, that the “application of the principle of 
State liability to judicial decisions has been accepted in one form or another by most 
of the Member States.”1571 
 
Now, at the end of a large comparative study including not only the then 15 
Member States, but an enlarged Europe of 27, we can answer our initial question: was 
the Advocate General’s assertion correct to speak about common principles of the 
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I. The Comparative Evidence: Legal Cartography 
 
 
1. Final legal taxonomy 
  
As outlined in chapter II, our methodological framework was based on two 
basic parameters. First, we restricted our analysis to judicial breaches stricto sensu, 
that is judicial acts taken in the course of contentious court proceedings.1572 With this 
first delimitation we tried to adjust to the parameters which had dominated the 
Advocate General’s as well as the CJEU’s comparative approach. We have 
nevertheless in the course of this study tried to see the issue from a bigger perspective 
whenever possible, so that we have not only looked at the possibility of invoking State 
liability claims against judicial acts stricto sensu, but have tried to take as wide an 
approach as possible by including ministerial judicial acts in our analysis. Secondly, 
while Léger’s approach concerning the width of his comparative analysis is not 
entirely clear in his Opinion, we have once again taken a broader approach in that we 
did not merely restrict our analysis to the possibility of invoking State liability claims 
against national courts adjudicating at last instance, but sought to look at national 
regimes in more general terms including options or restrictions to State liability 
claims for erroneous acts of lower instance courts. We will, however, in the course of 
comparing our results with those obtained by the Advocate General in his 
comparative analysis in Köbler certainly adjust to the parameters used by Léger in 
order to be able to achieve a comparable output.  
 
Based on these guidelines and our choice of methodology which we had already 
outlined quite early in our study,1573 but which has nonetheless remained consistent 
throughout the entire process, we are now able to present the following geographical 
mapping of the European landscape of State liability for judicial breaches in an 
enlarged European Union of 27 Member States.  
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 For a precise definition of the terminology we employed in the course of this study see chapter II, 
pp. 44 et seq. 
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 For further details on the methodological approach of this study consult chapter II, pp. 43 et seq. 
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3. Summary and survey of the results: “E Pluribus Unum”? 
 
On the basis of the wealth of information we have gathered on the various 
national concepts of State liability, we have arrived at a classification of the wide 
scope of systems applicable in the various Member States into four different groups, 
whose characteristics we have already presented in the second chapter of this study. 
Now, having established a comprehensive cartography providing an overall picture of 
the European landscape with respect to the notion of State liability for judicial 
breaches, we can proceed to drawing our concluding observations and contrast them 
with the conclusions drawn on the same question by Advocate General Léger in 
Köbler.  
 
a) Obstacles….common to the laws of the Member States 
 
i) General observations on the 27 Member States 
 
Overall, the European landscape of national systems of State liability for 
judicial breaches is multifaceted and diverse, not only with respect to the structure of 
the various national liability regimes, but also with respect to their legal bases. In fact, 
already methodologically speaking, when it comes to erroneous judicial acts the field 
of public tort law seems to a certain extent unsettled. First, liability of public 
authorities is not always governed by tort law. In France, as we have seen, liability 
consists in principle of a two-track system that combines private law and 
administrative law (droit administratif).1574 Germany also provides a two-track system 
but here the State’s liability is generally considered as a private and not as a public 
law affair. English law is purely tort oriented in that it does not contain special rules 
concerning public liability. Torts in the United Kingdom simply apply to private 
individuals and bodies as well as public authorities.1575 
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 See elaborate analysis of the French system of State liability in chapter V, especially pp. 232 et seq. 
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 On the concept of tort see chapter III, pp. 102 et seq. 




Furthermore, our research has demonstrated that there are basically three 
principal approaches dominating the European landscape. First, there are those 
countries where rules concerning the State’s liability especially with respect to 
judicial breaches are grounded on a firm normative/statutory basis. Examples for such 
countries would be for instance the Austrian, the Italian or the UK framework of State 
liability for erroneous judicial acts.1576 In many cases, such as for example in Greece 
or Belgium, it is due to the silence of the legislature on the specific question, that an 
established jurisprudence has developed over time which lays out the guiding 
principles and applicable standards on this issue. The latter constitutes the second 
approach we have encountered in the course of our research.  
 
Finally, the most difficult situation arose in those Member States where in 
addition to the silence of the legislature concerning the State’s liability regime for 
judicial breaches also the jurisprudence had not developed a unified stance on the 
question. It appears that such a situation dominates the State liability regime in Malta, 
which consequently rendered it rather difficult for us to classify such a country. 
Nevertheless with respect to the Maltese framework of State liability for judicial 
breaches, there is at least in the legal doctrine apparently strong support for the 
restriction of such cases of liability to judicial violations of one of the “fundamental 
rights and freedoms of the individual” as outlined in Articles 32 to 45 of the Maltese 
Constitution. However, such an action would be based on a special procedure which 
has been regulated under Article 46 of the Constitution.1577 In essence, such a regime 
would place Malta in the category with countries such as the UK or Ireland, which 
only ever allow for claims of State liability for judicial breaches in highly exceptional 
cases of fundamental human rights violations. Due to the uncertainty prevailing over 
the applicable regime in Malta, we have therefore marked the classification of this 
country to group I with an asterisk. 
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 See analysis in chapters III and IV. 
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 A full-text version of the Maltese Constitution is available at www.legal-
malta.com/law/constitution.htm. 




Notwithstanding the differences in methodology and structure of the various 
national approaches to State liability for judicial breaches, one startling commonality 
which is self-evident among the 27 Member States is that in almost every country 
State liability for judicial breaches is subject to rigorous restrictions, be they of a 
substantive or of a procedural nature. At times these limitations even apply 
cumulatively and hence, render the specific liability regime even more restrictive. In 
many countries, such as in Austria, Portugal, Hungary or Spain, substantive 
restrictions are paired with additional procedural hurdles, which also have to be 
overcome by the claimant. Moreover, the common-law world has generally shrouded 
the judiciary in the protective cloak of judicial immunity, which at the same time 
renders the State (Crown) immune to any liability claims based on erroneous judicial 
acts. Overall, the restrictions vary to a certain extent among the different Member 
States, not only regarding their procedural and/or substantive nature, but also with 
respect to their content, degree and structure. Nevertheless, if there is one overarching 
theme dominating the European landscape of State liability for judicial breaches, it is 
that there is always a set of very stringent conditions making the practical application 
of such a principle very difficult.1578 
 
Even though the restricted approach in the various Member States is also 
apparent in Léger’s analysis, he did not seem to take full account of these restrictions 
and the impact they have on limiting the overall application of State liability. In fact, 
even from the Advocate General’s analysis in paragraphs 77 to 85 of his Opinion, it is 
apparent that out of the (then) fifteen Member States he expressly referred to, only a 
handful of countries recognize the principle of State liability for any kind of judicial 
breaches at all levels of courts (including courts adjudicating at last instance). It is 
therefore rather surprising that Léger, while briefly mentioning the existence of such 
restrictions, did not underline the large extent to which these substantive and 
procedural barriers restrain the individual’s access to such a claim and in several 
instances even render it almost impossible in practice to lodge a successful damages 
action against the State.    
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 In a similar vein, BERNHARD W. WEGENER, "Staatshaftung für die Verletzung von 
Gemeinschaftsrecht durch nationale Gerichte?" (2002) EuR 6, p. 791. 




ii) Léger’s perspective: courts of last instance in a Community of 15 
 
Looking at the overall restrictions regarding liability claims for decisions of 
courts adjudicating at last instance only, the common features as to the application of 
such a principle are strong and highly visible, in that sense the Advocate General 
surely had a point. However, the strong commonalities are once again to be found at 
the level of restricting or entirely excluding the possibility of holding the State liable 
for harmful acts committed by national courts adjudicating at last instance. It is 
undeniable that most Member States adhere to a strict protection of the principle of res 
judicata, which in most cases clearly prevails over the individual’s right to justice. The 
core consideration behind the principle of legal certainty is that every judicial 
procedure has to come to an irrevocable end at a certain point. This maxim and its 
wide ambit of protection for judicial acts stricto sensu is a crucial commonality across 
the European landscape. As a result, the possibility of a successful liability claim 
against a court adjudicating at last instance becomes close to impossible in most of the 
Member States, as every judicial decision taken at last instance automatically assumes 
the force of res judicata. While in some countries, such as Belgium, the principle of 
legal certainty exempts any judicial decision having become final entirely from 
liability proceedings,1579 other Member States such as Austria1580 and Sweden1581 limit 
the application of this restriction only to the highest courts within the national judicial 
hierarchy. In fact, taking into consideration the then fifteen Member States at the time 
of Léger’s conclusions in Köbler, the following picture prevailed: 
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 See graph on p. 408. 
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 See graph on p. 227. 
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Contrary to Advocate General Léger’s observation that “the principle of State 
liability for the acts or omissions of supreme courts can be acknowledged as a general 
principle of Community law”,1582 even in a European Community of only fifteen 
Member States, the situation with respect to the principle of State liability for acts or 
omissions of supreme courts was more nuanced than that. In total, at least seven 
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 Opinion, Advocate General Léger in C-224/01, Köbler, supra note 1, para. 85. 




Member States out of fifteen precluded the application of this principle when the 
decision stemmed from a court adjudicating at last instance. Hence, half the Member 
States at the time did in fact impose heavy restrictions on the invocation of State 
liability for acts performed by one of their courts of last instance. Some countries such 
as Sweden, Austria, Belgium and to a certain extent also Italy, did so expressly; other 
Member States like the United Kingdom, Greece, Ireland and the Netherlands, where 
there was a basic refusal to recognize a principle of State liability for judicial breaches 
by any court, did so implicitly. Therefore, it is questionable how the Advocate General 
arrived at his final conclusion that the principle of State liability for the acts or 
omissions of courts adjudicating at last instance could be acknowledged as a general 
principle of Community law. How can a concept which is rejected by at least half of all 
the Member States amount to a general principle of the Community?   
 
4. Liability à la Köbler…Common in Diversity? 
 
In our study on the liability regimes of Europe, we have attempted to set forth a 
coherent way of describing the various approaches of the legal systems to the concept 
of State liability for judicial breaches. What is then the final answer to the question we 
raised in the introduction to this chapter?   The answer is that a common theoretical 
matrix of State liability for judicial breaches does not exist in Europe and that there 
are no general principles common to the laws of the Member States on this question. 
If there are, they exist only at a level of generality so broad as to be of little practical 
use. The only pertinent trend among the Member States which we could identify lies 
in the obstacles various national systems use to limit the application of such a 
principle in the various Member States. This was certainly the case in 2003 in a 
Community of fifteen Member States and it has again been confirmed in an enlarged 
Europe of twenty-seven.  
 
The message which emerges can therefore be conveyed quite simply. The 
significant divergences that exist between the national regimes of State liability for 
judicial breaches and the newly established concept of Member State liability for such 
breaches at the Community level continue to plague the effective functioning of this 




regime. The fact that it exposes the Member States to so many new conceptual and 
procedural challenges, which we have examined for each of our four groups of 
classification, should be proof enough that the Köbler line is far from ‘common’ to the 
laws of the Member States. There is no doubt that the extension of the Francovich 
line by the CJEU was legitimate. After all, the acknowledgment of the concept of 
Member State liability for judicial breaches is fully consistent with the Court’s 
previously established Francovich line. This holds true insofar as recognition of the 
aforementioned principle could have already been based on the CJEU’s reasoning in 
the Konle case where the Court had laid the basis for an all-inclusive definition of the 
concept of attribution with respect to the principle of Member State liability.1583 What 
we do however dispute is that there is, as declared by Advocate General Léger and 
subsequently, in the CJEU’s ruling in Köbler, something like a general principle of 
Community law that reflects the commonalities existing between equivalent concepts 
under the national laws of the Member States. 
 
As we have mentioned before, the concept of ‘principles common to the laws of 
the Member States’ is not a phrase invented by the Court of Justice, but is in fact an 
expression used in the Treaty of Rome to describe the origins of the system of extra-
contractual liability of the Community itself, which is today regulated in Article 
288(2) EC. Nevertheless, it seems like the Court and at times also the Advocate 
General are the only ones who know the secret spell for unravelling those ‘common 
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